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Abstract 
Interventions to prevent error and improve error management have been central to 
health care safety and quality research. To achieve this, any error needs to be reported 
formally and should also be acknowledged to the patient/consumer or their family. 
Appropriate organisational culture is regarded as a means of assisting these actions.  
Error management is important to the health system, clinicians and most importantly for 
consumers. When an error occurs it can lead to harm, which itself can be traumatic, but 
this in turn can lead to increased costs both to the system and to the consumer. 
Clinicians involved in error, along with their colleagues, also suffer when harm occurs as 
a result of error. Most importantly, the consumer and/or their family suffer, including if 
the facts of an error are not fully disclosed.  
This research aims to describe the complexity of safety climate amongst nurses working 
in rural clinical settings.  It focuses on the nature of this complexity in relation to nurses’ 
views of reporting medication error. 
The framework for the research was underpinned by complexity science with health 
care viewed as a complex system where evidence and sense-making are forms of 
knowledge generation. A survey incorporating a safety attitudes questionnaire and a 
hypothetical medication error with multiple outcome scenarios (severe, moderate and 
near miss error) was used to collect data for this research. Variable analysis was 
undertaken along with case-based analysis using a configurational comparative method 
(CCM). This provided an additional means of analysing the data with each individual 
nurse considered a case.  
Variable analysis found differences in both views of reporting and disclosure as well as 
safety climate and teamwork factors amongst reporting compared with disclosure, 
severity of harm from the error, workplace setting and work role. The results from the 
case-based configurations of factors of safety climate present for the outcomes in each 
viii 
of these areas also demonstrated complexity existed in the relationship between the 
factors and views. 
Some of these configurations suggest common assumptions made about culture and 
error reporting are not fully consistent with an outcome that an error would always be 
viewed as reported or acknowledged by each individual nurse. These assumptions need 
to be rethought, particularly those surrounding positive safety climate factors as being 
causal for improvements in error reporting and disclosure.  
The case-based results also had implications for the concept of resilience. They suggest a 
need for more focus upon why error is reported and disclosed rather than looking 
primarily at why it is not occurring. Error management should be regarded as an 
intervention for safe patient care rather than an outcome of positive safety climate. In 
this way resilience to safety climate may be achieved. 
Use of a configurational comparative method has provided for better understanding of 
safety climate and error within the complex and chaotic world in which health care 
delivery occurs. Shifting from a focus upon reductive approaches to research, that are 
driven by evidence, to one of expanding knowledge and sense-making helps with 
understanding the world of clinical practice where nurses work, and consumers receive 
health care. This informs both future research as well as the development of new 
theories for the delivery of safe patient care.  
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1 Introduction 
Throughout our lives we all interact with the health care system. It commences at 
birth and continues until the end of life. As a result of this interaction the majority 
of us do not suffer harm. However, we know health care is not always as safe and 
effective as it should be and sometimes things can go wrong. When something goes 
wrong it may be unforeseeable harm, but there are times when things go wrong 
because someone has made a mistake. 
These mistakes occur as the result of numerous factors. The clinicians who provide 
the care are human beings and human beings sometimes make mistakes. However, 
clinicians also work in a complex health system and sometimes it is something in the 
system that results in the clinician making a mistake and sometimes what is wrong 
in the system has been present in the culture of the system for some time. 
The nature of culture is complex and difficult to define (Bennett, Grossberg, & 
Morris, 2005; Hollnagel, 2014; Williams, 1983). The behaviour, beliefs and attitudes 
relating to culture and safety are referred to as safety climate (Morello et al., 2013). 
In this research, the complexity of safety climate is researched in relation to 
different levels of harm that result when a clinician makes a mistake.  
 Background  
The issue of patient safety in health care is important for consumers, clinicians and 
governments. Although the harm that may result from a mistake has an impact on 
the consumer or patient, there are additional issues that arise.  
Clinicians do not like to hurt people and “first do no harm” has been central to their 
training. Therefore, when a mistake leads to harm it has an impact on the clinician 
and at times their colleagues as well. The term second victim is used to describe this 
outcome (Wu, 2000). 
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There are also issues relating to cost. The cost of medication error in Australia alone 
has been estimated at $AUS1.2 billion per annum (Australian Commission for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, 2013b). Thus the prevention of error has important 
budgetary implications and governments are interested in reducing such costs. 
It was in 1991 with the release of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) 
(Brennan et al., 1991) that the issue of health care error arose to the fore. It 
estimated that 6.7% of hospital admissions resulted in an adverse event. A few 
years later an Australian study estimated the level of adverse events amongst 
hospital admissions at 16.7% (Wilson et al., 1995). Such levels of harm were 
considered unacceptable so a focus developed regarding how to improve outcomes 
as well as manage error when it occurred. 
It was considered that for openness and transparency of error management a no-
blame culture was needed (Kohn, Donaldson, Corrigan, & Institute of Medicine 
(U.S.). Committee on Quality of Health Care in America., 2000). Errors needed to be 
reported so that they could be examined, better understood and mechanisms for 
prevention could be developed (Kohn et al., 2000). Yet, after some twenty or more 
years since the issue was identified, there are still major incidents occurring in 
health systems globally. 
Examples of such incidents include the events surrounding Mid Staffordshire Trust 
and Bristol Infirmary in the United Kingdom (UK) (Francis, 2013; Walshe & Offen, 
2001). Similar examples can be found in Australia relating to Bundaberg Hospital in 
Queensland (Queensland Health, 2005) and Sydney’s Royal North Shore Hospital 
(Skinner, Braithwaite, Frankum, Kerridge, & Goulston, 2009). All of these incidents 
were the subject of major public enquiries with each making similar 
recommendations, many of which reflect those of previous enquiries.  
In some incidents errors are reported but nothing is done to remedy the situation. 
Examples of this include the events of Bristol Infirmary in the UK where the 
incompetent practice of a paediatric surgeon was known but was not dealt with 
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until an anaesthetist went public about the issue. The Bundaberg Hospital incident 
in Australia was a similar event with nothing done regarding the similar 
incompetence of a surgeon until the issue was made public. 
This differs from the situations relating from Mid Staffordshire Trust and Royal 
North Shore Hospital. The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Enquiry 
was conducted to determine why this organisation had a mortality rate much higher 
than similar facilities and found a culture of an acceptance of poor standard of care. 
That is, clinicians were not recognising poor practice. 
In Australia, the inquest into the death of Vanessa Anderson, a 15 year old girl who 
died after receiving an overdose of a narcotic administered over a number of days 
at the Royal North Shore Hospital in Sydney, was scathing of the health system in 
particular the failure of clinicians to recognise serious issues in her care 
(Interprofessional Education for Quality Use of Medicines, 2014).  It resulted in the 
instigation of a full enquiry into New South Wales Health. Amongst the findings 
were issues in relation to culture, not only within Royal North Shore Hospital but 
within the NSW Health system as a whole.  
The issue of error management in the health system is not only limited to reporting. 
When a mistake is made, consumers like to know about it. Research suggests that 
when an error occurs if information is provided in an appropriate fashion the rate of 
litigation is reduced (Gallagher, Studdert, & Levinson, 2007).  
There are also some unique aspects with regards to error management in the health 
care system. Care is delivered to individuals with complex needs in a variety of 
settings and when an error occurs it is often investigated at a local level thereby 
restricting any learning to that same level (Reason, 2013).  
The importance of appropriate culture has been highlighted in the literature. 
Several studies have identified potential links between culture and the occurrence 
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of error as well as error reporting. Other studies suggest any link is not clearly 
evident.   
Some arguments suggest if we are to learn about safety there is a need to focus 
more on the many episodes of care that go well, rather than those where harm 
occurs (Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel, Braithwaite, & Wears, 2013). This would allow 
for learning about why things have gone as they should as opposed to constantly 
measuring error which is a focus on the non-presence of safety. 
Such an approach is based upon the notion of complexity. Complexity theory has 
been associated with organisational failure resulting from error. Organisations are 
described as suffering from “drifting into failure” (Dekker, 2011, p. 14) over a period 
of time. Hence the argument for a greater focus on understanding what goes well 
rather than continually measuring what has gone wrong.   
Complexity theory has also been used to inform approaches to research. In applying 
this alternative view to health care it is possible to adopt different approaches to 
the generation of knowledge. The dominant approach in health care research is 
evidence-based medicine which is one way of informing knowledge. Complexity 
theory is another which focuses more on sense-making as a means of using 
knowledge for understanding.  
This research encompasses the aspects outlined here so far. More specifically, it 
examines the issue of safety climate and how it relates to nurses’ views of reporting 
and disclosure.  
Different frameworks for research require the use of different methods. This 
research applies a configurational comparative method (CCM), a method developed 
for the purpose of researching complexity.  
Hence, the subject matter of this research relates to patient safety, in particular 
safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure amongst nurses. The context 
for this research is rural clinical settings in Tasmania. A configurational method 
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applied within a framework of knowledge generation within health care as a 
complex system forms the process for this research.   
As the subject matter and process for this research may not be familiar to all who 
read this document an overview of the key terms used will be now undertaken. 
Following this, further details of the research will be provided.  
 Key terms 
The subject matter of this research, along with the method used requires an 
understanding of terminology appropriate to each. Although terms will be defined 
in the following chapters, a summary of the key terms used in this research is 
provided here. 
Table 1-1 Key terms used in this research 
 
Key terms (error and safety climate) 
Error “Failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application of an 
incorrect plan” (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2013a, p. 2) 
Adverse event An incident in which harm resulted to a person receiving health care 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a)p2 
Reporting Incident management consists of the recognition, reporting and analysis of 
incidents to improve patient safety systems (Australian Commission for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011, p14). The term reporting is used in 
this thesis to indicate the formal notification of error as part of incident 
management. 
Medication error Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication 
use or patient harm (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, 2013a, p. 2) 
Near miss An incident that does not cause harm but had the potential to do so 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 10)  
Open disclosure An open discussion with a patient about an incident that resulted in harm 
to a patient while they were receiving health care (Australian Commission 
for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 3). This term includes a 
process of providing an apology. For the purposes of this research the term 
‘disclosure’ refers to the acknowledgment of an error 
Safety climate Shared perceptions, beliefs, values, norms and practices that achieves 
patient safety (Morello et al., 2013). 
Key terms (method) 
Configurational A group of methods used to study cases by considering configurations of 
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comparative method  
(CCM) 
the presence (or absence) of conditions of interest and determines those 
which may be causal for the presence (or absence) of an outcome (Ragin & 
Amoroso, 2011). Also known as set-theoretic methods (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
Crisp set qualitative 
comparative analysis 
(csQCA) 
Fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis 
(fsQCA)  
The two most commonly used configurational comparative methods. The 
first (csQCA) provides for comparison of dichotomised of set membership 
(the condition or outcome is either present or absent) (Greckhamer, 
Misangyi, & Fiss, 2013; Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The 
latter (fsQCA) applies calibration to set membership. That is, set 
membership is allocated by degrees of membership rather than the 
presence or absence of the condition or outcome. More details of each of 
these may be found in Chapter 4. 
Condition Something that may affect an outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) or may 
explain it (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) 
Outcome The main focus of a study, the variable to be explained by conditions 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) or the phenomenon of interest (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
Case Cases may be a theoretical construct or identified through empirical units 
(Ragin, 1992). Ultimately, it is important for a researcher to clearly indicate 
what a case is of (Luck, Jackson, & Usher, 2006). 
Contradiction Cases exhibiting identical configurations of conditions but where the 
outcome is different (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009; 
Ragin, 2009)  
Conjunctural causality The intersection of more than one factor (that is a configuration of 
conditions) leading to an outcome (Ragin, 1987) 
Equifinality The possibility that more than one configuration (that is alternative 
configurations of the same conditions) may also lead to the same outcome 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
Two sets of key terms are presented in Table 1-1. The first of these relates to the 
research content, namely error reporting, disclosure and safety climate while the 
second group of terms refer to the research design. 
 Identifying the research problem 
The lack of research regarding safety climate and the reporting and disclosure of 
error amongst nurses in rural clinical settings has been determined through 
consideration of available literature. While some of the literature is referred to 
here, more detail is provided in Chapter 2. 
In addition, CCM requires that theoretical knowledge is used to inform the design of 
any research. This is discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Some background regarding the problems associated with error and patient safety 
was provided earlier in this chapter (Section 1.1). Error is costly and impacts upon 
patients as well as clinicians. It is evident from some very public examples that the 
issue remains a prominent one for the health system. 
The uniqueness of error management within rural settings has been acknowledged 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2012b; Institute of 
Medicine, 2005). Yet, despite acknowledgment of the difficulties that rural hospitals 
face in terms of isolation and financial limitations there is little research available in 
this area (Thornlow, 2008). 
Therefore rural clinical settings were used for this research. Restricting the research 
to the Tasmanian context ensured a single heath system was involved. 
Error, in particular medication error, is not limited to the hospital setting. Studies 
have identified that aged care, mental health (Haw, Stubbs, & Dickens, 2014) and 
community settings (Easton, Morgan, & Williamson, 2009) are also areas where 
medication error occurs. No studies were found that involved a variety of settings 
within the rural context. Due to its broad incidence, medication error was the focus 
of this research. 
Nurses are actively involved in medication management (Choo, Hutchinson, & 
Bucknall, 2010). Although there are studies that consider the role of nurses in 
medication management and medication error, few are available that relate to the 
rural context. Therefore research amongst nurses has been undertaken for this 
research.  
Safety climate has been found to differ across different settings and amongst 
different roles (Braithwaite et al., 2009; Castle & Sonon, 2006; Vlayen, Hellings, 
Claes, Peleman, & Schrooten, 2011). While there are suggestions of links between 
safety climate and error (Colla, Bracken, Kinney, & Weeks, 2005) others suggest 
there may not be (Groves, 2014), indicating the area is one with a degree of 
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complexity. One study in rural settings found safety climate changed over time 
when a medication error reporting system was introduced (Jones, Skinner, Xu, Sun, 
& Mueller, 2008). Safety climate was therefore considered an important element 
for this research.  
The subject matter of this research was therefore determined as safety climate, 
views of reporting and views of disclosure. Rural clinical settings were determined 
as the context with the participants being nurses working in rural clinical settings in 
Tasmania.  
 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this research is to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses 
working in rural clinical settings.  
The principle research question of this research is how is safety climate related to 
views of reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in 
rural clinical settings?  
This question is informed by five sub-questions which are: 
1. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
2. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in these 
settings?   
3. What is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses 
in rural clinical settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a 
hypothetical medication error? 
4. How is the understanding of the relationship between workplace safety 
climate and views of reporting medication error changed through the use of 
a configurational comparative method? 
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5. What does this mean for the management of medication error? 
The first two of these research sub-questions relate to the conditions and outcomes 
of this research. The third compares the relationship between the two. The fourth 
and fifth sub-questions make reference to the method used and the overall key 
finding of this research.  
 An overview of the research approach 
This research uses a configurational comparative method (CCM) within a framework 
of health care as a complex system. Configurational comparative methods are a 
case-based approach to research, primarily used within the social and political 
science, although potential use in other areas, including health, have been noted 
(Bell, 2007; Ragin, 1999a, 1999b; Rihoux, Ragin, Yamasaki, & Bol, 2009). 
The research design applied for these methods centres upon the concept of 
conjunctural causality and equifinality from studying configurations of the presence 
or absence of conditions for the presence or absence of an outcome. Although 
foundations of CCM are from fuzzy set theory, they are to all intents and purposes 
qualitative.  
That is, the methods identify combinations of causal conditions which may impact 
an outcome. The data are handled in sets. Combinations of the presence or absence 
of a condition are compared to the outcome (or non-outcome) of interest.  
The theoretical framework of this research is based upon complexity (Lewin, 1999) 
and in particular a view of how knowledge is generated in a complex health care 
system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). This framework regards health care as a 
system made up of sub-systems in which knowledge is obtained through evidence 
and sense-making. The former is based upon the concept of knowledge as truth and 
the latter on knowledge as understanding (Bennett et al., 2005).  
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Evidence is informed through simple/complicated systems using research which is 
largely based upon cause-and-effect science reflecting the nature of evidence based 
medicine (EBM) (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). In contrast, complex/chaotic 
systems are underpinned by complexity that is better understood through more 
inductive approaches to research.  
In order to research complexity appropriate methods are required. Configurational 
comparative methods (CCM) apply fuzzy set theory to analysis that considers 
diversity of cause, or conjunctural causality (Ragin, 1987; Ragin & Amoroso, 2011).   
That is, there may be more than one condition required to be present in order to 
cause an outcome. In addition, there may be more than one pathway or 
combination of conditions that may be causal. This is referred to as equifinality 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
As these methods are underpinned by the existence of complexity, the approach 
was considered appropriate for this research.  
 Significance and scope of the research 
The subject matter of this research is safety climate and views of reporting and 
disclosure of a hypothetical medication error amongst nurses in rural clinical 
settings. The process of undertaking the research was use of CCM within a 
framework of health care as a complex system.  
Findings relate to each of these and encompass three areas. These are the 
complexity of safety climate in rural clinical settings, the implications for resilience 
and the need to reframe error management as an element for the delivery of safe 
patient care. 
The research contributes to knowledge in three areas. Firstly, it extends current 
knowledge relating to the complexity of error reporting, disclosure and safety 
climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings. This is achieved through both a 
variable and case-based analysis of the data obtained from an online questionnaire. 
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Findings of this research reflect those of other studies, particularly in relation to 
workplace setting and work role.  
Traditional approaches to safety include the measurement of error. It is regarded 
that this way of doing things identifies what is not safe rather than what is. This is 
termed a Safety I approach and what is needed is Safety II or more focus on the 
things that are done well (Hollnagel, 2014). Where organisations continually do 
things well it is regarded as resilience. 
The second contribution this research makes is in relation to the understanding of 
the relationship between safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure of 
error. This finding is informed through the research design which regarded health 
care as a complex system with knowledge generation acquired from both evidence 
and sense-making. Variable-based results reflect those of other studies but the 
inclusion of case-based results obtained through use of CCM allows for 
understanding to be extended to the impact the relationship has upon each 
individual nurse. It is possible that some nurses are resilient to safety climate. That 
is, they are capable of delivery of safe patient care regardless of the nature of the 
safety climate of their workplace. 
Finally, this research contributes to knowledge for the management of medications. 
Rather than view safety climate as an intervention to improve medication 
management, including error reporting and disclosure, error management should 
be viewed as an intervention required for safe patient care. 
Both the subject matter and design of this research determine its scope. The 
research was conducted amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings in 
Tasmania. Specifically, the research focused upon safety climate and views of 
reporting and disclosure of a hypothetical medication error. The method used for 
the research was a configurational comparative method applying fuzzy set 
qualitative analysis (fsQCA). 
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It is therefore expected that the primary audience for this research will be those 
interested in patient safety, particularly those concerned with error management 
and medication error. However, as this research has also used a CCM, it is 
recognised that some of the readership may include those interested purely in the 
research design and method, without a particular interest in the subject matter. 
 An outline of the thesis 
Having introduced the research the thesis will now be outlined.  Each of the 
following chapters contains further detail regarding this research. 
Chapter 2 is presented in two parts. Part I provides the background to the research 
including the importance of error management and error disclosure. The context of 
the research is also introduced, including the non-static nature of the health care 
system. An overview of health services in Tasmania, the location of this research, is 
provided.  
The second part of Chapter 2 explores the literature in relation to error reporting, 
error disclosure and safety climate. Areas of difference that have been noted in 
previous studies are outlined, including differences between rates of error reporting 
and disclosure as well as differences in relation to workplace setting, work role and 
various other factors. Research related to safety climate and teamwork is also 
presented, again noting differences relating to workplace setting and work role. 
Literature relating to the relationship between safety climate and error reporting 
and disclosure is also examined in this chapter 
Chapter 2 concludes with the development of the aim and main research question 
that is explored in this research. The first three research sub-questions informing 
the main research question and aim are also presented. 
In Chapter 3 the contrast between evidence based medicine (EBM) and complexity 
science is presented. This contrast is then explored within a framework of health 
care as a complex system, thereby forming the theoretical framework for this 
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research. Knowledge is discussed in terms of an absolute truth as compared with an 
understanding which is mirrored in the framework as knowledge generation based 
on evidence and sense-making. Configurational comparative methods (CCM) are 
introduced as a means of researching the complexity of health care. Two further 
research sub-questions are presented at the conclusion of this chapter. 
The method is outlined in Chapter 4. This includes the research design for use of 
CCM.  This design is based upon the funnel of complexity which consists of the three 
phases of before, during and after the analytic moment.  
The first phase consists of using existing theoretical knowledge to inform this 
design, including data collection and data analysis. This is outlined in detail in 
Chapter 4 in relation to the development of a questionnaire based upon existing 
available tools.    
A variable-based approach to analysis (inferential statistics) has been used 
alongside the case-based analysis of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA). The first is undertaken in the before the analytic moment phase as some 
results inform the analysis using fsQCA. Details of the variable-based analysis are 
outlined in detail. 
This is followed by details of the analysis using fsQCA. The analysis proper is the 
second phase, termed during the analytic moment. Once this has been outlined an 
overview of how the fsQCA results are presented is provided. 
Chapter 5 provides the results in two separate parts. Variable-based results are 
presented in Part I and the case-based results are included in Part II.  
Variable results include frequency data relating to the demographic data allowing 
for an overview of the sample to be provided. This includes, where possible, 
assessment of sample representativeness.  
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Other results include those relating to safety climate and the identification of 
factors of teamwork and safety climate through principal components analysis. 
These form the basis of the conditions for analysis with fsQCA.  
The final chapter, Chapter 6, interprets the results. This represents the final phase 
of the funnel of complexity or the after the analytic moment. This phase requires 
results to be interpreted in respect to the theoretical knowledge that underpinned 
the research design.  
Both variable and case-based results are interpreted in this fashion, with 
consideration also given to each of the research sub-questions as well as to the 
overall main research question and the research aim. 
The limitations of the research are also discussed in Chapter 6. These are outlined in 
relation to research design, analysis and generalisability of the results. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research findings upon future 
practice along with suggestions for future research. 
The need for improvements in patient safety and health systems reform have been 
referred to as a “quality chasm” (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The following 
chapters outline research that has been undertaken with the aim to describe the 
complexity of safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings. In doing so it 
makes a contribution to narrowing the quality chasm. 
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2 The complex nature of  health care 
error  
Patient harm resulting from human error remains an ongoing challenge for health 
care. The issue is important to consumers, clinicians, managers and government. 
Despite almost a quarter of a century of work aimed at improvement, patient safety 
remains an ongoing matter of both public and professional debate. 
Health care services form a complex system. Understanding and managing error 
within that complex system is important for providing safe patient care. This, along 
with the impact of safety culture, is the subject of this research.  
The key role of this chapter is to provide an overview of both the context and 
literature and outline how each of these informed the development of the research. 
The chapter is divided into two parts with the first of these providing an overview of 
the background of patient safety and provides the context for the research. The 
second part discusses how the available literature has informed the research aim 
and research question. 
The complex nature of health care is outlined in Part I. The global context of patient 
safety is presented followed by background in relation to the Australian context. 
Information about health services and recent developments in Tasmania is then 
provided. 
Following this the complexities that evolve from defining error are discussed with 
specific consideration given to error and the disclosure of error in health care 
settings. Some background is also provided about current law and policy in relation 
to these matters in the Australian context.  
Approaches to patient safety and error management are then presented 
introducing the concept of resilience engineering. The management of error health 
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care is outlined including discussion of the differences found when comparing 
health care compared to other industries.  Part I concludes with an overview of 
medication error within the Australian context. 
Part II provides detail of current knowledge of error reporting and error disclosure. 
It commences with an examination of the publications available from a recent 
search of the literature relating to error reporting and disclosure. This is followed by 
a summary of the literature relating to error reporting and disclosure and the 
differences that exist based upon workplace setting, work role and other factors. At 
the end of Part II is a discussion of safety climate that focuses on how differences 
have been found in these same areas in relation to variations in safety climate. 
The chapter concludes with an explanation of how the literature has informed the 
research. From this discussion the development of the research aim and research 
question are outlined. Three research sub-questions, necessary for informing the 
overall research question, will also be presented. A constant theme throughout 
both parts of the chapter is that health care delivery, error reporting and disclosure 
and safety climate are areas that are extremely complex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17 
Part I:  Background and context of  the 
research 
Before examining the literature relating to error, disclosure and safety climate in 
detail it is important to provide some background and context to the research. 
Patient safety is important within health care settings and there have been several 
key developments over a number of years that have informed the management of 
error today.  
In addition, there has been a large amount of change to the way that health care is 
delivered and such reform means the health system is constantly changing. The 
recent changes in the Australian and Tasmanian context are noted in this part of the 
chapter. 
Definitions of error and disclosure are then provided followed with an explanation 
of why they are important issues. This is followed by an overview of how health 
care differs from other industries in relation to error management.  
Approaches to error management are then outlined, including an introduction to 
the concept of resilience engineering (Qureshi, 2007). Detail regarding the specific 
issue of the management of medication error, a common source of error in health 
care, concludes this Part I. 
 Global context 
In 1991 the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) estimated that 3.7% of hospital 
admissions in the United States (US) resulted in an adverse event (Brennan et al., 
1991). This study is credited with leading to both the establishment of a set of 
standards to measure such events and laying the groundwork for policy discussion 
on patient safety in a number of countries (Baker, 2004).  Another important, but 
less widely noted element of this same study was that many acts assessed as 
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negligent resulted in either minimal or minor injury to the patient (Brennan et al., 
1991).  
Following the HMPS the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a series of reports 
relating to human error. The most prominent of these was To Err is Human (Kohn et 
al., 2000). Considered a landmark in health care safety and quality this report urged 
for the recognition that error occurs as a result of human factors recognising it as an 
inevitable occurrence in clinical environments. It argued for a greater focus on a 
systems approach to dealing with error.  
Studies similar to HMPS have been undertaken in many other countries, including 
the UK (Vincent, Neale, & Woloshynowych, 2001), Australia (Wilson et al., 1995), 
New Zealand (Davis et al., 2001) and Canada (Baker et al., 2004). Results from these 
studies found that between 3.7% and 16.6% of hospital admissions suffered an 
adverse event. Whilst such data suggests there is a widespread problem, there are 
also public examples of serious organisational failure in regards to patient safety. 
For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2001 the events of the Bristol Infirmary 
became public. Investigations following the deaths of more than 50 children who 
had undergone cardiac surgery found failures in the audit processes and 
emphasised the need for strong clinical leadership (Walshe & Offen, 2001).  
Another UK example is that of Winterbourne View, a private hospital offering 
treatment and rehabilitation for people with a learning disability. Despite regulatory 
oversight, poor care in this facility went undetected and it was not until families 
blew the whistle publicly that issues such as the excessive use of physical restraints 
were acknowledged. Patients were subject to what has been described as ‘horrific 
and sustained abuse’ (Department of Health, 2012, p16). Following legal 
proceedings six staff were imprisoned for their criminal actions. 
The release of the Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Enquiry in February 2013 (Francis, 2013) provided yet another reminder of the 
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importance of appropriate error management within health care settings and how 
things can go terribly wrong. The report was undertaken to investigate why the rust 
had such a high mortality rate. 
The release of this report occurred some 25 years after the acknowledgment that 
error within health settings was a problem. Amongst the findings was the 
identification that Mid Staffordshire Trust staff had accepted low standards of care 
(Francis, 2013). It was not only that error was unreported, but when concerns were 
raised those in positions of responsibility failed to act. This was not limited to the 
hospital as the academic sector also came under fire for failing to acknowledge and 
appropriately deal with safety concerns raised by students. 
Although this report noted that the benefit of hindsight was mentioned by several 
of those who gave evidence, others have noted the importance that culture played 
in this situation (Reason, 2013). Other issues of concern raised from the report 
include the impact that a focus on cost-cutting had over patient care (Francis, 
2013). 
 Australian context 
The Quality in Australian Healthcare Study was published in 1995. This study found 
16.6% of hospital admissions resulted in an adverse event (Wilson et al., 1995). 
Following its release the Australian Council for Quality in Health was formed in 2000 
and five years later agreement was reached on the formation of a commission 
(Barraclough & Birch, 2006). Since its inception the Australian Commission for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care (ACSQH) has produced numerous supports for safety and 
quality including a set of standards that are now mandatory for hospital 
accreditation (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a).  
One of the standards (Standard 4) relates to medication management, indicating 
the importance of this issue for patient safety. The ACSQHC has also produced a 
framework for open disclosure (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, 2013a) with a requirement for an open disclosure process conforming 
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to this framework now a requirement for hospital accreditation in Australia 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a).  
Australia also has examples of serious incidents relating to patient safety with a 
major enquiry having been undertaken in New South Wales (NSW) following several 
incidents at Sydney’s Royal North Shore Hospital. The Garling Enquiry found 
ongoing issues in relation to culture and made several recommendations including 
the need for clinicians to be the drivers for change (Skinner et al., 2009).  
A further example from Australia is the Queensland Bundaberg Hospital Enquiry 
(Queensland Health, 2005). This enquiry was instigated after a nurse blew the 
whistle on events surrounding the work of surgeon Dr Jayant Patel. The concern 
from this particular case of system failure is that staff raised issues internally but 
those calls were not investigated or acted upon. It was only when details were 
raised within the Queensland Parliament under parliamentary privilege that any 
action was taken. Dr Patel was eventually charged and whilst the following trial 
found him guilty he was later retried and acquitted (Australian Associated Press, 
2013).  
Major incidents are not purely the domain of hospital settings. The aged care sector 
in Australia has also had high-profile examples of poor patient care. In 2000 it was 
found that residents of the Riverside Nursing Home in Victoria had been bathed in 
kerosene as a treatment for scabies (Cauchi, 2002).  
A later senate enquiry released in 2005 noted there were problems with nursing 
homes, the aged care complaints process and accreditation and made 51 
recommendations (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). Nursing home accreditation 
is now undertaken by the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency and nursing homes 
that do not achieve accreditation are not able to receive Commonwealth subsidy 
payments (Australian Aged Care Quality Agency 2015). 
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These incidents need to be put into context. A recent report into noted with respect 
to Safe Care Measures Australia ranks third behind the United Kingdom (UK) and 
France with the US ranking  eleventh (Davis, Stremikis, Squires, & Schoen, 2014).  In 
addition Australia operates accreditation systems for hospitals, aged care and 
general practice (Hinchcliff et al., 2012). Although the approaches are separate, a 
recent publication has identified that a hybrid model consisting of a focus on both 
regulatory compliance and continuous improvement have evolved across the 
different sectors (Greenfield, Greenfield, Hinchcliff, Hogden, Mumford, Debono, 
Pawsey, Westbrooke & Braithwaite, 2015). 
However, despite these systems and rankings, the previously referred to enquiries 
have identified failures within health care organisations in terms of how error is 
dealt with as well as failures to understand what constitutes the safe delivery of 
care.  Approaches to error management will be discussed at a later stage in this 
chapter. Prior to this an overview of the health system in Tasmania will be 
presented. 
 Tasmanian context 
Tasmania is the small island state of Australia. It has a population of approximately 
half a million (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2015) and a health system that 
is constantly challenged. The population is decentralised and largely rural.  
A common approach to identifying the rural location of services is the Australian 
Standard Geographical Classification (ASGC) Remoteness Area (RA) (Australian 
Government, 2010). This classification defines locality as major cities (RA-1), inner 
regional (RA-2), outer regional (RA-3), remote (RA-4) and very remote (RA-5). 
Tasmania has no major cities so the state has health services in the ASGC-RA 2-5 
classifications. The two inner regional areas are located around the capital city, 
Hobart and the northern city of Launceston. As the majority of the state is 
considered outer regional, remote or very remote there is an opportunity to 
research rural clinical settings within a single health system. 
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Prior to the reforms to the Australian health system the state’s Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) operated three regional health areas  in the 
South, North, and North West. A major health plan released in May 2007 identified 
a variety of health services across the state (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2007). These services include four public hospitals (Royal Hobart Hospital, 
Launceston General Hospital, North West Regional Hospital and Mersey Community 
Hospital) and private hospitals in the south, north and north-west of the state. 
There were also several rural hospitals (some of which operate multi-purpose 
services including both acute and aged care beds) and community nursing services 
(both public and private sector), residential aged care facilities, mental health 
services and disability services group homes. General practitioners operate in many 
townships with some practices located within or near to a local hospital.  
The health reforms implemented following the election of the Rudd Government in 
2007 saw the formation of health organisations that were contracted by state 
health departments to deliver health care services. Tasmania had three of these 
although the current federal government reforms have resulted in a merging of the 
initial three health organisations formed to just one—the Tasmanian Health 
Organisation (THO) (Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). 
This is in addition to the Tasmanian Medicare Local (TML is the organisation which 
has responsibility for working alongside the THO to improve service delivery and 
outcomes in primary care). From 1 July 2015 this entity will become a Primary 
Health Network as part of reforms by the current federal government (Tasmania 
Medicare Local Tasmania, 2015).  
In 2011 the Tasmanian government announced a restructure and staffing cuts as 
part of budgetary reform with further budgetary tightening undertaken during 
2012. The current state government is also undertaking restructuring with the 
recent release of a consultation white paper (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2015). 
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This demonstrates how health care operates within a political environment where 
change occurs on a regular basis and where the health system does not remaining 
static over time. Whilst the detail of the timing of this research is outlined in the 
methods chapter (Section 4.2.7) it should be noted here that this research was 
undertaken within the context of ongoing change. 
It is within the context of constant change that error management occurs. The 
notion of a changing environment within a complex health system will be discussed 
further in the following chapter. 
 Defining error  
It is expected that incidents within clinical settings, including those resulting from 
error, are managed and such management includes identification, reporting and 
analysis to improve patient safety systems (Australian Commission for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2011). The term reporting is used in this research to indicate 
the formal notification of error as part of such incident management. 
In order to discuss error further it is necessary to define it. Error has been defined 
as “all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities 
fails to achieve its desired goal without the intervention of some chance 
agency”(Reason, 2013, p. 10). 
The subject of error becomes more complex when consideration is given as to how 
it occurs.  There are two pathways that may lead to an error (Reason, 2013). The 
first is that the plan may be appropriate but it is not properly executed (for 
example, prescribing a medication that is then administered at the wrong dose) and 
the second is that the plan itself may be inadequate so even when executed the 
desired outcome is not achieved (such as prescribing an antibiotic for a viral illness). 
The second situation involves a greater level of complexity and it is therefore often 
more difficult to detect resulting errors so they frequently remain undetected for 
some time (Reason, 2013).  
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Error has also been described as active or latent. An active error indicates the error 
effect is immediate whilst a latent error is one that is present for some time and can 
spread through an organisation before the impact is felt (Reason, 1997). Active 
error usually surfaces within the front-line workforce and is the result of human 
factors often equating to the poor execution of a plan (Reason, 1997). By contrast 
latent error originates within the upper levels of an organisation or government 
agency so it is more likely to be the result organisational factors and the absence of 
an adequate plan being in place. 
Within health care numerous definitions of error exist. One review found that whilst 
45 studies had a generic definition of medication error there were 26 different 
forms of wording which is problematic as the lack of consistency makes comparing 
studies difficult (Lisby, Nielsen, Brock, & Mainz, 2010).  
The definitions used for this research are specific to the research context where 
possible. The Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) 
has defined error as “failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application 
of an incorrect plan” (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2013a, p. 2). Error is the result of a differentiation of that which may be due to 
commission (by doing the wrong thing) or by omission (failing to do the right thing).  
An error may or may not result in harm which is an “impairment of structure or 
function of the body and/or any deleterious effect arising therefrom, including 
disease, injury, suffering, disability and death” (Australian Commission for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 2). Such harm may be of a physical, social or 
psychological nature. 
An “adverse event is an incident in which harm resulted to a person receiving health 
care” (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 2). 
Not all adverse events are the result of foreseeable preventable error (Thomas & 
Petersen, 2003). Where an incident occurs that “does not cause harm but had the 
potential to do so” is referred to as a “near miss” (Australian Commission for Safety 
  
25 
and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 3). Where an error occurs that reaches the 
patient but does not cause harm it is referred to as a “no harm incident” (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p2). However, it is also 
arguable that such incidents are also “near miss”. Therefore the term “near miss” 
has been used in reference to both instances for this research. 
Medication error is the term used for “any preventable event that may cause or lead 
to inappropriate medication use or patient harm” (Australian Commission for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, 2013a, p. 10). The medication may be in the control of a 
health care professional, patient or consumer. 
This compares with an adverse medicines event or adverse drug reaction. An 
adverse medicines event occurs when the cause of harm is the result: 
…from the medicine itself (adverse drug reaction) and the potential or 
actual patient harm that comes from errors or systems failures 
associated with the preparation, prescribing, dispensing, distribution or 
administration of medicines (medication incident). (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a, p. 7).  
The term adverse drug reaction applies to:  
…a drug response that is noxious and unintended, and which occurs at 
doses normally used or tested in humans for the prophylaxis, diagnosis 
or therapy of disease, or for the modification of physiological function 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a, p. 
7). 
Different definitions for different types of error reflect the complexity of error and 
subsequent error management. Similar complexity exists when considering 
definitions for error disclosure. 
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 Defining error disclosure 
Clinicians involved in incidents where patients are harmed do not go unaffected 
from the experience. In addition, when a practitioner makes an error work 
colleagues are often affected through witnessing what they go through (Hall & 
Scott, 2012; Wu, 2000; Wu & Steckelberg, 2012).   
The term second victims is used to describe the suffering experienced by clinicians 
involved in a patient safety event (Nelson & Beyea, 2009). Clinicians often suffer 
similar emotions to the first victims (the patient and their family) with some health 
care workers leaving the profession and a small few committing suicide (Wu & 
Steckelberg, 2012). One study found that one in seven staff who had experienced a 
patient safety event within a twelve-month period had suffered anxiety, depression 
or had doubts about their ability to do their job well (Hall & Scott, 2012).  
Associated with this is the issue of being open with patients and/or their families if 
an error occurs. With a growing impetus to incorporate disclosure as an essential 
part of managing adverse events there is also a need to ensure that clinicians are 
supported as well as the patient and their families. (Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). 
Despite fears of litigation (Studdert & Richardson, 2010; Haw et al.,  2014) it has 
been identified that the risk of this occurring is reduced if there is openness when 
an error occurs (Gallagher et al., 2007). 
Just as there are multiple definitions for the term error there is also difference 
associated with the term disclosure. This, along with a brief overview of the law, will 
now be considered. 
A published review of the literature on disclosure found that policies in relation to 
dealing with adverse events with openness used a variety of terms such as duty of 
candour, full-disclosure and disclosure of harmful errors (Allen & Munro, 2008). 
Although terminology and language differs, the policies and definitions work 
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towards a common goal of dealing with a patient and/or their family when an 
adverse event occurs.  
A more recent systematic review found a gap between the ideal practice of 
disclosure and what really occurs (O'Connor, Coates, Yardley, & Wu, 2010). It was 
also noted that the bulk of research on disclosure is related to the experience of 
physicians despite health care being delivered by multi-disciplinary teams.  
For this research use of the term open disclosure is defined as “an open discussion 
with a patient about an incident(s) that resulted in harm to that patient while they 
were receiving health care” (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2013a, p. 4). The Australian Open Disclosure Framework outlines that for open 
disclosure to occur there should be an apology, provision of the facts regarding the 
events leading to the harm and an explanation of what will be done to manage the 
situation along with information about what is being done to ensure a similar 
situation does not arise again. The patient also needs to be given an opportunity to 
put forward their own experience. This process may occur over more than one 
meeting. 
For the purposes of this research the term open disclosure will be used when 
referring specifically to this definition as provided within the Australian Open 
Disclosure Framework (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2013a). The term disclosure will be used in reference to the acknowledgment to a 
patient and/or their family that an error has occurred.  
In Australia a nurse is mandated to report if he or she has any serious concerns 
relating to care delivery patients may have received from other health care workers 
(Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, 2010). They also have to balance 
their duty of care to the patient (also legally mandated) with their duty to the team, 
their organisation and their personal interests (Harrison et al., 2014).  
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The open disclosure of error is also required as part of the hospital accreditation 
process. Standard 1.16 of the National Standards requires a program is in place that 
is based upon the national open disclosure standard (Australian Commission for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a; Australian Commission for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2013a).  
Within the Australian context it has been noted the laws associated with disclosure 
have not been developed with disclosure in mind and they have been described as 
offering “weak” protection for clinicians (Studdert & Richardson, 2010). It is not 
only a fear of medico-legal consequences but also a lack of education and training in 
the skills required to undertake the process that is a barrier (Studdert & Richardson, 
2010).  
An example of this is apology laws. Clinicians in some states who apologise for an 
error are protected from the use of that apology in any subsequent litigation. Other 
states, of which Tasmania is included, either do not offer this protection or any 
admission of fault is excluded from what constitutes an apology (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2012a; Studdert & Richardson, 
2010). As a result there is a conflict between what the system expects by way of 
protecting the public compared to what is offered with respect to the protection of 
clinicians.  
There are some who argue that protection of the public does not go far enough and 
that the duty to disclose should be mandatory. A case heard in the European Court 
of Human Rights found that there was no statutory requirement for medical 
professionals to inform patients when errors occur (Powell, 2014). This has sparked 
debate around the need for mandated duty of candour (Birks, 2014; Francis, 2014; 
Powell, 2014). A legislative requirement such as this would put the accountability 
upon the individual and it is not clear if such an approach would be effective. There 
are arguments that the accountability for error disclosure should be maintained as 
an organisational a systems focus rather than placing responsibility for disclosure at 
the level of the individual. (Harrison et al., 2014).   
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It is issues such as these that create tension between what is expected of clinicians 
and what they are able to undertake in the day-to-day reality of practice. This 
underlying complexity makes it difficult to ensure that error is always appropriately 
dealt with within the health care system. 
 Approaches to patient safety 
There are numerous approaches to patient safety and error management. Perhaps 
the most well-known is the Swiss Cheese Model outlined by James Reason (Reason, 
1997). This model is based upon a linear view of error whereby a series of barriers 
and defences are put in place to prevent error. These barriers are regarded as being 
full of holes and when the holes line up an error trajectory occurs resulting in 
organisational disaster. Reason himself has since been critical of the limitations of 
this approach recognising the work of other error theorists (Reason, 2013).  
Another error theorist has criticised the practice of safety models being developed 
through the use of average data from large data sets. This leads to the hiding of 
variability and conclusions drawn from large samples to inform small to medium 
businesses which is where the majority of workplace injury occurs (Townsend, 
2013). He argues for a greater focus on qualitative research methods to inform 
safety theory.  
A review of approaches to accident modelling was published in 2007. This review 
acknowledges Reason’s work but argues in regards to the existence of latent errors 
that systems are extremely dynamic and complex (Qureshi, 2007). Qureshi 
summarises a series of other accident models that focus on complex socio-technical 
systems suggesting that resilience engineering may be a new paradigm for safety 
management (Qureshi, 2007) 
This concept is based upon organisations behaving as complex entities where 
success in safety management is the result of being able to adapt to that very 
complexity and the changing nature of risk (Qureshi, 2007). Safety is traditionally 
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seen as where things do not go wrong, yet it is measured by its absence (Hollnagel, 
2014). That is, when an incidence occurs, or could occur, there is a focus on cause-
effect and prevention is undertaken through management of the cause. Over time, 
the focus on the causal elements of significant incidents has meant that there is less 
focus on when things go right.  
Hollnagel argues, that if the rate of incident occurrence is 1 out of 10 000 then in 
9999 instances the expected and safe outcome eventuates (Hollnagel, 2014). He 
defines the reactive approach of avoidance of things going wrong as Safety I and 
presents the alternative Safety II approach of ensuring things go right. The latter 
recognises the ability of workers to adjust to the conditions surrounding them and 
to recognise when situations deviate from what is normal.   
Health care has been acknowledged as a complex adaptive system (Martin & Félix-
Bortolotti, 2010) where the focus of cause and effect, single interventions may lead 
to “unintended consequences” (Martin & Sturmberg, 2009). This will be explored 
further in the next chapter, particularly in relation to research.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to consideration of complexity in the 
management of medications. 
 The management of error and disclosure in health care 
The management of error is important to consumers, clinicians and governments. 
Consumers may be harmed as a result of error, which is an obvious concern. As 
error can lead to increased health care costs it becomes a concern to governments 
as well. As indicated earlier in this chapter (Section 2.5), clinicians are also 
concerned with error in that they do not wish to harm others, but when this occurs 
they may also suffer themselves, as may their colleagues.  
As error may lead to harm it may also lead to increases in the cost of health care 
delivery. The To Err is Human report estimated that the cost resulting from error in 
the hospital system in the US is between US$17—29 billion annually, of which half is 
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health care costs (Kohn et al., 2000).   In Australia during 2012—2013 the rate of 
adverse event amongst hospital separations was 5.5 per 100 separations (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014). Reducing the rate of harm reduces the 
additional costs to the health system making error prevention in the health care 
sector a concern for government. 
When dealing with error management it is important to spend hard dollars to make 
savings, but savings are often indirect and therefore difficult to measure (Barach & 
Small, 2000). The development of national standards for accreditation of Australian 
Hospitals (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a) may 
assist with this, although it may be some time before any impact can be assessed. 
Despite acknowledgment that accreditors are able to encourage cultural change 
(O'Leary, 2000) it remains to be seen what that change may be with respect to error 
management. 
Reference to culture has occurred several times in this chapter including the 
findings of enquiries (Francis, 2013; Skinner et al., 2009) as well as need for 
appropriate culture to ensure disclosure occurs. More detailed discussion of culture 
is provided later in this chapter (Section 2.15). Prior to this, the differences relating 
to health care will be explored followed by an outline of medication management 
and error. 
 How health care is different to other industries 
Three key elements are seen as being present in all disasters. These are the 
presence of contributing factors well before the disaster, putting systems of barriers 
and defences in place prior to prevent such disasters and, the presence of 
unforeseen latent conditions that defeat these defences (Reason, 2013).  
There are elements of the health care system that differ to other industries in 
relation to error. They are succinctly outlined in a recent publication by James 
Reason (Reason, 2013). The key differences he highlights relate to the complexity of 
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care delivery, complexity of patient illness and needs, and the manner in which 
error is investigated. 
Firstly, the context in which health care is delivered is complex. This has already 
been noted with reference to the health system in Tasmania (Section 2.3). Health 
care delivery is hands-on, diverse and so is the equipment. One patient will be cared 
for by several clinicians and support staff whilst at the same time those staff will 
have care responsibilities for many other patients. This complexity of care delivery 
results in a risk of error occurring. 
Secondly, the care is delivered to patients who have very complex needs. The more 
acute the setting, the more acute the patient illness and therefore the more acute 
the patient needs. This makes for potential risk but can also result in health care 
professionals bypassing various safeguards in order to save time. The sum of these 
factors is an increased risk of error occurring. 
Finally, when an error occurs it is usually investigated at the local level. In other 
industries an adverse event is often quite public, hence the investigation is public 
and the findings are shared. Health care error is not so public and usually this means 
that the local investigation does not publicly share the lessons learned. Information 
is not disseminated which further enhances the risk of error occurring, perhaps not 
in the original setting but somewhere else. 
All of the above is then compounded further through the training of health 
professionals. The emphasis on training to perfection results in an expectation that 
things must always go right. So whilst the abovementioned enquiries may seem 
disturbing, when considering the environment and expectations of clinical practice, 
it is not surprising they have been required as a result of error not always dealt with 
openly and swiftly.  
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 Medication management and error 
Medication error is a key issue amongst health settings in Australia. It is estimated 
that approximately 2—3% of hospital admissions are related to an adverse event 
associated with a medication costing the Australian health system some $1.2 billion 
annually (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a). 
Medication error within the community setting has also been identified as a 
problem (Easton et al., 2009) particularly amongst those taking numerous 
medications (Gilbert, Roughead, Beilby, Mott, & Barratt, 2002). 
There are numerous barriers and defences that have been put in place in Australia 
with the aim of preventing medication error. Recommendations for prevention 
include not using hazardous abbreviations, greater involvement of clinical 
pharmacists, medication reconciliation and use of technology (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b).  
In relation to future research several areas have been highlighted. Included in these 
are the prioritisation of interventions to improve post-discharge transitions, 
measures to encourage a culture of patient engagement, and the use of human 
factors engineering and ergonomics in the design of health care practices 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b).  
Patient involvement in the management of medications is particularly important. 
Studies have identified prescribing, dispensing and administration of medication as 
areas where medication error may occur (Australian Commission for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2013b). Whilst these three areas are regarded as elements 
where interventions may be applied to reduce the risk of a medication error 
occurring, the patient is considered the final point at which an error may be 
prevented (Elliott & Liu, 2010). 
Medication safety is one of the standards required for hospital accreditation in 
Australia (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a). This 
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standard (Standard 4) contains requirements for governance and systems for 
medication safety, documentation of patient information, medication management 
processes, continuity of medication management and communicating with patients 
and carers. The standards also apply to small rural hospitals, although rural facilities 
have raised concerns about their ability to meet the standards (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2012b). 
Residential aged care facilities in Australia are also required to demonstrate 
appropriate medication management as part of accreditation. Standard 2.7 of the 
Accreditation Standards requires medications to be managed safety and correctly.   
In Tasmania, medication management within the disability sector occurs in relation 
to the Quality and Safety Standards Framework for Tasmania’s DHHS Funded 
Community Sector (2013) which are linked to the Quality Frameworks associated 
with the National Disability Insurance Scheme (National Disability Insurance 
Scheme, 2013).   
Other approaches underway in Australia relating to medication management 
include a set of recommended terminology for prescribing medications, a national 
medication chart (now available in a variety of formats with one for residential aged 
care now in trial), tall lettering and documentation of allergies (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a, 2011b, 2014). Many of 
these interventions are in their infancy so there is limited research available 
regarding their success. One study of the national inpatient medication chart 
(NIMC) suggested that its use is effective in reducing prescribing error (Coombes et 
al., 2011) and audits indicate varying levels of compliance with requirements 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013c). 
The translation of policy and interventions such as the NIMC and open disclosure 
into clinical practice are an ongoing challenge. Studies have identified that in 
relation to error practitioners often experience tensions such as having to balance 
productivity and safety. For example, research has shown that if staffing levels are 
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adequate the practices amongst nurses in an emergency department improve 
(Mitchell Scott, Considine, & Botti, 2014).  
 Summary of background and context 
The issue of patient safety is a complex one. Studies in several countries have 
identified that preventable error occurs in health care (Baker & Norton, 2004; Baker 
et al., 2004; Brennan et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995). Health care is delivered in a 
changing environment. Although there are similarities with other industries some 
issues are specific to health care (Reason, 2013). It has been proposed that 
resilience engineering may be an appropriate means of managing error (Qureshi, 
2007). This may be appropriate as health care is complex and resilience engineering 
acknowledges that organisations function as complex adaptive systems. 
Further adding to the complexity, different definitions exist for terms such as error 
and disclosure. Therefore, this research will use terminology developed for the local 
context by the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care.  
Error management is important to ensure reduction in harm as well as costs. 
Numerous mechanisms are in place for this purpose including accreditation and 
more specific interventions for areas such as medication management. Nurses have 
a role to play in the prevention of error as well as participating in disclosure. Patient 
involvement is also important and medication management is an area noted here 
where this involvement could be improved.   
Despite this knowledge, over time enquiries have found shortfalls in the delivery of 
health care services (Francis, 2013; Queensland Health, 2005; Skinner et al., 2009). 
Included in findings have been concerns about cost-cutting and culture.  
Issues surrounding error and disclosure have been introduced in this chapter. There 
has also been some reference to the importance of culture in relation to each of 
these. The issue of culture, error and disclosure will be examined in more detail in 
the next part of this chapter.  
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Part II:  The literature informing the research 
Having undertaken an overview of the context of patient safety related to error and 
its disclosure with particular reference to the Australian context it is now possible to 
consider the literature that informs this research. The first step in this process is the 
presentation of publications found from a structured search relating to error 
reporting, error disclosure and nursing which highlights the range of publications for 
each area.  
Following this, literature that establishes the non-reporting and non-disclosure of 
error is presented. Several areas pertaining to differences in each of these areas are 
then considered, such as severity of harm, workplace setting, work role and other 
factors.  
The issue of culture and safety climate is then discussed with further consideration 
given to differences again with respect to workplace setting, work role and other 
factors. This is followed by the review of literature relating to the relationship 
between safety climate and error reporting and disclosure.  
Areas of deficit in relation to this subject are then put forward. These inform the 
development of the aim of this research as well as the research question.  
The literature in relation to error reporting is extensive and for this reason it was 
not possible to undertake a systematic review for this research. A simple search in 
two key databases (Pubmed and CINAHL) conducted on 31 March 2015 shows the 
degree of research that is available in this subject area. The results of this search 
indicating the number of publications returned appear in Table 2-1. Although more 
exhaustive search terms may produce more publications for both error reporting 
and disclosure this table suggests there is substantially less research available on 
the topic of error disclosure. 
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Table 2-1 Publications from search of databases conducted on 31 March 2015 
Search term Timeframe PUBMED CINAHL 
(error) AND report* Overall 20 518 2 869 
 Last 5 years 6 696 1054 
 Last 10 years 11 462 2034 
(((error) AND report*)) AND nurs* Overall 976 609 
 Last 5 years 383 231 
 Last 10 years 645 446 
(error) AND disclos* Overall 870 239 
 Last 5 years 318 91 
 Last 10 years 576 198 
error AND disclos* AND nurs* Overall 79 55 
 Last 5 years 24 20 
 Last 10 years 57 44 
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Another observation from this table is the comparatively low number of 
publications when the term “nurs*” is added to the search terms. Whilst the search 
in Pubmed identified more than 20 000 from the search “(error) AND report*” there 
were only 976 publications identified when “nurs*” is added. This figure represents 
less than 5% of the previous search. There is also clearly substantially fewer 
publications in relation to error disclosure compared to error reporting.  
On 30 June 2014 there were 362 450 registered, enrolled nurses and midwives in 
Australia compared to 99 379 registered medical practitioners (Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency, 2014). For a profession so high in number, with a 
role in the delivery of direct patient care, it is hard to explain why research in the 
areas of error reporting and disclosure in nursing is a comparatively low percentage 
of the overall research. 
The above search was conducted in order to present the differences in published 
research for error reporting and disclosure both broadly and more specific to 
nursing. The literature presented in the following sections has been identified 
through more extensive database searches conducted over time, hand searches of 
journals (particularly BMJ Safety and Quality, and Medical Journal of Australia), grey 
literature (from Institute of Medicine and Australian Policy Online) and websites 
such as the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care. It is not an 
exhaustive narrative but one designed to present the thematic areas relevant to the 
subject of this research, namely error reporting, error disclosure and safety climate. 
 Non-reporting and non-disclosure of error  
The non-reporting and non-disclosure of error is evident amongst the literature 
with some alarming figures to be found in research relating to this area.  Some 
studies focus on the views health professionals have regarding reporting their own 
errors and/or the errors of others. Other studies have used observational 
approaches to detect the amount of error that is reported with some studies 
comparing both. 
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A survey of Israeli nurses showed that whilst only 6% of nurses stated they would 
“never” report their own errors, 50% admitted to “rarely” or “sometimes” reporting 
an error (Kagan & Barnoy, 2008). Similarly a survey of Taiwanese nurses estimated 
that 47% of respondents had failed to report themselves or a co-worker in relation 
to medication adverse events (Chiang, Lin, Hsu, & Ma, 2010). Yet another survey 
conducted amongst Korean nurses found 50.6% of nurses were unclear which 
errors needed to be reported (Kim, An, Minah, & Sook, 2007). Despite 82.8% of 
respondents to this same study believing error reporting was important only 58.5% 
felt reporting errors led to improved patient safety. 
A study of barriers and reporting in mental health settings found less than half the 
nurses would report either an error made by a colleague or a near miss error that 
they made themselves (Haw et al., 2014). Themes identified for non-reporting 
included fear (of litigation, disciplinary action or loss of faith from colleagues), lack 
of knowledge (of process or definition of error), burden of work and excusing the 
error (particularly near miss error). This study concluded that mental health nurses 
did not report errors for similar reasons to their general medical nursing 
counterparts.  
Nurses report fewer errors than the errors they actually make, citing perceived 
fears of reprimand and punishment, and blaming individuals as opposed to system 
failures as barriers to reporting (Bayazidi, Zarezadeh, Zamanzadeh, & Parvan, 2012). 
A direct observational study of nurses administering medications in two Australian 
hospitals reflects this result with an audit indicating that only 1.2 per 1000 incidents 
had reports filed and of the prescribing errors noted (218.9 per 1000) only 13 per 
1000 were reported (Westbrook et al., 2015).  
The disclosure of error by nurses has been defined in the past as informing the 
physician when an error has occurred with full disclosure to the patient being the 
responsibility of the physician (Kelley, 2002). This may explain why, as indicated 
earlier, the majority of research relating to disclosure involves the perspective of 
physicians (O'Connor et al., 2010). Whilst such studies confirm that that medical 
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professionals support the notion of disclosing error the practice of disclosure is not 
consistent with that support.  
It has also been noted that there are few studies in relation to the involvement of 
nurses in disclosure (Wagner, Harkness, Hébert, & Gallagher, 2012) although it has 
been suggested that nurses balance their personal welfare, professional reputation 
and patient interests when determining whether or not an error should be disclosed 
(Kelley, 2002) 
Studies have found differences between rates of error reporting and disclosure. For 
example a study of emergency department personnel found that physicians, nurses 
and emergency medical technicians were more likely to report an error than to 
inform the patient (Hobgood, Bowen, Brice, Overby, & Tamayo-Sarver, 2006; 
Hobgood, Weiner, & Tamayo-Sarver, 2006). Another study comparing reported 
medication errors between intensive care units (ICU) and non-ICU settings found 
that when an error occurred the patient and caregivers were not informed (Latif, 
Rawat, Pustavoitau, Pronovost, & Pham, 2013).  
A qualitative study amongst nurses in China found that of the seven nurses 
recruited who admitted they had made mistakes in administering medication none 
of them disclosed the error to patients or family (Luk, Ng, Ko, & Ung, 2008). This 
was despite the participants feeling they were treated fairly during the process of 
investigating the errors.  
In contrast, a US study found that hospital leaders indicated that it was more likely a 
patient would be informed of an error (particularly one of moderate or near miss 
harm) than an error being formally reported to the state (Weissman et al., 2005). 
The values reported for this study combined the “always” and “usually” responses. 
It is not possible to determine if this aggregation has led to the results contrasting 
to other studies or whether senior managers hold different views. 
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 Severity of harm and error reporting and disclosure 
The level of harm that occurs from error varies as do the levels reporting and 
disclosure relative to harm. Generally, errors of higher severity are more likely to be 
reported or disclosed despite errors of lesser harm being more common. 
For example, a study which identified numerous errors in prescribing on admission 
to a large acute medical unit in UK found the rate of severe error quite low (1%) 
compared to that of moderate (11.8%) and near miss error (87.2%)  (Basey, Krska, 
Kennedy, & Mackridge, 2013). Reporting data from the NSW Clinical Excellence 
Commission in 2010 reflects a similar pattern. The rate of errors reported varied 
with the more severe level of clinical incidents reported reflecting 0.04% of hospital 
admissions to the least serious category rate of 9.94% of hospital admissions 
(Atkins, De Lacey, & Britton, 2014). 
One study found that reporting rates for a serious error were higher (62.5%) than 
near miss error (50.7%) with just 3.5% of serious errors and none (0%) of the near 
miss errors disclosed to patients and families (Sheu, Wei, Chen, Yu, & Tang, 2009). 
Another study using a cross-sectional survey of a convenience sample found that 
the identification, disclosure and reporting of error decreased as error severity 
decreased (Hobgood, Weiner et al., 2006).  
The previously cited Israeli study found that although 16.9% of nurses indicated 
they felt all errors were reported although where patient harm was involved 
responses that the error was “always” reported were higher (66.8%) compared to 
near miss errors (17.4-17.2%) where the error either resulted in no harm or actions 
were halted before an error was made.(Kagan & Barnoy, 2008).  
Similar results have been found in relation to error disclosure. Disclosure rates from 
ICU (1.5%) were lower than the non-ICU settings (2.1%) with the ICU errors causing 
harm (6.6%) more frequent than the non-ICU environment (3.7%) (Latif et al., 
2013).  
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Severity of harm has also been linked to punitive action amongst pharmacy boards 
in the US (Holdsworth, Wittstrom, & Yeitrakis, 2013). This study found error severity 
was one of the main elements leading to punitive action such as licence suspension, 
probation and fines.  
Although not directly related to professionals a study of health plan members who 
were mailed videos of two vignettes depicting medical error and disclosure found 
that, even with full disclosure, most respondents indicated they were likely to seek 
legal advice (Mazor et al., 2004). However, this same study found that whilst most 
(83%) thought financial compensation was appropriate for error resulting in harm 
there was a much lower response (12.7%) indicating they felt compensation was 
appropriate if no harm occurred. 
In light of the previous discussion regarding less severe errors being under-reported 
combined with the data indicating lower levels of harm are less likely to be 
reported, it is clearly likely that there is a large amount of error that is not captured 
within error reporting systems. This may reflect fears of the risk of litigation (Haw et 
al., 2014; Studdert & Richardson, 2010). The HMPS found 27.6% (95% CI 22.5-
32.6%) of error was the result of negligence although this rate increased with the 
severity of error.  
However, there may be other reasons why near miss errors are not reported. A 
study in the chemical industry found that workers did not consider that when they 
intervened in relation to a near miss error they did not consider it to be an error at 
all (Kanse, 2004). A recently published Australian study found nurses tended to have 
a similar view (Hewitt & Chreim, 2015)  
What should be reinforced here is the relatively low level of severe harm compared 
to lesser levels. The more severe an error is, the more likely it is to be reported 
suggesting that what is known about error reflects the more severe end of the 
spectrum. This reflects a Safety I approach to error management in health care 
which is to detect and report a lack of safety (Hollnagel, 2014).   
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 Error reporting and disclosure in different workplace 
settings 
It was identified over a decade ago that little was known about error in the rural 
context (Wholey, Moscovice, Hietpas, & Holtzman, 2004). A short time afterwards 
the Institute of Medicine in the US recognised the uniqueness of rural settings 
(Institute of Medicine, 2005). It laid out the key areas that need to be addressed 
including the needs of the population, an appropriate support structure, improving 
human resources, adequate funding support and use of appropriate technology 
(Institute of Medicine, 2005). The report also acknowledged the poorer health and 
economic circumstances that many US rural areas face.  
There is limited research available in relation to error reporting in the rural context. 
A study of small rural hospitals in Nebraska found 99% of errors reported were near 
miss errors (Thornlow, 2008) reflecting other studies cited in relation to the 
influence of error severity. Results from this study also suggest that the involvement 
of pharmacists in small rural hospital medication management assists in improving 
the reporting rates and identification of prescribing error, with the latter leading to 
a reduction of errors reaching the patient.       
A more recent cross-sectional study carried out amongst 48 rural and urban primary 
care centres in Spain found that most health professionals indicated 64.3% of 
adverse events were preventable (Aranaz-Andrés et al., 2011). Of these 5.9% were 
considered to be severe. In addition nurses reported more adverse events as 
preventable compared to other professions. The majority of adverse events were 
adverse drug reactions or medication errors, with the serious events considered 
more preventable. Unfortunately this study did not report any comparison between 
the rural and urban results.                                       
Context has been highlighted as important for future research in order to improve 
disclosure practices with the majority of research undertaken to date occurring in 
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secondary care hospital environment (Birks et al., 2014).  However there are some 
studies that have been undertaken outside such settings. 
Thirteen of the individuals interviewed for the One Hundred Patient Stories Project 
were either themselves, or their family, from a rural area. These patients identified 
issues with the diagnosis, transfer and treatment process as well as the process of 
open disclosure (Piper, Iedema, & Bower, 2014). Participants reported that training 
and geographical isolation meant diagnosis was often delayed and a lack of 
resources, including faulty equipment and staffing issues, was identified as a 
precursor to incidents.  
Even if the equipment was functioning, often staff did not know how to use it, or 
there was no qualified doctor at the facility to which the patient was transported. 
These observations are reinforced by the findings of a report that rural hospitals 
feel ill-equipped and under-resourced in relation to their capacity to meet the new 
Australian hospital accreditation standards (Australian Commission for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2012b).  
Another study set in nursing homes found that there was an increased likelihood 
that nurses would disclose more information relating to errors if there was less 
harm or if the resident concerned was cognitively impaired (Wagner, Harkness, 
Hébert, & Gallagher, 2013). The authors postulated that this was due to family 
members being involved and it being easier to disclose information if there is little 
harm.  
The contribution of nurses to the disclosure process was the subject of a systematic 
literature review which found just 15 studies on this subject (Harrison et al., 2014). 
This review found that despite the potential for nurses to be involved in the process 
of open disclosure the hierarchical nature of health care is often a barrier although 
the demands of work and a fear of punitive action or disproportionate blame for 
the incident were also restrictions to the involvement of nurses. This review 
concludes that through overcoming such barriers there is potential for nurses to be 
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more involved in open disclosure with potential for them to support both patients 
and physicians through the process.  
 Error reporting and disclosure amongst different work 
roles 
There are two areas where differences have been noted in relation to error 
reporting based upon role. These are differences amongst professions and 
differences between managers and other nurses. 
One study found that physicians were less likely to report an error than nurses or 
emergency medical technicians yet physicians were more likely to disclose an error 
to a patient (Hobgood, Weiner et al., 2006). 
Another found that whilst only 17% of respondents reported disclosing error 39% 
admitted to apologising for situations resulting from errors. That is, some medical 
staff would apologise for a situation without the underlying explanation that it had 
resulted from a mistake (Kronman, Paasche-Orlow, & Orlander, 2012). . 
Differences in views about reporting have been noted across different professions 
from a survey undertaken at Aberdeen Royal Infirmary in Scotland (Sarvadikar, 
Prescott, & Williams, 2010). Whilst results indicated that all professions were more 
likely to report serious errors that caused actual harm to patients nurses and 
pharmacists were likely to report all errors compared to doctors who were more 
likely to report an error with a severe outcome.  
In a previous study using scenarios across different levels of harm it was found that  
senior hospital staff in the USA had different views about different levels of harm 
for both reporting and disclosure (Weissman et al., 2005). However, it has been 
noted by others that there are gaps between what managers view they would 
report in relation to their actions compared to what is actually happening in 
practice (Morello et al., 2013). Therefore actual reporting and disclosure rates may 
be lower than this study indicated. 
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In Korea, similar results were found amongst nurses where more senior nurses 
indicated they reported error more frequently compared to the clinical (staff) 
nurses (Kim et al., 2007) which was also the case in a more recent Israeli study 
(Kagan & Barnoy, 2013). Whilst this may explain the differences noted between 
managers and clinicians it is also possible that if clinicians are not involved in 
disclosure they may not be aware when an error is formally acknowledged. 
Another study found that 75% of nurses and physicians were not reporting error. 
(Scherer & Fitzpatrick, 2008). A further study that investigated hospital nurses and 
their reporting of medication adverse events found differences in attitude between 
self-reporting and reporting others’ errors. Although 18.3% of respondents 
admitted to not self-reporting their errors, 36.8% of respondents admitted not 
reporting the errors of their co-workers (Chiang et al., 2010). 
 The impact of other factors upon error reporting and 
disclosure  
Several other areas have been identified where differences in reporting or 
disclosure have been found. These include experience and age, ethical reasoning, 
burnout and education. 
Experience of error has been found to be linked to error reporting with one study 
finding younger respondents had no experience of either reporting their own errors 
or the errors of their co-workers and those with less experience of making errors 
were more likely to underreport (Chiang et al., 2010). This mirrors results from 
Korea where there was increased likelihood of more experienced staff reporting 
errors (Kim et al., 2007). Nurses with experience of underreporting have also been 
found more likely to perceive barriers to reporting such as fear, nursing quality and 
nursing professional development (Chiang et al., 2010).  
Ethical reasoning has been linked to error disclosure. A study in the USA found that 
positive ethical reasoning scores were associated with acknowledging error (Cole, 
  
48 
Block, & Wu, 2013). Although his study had a low sample and low response, the 
results indicated significance. 
Whilst burnout has not been associated with event reporting it has been associated 
with low reporting rates of near miss error (Halbesleben, Wakefield, Wakefield, & 
Cooper, 2008). High levels of stress and demands on the community sector have 
been also noted (Dollard & McTernan, 2011).  
Longer work hours have also been associated with increased risk of errors and near 
miss errors with a decrease in vigilance from nurses also observed (Scott, Rogers, 
Hwang, & Zhang, 2006). This particular study was located within an intensive care 
setting which is arguably an area of high demand. Work patterns have also been 
noted as a potential barrier to error disclosure (Harrison et al., 2014).  
It has been noted that academic nurses have higher rates of error but lower 
reporting rates (Kagan & Barnoy, 2008). Education has also been linked to 
improving medication error reporting along with improving communication and 
ensuring reporting is not burdensome (Hartnell, MacKinnon, Sketris, & Fleming, 
2012). Feedback has also been highlighted as a facilitating factor (Hartnell et al., 
2012). 
Another study found that there was no difference in the rate of medication error in 
nursing homes based upon staff qualifications or role (ie nurse, aide, medication 
technicians) (Scott-Cawiezell et al., 2007). However this study did find that 
Registered Nurses had more interruptions when administering medications and 
these were associated with increased medication error rates when excluding wrong 
time errors. 
Education is also an important issue when considering error disclosure. A lack of 
training has been identified as a barrier to error disclosure along with fear, blame 
and punitive culture (Harrison et al., 2014). An Australian study found that the 
majority of respondents in four states were unaware that there were apology laws 
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in their state that were related to open disclosure (Studdert, Piper, & Iedema, 
2010). It is worth noting that the recruitment strategy of this study was focused on 
those considered to be leaders in open disclosure. 
The lack of education and training has also been noted in the UK (Birks et al., 2014). 
This study also found there was poor knowledge of any training that may be 
available.  
The notion that education is important to improving error disclosure is supported 
by the findings of a study conducted in aged care. Registered Nurses with more 
education and having had prior experience with error disclosure were found more 
likely to provide more information about an error to nursing home residents 
(Wagner et al., 2013). Education was also highlighted in the review of the Australian 
Open Disclosure Pilot along with careful planning, support for staff involved and 
monitoring of the impact upon patients (Iedema et al., 2008).  
 Culture and safety climate 
Organisational factors have been identified as associated with latent error and are 
regarded as key to the prevention and management of error. Failures in health care 
are considered to be the product of organisational culture, health care profession 
culture and the health system culture (Walshe & Shortell, 2004). Culture is also 
considered an important factor for improving error disclosure. 
Defining culture is not an easy process and the term has been described as one of 
the most complicated words in the English language to define (Williams, 1983). It 
has been argued that the word has become overused and it is better to be specific 
by breaking the term down to the component parts of interest (Bennett et al., 
2005). The term is certainly complex in respect to safety with numerous examples 
of the elements that can be considered to be a part of safety culture. 
A review by Glendon (2008) makes this very point. He defines several elements 
including safety climate, safety compliance and safety participation. Safety climate 
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is described as shared attitudes, values and beliefs around safety. Safety compliance 
is the undertaking of tasks or duties in order to comply with safety requirements 
whereas safety participation refers to an enthusiasm to participate in those same 
tasks. 
It has been noted that there is no consensus on the definition of safety culture 
(Walshe & Shortell, 2004). A recently published review of definitions of safety 
culture and safety climate found that there is much disagreement within health care 
about how these terms should be defined. (Halligan & Zecevic, 2011). This review 
found disagreement about whether the two terms are linked or whether they are 
entirely separate. 
Rather than attempt to define safety culture the approach taken for this research is 
to consider the element of safety climate and situate this within the broader 
context of organisational culture. A systematic review (Morello et al., 2013) of 
strategies to improve patient safety culture in hospitals has presented a model for 
patient safety culture that will be used for the purpose of defining safety culture 
and safety climate for this research. 
This model defines organisational culture as the core shared beliefs, values and 
norms identified amongst the organisation’s employees (Morello et al., 2013). 
Influenced by organisational culture, as well as being influenced by it, is patient 
safety culture which encompasses the individual and group beliefs, values and 
norms identified in relation to the management of the organisation’s health and 
safety. Patient safety climate is the shared perceptions of the beliefs, values, norms 
and practice that achieve patient safety. Patient safety climate also influences and is 
influenced by patient safety culture. It in turn influences and is influenced by the 
beliefs and attitudes of the individual with respect to patient safety. This model 
therefore acknowledges the complexity of safety culture and outlines the 
components that are situated within it.  
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The systematic review concluded that there was limited evidence that strategies 
have had any impact upon safety culture outcomes (Morello et al., 2013). Some 
evidence existed that leadership walk-rounds may have an impact for nurses and 
that multi-faceted unit-based patient safety programs (with a structured framework 
for assessing, identifying reporting and improving patient safety issues/concerns) 
may also have a positive impact. However, the review authors note that there were 
other studies that had found conflicting results.  
The authors also noted that culture is embedded in groups and sub-groups and that 
organisations are dynamic (Morello et al., 2013). This becomes more evident 
through the consideration of some of the literature in relation to error reporting, 
error disclosure, safety climate and the relationship between each of these.  
Most research undertaken in relation to safety climate in health settings has used 
quantitative surveys (Halligan & Zecevic, 2011). A recent systematic review of 
surveys designed to assess teamwork in health care settings found the different 
variations in how safety climate is measured could be confusing (Valentine, 
Nembhard, & Edmondson, 2015). The authors of this review recommended the 
adaption of one of the existing valid tools rather than developing a new one.  
The most used instruments are the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) and 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC). In reviews of the use of such 
instruments in health care both have been determined as reliable and valid (Colla et 
al., 2005; Flin, Burns, Mearns, Yule, & Robertson, 2006). Of the two, the SAQ is 
considered more reliable to assess safety climate across a whole health system 
whereas the HSPOSC provides a better assessment of safety climate within a single 
hospital or service (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012). 
One study comparing Swiss and US hospitals reported differences in factor scores 
between the two countries with units in both hospitals indicating low thresholds (a 
score of less than 60%) for stress recognition and perceptions of unit management 
(Schwendimann, Zimmermann, Küng, Ausserhofer, & Sexton, 2012). There was no 
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difference found for teamwork climate, job satisfaction and working conditions 
when mean scores were compared.  
 Safety climate in different workplace settings and work 
roles 
Variations in safety climate have been found in different workplace settings. For 
example one study suggests staff in long term care settings have a more positive 
safety culture compared to those in acute hospitals (Vlayen et al., 2011). Another, 
using the HSPOSC, found most subscale scores were lower in nursing homes 
compared to hospital settings (Castle & Sonon, 2006).  
A study of rural settings found changes in safety culture occurred over time 
following the implementation of a voluntary medication error reporting system 
(Jones et al., 2008). This study also found that safety culture varied by extent of 
participation in a patient safety program. It is difficult to ascertain whether this 
would relate to an educational activity, supporting previous comments in relation to 
education or whether this may be an example of the difference between safety 
compliance and safety participation (Glendon, 2008). It has also been identified that 
safety climate varies at the level of a clinical department rather than at the level of 
a hospital (Freeth, Sandall, Allan, Warburton, & Berridge, 2012). 
Safety climate has also been found to vary according to workplace role. This reflects 
what has already been outlined earlier in this chapter in relation to error reporting 
and disclosure (Section 2.13). 
One study found differences amongst administrators within aged care settings 
(Castle, Engberg, & Anderson, 2007). Safety culture was more likely to be positive 
amongst those who were working in not-for-profit facilities. Another study found 
staff working as nurses’ aids in aged care had lower scores for safety climate 
compared to hospital benchmark scores (Castle, Engberg, & Aiju, 2008).  
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Within the Australian setting a report produced for the South Australian Health 
Department found similar results. Those working in management roles were more 
likely to have higher mean scores for SAQ questions compared to those working in 
clinical roles (Braithwaite et al., 2009). That is, based upon the average score for 
items of the SAQ responses were higher amongst managers which indicates a 
difference between staff working in management compared to those working in 
non-management roles.    
 The impact of other factors upon safety climate 
One study that has looked at differences in this area found that safety climate level 
(the perception of importance given to safety issues) has a larger effect than the 
strength of safety climate (the degree of consensus with the level) (Keren, Mills, 
Freeman, & Shelley Il, 2009). This same study found that whilst safety climate may 
be likely to predict the selection of a safer choice it fails to predict orientation 
toward safety during the processing of information thus highlighting the possibility 
of peer pressure to influence decision making around reporting. Where safety was 
seen to be prioritised over productivity reporting was more likely to occur. 
Both organisational dynamics as well as individual characteristics have been 
identified as having significant correlational relationships with respect to error 
(Moody, 2006). This study found cognitive style and manager actions and 
expectations were predictive for the incidence of nurses reporting medication 
errors while open communication and the patient safety grade (which relates to 
patient acuity) correlated with frequency of error reporting. 
Along with the focus on the measurement of safety climate there are also those 
who argue for qualitative research studies to be conducted (Halligan & Zecevic, 
2011). Methodology is one area where it has been acknowledged that the 
limitations of a quantitative approach leave some aspects of safety culture 
underexposed (Vlayen et al., 2011). An example of this may be the previously 
referred to elements of safety participation and safety compliance (Glendon, 2008).  
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 Safety climate, error reporting and error disclosure 
Having reviewed the literature in relation to error reporting and disclosure it has 
been identified that there are differences have been to be found that are based 
upon different workplace settings and work roles as well as other factors. Research 
relating to safety climate has produced similar results.  
There is limited research available with respect to the relationship between safety 
climate and error reporting. Although not specifically considering the issue of safety 
climate, the previously cited Korean study found elements related to safety climate.  
For example 45% of respondents felt staff members were afraid to report mistakes 
and 10% felt errors were held against them. There were 10.7% of respondents who 
agreed that finding the person responsible for an error was important. Some 
(30.8%) indicated they agreed with the statement they were worried their mistakes 
were kept on file (Kim et al., 2007). Although 70.8% felt informed about errors that 
occurred, only 52.1% felt that when errors occurred people were given feedback 
(Kim et al., 2007). These results suggest nurses fear reporting from the perspective 
of the impact it has upon them as an individual. 
Safety culture has been linked to the frequency of event reporting (Kagan & Barnoy, 
2008) (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012; Hutchinson et al., 2009). Higher scores have 
also been associated with lower incident rates (Kagan & Barnoy, 2008) and fewer 
medication errors as well as other clinical outcomes such as lower ventilator-
associated pneumonia, fewer infections of the bloodstream and reduced length of 
stay in intensive care units (Colla et al., 2005). However, a more recently published 
pilot meta-analysis concluded there was no relationship between safety culture and 
medication error although the authors acknowledge an assessment of methodology 
was not undertaken as part of this review (Groves, 2014).  
Safety culture dimensions are not the only element with a degree of predictive 
validity. A new measure that is argued predicts intent to disclose error better than 
other measures of healthcare culture has been developed (Etchegaray, Gallagher, 
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Bell, Dunlap, & Thomas, 2012). This same tool used the safety and teamwork 
dimensions of the SAQ but found that these did not predict error disclosure. This 
study used another method of analysis focusing on mean scores rather than on 
whether the factor score was high. 
The factors that were related to improved error disclosure were general culture and 
error disclosure trust culture (Etchegaray et al., 2012). Participants with education 
in disclosure had higher scores for both these factors, a point that supports previous 
discussion regarding the importance of education (Section 2.14). 
Other studies suggest a link between safety climate and error disclosure. A survey 
of medical staff in the USA found that the summary score from the study was 
positively associated with both error disclosure and apology (Kronman et al., 2012) 
A study of culture and open disclosure in Ireland found that staff felt the approach 
to disclosure was unstructured and 24% of respondents feared litigation (Duffy, 
2012). The respondents to this study also highlighted barriers from culture and lack 
of support for staff as concerns. 
 Summary  
It is clear from the research presented here that nurses and other professionals do 
not report and disclose all error. Areas of difference have been noted based upon 
workplace setting, work role and other areas such as education. This is clearly a 
complex area and not one where a simple linear relationship may be identified. 
Similar complexity exists in relation to safety climate where differences have been 
found in relation to many of the same areas. When considering the relationship 
between safety climate and the reporting and disclosure of error, again, a similar 
complexity arises. 
A large amount of research has been undertaken in relation to error reporting, 
however there is less available relating to error disclosure. This is evident from the 
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search strategy presented at the commencement of Part II of this chapter. There 
are some areas where research is lacking, including research in the rural context 
and research that includes nurses particularly in relation to error disclosure.  It has 
also been highlighted that medication error is both prevalent and a significant cost 
to the Australian health system. 
Although there is information about the occurrence of medication error in the 
Australian context, little is known about the views of reporting and the disclosure of 
such errors that occur in rural services, within Australia or globally. Health 
workforce data indicates that nurses in rural areas work in a variety of different 
workplace settings including hospitals, aged care, community and general practice 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013). Nurses are also actively involved 
in medication administration (Choo et al., 2010). 
Drug -related error was the highest non-operative error detected by the HMPS, the 
majority of which were the result of wrong dose or therapy or inadequate post 
therapy follow up (Leape et al., 1991). Reporting data from NSW shows that the 
medication error is the second highest error type reported (the highest is for falls) 
(Atkins et al., 2014).  
A lack of information in relation to error reporting and disclosure indicates this is an 
area for future research. Whilst the lack of information is global, the Tasmanian 
context offers the opportunity to research this issue within a single health system 
across different settings.  
A hypothetical medication error will be used for this research. This reflects the 
approach taken by several of the studies referred to in this chapter where error 
scenarios have been used in order to investigate medication error and/or views of 
reporting and disclosure.   
The literature review has indicated that although there may not be a relationship 
between safety climate and medication error, there is a lack of information 
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available on this issue within the rural context. There is no known research relating 
to safety climate and views of reporting or disclosure amongst nurses working in 
rural clinical settings indicating this is an area in need of further research. 
 Aim of the research  
The literature review has established there is limited information available about 
safety culture amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings. The bulk of the 
research undertaken uses surveys to measure safety climate, teamwork and other 
factors. Workplace setting, work role and other factors have been identified as 
having a potential impact on the level of safety climate. Error reporting, error 
disclosure and medication error are possibly influenced by these same factors.  
Clearly, the nature of safety culture is quite complex. An example of that complexity 
is the possible relationship between safety climate and error reporting and 
disclosure. Although some studies suggest there may be a relationship, a recent 
review found there was none. There are no known studies on this issue that have 
been undertaken in the rural context.  
Thus the aim of this research is to describe the complexity of safety climate of 
nurses working in rural clinical settings. The research question is: how is safety 
climate related to views of reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst 
nurses working in rural clinical settings?   
Determining how safety climate influences views of reporting necessitated the 
collection of information relating to each of safety climate and views of reporting 
and disclosure. Therefore, to inform the research question the first three research 
sub-questions were developed. These are: 
1. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
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2. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in such 
settings?   
3. What is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses 
in rural clinical settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a 
hypothetical medication error?  
These three sub-questions identify that the research will be conducted in rural 
clinical settings amongst nurses. They also clarify that the research relates to safety 
climate, error reporting and error disclosure. 
 Chapter summary  
The complexity of health care delivery has been established in this chapter. In 
particular, the complexity of the relationship between safety climate, error 
reporting and error disclosure has been noted.  
It has also been identified that nurses, although involved in error management and 
disclosure are not always included in research. The body of research in relation to 
rural clinical settings is also lacking. Having identified the subject matter of this 
research and developed a research aim and question the issue of how best to 
research the subject now needs to be considered.   
The bulk of research presented in relation to error reporting has focused on the 
measurement of the error that is actually reported or is viewed as being reported. 
The systematic review of how nurses are involved with the process of error 
disclosure also found more quantitative studies than qualitative (Harrison et al., 
2014). Although it has been argued that research of safety climate needs to 
encompass both qualitative and quantitative methods the main approach to 
obtaining data in relation to safety climate is through quantitative surveys (Halligan 
& Zecevic, 2011). There are calls for new methods to be applied in patient safety 
research including more qualitative research (Iedema, 2009; Jorm & White, 2009; 
  
59 
Vincent, 2009). How best to conduct this research in a manner that acknowledges 
complexity will be considered in the following chapter. 
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3 Researching complexity in health 
care 
 Introduction 
Health care consumers receive care from numerous practitioners who in turn are 
usually caring for numerous others. Care is also delivered in a variety of settings. 
Although the majority of consumers receive health care safely, there are times 
when an error occurs that leaves a consumer harmed. At other times the same 
error may not cause any harm at all. Such is the complexity of health care delivery. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the nature of error management, reporting, 
disclosure and safety climate is complex. More recent approaches to error 
management acknowledge some industries, including health care, are complex 
technical systems. Numerous factors such as workplace setting and work role may 
influence reporting and disclosure as well as safety climate. Although there may be 
a relationship between safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure of 
error, the nature of any relationship may be complex and requires further 
investigation.  
In order to address the aims of this research and describe the complexity of safety 
climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings a research question has been 
developed. This question asks: how is safety climate related to views of reporting 
and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings?  
The research question assumes there is a relationship between safety climate and 
nurses’ views of reporting and disclosure of medication error. Although the 
research question does not make any assumptions about the nature of that 
relationship, the research aim assumes that the subject of safety climate amongst 
nurses in rural clinical settings is complex. 
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For the relationship between safety climate and views of reporting to be 
determined it is necessary to consider the separate elements. Subsequently three 
research sub-questions have been developed. These are: 
1. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
2. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in such 
settings?  
3. What is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses 
in rural clinical settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a 
hypothetical medication error? 
Having determined the aim, research questions and sub-questions, the remaining 
issue is adopting the best approach to undertake the research. In doing so, the issue 
of complexity needs to be acknowledged.  
Health care is complex. Therefore the use of research methods designed to 
understand complexity is an obvious choice. However, as will be put forward here, 
there is a debate about the most appropriate methods to use for this.  
Arguments for new approaches to researching quality and safety are evident in 
health care (Jorm & White, 2009; Vincent, 2009) (Iedema, 2009), reflecting similar 
arguments in other industries (Glendon, 2008). Despite this, there is little to suggest 
that policy or funding for research has increased the use of other methods (Khushf, 
Raymond, & Beaman, 2008).  
Debates surrounding different methods indicate a tension between how research is 
currently undertaken and how it should be done. Whilst discussion tends to be 
focused on the benefits of either quantitative or qualitative research, there is also 
an underlying tension between different worldviews.  
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The dominant view within health care is that of evidence based medicine. This 
contrasts with an alternative view proposed by complexity science. These two 
different views are discussed within this chapter. This is followed by consideration 
of health care as a complex system and a framework for how knowledge is formed 
within that system. The issue of how to research such complexity is then addressed, 
leading to the introduction of configurational comparative methods and their use in 
research for the purpose of understanding complexity.  
These matters are then given consideration in light of what has already been noted 
in the previous chapter in relation to the complexity surrounding safety climate and 
the reporting and disclosure of medication error. The chapter then concludes with 
two further research sub-questions that inform the main research question and 
research aim.   
 The influence of evidence based medicine 
In 1992 evidence-based medicine (EBM) emerged as a new approach for improving 
medical care (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992). Although having its 
origins in the mid-19th century (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 
1996) the more recent use of the term applies to the systematic search of literature 
and its evaluation using rules of evidence (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 
1992). Alongside this process is the judgement of the clinician and the patient 
preference (Haynes, Devereaux, & Guyatt, 2002). 
The steps required for evidence based medicine were the development of an 
answerable question, systematically searching for the best available research to 
answer that question, critically appraising the research found (including applying 
rules of evidence) and integrating this appraisal with clinical experience and the 
patient preference and then evaluation of the outcome of the care delivered (Straus 
& McAlister, 2000). The rules of evidence regard that randomised control trials (RCT) 
and meta-analysis provide a higher level of evidence compared to other research 
methods and these have become the “gold standard”, although it has been noted 
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that there are other forms of evidence that can inform practice (Sackett et al., 
1996).  
The approach is not without its critics. A subsequent systematic review has 
identified several limitations to the application of EBM including the absence of 
coherent evidence in some areas, difficulties applying the evidence in some patient 
situations and barriers to practising high quality medicine (Straus & McAlister, 
2000). Further issues identified by the same review were that the clinician needed 
to have the skills to undertake the process, limited time and available resources and 
that there is a limited amount of research indicating that evidence based medicine 
is effective.  
Overall, the focus of the evidence is upon empirical research of intervention and 
outcome. This process, whereby research is effectively reduced to cause and effect 
element, is referred to as reductionist (Martin & Sturmberg, 2009). Also referred to 
as Newtonian or Newtonian Science, it is considered flawed particularly when 
applied to organisations as such an approach assumes stability (Anderson, Crabtree, 
Steele, & McDaniel, 2005). In other words, when measuring an intervention against 
an outcome there is an assumption that all other factors will remain constant. For 
example, in designing a study considering the relationship between safety climate 
and error reporting and disclosure, the adoption of a Newtonian approach would 
assume that “safety climate” was an intervention, “error reporting and disclosure” 
the outcome and all other factors would be assumed to remain static.  
Use of the term has extended to other areas beyond health care with commentaries 
in social science acknowledging a need to focus on empirical research in order to 
inform evidence based approaches in the political and social context (Mykhalovskiy 
& Weir, 2004). Others within medicine have argued that the original model was 
limited and there is a need for a broader focus on clinical expertise (Haynes et al., 
2002).  
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The insistence from those working in public health that explanations and 
identification of complexity is obtained through studies that are artificially 
controlled (Martin & Sturmberg, 2009) results in complexity not being dealt with 
well in health care research. Such complexity lies within the individual, the system 
and the organisational infrastructure not merely with an intervention (Miles, 2009). 
The use of terms such as evidence and evidence-based are common amongst even 
the layperson and the use of such reductionist approaches to research resulted in a 
similar reductionism in how issues in health care are dealt with (De Simone, 2006).  
Policy has also been influenced by this approach with the dominance of EBM leaving 
social science research criticised as not being high level evidence (Blackman, 
Wistow, & Byrne, 2013). Yet, social science studies help to provide understanding of 
issues in a specific context. It is often not the average that is important but what 
explains “these highs and the lows” (Ovretveit, 2009, p. 1732). The previously 
mentioned work of Townsend (2013) in relation to large-N studies within safety 
obscuring local level results reflects a similar view (Section 2.7). 
It should be noted that this is not an argument for abandoning EBM. It is more a call 
to recognise that not all health care problems can be solved through such 
reductionist approaches to research where clinical work is reduced to an activity or 
task with cost containment being the driver (Martin & Sturmberg, 2009). 
Subsequently reports urging for the use of qualitative research as evidence to 
inform public policy have emerged that further add to this argument (National 
Research Council, 2012).  
Evidence based medicine (EBM) is therefore considered flawed in situations that 
exhibit complexity. It is considered that it does not acknowledge whole of systems 
approaches, where both simple and complex interventions do not always work as 
expected nor can they be explained by such an approach (Martin & Sturmberg, 
2009).  
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Whilst appropriate for cause and effect interventions for many areas of research, it 
is arguable that more is required in some situations. For example, some argue there 
is a need to explore “how to research complex clinical conducts and experiences in 
the interest of limiting the risks and harm inflicted on patients and clinicians alike” 
(Iedema, 2009, p. 1703). For this to occur, methods need to be developed that allow 
for the research of scenarios relevant to the reality of the real world (Blackman et 
al., 2013). This also requires a paradigm shift to one that better represents a more 
complex reality (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010).  
 Complexity, organisations and safety 
Complexity science offers an alternative view to inform research. The theory 
emerged in the 1950’s from the Santa Fe Institute where anthropologists studying 
civilisations noticed that many successful ones came to an abrupt end rather than 
experiencing a slow decline, suggesting a single catastrophic event may have been 
responsible (Lewin, 1999). Theorists were interested in the complexity of such 
cultures, similarities of events leading to their end and the concept that civilisations 
were more complex than linear. Further work involving computing science 
developed theories based upon the concept of the world being chaotic but within 
the chaos elements emerge through adapting (Lewin, 1999). Numerous disciplines 
have since adopted complexity theory including meteorology, physics, mathematics 
and genetics (McMillan, 2008; Mitchell, 2009). Theories of complexity challenge the 
nature of cause and effect thinking. 
Central to complexity theory is the concept of a system which has been defined as a 
“delineated part of the universe which is distinguished from the rest by an imaginary 
boundary“ (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010, p 417). Whilst Aristotle considered that 
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (Martin & Sturmberg, 2009), systems 
thinking sees the whole as interconnected, interacting and interdependent parts 
(De Simone, 2006). The focus on the whole is considered more meaningful through 
the study of complexity as it focuses on determining how the whole exists through 
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how the parts are organised whereas reductionism focuses on single cause and 
effect or interventions (De Simone, 2006). Through understanding the complex 
relationships and patterns of the whole it is therefore possible to understand the 
system (Anderson et al., 2005).  
As noted in the previous section, this is not an argument that EBM should be 
abandoned. Indeed, it should be noted that complexity science does not dismiss 
evidence based approaches (De Simone, 2006) and it is acknowledged that such 
reductivism may be useful for the mechanical aspects of medicine (Sturmberg & 
Martin, 2009). However, for complex technical systems such as health care to be 
effective there is a need to understand heterogeneity (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010). 
An awareness of complexity may not solve a problem but opens it up to a greater 
awareness through improving the understanding of complex relationships within 
the system as opposed to merely considering the relationship of discreet elements 
(Martin & Sturmberg, 2009). Therefore, approaching research from the perspective 
of complexity science allows for finding out how an organisation learns rather than 
what it knows (Anderson et al., 2005).  
There are several features present in complex systems. They are made up of 
individual components and networks that exhibit collective behaviour, information 
is processed from both the internal and external environment and they are able to 
adapt (Mitchell, 2009). That is, the behaviour within the system is hard to predict 
but can change through learning or evolution in order to improve the possibility of 
survival or success (Mitchell, 2009). 
Complex systems are also autonomous in that what they become is part of the 
system where the components within the surrounding environment may impact 
(Byrne, 2011). These multiplied relationships result in the potential for new states 
through adaption, that is, the system is open (Byrne, 2011; Dekker, 2011). 
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Systems may be described as simple or complex (Byrne, 2011). A simple system 
exists where a single cause can be determined and a causal category can be 
segregated from another.  By comparison a complex system has causal categories 
that are intertwined and cannot be completely described in such a dualistic manner. 
One system may intersect with another or be nested within it and the boundaries 
may be fuzzy.  
These concepts can be applied to complex organisations and they assist in 
explaining the nature of serious organisational failure. Systems can become resilient 
and are also able to adapt, which means they may not ever be fully describable 
(Dekker, 2011). Rather than describing the ‘whole’ as the sum of its parts, it is 
considered that the ‘whole’ has emergent parts (Dekker, 2011; McMillan, 2008). 
This emergence cannot be understood by analysis alone (Byrne, 2011).  
Complexity has been described as a subset of chaos. It is from chaos that 
emergence comes which may include “something that you couldn’t have predicted 
from what you know of the component parts” (Langton cited in Lewin, 1999, pp. 
12—13). The emergent global structure influences behaviour at the local level 
which then feeds back to the global structure in a way that produces further 
influences.  
It has been observed that in the traditional model which is based upon Newtonian 
science, something must break in order to indicate failure (Dekker, 2011). This 
reliance upon a Newtonian view of the world is problematic as it fails to recognise 
complexity. Complex systems are dynamic and non-linear, and the system may be 
robust enough to sustain the change (Byrne, 2011) or a small change may have a 
significant impact (Dekker, 2011; McMillan, 2008).  
The notion of small changes having an impact is often referred to as the butterfly 
effect, a term that has its origins in a model for meteorology that considered 
whether the wing flap of a butterfly could cause a tornado. The conclusion was the 
single event of a butterfly flapping its wings could lead to a tornado depending upon 
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what other elements were present in the weather system at the time (Lorenz, 
1972).  
Behaviour within an organisation emerges from the bottom up rather than top 
down and through adaption results in systems that develop a capacity to function at 
maximum capability. This is termed the edge of chaos (Dekker, 2011; McMillan, 
2008). That is, the organisation (system) may appear to be chaotic but those 
working within it have adapted to form complex ways of operating. Hence, when 
the equivalent of a butterfly flapping its wings occurs there may be no effect, or the 
outcome may be extremely dramatic. 
Once this point is reached there is a risk that a phase shift may result (Dekker, 
2011). Other terms such as a phase transit or tipping point have also been used to 
describe this concept which refers to a little bit more or less of something leading to  
something very different. An example of such a process from the physical sciences is 
the impact temperature on an object’s solid, liquid or gaseous form (Lewin, 1999).  
For example, although possible temperatures have a large range, H2O changes its 
form from solid to liquid and from liquid to gas at a specific temperature. A cup of 
water remains liquid even with a shift in temperature from 20—90 degrees but a 
small change from 95—100 degrees results in a significant change of form. When a 
phase shift or tipping point occurs within an organisation operating at the edge of 
chaos it is possible for a major system ( or organisational) failure or disaster to occur 
(Dekker, 2011).   
This view of how organisations fail has similarities with the Swiss Cheese Model 
referred to in the previous chapter (Reason, 1997). A latent error, for example, may 
be the eventual tipping point for a major incident. However, the nature of such a 
model is linear in that it may explain the events leading up to an organisational 
failure but the result of this type of thinking is to react to error and the constant 
measurement of the absence of safety rather than its presence (Hollnagel, 2014). It 
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is possible that the focus on measurement of error is an unintended consequence 
of a focus on cause and effect approaches to error management and research. 
It has been noted in the previous chapter that the concept of resilience engineering 
may offer an alternative approach to error management in complex-technical 
systems (Qureshi, 2007). Complexity, resilience and an acknowledgment of adaptive 
systems are underlying elements of this concept.  
Focusing on the measurement of error, (the non-presence of safety) is referred to 
as Safety I. The alternative approach is Safety II where the focus is on what has gone 
right. When things in an organisation continually go right the organisation is 
considered resilient. Even when things do go wrong (that is, an error occurs) an 
organisation may be able to deal with the error and adapt in such a way that it 
continues to exist. This is further indication of resilience. Therefore, in order to 
understand how safety exists, there is a need to understand how organisations are 
resilient.  
Organisations or systems that are continually resilient and that achieve greater 
levels of successful performance have been referred to as positive deviants (Lawton, 
Taylor, Clay-Williams, & Braithwaite, 2014). It has been proposed that a better 
understanding of safety may be achieved through identifying these, studying them 
in-depth to find the processes and practices that allow them to succeed (using 
qualitative methods), developing and testing findings in larger statistical studies 
followed by working with key stakeholders to “disseminate the evidence about 
newly characterized best practices” (Lawton et al., 2014 p. 881). 
The focus of such an approach still hinges on the concept of evidence and large 
statistical studies that focus on intervention and outcome rather than complexity. 
The authors note that measuring concepts such as safe care is difficult as there is 
often variation found in measures amongst different work settings and professions 
(Lawton et al., 2014). Such differences in relation to medication error and safety 
climate have already been outlined in the previous chapter.  
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The challenge is how to better understand the complex health system, the sub-
systems within it and how best to undertake research that is able to inform 
practice. Despite arguments that paradigms of knowledge generation need to 
reflect reality (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010) there is resistance to such change 
(De Simone, 2006). These types of statements assume an understanding of what 
constitutes knowledge. This will be explored further in the next section in relation 
to how knowledge is generated in a health care system that is complex. 
 Health care as a complex system 
The previously cited To Err is Human proposed the need for a systems approach to 
health care error (Kohn et al., 2000). In order to take a systems approach to error 
management it is important to understand the health system as complex in the first 
place. It is also necessary to understand how different research methods can 
contribute to the understanding of that complexity. 
Just as the terms error and culture are difficult to define so too is the term 
knowledge. Whilst the current tendency is to see knowledge as a state of fixity, of 
retrievable information, or meanings focused upon evidence, authority or expertise 
with a degree of certainty the word has its origins in a verb meaning to knowledge 
(Bennett et al., 2005). Philosophers sought to question and to actively seek 
knowledge rather than having a pre-occupation with certainty.  
A similar contrast can be made between EBM and complexity science. The 
evidence-based approach focuses on certainty whilst complexity science focuses on 
understanding. As a result, there are differences in the way research is undertaken, 
the types of methods that may be used and the way in which theory is developed.  
This contrast has been outlined in a model of knowledge generation through a view 
of the complex health system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). As noted earlier, a 
system may have other systems nested within it (Byrne, 2011; Dekker & Leveson, 
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2014).  Through accepting health care as a complex system it is therefore possible 
to consider different ways of understanding it. 
Knowledge generation in health care is informed through two approaches, 
simple/complicated and complex/chaotic (Byrne, 2011; Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010). The former uses the cause and effect evidence-based approach previously 
outlined in this chapter. As a result evidence is informed by research that assumes 
both objectivity and linearity deemed to have both a high degree of certainty and 
agreement (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010).  
The latter concept of complex/chaotic knowledge generation is informed by sense-
making. Informed by complexity science sense-making assumes non-linearity and 
uses research for retrospective understanding although it is regarded there is less 
agreement and certainty from this research (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). 
Knowledge generation in a complex health system can therefore be informed by 
both simple/complicated and complex/chaotic approaches to research. It could be 
that a simple/complicated knowledge needs context or that a complex system may 
have either a complex or linear component. This results in evidence, knowledge and 
sense-making informing the edge of chaos that exists within the complex health 
system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010).  
In relation to improving knowledge of patient safety within the complex-technical 
health system the Safety I approach seeks evidence of the cause of error. More 
specifically in relation to medication error, safety climate would be considered an 
intervention to reduce the occurrence of error or to improve error reporting. In 
doing so, evidence is sought as to whether or not there is a relationship between 
the two. However, as outlined in the previous chapter, workplace setting, work role 
and other elements influence both safety climate and medication error. Differences 
have also been found in these elements and the relationship between the two. 
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The alternative Safety II approach aims to determine how a system or organisation 
may be resilient. Safety is viewed from a socio-cultural perspective which accepts 
complexity and attempts to understand it through sense-making (Martin & Félix-
Bortolotti, 2010). Research applied to safety climate and medication error through 
this approach would be focussed on a retrospective understanding of that 
complexity.  
Theory is also developed through either deductive or inductive means (Bryman, 
2012; Ragin, 1987; Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). The formation of a hypothesis followed 
by data collection and analysis to test the hypothesis is to inform theory through 
deductive means. In contrast, to obtain data and undertake analysis is to undertake 
inductive theory development. The approach of EBM is to assume a system is 
simple/complicated and to use deductive reasoning in theory development whereas 
complexity science tends to use an inductive approach to understand a 
complex/chaotic system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010).  
This raises the issue of which is the best approach to undertake for this research. It 
also leads to a need to consider an appropriate method for such a task.  
 Researching the complex health system 
Research involving the complex and dynamic health system requires a method used 
that acknowledges complexity. There are numerous debates present in the 
literature regarding how to achieve this in relation to researching patient safety and 
complexity. The dominant debate within health care is focused on a comparison 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches for patient safety research. 
Meanwhile a debate within social sciences surrounding the benefits of case-based 
comparative research offers an opportunity to introduce a new means of research 
to contribute to knowledge generation for the complex system of health care. 
Social science research has been put forward as offering promise in researching 
both systems and patient safety. Examples of how it may be used include reframing 
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problems and offering a different way of viewing them, particularly in relation to 
the implementation of change (Ovretveit, 2009). That is, it may be possible to show 
how a system may be changing (Runciman, 2002). 
It has already been identified in the previous section that EBM embeds the notion 
of cause and effect through focusing on interventions and outcomes. However, as 
also outlined in the previous section it is not the only way in which knowledge may 
be generated. Knowledge may also be informed through an improved 
understanding of complexity, although how to research this remains a challenge.  
People are influenced by context and as a result do not always do as they are 
supposed to, the question remaining is why (Ovretveit, 2009). In addition, clinical 
practice is dominated by management and data whilst questions remain 
unanswered in relation to how clinicians work with the socio- and psycho-social 
aspects of both patient safety and their own safety (Vincent, 2009). It has been 
suggested that questions such as why health care workers are reluctant to report or 
disclose error openly when there is a policy to do so may be answered by social 
science frameworks of analysis rather than merely through checklists and evidence 
based medicine (Ovretveit, 2009).  
Central to EBM is the nature of interventions (cause) to achieve a specific outcome 
(effect). Although complexity science recognises the potential for a broader 
understanding of complex systems, social science theorists have postulated the 
notion of causality within such complexity.  
The problem with social science data is that it tends to be noisy (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). That is, real world data do not always clearly fit a particular 
causal path and therefore it is not always possible to clearly identify causal 
elements in relation to an outcome. This reflects complexity. 
The use of configurational comparative methods (CCM) offers an opportunity to 
study such noisy data in a transparent and structured manner. While the details of 
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how this approach has been used for this research appears in the next chapter, an 
overview of some of the key concepts of CCM is necessary here to demonstrate 
how such methods have the potential to contribute to knowledge generation and 
improved understanding of the complexity between safety climate, error reporting 
and error disclosure. 
 Configurational comparative methods 
One of the problems noted regarding the ability to research complexity is the failure 
to develop methods that allow the research of scenarios relevant to the reality of 
the real world (Blackman et al., 2013). Configurational comparative methods offer 
an opportunity to address this issue and it has been suggested that they could be 
applied to researching hospital error and in particular examine unusual cases in 
order to develop better understanding of the underlying complexity which may 
then assist in improving error management (Bell, 2007). 
The term CCM generally refers to a group of methods. For the purposes of this 
research the term will be used in reference to the associated with the two most 
common set-theoretic methods of crisp and fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis (csQCA and fsQCA). When discussing the detail in relation to analysis using 
each of these methods reference will be made to the particular form of QCA being 
used. This clear differentiation between terminology relating to research design and 
the process of analysis is to clearly separate the two and to assist in avoiding 
confusion which may occur if the terms are used interchangeably.  
These methods use comparative approaches to study diversity as opposed to 
qualitative approaches which are used to study commonality and quantitative 
approaches used to study covariance (Ragin, 1987; Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). They 
are also case-based. 
There are a variety of ways in which case research is applied.  Cases may be a 
theoretical construct or identified through empirical units (Ragin, 1992). Ultimately, 
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it is important for a researcher to clearly indicate what a case is “of” (Luck et al., 
2006). 
Configurational comparative methods study cases by considering configurations of 
the presence (or absence) of conditions of interest and determines those which 
may be causal for the presence (or absence) of an outcome (Ragin & Amoroso, 
2011). Hence, use of the term configurational comparative methods. The 
mathematical underpinnings of these methods reside in fuzzy set theory leading to 
them also being referred to as set theoretic methods. 
These methods contrast with both quantitative and qualitative methods (Ragin, 
1987). Quantitative research emphasises the relationship between different 
variables, whereas configurational methods focus upon the cases themselves and 
how the conditions of interest relate to each case. Qualitative research focuses on 
identifying variables or conditions but how their presence or absence impacts upon 
a particular outcome on a case-by-case basis is not understood. It is possible to 
understand this impact through a CCM approach. 
Central to CCMs are the concepts of conjunctural causality and equifinality. The 
intersection of more than one factor (that is a configuration of conditions) leading 
to an outcome is referred to as conjunctural causality (Ragin, 1987). That is, a single 
element alone does not cause an outcome but the outcome is the result of that 
element acting with other factors (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The term 
equifinality refers to the possibility that more than one configuration (that is 
alternative configurations of the same conditions) may also lead to the same 
outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
There are several ways that CCM may be used for research. These include 
summarising data, checking data coherence, checking a hypothesis or existing 
theory, testing conjecture and for developing new theoretical arguments. Analysis 
with CCM leads to the researcher moving between inductive and deductive 
reasoning. This process is termed retroduction (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011).  
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Configurational comparative methods are valuable for understanding context, 
interactions and causal complexity (Collier, 2014). This makes them useful for 
researching the complexity of patient safety within health care. 
A systems approach to patient safety is about enhancing the capacity for those who 
work within the system to do the right thing through more than just standardised 
approaches such as checklists but recognising that behaviour is influenced by 
context (Dekker & Leveson, 2014). The literature review presented in the previous 
chapter identified a possible influence of workplace setting, work role and other 
elements upon safety climate, error reporting and disclosure.  Each of these is an 
example of how context may influence behaviour. 
Current approaches to research have merely identified these issues that exist, with 
no capacity to understand how they impact upon the individual clinician whose 
behaviour in doing the right thing is crucial to the delivery of safe patient care. 
Configurational comparative methods therefore offer an opportunity to fill this gap 
in how knowledge is formed in relation to the way clinicians think and behave. 
Causal relationships may work differently in different contexts (Denk & Lehtinen, 
2013). Therefore the use of CCM for this research may assist in understanding why 
different workplace settings or work roles show differences relating to safety 
climate, error and disclosure. 
It is the configurations of the conditions of each case that matter, specific to that 
case (Denk & Lehtinen, 2013). It is often unusual cases or outliers that provide new 
information in health care (Runciman, 2002). The use of configurational 
comparative methods allows for the identification of different states of a similar 
system that enables the researcher to look at the cases that are of interest, whether 
that be in relation to a particular outcome or the identification and examination of 
those cases that are unusual.  
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 Focus on effectality 
Arguments have also been put forward of a need for greater focus on the nature of 
effect as much as that of causality. This is termed effectality and it is achieved 
through thinking about the actions needed towards the achievement of a desired 
outcome rather than actions as a cause of what has happened. Such an approach is 
considered retroductive (Byrne, 2011). 
Four types of effectality have been defined with respect to a system. These are the 
specifying of the original position (the nature of the space when it came into 
existence), staying the same (whilst some aspects may change the system remains 
the same), undergoing phase shift (although the system remains there is a change 
in its character) and terminating (whereby the system ceases to exist in any form 
and loses its inherent integrity) (Byrne, 2011).  
Evidence based medicine tends to promote deductive reasoning using quantitative 
methods and is useful for researching simple/complicated systems. In contrast 
complexity science leans towards a more inductive approach using qualitative 
methods to assist understanding a complex/chaotic system. Through use of a CCM 
the recognition of effectality and approaches to more inductive theory 
development may also be a means of adding knowledge and understanding of 
complexity within health care settings.  
The use of CCM is growing. Two reviews have found increasing numbers of studies 
in a variety of disciplines including health (Rihoux & Marx, 2013; Thiem & Dusa, 
2013). Publications have increased substantially in the past ten years with greatest 
growth occurring in the more developed analysis of fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA).   
An example of the use of CCM for health care research is an analysis undertaken 
with respect to conditions observed for the successful implementation of a smoking 
cessation program. This research specifically looked at the conditions present 
amongst the individuals who participated in the program who ceased smoking. This 
study determined that whilst education was a required condition,  in all cases where 
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an individual ceased smoking access to employment opportunities and housing 
were conditions that were also needed to be present for the desired outcome 
(Blackman, 2008).  
Without these additional conditions as well as the education provided with the 
program there was no success for individuals who participated in the smoking 
cessation program. That is, the research considered each condition with respect to 
the individual case, rather than comparing the relationship between variables and 
as a result was able to establish which elements were required for individuals to 
succeed and cease smoking. These methods have also been used in organisational 
studies. It has been suggested that as organisational parts are inter-connected then 
configurational approaches to research are appropriate (Ragin, 2013).  
An example from organisational research found that managers with 
transformational leadership characteristics were likely to successfully implement 
change within an organisation. However, through the use of CCM it was also 
identified that in the absence of such a leadership style the same achievement was 
possible through a combination of other characteristics by a leader (Whittington & 
Goodwin, 2013). 
These examples demonstrate the use of CCM to generate knowledge of complexity. 
In addition, they are examples of the use of CCM within both health care and 
organisational research. 
Therefore use of CCM shows promise in order to understand the complexity of 
safety climate, error reporting and disclosure. Having established this, it is 
necessary to now consider the development of research sub-questions to inform 
the overall research question and research aims of this research. Once this has been 
undertaken it is possible to discuss in detail how CCM may be used for this research. 
This discussion will be presented in the following chapter. 
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 The complexity of safety climate and the reporting and 
disclosure of medication error 
There are several matters that suggest the use of a configurational comparative 
method to research the complexity of safety climate and views of reporting and 
disclosure of medication error. Firstly, it has been identified in the previous chapter 
that the health system is undergoing constant change (Section 2.3). That is, it is not 
a static system. Secondly, the nature of the relationship between safety climate, 
reporting and disclosure is complex with differences found amongst different 
workplace settings and work roles (Section 2.16).  
Complexity science recognises each of these. There is an acknowledgment that 
systems are dynamic and changing (Lewin, 1999; Mitchell, 2009). There is also 
recognition that organisations adapt to the constantly changing environment 
(Dekker, 2011; McMillan, 2008). Some of these complex adaptive systems perform 
at a high level within that complexity and are resilient to change (Hollnagel, 2014).   
Patient safety, including medication error, is a serious problem for the health 
system (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b). 
However, the majority of care that consumers or patients receive is safely delivered 
without incident or harm (Hollnagel et al., 2013). In order to better manage safety 
and ensure safe patient care it is necessary to improve understanding of episodes of 
safe care.  
Therefore to achieve the aim of this research which is to describe the complexity of 
safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings, the use of a complexity 
science framework is more suitable than one based upon cause-effect science.  
Configurational methods assist in the identification of causal complexity 
(conjunctural causality) (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). They also 
recognise more than one causal pathway may be present for a specific outcome. 
Thus, use of a configurational comparative method would be beneficial for this 
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research through informing the research aim and contributing to knowledge of the 
complex health system through providing sense-making of how safety climate is 
related to views of reporting and disclosure of error. 
 Development of 4th and 5th research sub-questions 
It has been noted that simple/complicated approaches to research assist in 
identifying difference but do not explain them (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). For this 
research method acknowledging complexity is required and this may be addressed 
by the use of CCM.  Therefore, CCM may assist in informing the main research 
question of how is safety climate related to views of reporting and disclosure of 
medication error amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings?   
What is not so clear is how this may be achieved. Therefore a fourth research sub-
question for this research is: how is the understanding of the relationship between 
workplace safety climate and views of reporting medication error changed through 
the use of a configurational comparative method?  That is, if a CCM approach is 
used for this research there is a need to identify how it contributes to generating 
knowledge of the complex health care system. 
This research sub-question assumes use of CCM will lead to a change of 
understanding through this contribution to knowledge. Once this change is 
identified there are implications in relation to the main research question.  
That is, if the understanding of how safety climate is related to nurses’ views of 
reporting and disclosure of medication error is changed then there may be 
implication for both the management of medication as well as medication error. 
Therefore a fifth research sub-question for this research is: what could this mean for 
the management of medication error?  
With the research aim, question and sub-questions established, the following 
chapter will provide more detail of how a configurational comparative method has 
been used for this research. 
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4 Research design and method 
Safety and error are complex areas. Organisations are complex in terms of how they 
operate hence understanding what should be done to ensure that safe patient care 
occurs is difficult to research. However, there is still much that is unknown about 
how complex organisations work. 
It has been suggested that a shift in focus is needed away from concentrating on 
what has gone wrong in a few cases (Safety I) to what has gone right in most cases 
(Safety II) (Hollnagel, 2014). This means a greater focus upon understanding how 
some organisations develop the capacity to ensure what should happen does.  
Those that achieve this are regarded as resilient. 
Complexity science is emerging as a paradigm for a better understanding of how 
organisations work in respect to organisational culture and safety. Rather than 
focusing on evidence, complexity science acknowledges the need for sense-making 
and recognises that different things work in different settings and situations (Martin 
& Félix-Bortolotti, 2010).  
The aim of this research is to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses 
working in rural clinical settings. This aim was developed through examination of 
the literature in relation to safety climate and error reporting and disclosure, and 
will be informed through the research question which is how is safety climate 
related to views of reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses 
working in rural clinical settings?   
The notion of complexity is central to CCM and therefore such methods offer an 
innovative means for the future research of organisational complexity. Through 
case-based analysis of sub-set relations it is possible to consider a variety of 
conditions and their impact on a particular outcome (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 
2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In using this approach it is possible to identify 
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more than one set of conditions that may lead to an outcome, or several similar sets 
of conditions that may lead to very different outcomes which reflects the key 
concepts of conjunctural causality and equifinality (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
There is a growing number of studies where a CCM research design has been 
applied (Rihoux & Marx, 2013; Thiem & Dusa, 2013). This includes publications of 
applications of a CCM in high ranking journals, including one recently (Trujillo & 
Woulfin, 2014).  
The potential for use of CCM in researching the complexity in health care was 
introduced in the previous chapter. For this research it has been used for the 
summarising of data as well as for theory development (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). 
Further details about the specific research design that has been applied to this 
research and the methods of analysis will now be outlined in in this chapter.  
The research design is based upon the funnel of complexity which outlines three 
phases that should be undertaken when applying a CCM research design (Rihoux & 
Lobe, 2009). Detail of this how this process has been applied to this research is 
presented in Figure 4-1.  
The first of these phases is before the analytic moment where theory and case 
knowledge informs the research (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2010). The detail of the research design, data collection and preparation of research 
data for analysis using a CCM will also be presented in this section. This includes the 
selection of cases as well as the conditions and outcomes of interest for the 
research. 
It is recommended that another form of analysis be used alongside CCM (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2010). Therefore a variable-based analysis using principal 
components analysis (PCA) and inferential statistics was undertaken.  Use of each of 
these approaches assisted in addressing the first three research sub-questions with 
the former also adopted as a means of determining the conditions for analysis using 
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fsQCA. More detail of how these analyses were used will also be outlined in this 
chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Funnel of complexity as applied in this research (adapted from Rihoux & Lobe, 2009) 
Once this has been presented the second phase during the analytic moment will be 
outlined (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). Analysis of case-based data will be explained 
including the preparation of data through calibration of sets, use of Boolean algebra 
and software, and production of solution terms (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, 2012). Definitions and explanations of these and 
other key terms for analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions, the production 
of a truth table, discussion of truth table analysis and handling of contradictions and 
logical remainders will also be provided.  
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This research involves the comparison of several different outcomes. Outlined in 
this chapter is the consistent and transparent approach to analysis that has been 
developed to allow comparison between these different outcomes. 
Following the analysis the third phase after the analytic moment occurs. During this 
phase results from the analysis will be presented and discussed in terms of how 
they inform existing case and theoretical knowledge. This final phase will be mostly 
undertaken in the following chapters, however an outline of how results will be 
presented is provided at the end of this chapter.  
The recommended set of standards of good practice have also been used to inform 
this research (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). These provide a guide to the 
researcher as to how to undertake configurational methods.  
Theoretical knowledge has underpinned the aims of this research. The research sub-
questions also reflect both theoretical and case knowledge and inform the 
outcome, conditions and cases that will be used for analysis using fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). Before the research design is discussed an 
overview of analysis with CCM is required.  
 Overview of CCM analysis 
Configurational comparative methods are used to research the complexity of 
configurations of conditions of interest and the presence or absence of a particular 
outcome of interest (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Ragin, 1987, 1992; Ragin & 
Amoroso, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). These approaches have their 
foundations in fuzzy set theory and are also referred to as set-theoretic as they 
allow for the study of sub-set relations (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009; Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012). An outcome is the main focus of a study, the variable to be 
explained by conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) or the phenomenon of interest 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). A condition is described as something that may 
affect an outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) or may explain it (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
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That is, within a given data set there are two sub-sets. One is the set of cases where 
the outcome of interest is present and the other is the set of cases where the 
outcome is not present. The cases in each of these sub-sets are studied with 
consideration as to whether configurations of conditions of interest are present or 
absent.  
There are different forms of CCM. The two most common are crisp set qualitative 
comparative analysis (csQCA) and fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) 
(Rihoux & Marx, 2013; Thiem & Dusa, 2013). The detail of how each has been 
applied in relation to this research appears later in this chapter. First, it is important 
consider the different approaches to analysis in order to assist in understanding the 
nature of CCM research design.  
To undertake an analysis using csQCA or fsQCA data needs to be transformed or 
calibrated (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, 2012). Each of these 
methods of analysis differ in approaches to calibration and this will be explained 
here.  
Crisp set QCA (csQCA) is the approach used when the set membership of the 
conditions and outcome are dichotomised (Marx, Cambre, & Rihoux, 2013; Rihoux 
& De Meur, 2009) That is, it is determined that the cases are contained in the set of 
the condition or outcome (fully in) or they are not (fully out). The terminology used 
to indicate each is True or 1 for fully in and False or 0 for fully out. Fuzzy set QCA 
(fsQCA) allocates cases to set membership by degrees rather than by 
dichotomisation (Greckhamer et al., 2013; Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). Hence, rather than be classified “fully in” or “fully out” the classification can 
be by degrees on a range from 0 (fully out) to 1 (fully in). Sets are thus calibrated to 
reflect the degrees. A crossover point is set as the point at which a condition or 
outcome is considered neither in nor out of the set. Thus cases can then be 
assigned set membership by degrees. This point, which is within the range of 0—1, 
is set as 0.5 (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
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This may seem somewhat confusing when explained in isolation but applying it to 
an example assists in understanding. If it was necessary to determine set 
membership of the set Red Squares, then a red square may be considered fully in 
(1) and a blue circle fully out (0). If there were four cases present, these being a red 
square, a blue square, a red circle and a blue circle, then a red square could easily 
be assigned as fully in (1) and any other cases present, regardless of shape or colour 
would be assigned fully out (0).  
The approach taken with csQCA only allows for the choice of considering each case 
as either fully in (1) or fully out (0) (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). By 
adopting an fsQCA approach it is possible to consider that cases may be partially in 
a given set.  
Thus, in the example of the set of Red Squares, if a researcher was more interested 
in cases based upon shape rather than colour then for the condition of red or 
square was present then they may assign a value of 0.75 to the blue square and a 
value of 0 to the red circle to reflect that the condition of interest square was more 
present in the blue square.  In this instance the respective shape with the calibrated 
value of 0.75 would be considered partially in the set of red squares, indicated by a 
calibration of above 0.5 but less than 1. With this approach to set calibration the 
diversity of cases can be accommodated. 
Decisions around set calibration and membership need to be transparent and based 
upon theory and research (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, 2012). That 
is, when calibrating set membership of cases for a given set the researcher needs to 
justify any decisions regarding how cases are assigned. 
As noted in the previous chapter, when the neat world of science meets the reality 
of society and social science that data can become noisy (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). This noise reflects the nature of the complex/chaotic world and hence a 
method that allows the nature of chaos to be reflected in the way data can be 
analysed is useful in aiding the understanding of complexity. The ability to calibrate 
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by degrees in fsQCA, when compared to the crisp set approach of a set being either 
‘fully in’ or ‘fully out’, has resulted in growing use of this approach (Rihoux & Marx, 
2013; Thiem & Dusa, 2013).  
Having determined fsQCA as the analysis approach for this research, further detail 
will now be presented regarding the research design, including selection of cases as 
well as detail of conditions and outcome of interest. The specifics of how sets were 
calibrated will be provided later in this chapter. Included is reference to several of 
the sub-questions which also reflect theoretical knowledge informing the research 
design with regards to the selection of outcomes, conditions and cases that 
underpinned the analysis with fsQCA.  
 Theoretical and case knowledge informing conditions, 
outcome and cases. 
During the first phase of the funnel of complexity theoretical and case knowledge 
should be used to develop the research design (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). In this before 
the analytic moment phase of the research design, the conditions, outcome and 
cases should therefore be informed by theoretical and case knowledge. 
Configurational comparative methods should not be used for anything other than 
their original aims of understanding complexity (Ragin, 2009; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, 2012). To ensure these aims are met there needs to 
be transparent justification surrounding selection of cases, conditions and 
outcomes, the use of appropriate terminology and a detailed discussion 
surrounding the assignment of set membership scores (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 
2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).  
It has already been highlighted that the aims and research question of this research 
have been developed from theory and existing research, as outlined in the 
literature review. More detail regarding how some of the research sub-questions 
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have further ensured the use of theory in the development of the research design 
will now be provided. 
The first of these research sub-questions is: what level of reporting and disclosure of 
different severity of a hypothetical medication error do nurses in rural clinical 
settings think is occurring?  This sub-question was developed through consideration 
of the literature. Little research is available surrounding reporting and disclosure of 
error in rural clinical settings (Aranaz-Andrés et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2008; Wholey 
et al., 2004)(Section 2.12). In addition, the involvement of nurses in error disclosure 
is not well researched (Harrison et al., 2014).  
Similar issues were identified in relation to safety culture and more particularly 
safety climate. This resulted in the development of a second research sub-question 
which is: what is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in these 
settings?   
In both instances differences were noted amongst different workplace settings and 
work roles as well as other elements such as experience and issues such as burnout. 
Current research has focused upon the identification and measurement of such 
differences but not upon understanding them. 
The conflicting information provided in the t literature makes it difficult to 
determine if there is a relationship between safety climate and the reporting and 
disclosure of error. Although some studies suggest there is a relationship (Colla et 
al., 2005; Hutchinson et al., 2009) others suggest there may not be (Freeth et al., 
2012; Groves, 2014). In addition, in relation to rural clinical settings there are no 
known studies of this relationship.  
In order to address the first two research sub-questions frequency data are 
required. As noted in the literature review existing studies have adopted the 
approach of asking participants their reporting and disclosure habits (Haw et al., 
2014; Kagan & Barnoy, 2008) or they have observed them (Bayazidi et al., 2012; 
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Westbrook et al., 2015). For this reason the use of a statistical approach with CCM, 
was required, particularly the use of inferential statistics. 
In addition, safety climate is generally measured using questionnaires which have 
the capacity to reduce questions or items into groups or factors (Etchegaray, St. 
John, & Thomas, 2011; Freeth et al., 2012). For this reason principal components 
analysis (PCA) was also used for this research. 
Therefore, whilst a variety of options to obtain data are available, use of a 
questionnaire would allow for collection of data in relation to both factors of safety 
climate and views of reporting and disclosure. Use of a hypothetical medication 
error could also be accommodated through this means.  
Further detail regarding the development of a questionnaire is presented later in 
this chapter. Before this can be considered, more detail regarding the identification 
of outcomes, conditions and cases is required. 
The third research sub-question is: what is the relationship between workplace 
safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings and their views of 
reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error?  This sub-question 
compares the relationship between safety climate and views of reporting and 
disclosure of error. Recalling the debate outlined in the previous study regarding 
case and variable research (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011) it is possible that both 
approaches may be used for this research in order to address the third sub-
question. That is, the relationship between safety climate and views of reporting 
and disclosure could be analysed using both a variable-based and case-based 
analysis.  
In addition it is recommended that when undertaking fsQCA another form of 
analysis is used (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Therefore, use of inferential 
statistics to compare variables was possible alongside a case-based analysis of 
safety climate conditions analysed in relation to the outcome of views of reporting 
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and disclosure of a hypothetical medication error also conducted. The use of both 
inferential statistics and PCA within a CCM research design assisted in obtaining and 
analysing data to address a further sub-question and therefore contribute to the 
findings relating to the research question and aims of this research. 
With the conditions and outcomes informed by the research sub-questions a further 
step was required. The selection of cases needed to be informed by case and 
theoretical knowledge.  
The aim of this research specifically refers to nurses in rural clinical settings as does 
the main research question and three sub-questions discussed thus far. The 
research aim, question and sub-questions were developed through reviewing both 
the context of patient safety and related research. Therefore theoretical and case 
knowledge has therefore informed the selection of cases.  
The rationale for the focus upon nurses was also determined through the literature 
review. Nurses are actively involved in medication management (Choo et al., 2010). 
In addition, there is limited research involving nurses, including rural nurses, in the 
process of error disclosure (Harrison et al., 2014; O'Connor et al., 2010). 
It is therefore clear that theoretical knowledge determined the outcome (views of 
reporting and disclosure), conditions (factors of teamwork and safety climate) and 
cases (nurses in rural clinical settings) for this research. Having done this it was then 
necessary to obtain data from the cases in relation to the outcome and conditions 
in a manner that allowed for transparent set calibration. 
 Questionnaire development 
As outlined in the previous section, it was necessary to transparently obtain data for 
this research in relation to conditions, outcome and cases. A questionnaire was 
developed for this purpose and this will now be detailed. 
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The questionnaire contained three sections. The first obtained data relating to 
factors of safety climate, the second made use of a hypothetical scenario to obtain 
data regarding views of reporting and disclosure and the third section collected 
demographic information.  
To enhance transparency and reduce researcher bias, for the first two sections 
existing tools were used. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 
2006) was used for collecting data regarding the conditions and a hypothetical 
medication error used in a previous study allowed for data relating to the outcome 
to be obtained (Weissman et al., 2005). The section relating to demographic was 
developed based upon the type of data collected by the SAQ, differences identified 
through the literature review (Chapter 2) and the context in which the research was 
undertaken (Department of Health and Human Services, 2007; Sexton et al., 2006). 
As noted in the literature review (Section 2.15) there are numerous tools available 
for collection of data relating to safety climate (Colla et al., 2005; Flin et al., 2006; 
Valentine et al., 2015). Three elements require attention when choosing a safety 
climate data collection instrument (Flin et al., 2006). These are content validity, 
criterion related validity and factor analysis.  
Content validity refers to the nature of questions contained within the SAQ and 
whether or not they measure what is intended to be measured (Flin et al., 2006). 
Use of theory, expert judgment and available literature are means of determining 
content validity (Bryman, 2012).   
One particular study undertaken in the UK adapted the language of the SAQ to suit 
the non-hospital primary care environment (Hutchinson et al., 2006). The settings of 
this previous research were similar to those of the present research in that they 
were outside the acute hospital environment. Therefore the same wording was 
used for this present research. For in the context of this research, theory therefore 
informed content validity. 
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The correlation of safety attitudes factor scores with outcome data is referred to as 
criterion related validity (Flin et al., 2006). The SAQ has been used in several studies 
in this respect (Colla et al., 2005; Hutchinson et al., 2009). Although the preference 
is to source information from something other than the data collection instrument 
it has been noted that self-reporting is often the only means available (Flin et al., 
2006).   Data regarding outcomes were collected from the same instrument for this 
research.  
Factor analysis shows if the themes being measured can be distinguished (Flin et al., 
2006). This approach has been used in prior studies with the SAQ (Hutchinson et al., 
2006; Sexton et al., 2006). The term factor analysis is used to describe various ways 
in which a number of variables may be reduced to a smaller number of coherently 
grouped factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
The term is often used interchangeably with that of principal components analysis 
(PCA). However, there is a subtle difference in that PCA is used to reduce the 
observed variables into components (Matsunaga, 2010). For this research the items 
in the SAQ were reduced to a set of factors for safety climate and teamwork. 
Therefore the term principal components analysis is used. Although this process 
identifies components rather than factors, it has been noted that the term factors 
may also be used to avoid confusion. Therefore, the term factor was used for this 
research. More detail regarding how this was analysis was conducted is presented 
in Section 4.3.3. 
As much information as possible should be collected when using PCA (Matsunaga, 
2010). For this reason the questionnaire used in the previously mentioned UK study 
(Hutchinson et al., 2006) was administered with use of all items including those not 
retained in the final factor structure identified by the previous study.  
Organisations are considered hierarchical, therefore safety climate may be 
measured at the individual, work group, department or organisational level (Flin et 
al., 2006). Of the two most widely used surveys for safety climate, the SAQ and 
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HSOPSC, the former has been found to be more suitable for benchmarking and 
examining relationships with outcomes whereas the latter allows for unit- and 
institutional-level results (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012).  
As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.15) the SAQ is considered more reliable to assess 
safety climate across a whole health system (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012). This 
supports the use of the SAQ for this research which was conducted to examine the 
relationship of safety climate with views of reporting and disclosure of error.  
The second section of the questionnaire obtained data relating to these outcomes. 
A hypothetical medication error was used to collect data regarding the outcome of 
nurses’ views of reporting and disclosure (Weissman et al., 2005). The use of a 
hypothetical scenario was considered a means to reduce the risk to participants in 
that they would be answering in relation to a hypothetical situation rather than 
being asked to respond to events that had occurred in their workplace that may or 
may not have been reported or disclosed. 
The error constituted the prescribing of an antibiotic to which a patient had a 
known documented allergy and three outcomes of an allergic reaction with 
irreversible severe harm, a reaction that was treated and the patient recovered 
(moderate error) and a near miss error outcome where the patient had no reaction 
and after two days of receiving the medication the prescription was changed to 
another medication. The near miss scenario could also be considered a “no harm 
incident” in reference to definitions used in the Australian context (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a). 
This scenario was adapted, with permission, from that of a previous study amongst 
hospital leaders in the US (Weissman et al., 2005). Adaptions of the scenario for this 
present research included use of the generic (non-brand) name for the medication 
prescribed and clarification that there were no allergy symptoms for the near miss 
outcome.  
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The content validity of this scenario was verified through the literature relating to 
medication error. Prescribing errors where there are known documented allergies 
occur in hospital, community and aged care settings (Australian Commission for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b; Easton et al., 2009). As the prescribing of 
the medication was for a urinary tract infection, a condition that is common within 
hospitals and community settings in Australia, the scenario was considered suitable 
for use in this research (Jarvis, Chan, & Gottlieb, 2014).  
It should be noted here that the error scenario relates to views of what nurses think 
is being reported or disclosed rather than what nurses themselves would report. In 
addition, it has already been highlighted in previous chapters that nurses often 
state they would report an error more than which they actually do report in 
practice (Section 2.10). Therefore, this present study may not be directly 
comparable to studies of actual reporting rates. Both these elements are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 3 (Section 6.1) 
The final section of the questionnaire obtained information relating to the nurse 
respondents who made up the cases for this research. Demographic information 
obtained included, workplace setting, work role, experience in current role and 
experience working in nursing, and worksite postcode. Details of how questions 
were developed for each of these can be found in Appendix 5. As noted above, the 
SAQ is best used to collect data across a whole health system so its use in this 
research for the collection of the demographic data was appropriate as it allowed 
for a comparisons of safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure to be 
compared amongst different groups from within a whole health system. 
It has already been identified in the literature review that differences in reporting, 
disclosure and safety climate have been found relating to workplace setting (Latif et 
al., 2013), work role (Hobgood, Weiner et al., 2006; Kagan & Barnoy, 2008; Kim et 
al., 2007; Morello et al., 2013) and experience (Chiang et al., 2010; Cole et al., 
2013). Therefore work setting, work role and experience were included in 
demographic data collection. 
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Registration level, employment sector and facility size were also included as 
demographic items. Two levels of registration operate in Australia encompassing 
different roles in the administration of medications (Kerr, Lu, Mill, & McKinlay, 
2012). It was considered there may therefore be different views associated with 
this.  
The ACSQHC has also noted concerns regarding low response rates from non-
government small rural hospitals to a survey they conducted relating to the new 
standards for accreditation (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2012b). This suggested it was worthwhile examining data based upon 
employment sector as well as facility size. 
Postcode data were obtained in order to ensure responses were received from 
worksites in the locations of interest as well as allowing for data to be analysed in 
relation to the three regional health areas operating in Tasmania at the time of data 
collection (Department of Health and Human Services, 2007, 2015). The ASGC-RA 
locality was also determined by postcode (Australian Government, 2010). A table 
combining this information and appears in Appendix 5. 
The demographic information collected was kept to a minimum and details 
regarding specific worksites were omitted. This was done to ensure nurses could 
not be identified despite the anonymous nature of the questionnaire. In addition, as 
the content of the research related to safety there were concerns that if data were 
analysed on a worksite-by-worksite basis there was potential for a particular facility 
to be labelled as “unsafe” if safety climate scores were found to be low. 
 Set calibration 
With the data collection questionnaire finalised it was necessary to determine how 
the cases would be assigned to the condition and outcome sets through a 
transparent process of calibration. It is recommended that this process be discussed 
in detail (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).  
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Whilst the name “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” suggests the method is 
qualitative this does not mean that only qualitative data may be analysed. Both 
numerical and non-numerical forms of data may be used with QCA (Ragin, 2009). 
The term “qualitative” is more applicable in the nature of the analysis itself than the 
data that is used (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Through applying a qualitative 
descriptor to a data set the method allows for data to be “described” (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Hence it was possible to use a questionnaire using quantitative 
data for this research. 
The use of another form of analysis alongside fsQCA is also recommended 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The calibration of the data for fsQCA also 
determined which statistical tests were applied for this research. These are 
discussed in detail at a later stage in this chapter (Section 4.3).  
When undertaking set calibration it is important to determine the crossover point 
(also referred to as the cross-over or qualitative anchor) (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). This is given the value of 0.5 and distinguishes the point at 
which a case may be neither in nor out of a set. Values also need to be set for fully 
in and fully out. 
The SAQ was used for the purpose of obtaining data relating to the conditions. The 
importance of factor analysis has already been noted earlier and how it has been 
applied in this research will be discussed in more detail at a later stage. Through the 
use of this process it is possible to develop factor scores from the SAQ. 
Once factors were identified a factor score was calculated. Items were allocated a 
score from 1-5 (Agree Strongly = 5, Agree Slightly = 4, Neither Agree nor Disagree = 
3, Disagree Slightly = 2, Disagree Strongly =1) (University of Texas Health, 2015). 
 Following reversal of negatively worded items, the scores are then converted to a 
100 point scale score using the formula: 
Teamwork Climate Scale Score for a Respondent = (((Mean of the items)-1) * 25) 
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Guidelines relating to SAQ scores were used to assist calibration of the conditions 
set further (University of Texas Health, 2015). A score of 75 or higher is considered 
positive (University of Texas Health, 2015). The crossover point for set calibration 
was therefore set at a value of 74.999. This value ensured a case with a score of 75 
or higher was allocated to be fully in the set of positive factor score (the qualitative 
descriptor) and a scores of 74.99 were considered  outside the set.  
The scores below 75 are “0”, “25” and “50” representing initial values of 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree) and 3 (neutral) respectively. It could be argued that a neutral 
score, whilst not positive, is closer to being so that disagree or strongly disagree, 
with the former partially out of the set of positive factor scores, the latter fully out, 
and disagree responses almost fully out. Thus, scores of 25 or less were determined 
as fully out (allocated a value of 0), scores of 50 but less than 75 were considered 
partially out (0.49), and scores over 25 but less than 50 considered almost fully out 
(0.25)., This resulted raw data being converted to calibration ranges of between 
0and 1. A summary of the calibration of conditions appears in Table 4-1. 
Calibration of the outcome sets for views of reporting was undertaken using a 
similar process. The data obtained for this purpose contained responses indicating 
whether the nurses felt the error would be formally reported or acknowledged to 
the client or their family. Response options were Always, Usually, Sometimes, 
Rarely and Never.  
The ideal situation is that an error would Always be reported or disclosed, although 
the disclosure of near miss error is viewed as requiring a low level disclosure 
response in the event the error indicates a change in care is required (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a). Therefore the crossover 
point was placed between the responses of Always (fully in the set) and Usually 
(almost in). The response of Never was considered fully out and the remaining 
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responses of Sometimes and Rarely were also placed outside the set with the latter 
being considered closer to being fully out.  
Table 4-1 Calibration values for SAQ scores 
 
This approach to calibration of the outcome set acknowledged the different 
frequency of each response. For example, it could be argued that those who 
responded Usually viewed error to be more likely to be reported than those who 
responded Rarely. However, in each instance, the response was calibrated with 
regards to the response where fully in was represented by the view each error 
outcome would Always be reported or disclosed. The qualitative descriptor for this 
set was the view of the error was Always reported or disclosed for each of the 
particular error outcomes. The values assigned to each of these can be seen in Table 
4-2. 
 
 
 Outside the set 
(factor not positive) 
 In the set 
(factor positive) 
SAQ factor score 0-25 25.01-49.99 50-74.99 74.999 75-100 
Calibration 
0 
minimum 
value 
(fully out)  
0.25 
(almost 
fully out) 
 
0.49 
(partially 
out) 
  
0.5 
crossover 
point 
(neither 
in nor 
out) 
1 
maximum value  
(fully in) 
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Table 4-2 Calibration values for views of reporting and disclosure of error 
 
Outside the set 
(view error Not Always reported) 
 
In the set 
(view error Always 
reported) 
Response Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always 
Calibration  
0  
minimum 
value 
(fully out) 
0.15 
(almost 
fully out) 
0.3 0.45 
(almost 
fully in) 
0.5 
crossover 
point 
(neither in 
nor out) 
1.00  
maximum  
value 
(fully in) 
Conditions based upon demographic data were assigned crisp set values. That is, 
these conditions were allocated set membership based upon if the condition was 
present it was fully in (1) or if absent it was fully out (0). The crisp set approach was 
preferred to a fuzzy set one as it was not possible to determine the degree to which 
respondents were partly in or partly out of a particular demographic set. This 
particular form of coding allowed for comparison of the demographic condition of 
interest (e.g. worksite/facility location or work role) with one set of respondents 
compared to all others.  
 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
An outline of health care in the Tasmanian context was provided in the literature 
review (Section 2.3). As the research aim and research question focus on rural 
clinical settings, the definition of rural clinical setting was those located in ASGC-RA 
3—5 locations which included all areas of the state except the two major 
metropolitan centres of Hobart and Launceston  (Australian Government, 2010).  
Workplace settings included acute hospitals, rural hospitals/multi-purpose services, 
community health centres and community nursing (including community-based 
programs administered by residential aged care providers), specific mental health 
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services worksites residential aged care, disability services and general practice. 
These reflect those services provided in Tasmania as also noted in the literature 
review (Department of Health and Human Services, 2007, 2015). 
Worksites excluded included those of medical specialists and dentists in private 
practice, other specialist services such as pathology services, worksites in education 
(e.g. University or vocational education providers) and volunteer- based 
organisations such as St John Ambulance.  
A level of heterogeneity is required for CCM as it is necessary to have difference in 
order to make comparisons. However, this also needs to be combined with a level 
of homogeneity. The inclusion and exclusion criteria were therefore aimed at 
ensuring diversity of respondents. Details of how each element was considered may 
be viewed in the table in Appendix 5.  
A Health and Medical Research Application was made to the University of Tasmania 
Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval was granted on 5 May 2011 (ref: 
H0011688). A copy of the approval appears in Appendix 1. 
 Data collection  
A pilot study was conducted initially with the aim of recruiting approximately forty 
respondents from a sample of 125 nurses from the Health and Community Services 
Union (HACSU). The sample of the pilot study was based upon response rates of 
previous studies (Hutchinson et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006). 
The purpose of the pilot was to test the survey and to ensure a degree of 
heterogeneity amongst the responses to determine that the data were suitable for 
a QCA analysis. Whilst limited, it was determined that there was a sufficient degree 
of heterogeneity amongst the sample of 11 responses that was obtained. With the 
low response rate in mind measures developed as part of the research design to 
ensure an adequate sample could be obtained.  These were adopted including a 
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direct mail-out to worksites and expanding the recruitment through other 
organisations.  
The recruitment sample for the full study of 125 nurses was undertaken through 
nurse membership of both the Health and Community Services Union (HACSU) and 
the Tasmanian Branch of Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation (ANMF). The 
aim of the recruitment process was to obtain broad heterogeneity for the QCA 
analysis (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009).  
The approach to participants was through an invitation distributed via email with a 
web-based survey link to a secure online survey. The University Department of Rural 
Health letterhead (now Tasmanian Centre for Rural Health) was included in the 
invitation. Hard copies of the invitation were also sent to worksites, followed by a 
reminder letter. Copies of these may be seen in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. More 
detail of the process of recruiting participants is contained in an upcoming section 
of this chapter (Section 4.2.6).  
 Sample size 
It was estimated that a study sample of between 125—150 was adequate for this 
research. This allowed for enough cases to conduct both PCA and fsQCA.  
The version of the SAQ that was used contains 27 items, of which 14 relate to 
teamwork and 13 relate to safety climate (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Recommended 
ratios required for principal components analysis for responses to item range from 
5:1 to 10:1 (Flin et al., 2006; Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore it 
was considered a sample of approximately 70—140 would be adequate for the SAQ 
data. 
Although ideal for small- to intermediate-N studies, CCM is also used for large-N 
studies (Greckhamer et al., 2013) and the importance of sample size is less specific 
many statistical analyses as sample size is more dependent upon the nature of the 
cases and the number of conditions being considered. Subsequently the 
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appropriate sample to obtain for CCM is difficult to determine. It is suggested for up 
to seven conditions a sample of 10—40 is often adequate (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009). The representativeness of the sample obtained for this research was also 
considered. Where available, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) data 
were used to assist in the determining of the sample representativeness. Workforce 
data at the time closest to the time in which the survey was distributed were used.  
 Processes 
The recruitment of participants occurred by distribution of an invitation to 
participate which included the link to a secure web-based survey. The invitation was 
sent via electronic means (email) through third parties (HACSU and ANMF) as well 
as through a direct mail-out of a hard copy of the invitation to worksites which 
potentially employed eligible participants.  
The two unions were provided with a list of worksites and postcodes for the 
purposes of contacting their members.  Emails were therefore sent directly from 
the third parties to their membership. The content of the emails was that approved 
by the ethics application process.  
During both the pilot and full study the emails sent to participants from HACSU 
disclosed the student researcher’s previous employment with that union. In 
addition for both studies the student researcher’s employment with a major 
employer (current during the time of the pilot only) was declared. This ensured that 
participants were fully informed. So as to reduce the risk of coercion the 
information sent by third parties also clearly indicated that it was being forwarded. 
Worksite contacts for posting information were identified for the distribution of the 
invitation to participate through publicly available information including the 
Department of Health and Human Services website , Aged Care Accreditation 
Standards Agency website information (now Australian Aged Care Quality Agency), 
the Commonwealth Services Information Database (now Commonwealth Respite 
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and Carelink Centres Database) and the Tasmanian Division of General Practice GP 
database (now Tasmanian Medicare Local).  
Survey data were collected through the Survey Monkey website. The function 
allowing participants ISP addresses to be collected was disabled ensuring 
participants could not be identified. The use of this website also ensured data were 
collected within a secure environment (SurveyMonkey, 2010). 
 Timelines 
A pilot study was conducted over a period of one month in June 2011 with the 
survey distributed through email to 125 members of the Health and Community 
Services Union. As noted earlier, the primary purpose of the pilot study was to 
check adequate heterogeneity of responses in relation to views of reporting and 
disclosure as well as to test the use of the online questionnaire. 
Data collection for the full study was undertaken over a six-week period from mid-
March 2012 until 30 April 2012.  
 Limitations 
It is recognised that there are limitations in the recruitment of the data sample 
(Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2006). Despite attempts to distribute the questionnaire 
via employers this was not possible to achieve. Time and financial constraints 
impacted upon decisions regarding the recruitment process.  
The invitations to participate in the online questionnaire were widely distributed.  
However, participants self-selected and there is always a risk in such a process that 
the sample obtained may not be representative (Bryman, 2012).   
The online-only nature of the questionnaire may also have restricted participation. 
The preference for online over mailed questionnaires was made based upon the 
online survey not requiring data entry, thereby reducing the risk of data entry error, 
although error by participants cannot be ruled out.  
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The timing of the data collection period for both the pilot and the full study may 
also have impacted upon responses received. Data collection for both was 
conducted during a time of announcements and implementation of budget cuts by 
the state government. This may have impacted upon the attitudes and views of the 
respondents. For example, one SAQ item asks about staffing levels (Hutchinson et 
al., 2006) so responses to this question may have altered during a time of budget 
cuts.  
Two approaches to data analysis were taken. How these relate to the research 
design is outlined in Figure 4-1. Variable-based analysis was conducted in the first 
instance. The principal components analysis from this informed the fsQCA whilst the 
inferential statistics allowed for the comparison of variables.  
 Variable-based data analysis 
Elements of the variable-base analysis include frequency data, factor analysis 
(confirmatory analysis and principle components analysis), scale reliability 
(Cronbach α), scale scores, chi-squared and Fisher’s exact test. Software used for 
variable-based analyses was SPSS (versions 20 and 21) (IBM Corp, released 2011, 
released 2012) and Monte Carlo (Watson, 2000) .Each of the specific analyses will 
now be discussed further. 
Choice of chi-squared and Fisher’s exact test were based upon the data being 
categorical in nature (Allen & Bennett, 2012; Howell, 2007). Although considered a 
scale, the factor scores for safety climate and teamwork were determined to be 
positive or not positive and therefore also categorical data. Similarly, in determining 
views of reporting and disclosure as Always and Not Always again resulted in 
categorical data.   
Factor analysis is considered an important element of safety climate questionnaires 
(Flin et al., 2006). It was determined that responses to the SAQ items were not 
normally distributed (refer to Appendix 6) however it is considered that principal 
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components analysis is robust enough to be used with such data (Pallant, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Use of Cronbach’s α is recommended and this was used to check the internal 
consistency of the scales from factors determined by a previous study undertaken 
using the same questionnaire (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Due to these factor scales 
being determined unreliable, an exploratory principal components analysis was 
then undertaken.  More details of this process will be presented later in this and the 
following chapter (Section 4.3.3 and Section 5.6) 
More detail of the approach taken with regard to frequency data will now be 
presented including handling of missing data and assessment of sample 
representativeness. The process of the exploratory principal components analysis is 
then described, followed by details of the inferential statistical used.  
 Frequency data  
The initial analysis included examination of the frequency data. Missing data were 
considered first, with questionnaire responses which had no data being excluded, as 
were those with post-codes outside the geographical area of interest. Responses 
with missing data relating to postcode were included in the analysis. It had been 
disclosed to participants that the student researcher had previously been employed 
by one of the unions assisting recruitment. Respondents may therefore have known 
the student researcher, leading to reluctance to divulge postcode information in 
case they could be personally identified. For example, some worksites were the sole 
site for health care in a particular postcode area with only one or two management 
staff. 
It was therefore considered that whilst there was a risk that responses with no 
postcode information could be from outside the geographical area of interest, there 
was also a possibility they may not have been. It was also considered that 
respondents were more likely to be concerned regarding identification than they 
were about not providing postcode data as their worksite was outside the ASGC-RA 
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area of interest. If a respondent who was outside the area of interest had an 
awareness of the ASGC-RA classification, then it would be possible for them to 
provide an appropriate postcode rather than not provide any information. 
The decision to include these responses was incorporated with the use of sensitivity 
tests to determine the impact of this decision relating to statistical significance from 
any results. Where inferential statistics results with borderline statistical 
significance were obtained the tests were repeated with these responses omitted. 
The results tables of these tests are located in Appendix 7. A low number of 
responses also resulted in the combining of some categories of responses reported 
in the results.  
Data were also missing for other items of the questionnaire. The approach to 
analysis determined how the missing data were treated with an emphasis on 
including the maximum possible respondents in any analysis. The nature of PCA 
determined that the missing data from the SAQ items were excluded pairwise 
(Pallant, 2013). For other items missing data listwise exclusion was applied.  
Only those cases with complete data (that is responses to all the SAQ items and the 
views of reporting and disclosure) were included in the case-based analysis. This 
ensured that no assumptions were made regarding missing data. Although this 
reduced the number of cases included the calculation of a factor score from SAQ 
data relied on complete data so some reduction was already required. 
The representativeness of the sample obtained was also considered. Where 
possible the frequency of demographic responses were compared to data sources 
such as the Nursing and Midwifery Labour Force 2012 data (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2013). 
Frequency data for demographic information and views of reporting and disclosure 
is presented in graph format with the frequency of responses for the SAQ items 
presented in tables. For some analyses, responses to demographic categories were 
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combined (Howell, 2007; Pallant, 2013) as this enhanced the analysis as well as 
reduced the possibility of respondents being identified.  
Frequency data were also produced regarding positive scores for the factors of 
teamwork and safety climate. However, these could not be calculated until the 
number of factors and items were identified through analysis of the SAQ including 
principal components analysis. This will now be outlined. 
 Analysis of conditions data 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (Section 4.2.1) the first section of the survey 
contained the SAQ items. A recent review has outlined several ways in which a 
questionnaire such as the SAQ may be assessed in relation to reliability and validity. 
Reliability is defined as the consistency to which a data collection instrument 
measures something across a variety of conditions whereas validity refers to 
whether or not the questionnaire measures what it is supposed to measure 
(Valentine et al., 2015). 
The review highlights four areas that address these elements. These areas are 
internal consistency, interrater agreement and reliability, structural validity and 
content validity.  
The previous use of the SAQ in the UK addressed three of these four areas with only 
interrater agreement and reliability not reported by the study (Valentine et al., 
2015). The work of Sexton and colleagues is noted to have addressed these same 
three areas (Valentine et al., 2015).  
Interrater agreement was not assessed in this research. This process is often not 
reported for this type of questionnaire as many of the analyses rely upon a test-
retest approach which was not part of the research design for this study (Valentine 
et al., 2015). In addition, neither of the questionnaires informing this research had 
reported interrater agreemen.t leaving no capacity to benchmark this (Hutchinson 
et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006; Valentine et al., 2015).  
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Internal consistency refers to the degree to which items in a scale correlate and is 
therefore a form of determining reliability (Valentine et al., 2015). Use of 
Cronbach’s α is one approach to assessing internal consistency. For this research 
the internal consistency of the SAQ items was checked with the use of Crohnbach’s 
α (Pallant, 2013) (Valentine et al., 2015). A value of 0.70 from this test is considered 
to indicate reliability (Matsunaga, 2010). 
Structural validity considers the degree to which scale items have a high covariance 
in structure and may be assessed through both confirmatory and exploratory factor 
analysis (Valentine et al., 2015). The previous UK study had conducted both 
exploratory and confirmatory analyses (Hutchinson et al., 2006). It is recommended 
that a different data set be used for confirmatory analysis (Matsunaga, 2010) and 
these authors met this through randomly dividing their sample in two and 
conducting each analysis on a separate data set. 
Assessment of structural validity of this research was limited. The assessment using 
Cronbach’s α indicated scale data were not reliable when applied to the scale 
determined from the UK study (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Therefore an exploratory 
principal components analysis was necessary.  
It is recommended that confirmatory analysis be undertaken following this process 
using a separate set of data (Matsunaga, 2010). This was not possible as the entire 
data set was used for the exploratory analysis. Although this is a limitation of this 
research of the four elements highlighted earlier (Valentine et al., 2015) as many as 
possible have been undertaken from the data that were obtained. 
 Principal components analysis 
Principal components analysis (PCA) (often also referred to as factor analysis) is a 
statistical technique used to determine a set of independent subsets from within a 
set of variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This process is used in developing scales 
and may be used in an exploratory or confirmatory capacity (Pallant, 2013). Here it 
has been used in an exploratory capacity. 
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The key element of PCA is its use for item-screening (Matsunaga, 2010). In this 
thesis PCA has been used for the analysis of the first section of the survey which 
used the safety attitudes questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006). This approach 
was also chosen due to its previous use by other applications of the same survey 
tool (Hutchinson et al., 2006).  
Several steps are outlined for the process of PCA (Pallant, 2013). Data must be 
considered suitable, the number of factors to extract needs to be determined and 
finally the rotation of data and interpretation is finalised. Steps to encompass this 
include determining the suitability of data and sample size, factor extraction and 
rotation of factors. These are outlined in the following sections and were followed 
in order to determine the number of factors to be extracted. It is generally regarded 
that a single factor is made up of at least four items (Matsunaga, 2010).  
There needs to be sufficient data for this analysis (Pallant, 2013). It has been 
previously been noted that sample size needs to be as large as possible so as to 
minimise the risk of incorrect results through bias or misspecification (Matsunaga, 
2010). Opinions of the sufficiency of data vary from 5:1 to 10:1 ratios of responses 
to items (Pallant, 2013) with one author citing a minimum of 100 respondents 
(Matsunaga, 2010). 
When considering the sample size (Section 4.2.5) it was determined that between 
125—150 responses would be adequate. This assessment also took into 
consideration that from a previous use of the SAQ analysis had been undertaken in 
two separate analyses, one for teamwork items and another for safety climate 
items (Hutchinson et al., 2006). 
 Factor extraction 
The extraction of factors involves a variety of different steps (Pallant, 2013). These 
include the use of Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and 
Eigenvalues, Kaiser’s criterion, scree test and parallel analysis. Some of these are 
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considered controversial and capable of producing variety in the results (Hubbard & 
Allen, 1987).  
Both Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy (Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) were used to 
determine the suitability of the data for further analysis. A KMO value of 0.6 is 
recommended along with significance of Bartlett’s Test of p<0.05 (Pallant, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Some of the SAQ results obtained for this research impacted upon this process. 
Further details of how this was dealt with appear in the following chapter (Sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.3). 
Analysis then proceeded to consider Kaiser’s criterion and Catell’s scree test 
(Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). These processes assist in determining the 
appropriate number of factors to extract in each of the two sample sets (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007).  
Kaiser’s criterion recommends an eigenvalue score of ≥1.0 (Matsunaga, 2010; 
Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Caution is urged however as it has been 
established that this process often leads to over extraction of factors (Hutchinson et 
al., 2006; Matsunaga, 2010). Catell’s scree test may also be inconclusive in similar 
circumstances as often it is difficult to determine the number of possible factors to 
extract (Pallant, 2013).  
An alternative to the two aforementioned tests is parallel analysis and this approach 
was adopted to assist addressing the above mentioned concerns. This complex 
approach is becoming more popular in social science literature (Pallant, 2013) and is 
considered often to be the most accurate means of extraction (Hubbard & Allen, 
1987; Matsunaga, 2010). Parallel analysis was applied along with use of Horn’s test 
(Hubbard & Allen, 1987; Zwick & Velicer, 1986) and the freely available Monte Carlo 
software (Watson, 2000). 
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 Rotation of factors 
The final element of PCA that needs to be discussed is the use of rotation. The two 
main approaches are oblique and orthogonal (Child, 2006; Matsunaga, 2010; 
Pallant, 2013). The main difference between the two is that orthogonal rotation 
assumes there is no underlying relationship or correlations in the data (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). It is therefore considered by many that oblique rotation methods 
are more appropriate as most data collection is likely to be correlated (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007) especially in the social sciences (Child, 2006; Matsunaga, 2010). 
Component and pattern matrix tables are elements that also need to be considered 
when undertaking PCA (Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The component 
matrix reflects the unrotated loadings of the Kaiser criterion whereas the pattern 
matrix presents the rotated solution (Pallant, 2013). There is debate in the literature 
about which of these should be interpreted (Matsunaga, 2010).  
Following factor extraction the unrotated solution is often difficult to interpret and 
the goal of rotation is therefore to improve this (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Numerous approaches to rotation are available but unfortunately there is no 
consistent approach with recognition that different approaches may be taken by 
different researchers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Oblique rotation using Direct Oblimen (Pallant, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) 
was found to be the approach that yielded factors that could be interpreted with a 
simple structure. This particular rotation method is useful as it allows for a wide 
range of factor correlations (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
The experience of use of the SAQ in the UK study was also drawn upon in 
determining which items to retain (Hutchinson et al., 2006). It is worth noting here 
that in a previous study the PCA for the teamwork factors was difficult and this also 
occurred with this present research (Hutchinson et al., 2006) 
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Following completion of the above steps the extracted factors were finalised.  
Having determined the items to retain, the internal consistency was assessed 
through the use of Cronbach’s α (Pallant, 2013). A score of 0.7 or higher is 
considered to reflect reliability (Allen & Bennett, 2012; Pallant, 2013). Following 
determination of the reliability of the identified scales, scores for each respondent 
were calculated. The formula used for this purpose was outlined previously when 
set calibration was discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
This approach to handling of the data for the conditions of this research allowed for 
transparency in terms of the manner in which the conditions were determined. It 
also provides an approach consistent with other studies that provided for a 
comparison of the results obtained from this research with those of other studies. 
  Inferential statistics  
As previously mentioned the data obtained for this research were categorical and 
thus inferential statistics were used to determine the probability and significance of 
differences in the data (Allen & Bennett, 2012; Howell, 2007; Pallant, 2013). The use 
of inferential statistics has also previously been undertaken with use of the SAQ 
(Colla et al., 2005). Due to the low response rate in this research there were some 
responses with similar low frequency.  The result was the violation of assumptions 
for this test in that many cells in the analysis had a count of less than five responses 
(Pallant, 2013).  
With this in mind the Fishers Exact Test was also used (Howell, 2007). In some cases 
this could not be calculated due to the increased number of variables increasing the 
complexity of the calculation (Howell, 2007). However in most elements the test 
was able to be applied.      
Whilst it has been argued that this analysis should only be used for a 2x2 design, 
others have considered the approach adequate for larger designs (Howell, 2007). 
Therefore the results of this research need to be considered with the knowledge 
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that the best available test was used for the data that were obtained, bearing in 
mind that the analysis is subject to limitations.  
In order to produce a 2x2 or table with fewer categories for comparison it was 
necessary to combine the categories of responses (Howell, 2007; Pallant, 2013). 
There were some areas where it was not possible to combine categories as to do so 
did not make sense. For example, a response of Unsure could not always be 
allocated to another category. Where numbers of responses were extremely low 
and there was no logical means of allocation to another category, these responses 
were excluded from the analysis. Where such an exclusion was applied it has been 
clearly noted. 
The use of a 2x2 design requires adjustment to the Chi-squared (χ2) value. The Yates 
Continuity Correction is therefore the value reported in the Chi-squared tables of a 
2x2 design (Howell, 2007; Pallant, 2013).  
These approaches adopted as part of the analysis with inferential statistical, whilst 
being required in order to produce results, also subject these same results to 
potential biases. It is therefore interpretation of these results needs to be mindful 
of this. 
 Case-based data analysis 
The preparation of the data for case-based analysis was discussed earlier (Section 
4.2.2). There is one further step required before the analysis proper and that is the 
use of Boolean algebra. This is required in order to use the software for analysis as 
well as to be able to interpret the results from fsQCA.  
The allocation of Boolean algebra expressions was made relating to safety climate 
factors and views of reporting and disclosure. The teamwork factors from the SAQ 
were allocated the expression tf and the safety climate factors allocated the 
expression scf. Numerical assignment also occurred in terms of the factors. For 
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example, the first teamwork factor identified was allocated the expression tf1 and 
further factors allocated tf2 and so on.  
Boolean terminology used for this research reflects that which uses common 
features of the QWERTY keyboard (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The rationale 
for this choice is that it reflects the terminology of the software used for analysis.  
Views that an error would always be reported were allocated the expression sr 
(severe error Always reported), mr (moderate error Always reported) and nmr (near 
miss error Always reported). Views of disclosure were allocated the expressions sd 
(severe error Always acknowledged), md (moderate error Always acknowledged), 
nmd (near miss error Always acknowledged). The non-presence of any condition or 
outcome (referred to as negated) is represented by the use of the symbol ~ prior to 
the Boolean term. Full details of the final expressions used, including the 
appropriate Boolean operators, are provided in the following chapter (Section 
5.11.2). 
Table 4-3 Software used for fsQCA analysis 
Action Software 
Set calibration fs/QCA used to calibrate condition sets 
Test for necessary conditions fs/QCA 
Construction of truth table fs/QCA 
Test for sufficiency fs/QCA (standard analysis) 
Kirq (for identifying cases consistent and 
contradictory to solution terms for truth tables 
and results tables) 
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Two different software packages were used for the fsQCA. The use of each is 
outlined in Table 4-3. The fs/QCA software (Ragin & Davey, 2012) was used for set 
calibration of condition sets and the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The identification of contradictory cases in the truth tables and the final solutions 
for sufficiency was obtained through use of Kirq (Reichert & Rubinson, 2014).  
 During the analytic moment 
With the preparation of data completed the next phase of the funnel of complexity 
is entered. The during the analytic moment phase is where the analysis proper 
occurs (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). This includes the 
analysis of whether or not conditions are necessary or sufficient for outcome(s) 
(Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
A condition is described as necessary for an outcome if it is always present when the 
outcome occurs (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  In 
other words, the outcome cannot occur if the condition is absent (Berg-Schlosser et 
al., 2009). The outcome is therefore a subset of the condition (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
For a condition to be described as sufficient it is present when the outcome is also 
present but there may be examples of cases that display the outcome when the 
condition is not present (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
That is, there may be other causes for the outcome and the causally sufficient 
condition is a subset of the outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Both 
necessary and sufficient conditions may be present when using fsQCA.  
An example of necessity and sufficiency, attributed to Lasse Conqvist, is given 
through three possible conditions relating to democratic states (Berg-Schlosser et 
al., 2009). These are condition A (holding regular competitive elections), condition B 
(ensuring civil liberties are comprehensive) and condition C (ensuring political 
decision makers are independent of the military. If two paths to the outcome were 
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determined to be a combination of condition A and condition B (path 1) and 
condition A and condition C (path 2) then each of these to paths is sufficent. 
Condition A is not alone sufficient for the outcome as another condition is required. 
Each of the paths, however, can be considered as sufficient. As condition A is always 
present when the outcome occurs then it is considered a necessary condition. 
 Test for necessity 
Performing a test for necessity is the first step of analysis with fsQCA. Such tests 
assess the degree to which a condition is present for an outcome. As the definition 
of necessity requires that the condition is always present when the outcome occurs 
then a threshold needs to be set that reflects this. This is referred to as consistency 
(Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). It is considered that for a test of 
necessity such a threshold should be set at no less than 0.9 (Ragin, 2009). That is, 
when the condition is present the outcome is present in the majority of cases. A 
necessity threshold of 1.0 indicates the condition is present in all cases.  
It is important that this test is undertaken first so that if a condition is assessed as 
necessary then this information can be incorporated when undertaking fsQCA. In 
addition, there are times when the nature of the data leads to necessary conditions 
being present in solution terms when they are not truly necessary (false necessary 
condition) or the solution terms indicate that there is no necessary condition when 
there is (hidden necessary condition). For those interested in the complex set 
theoretical mathematics behind the occurrence of this anomaly then further 
information is available in the text-book authored by Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012). 
The consistency for necessity for this research was set at a threshold of 1.0. A test of 
necessity was undertaken for each teamwork and safety climate factor identified 
from PCA as conditions for each of the outcomes of interest for views of reporting 
or disclosure and the severity of error (sr, mr, nmr, sd, md and nmd).  
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Cases were also calibrated into sets for each work location/setting and work role 
and further tests for necessity were undertaken in these groups. All outputs for 
necessity tests from fs/QCA software (Ragin & Davey, 2012) appear in Appendix 16.  
 Test for sufficiency 
Once data have been calibrated and the test for necessity performed it is possible to 
then undertake the next step of the analysis, the test for sufficiency. This process, 
undertaken with the use of software produces a truth table. This table contains all 
the configurations possible for a particular set of conditions. That is, the 
dichotomous table of the possible configurations is produced (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009; Ragin, 2009; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). For any 
analysis the total number of conditions is 2k where k is the number of conditions 
(Ragin, 2008). Therefore, an analysis with three conditions has eight possible 
combinations (23=8). 
The truth table also contains other information that was used in this research. The 
number of cases present for each configuration is provided, giving an indication of 
the diversity of the configurations of conditions present amongst the cases. 
Use of Kirq software (Reichert & Rubinson, 2014) identifies those cases that are 
present for the outcome and those which contradict it. A value of consistency is 
provided for each configuration present in both Kirq and fs/QCA software with the 
latter platform also providing values for proportional reduction in consistency (PRI) 
and PRODUCT (Ragin, 2006; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). How each of these has 
been used in this research will now be outlined in more detail.  
 Contradictions 
Where cases exhibit identical causal conditions but where the outcome is different 
they are referred to as contradictions (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Ragin, 2009). 
These configurations must be acknowledged and preferably resolved by the 
researcher.  
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The nature of the fuzzy social set data is that contradictory cases will appear. 
Examination of these requires the researcher to explore cases further in an effort to 
resolve them, making reference to the theoretical perspectives upon which the 
research has been developed (Rihoux & de Meur, 2009). 
Several options are available for this purpose. This includes adding a condition (or 
removing one), re-examining the operational aspects of the conditions, 
reconsidering the outcome variable, re-examining the cases for additional 
information that may differentiate them, re-examining cases to determine if they 
really are part of the same population, recode contradictory rows as ‘0’ and/or use 
frequency criteria to establish the outcome (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). 
For this research a proportional threshold of 0.85 (85%) was set regarding the 
inclusion of contradictory cases. In doing so it is possible to state that of the results 
for any Analysis Z conducted for this research at least 85% of the cases in the 
configuration were consistent for the outcome. Such a statement forms part of the 
description of the complexity of the cases. This contributes to meeting the aim of 
this research which is to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses working 
in rural clinical settings.  
This can be undertaken using the Kirq software (Rubinson, 2013). Where this has 
occurred it has been noted in the results.  This value was based upon the results of 
the frequency data obtained in relation to views of error reporting and disclosure 
(Section 5.4) and ensured that the minimum number of consistent cases was no less 
than the frequency percentage of views that a severe error would Always be 
reported. 
Cases were also re-examined to see if specific demographic conditions were present 
that differentiated them. This resulted in the additional conditions being added for 
further analysis. More detail regarding this appears in the following chapter (Section 
5.14.  
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Responses to this research were anonymous resulting in case knowledge being 
limited to the data obtained from the survey. Therefore whilst contradictory 
configurations were acknowledged and where possible further exploration of cases 
occurred through consideration of demographic data, any further revisiting of cases 
was not possible. This limitation is the outcome of the necessary step of addressing 
the ethical issues ensuring potential identification of participants did not occur 
(Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1).  
What is important to note from this discussion of cases with contradictory 
configurations is that they must first and foremost be acknowledged (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). In addition, they are potential examples of cases that are 
unusual. It is this unusual nature that makes them ideal for exploring possible new 
theories in relation to the conditions and outcome of interest.  
It is not always possible to resolve all contradictory rows within a truth table. 
Therefore the sufficiency consistency value provided in the truth table is used as a 
guide as to which rows to include in the analysis.  
In using the truth table for analysis the researcher must determine the level of 
consistency which is required for undertaking further analysis. This is the threshold 
which configurations must achieve in order to be included in the analysis (that is to 
be included in the subset of cases that display the outcome). This point is referred 
to as the sufficiency cut-off or sufficiency threshold (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Detail regarding how this was determined will now be provided. 
 PRI and PRODUCT 
Two other values have been used to assist determination of the inclusion of 
configurations within the analysis with fsQCA. These are the PRI and PRODUCT 
(Ragin, 2006). The proportional reduction in consistency (PRI) provides the 
consistency value of how much a condition is the subset of not only the outcome, 
but the non-outcome (absence of the outcome) as well (Ragin, 2006; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). That is, it is possible that a case is a member of both. The 
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PRODUCT is the multiplication of the values for consistency and PRI (Ragin, 2006; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
It is recommended that these values be considered. If consistency and PRI are high 
then the PRODUCT will also be high. If the PRODUCT value is high then it is clear 
that set membership in the outcome or non-outcome set is non simultaneous 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). (The PRODUCT minimum for this research was 
therefore set at a minimum of 0.75 which is slightly lower than the minimum 0.80 
consistency cut-off and slightly higher than the recommended minimum 
consistency cut-off value of 0.70 
A truth table was produced for all the outcome and negated (non-outcome) sets for 
this research. However, where consistency, PRI and PRODUCT values were outside 
those that set for inclusion in this research analysis with fsQCA did not proceed 
further. . These truth tables appear in Appendix 1.  
 Multiple outcomes analysis 
It is possible to undertake a multi-level analysis using configurational comparative 
methods. For this the cases are grouped within similarity of context, cases within 
each group are compared and comparison made between the context based upon 
the differences or similarities in the causal relationship that are found between the 
contexts (Byrne, 2011).  
This research however considers a multi-level analysis of different outcomes. That 
is, the conditions (factors scores for teamwork and safety climate factors) were 
compared for each of the six different outcomes (the views of reporting and 
disclosure for different levels of harm). In doing so it was possible consider the 
consistent data obtained for the conditions against the various levels of harm for 
both reporting and disclosure views.  
The only difference between each of these outcomes was that they related to either 
reporting or disclosure or different levels of severity of harm. There were six 
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possible outcomes. Thus the outcomes were similar and could therefore be 
compared based upon the differences alone (Byrne, 2011). 
A series of consistent parameters were needed to ensure the results from analyses 
for the different outcomes could be compared. These parameters appear in Table 
4-4. The first possible analysis (Analysis X) ensured that only fully consistent rows of 
configurations with a consistency of 1 were included in the analysis. The second 
analysis (Analysis Y) also ensured only configurations consistent for the outcome of 
interest were included but the consistency needed to be ≥0.85. For the final analysis 
(Analysis Z) the consistency cut-off applied was also ≥0.85 but with a proportion 
threshold of ≥0.85 applied to ensure no less than 85% of the cases included for any 
inconsistent row were consistent for the outcome. 
The minimum threshold recommended is no less than 0.75 (Ragin, 2009). For this 
research the minimum threshold was therefore set higher at 0.80.  
Table 4-4 Analyses parameters 
 
Analysis 
name 
Consistency 
cut-off 
Consistency 
proportion threshold 
Inclusion of inconsistent 
cases 
Analysis X 1 1 No 
Analysis Y ≥0.85 but ≤1 1 No 
Analysis Z ≥0.80 but ≤1 ≥ 0.85 Yes 
Where possible, analysis with consistency cut-off and proportion thresholds of 1 
were preferred. This assisted in ensuring comparison could be made between 
different outcomes therefore contributed towards achieving the aim of the 
research. 
There are examples of studies of larger numbers (large- or intermediate-N) where 
the frequency threshold (that is the number of cases present in a given 
configurational row of the truth table) is set higher (Greckhamer et al., 2013). 
However, as the aim of this research is to describe the complexity of safety climate 
of nurses working in rural clinical settings the frequency threshold was kept at 1. 
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 Logical remainders 
As previously noted, QCA considers conditions in combination in relation to an 
outcome set. Each row of a truth table includes one of the possible configurations. 
The number of conditions allows for the determination of the number of possible 
configurations of conditions to be determined through the use of the formula 2k 
where k = the number of conditions. Thus analysis of three conditions means there 
would be 23 or eight possible configurations.  
However, during any analysis not all configurations may be present in a given data 
set. Indeed some may even be implausible or incoherent. When a configuration is 
not present amongst cases included in an analysis it is referred to as a logical 
remainder (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
Logical remainders are considered as part of fsQCA. Where any decisions are made 
about a logical remainder the researcher may use theory in making an assumption 
about the outcome and/or consider the outcome of other configurations (Fowler et 
al., 2008; Ragin, 2009). In this sense the researcher is making assumptions about the 
directions of the factors within the configuration itself. No assumptions were made 
in this research regarding logical remainders as it was not possible to determine any 
assumptions based upon the data obtained or from available research. 
The outputs from fs/QCA software produce three solution terms. These are the 
complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Each reflects a different assessment of the underlying subset 
relations.  
The complex solution does not make any assumptions regarding logical remainders 
(Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The parsimonious solution makes 
simplifying assumptions to ensure the solution presented contains the least number 
of Boolean operators (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). More detail 
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regarding this is provided in the following chapter with reference to a result from 
this research (Section 5.13.2). 
The intermediate solution term refers to the solution produces when directional 
assumptions are made or where specific decisions are made regarding 
contradictions (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). It is generally 
considered that this solution term is the one that should be reported.   
The complex solution term covers all the possible subset relations from the various 
intermediate solution terms (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This 
solution term is a subset of the possible solution terms (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). However, in the event there are no directional assumptions made regarding 
logical remainders (as is the case with this research) the intermediate solution is the 
same as the complex solution. For this research it is the intermediate solution term 
that is presented in respect to fsQCA results. 
 Negated sets (non-outcome) 
As noted in the previous chapter, CCM are asymmetrical (Byrne, 2011; Ragin, 2009; 
Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). That is, the presence of a 
condition does not automatically mean the non-presence is causal for the non-
outcome. For this reason analysis of the negated outcome set should also be 
considered. The non-membership of a condition or outcome is referred to as the 
negated set (Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).    
A truth table was produced for all the outcome and negated (non-outcome) sets for 
this research. However, as noted in Section 4.8.2, not all truth tables proceeded to 
analysis with fsQCA. . These truth tables appear in Appendix 1.  
 After the analytic moment 
Once the fsQCA analysis has been completed the results need to be presented and 
also interpreted with regard to theoretical and case knowledge. This occurs in the 
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after the analytic moment phase (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2010).  
An overview of the solution terms that result from the analysis and how these will 
be presented is provided here. More details will be provided in the following 
chapter. 
To enhance transparency it is highly recommended that the raw data and calibrated 
data used for fsQCA is provided (Rihoux et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). 
This information is provided in Appendix 13and Appendix 15.  
Publication of all raw data obtained from the survey has not been undertaken as it 
may be possible to identify a respondent and/or their workplace and mechanisms 
to reduce such a risk were included in the ethics application (Sections 4.2.1 and 
4.3.1). However, raw the raw data table does contain each of the factor scores 
(teamwork and safety climate) as well as the responses relating to views of 
reporting and disclosure.   
Calibrated data have also been provided.  This data table includes the allocation of 
crisp set membership to the demographic data relating to workplace setting and 
work role. 
It is also recommended that results are presented through at least two means 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Use of software produces solution terms which 
summarise the configurations present for the outcome of interest. These results will 
be presented in two formats. 
Firstly a table containing the solution terms with the cases contained in each is 
provided. This table notes the cases that are consistent and those not consistent 
with the proposed solution term. These solution term tables contain the numerical 
detail at the level of the software output. In some instances, the data in this table 
will be rounded when reporting the results in text. Reporting all software output 
values in full would provide a level of detail not required. However, consistency 
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scores of greater than 0.995 will be reported in full as rounding would produce a 
value of 1.00, giving a false indication of full consistency. 
The second presentation of results is in the form of a matrix containing the 
comparison of the multi-level outcome analysis. More detail of this is provided in 
the following chapter at the point where the results are presented. 
Tables containing the solution terms report the consistency, raw coverage, unique 
coverage, solution consistency and solution coverage. A summary of the definitions 
of each of these appears in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 How to interpret QCA results terms in this thesis 
 
Outcome Logical Equations 
Consistency Expression of percentage of cases’ set membership scores in two sets that is in 
line with the statement that one of the sets is a subset of the other (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012) 
Raw coverage Percentage of cases’ set membership in outcome covered by a single sufficient 
path of the equifinal solution term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) 
Unique coverage Percentage of all cases’ set membership in the outcome that is uniquely covered 
by a single path of an equifinal solution term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) 
Solution consistency Expression of consistency of the complete solution term 
Solution coverage Percentage of all cases’ set membership in the outcome covered by the solution 
term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) 
These terms are referred to as parameters of fit (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
Two key parameters are those of consistency and coverage. Consistency has already 
been noted in previous sections of this chapter (Sections 4.7and 4.8). 
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The solution consistency refers to the consistency value of the complete solution 
term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The solution coverage is a value indicating 
the percentage of all cases that have membership in the outcome to which the 
solution term refers (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
Low solution coverage may indicate that a solution term is trivial. That is, although a 
solution term may have a high consistency if the solution coverage is low then the 
solution has less relevance to the cases (Ragin, 2006). 
Raw coverage is also used when interpreting the results. This term refers to the 
coverage of a single equation within the overall solution term. That is, the term is 
used in reference to how much membership of the outcome is covered by a single 
path in a solution term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Once again, if raw coverage 
is low then that particular equation within the overall solution may also be of less 
relevance.  
This compares unique coverage which refers to the coverage of a single path in a 
solution term that does not overlap with another condition (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). That is, it makes reference to how much a single path is uniquely 
covered. What is important with coverage, as with any element of fsQCA, is that the 
interpretation of the results needs to occur in conjunction with the overall research 
design and theory upon which the research is based. 
 Chapter summary 
This research has clearly been based upon theoretical knowledge of safety climate, 
error reporting and error disclosure. The aim of the research, the research question 
and several sub-questions were developed from a review of the literature. These 
have subsequently informed the research design. Standards of good practice for the 
use of a CCM have also been applied to all phases of the funnel of complexity.   
This has ensured that before the analytic moment the selection of cases, conditions 
and outcomes was based upon theory. Similarly set calibration was based upon the 
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research questions developed in previous chapters, and was therefore theoretically 
derived.  
Data were collected and analysed according to the process methods outlined in this 
chapter. This included ensuring the sample size was appropriate in order to perform 
the desired analysis of both variable and case-based approaches.  
A specific approach to the analysis with fsQCA has been provided to ensure that a 
multiple outcome comparison is possible. Appropriate parameters have been set for 
this.  
Having obtained the responses it was possible to conduct the analysis as outlined in 
this chapter. The results will now be presented in the Chapter 5. 
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5 Results  
Health care professionals work within a complex system, in complex work 
environments, dealing with complex issues. Management of medication error is but 
one of the many patient safety issues managed by nurses within rural clinical 
settings. 
The aim of the research is to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses 
working in rural clinical settings. This has been undertaken through the principal 
research question of how is safety climate related to views of reporting and 
disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings?  
The research aim assumes complexity. In order to address the research aim and 
research question it was necessary to consider the nature of the safety climate in 
which rural nurses work, the level of error that they think is being reported and 
disclosed and the relationship between each of these.  
Acknowledging health care as a complex system required a method that allowed 
complexity to be researched. Configurational comparative methods acknowledge 
complexity and therefore the research design reflected this approach. Use of the 
funnel of complexity informed this design ensuring the appropriate processes for 
collecting and preparing data, along with analysis and interpretation of that data, 
would be followed. 
It was important that the research design was informed by theoretical knowledge. 
Three research sub-questions were therefore developed from examination of the 
literature relating to safety climate, error reporting and disclosure. A further two 
sub-questions were developed through consideration of knowledge generation 
within a complex health system. 
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These five research sub-questions are: 
1. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in rural 
clinical settings?  
2. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a 
hypothetical medication error do nurses in such settings think is 
occurring? 
3. What is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst 
nurses in rural clinical settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of 
a hypothetical medication error? 
4. How is the understanding of the relationship between workplace safety 
climate and views of reporting medication error changed through the use 
of a configurational comparative method? 
5. What does this mean for the management of medication error?  
As outlined in the literature review, the complexity of safety culture commences 
with the definition of the term culture. Safety climate has been determined as a 
measureable element within safety culture.  Thus, this research considers safety 
attitude, an element of safety culture, which itself is an element of the broader 
workplace culture. 
Medication error is a key area of error. It is estimated that it costs the Australian 
health system AU$1.2 billion annually (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality 
in Health Care, 2013b). Nurses have a key role in the administration of medications 
(Choo et al., 2010). 
As highlighted in the literature review, public enquiries and research usually focus 
on what has gone wrong. Debate suggests that this has resulted in the 
measurement of the lack of safety rather than understanding what is needed for 
things to go well (Hollnagel, 2014).  
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Error disclosure is now a national standard for accreditation of hospitals in Australia 
(Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011a). As outlined in 
the literature review there are many elements as to why full, open disclosure is 
important. Not only is it something consumers consider important, clinicians also 
suffer when an error occurs and full disclosure does not occur (Hall & Scott, 2012; 
Nelson & Beyea, 2009; Wu & Steckelberg, 2012).  
This research is located in Tasmania, the island state within Australia. The research 
subjects have been restricted to nurses. For the purposes of this research the 
worksites in ASGC-RA 3—5 localities (Australian Government, 2010) were 
considered rural. 
The methodological approach undertaken in determining the relationship between 
safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure of error has focused upon 
accepting the complexity of the health care system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010). Complexity science has provided the framework for the research and this has 
been described in detail in Sections 3.3 to 3.5 of a previous chapter. 
Configurational comparative methods may be used in several ways. For this 
research fsQCA has been used to both summarise the data obtained through 
undertaking a case-based analysis and to use this analysis for theory development 
(Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). As recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2010) 
an additional method has been used in the form of inferential statistics for analysis 
of the questionnaire data.  
Data were obtained through use of a questionnaire comprising three sections: the 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Hutchinson et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006); 
an error scenario with three levels of harm asking respondents to indicate the 
likelihood it would either be formally reported or acknowledged to the 
patient/client or their family (Weissman et al., 2005); and demographic information.  
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Invitations to participate in the research through completing an online 
questionnaire were distributed to Registered and Enrolled Nurses of eligible 
worksites through two approaches. The first was a direct mail-out of an invitation to 
participate in the online survey to eligible worksites and the second was through an 
email via the two nursing unions to nurses working in those same worksites. 
 Chapter outline 
The results for this research are presented in two parts. The first will present the 
variable-based results relating to frequency data, principal components analysis and 
inferential statistics and the second the case-based results from fsQCA.  
The variable-based results include the data relating to demographic information 
obtained as well as the frequency of views of reporting and disclosure and the 
frequency data obtained from the SAQ. These data therefore considers the nature 
of the sample obtained as well as addressing the first two research sub-questions 
relating to the nature of safety climate and the level of reporting that nurses think is 
occurring.  
This will be followed by presentation of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA). 
This was undertaken in order to transparently determine factors of teamwork and 
safety climate, the condition of interest in this research. These results relate to the 
second research sub-question regarding the nature of safety climate amongst 
nurses working in rural clinical settings. 
The final element of Part I is presentation of results from the analysis using 
inferential statistics. Views of reporting and disclosure are noted to be different 
amongst nurses based upon some of the demographic information obtained. 
Differences between demographic data and some of the teamwork and safety 
climate factors from this analysis have also been identified. Results also suggest that 
differences exist between some factors of teamwork and safety climate and views 
of reporting and disclosure.  
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These results inform the first three research sub-questions relating to the level of 
reporting and disclosure nurses think is occurring, the nature of safety climate in 
which rural nurses work and the relationship between these two. The latter of these 
research sub-questions is also informed through the results presented in Part II. 
This second section of the chapter presents the results from fsQCA. Two levels of 
analysis were undertaken to produce these results. Firstly, an analysis of the factors 
of teamwork and safety climate (conditions) and the views of reporting and 
disclosure (outcome) was undertaken (Section 5.13). Following this, further analysis 
was done using demographic information.  The process for this second analysis was 
informed by the results of the inferential statistics. More detail with regard to this 
will be provided in Section 5.14.  
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Part I:  Variable-based results 
Results of the variable-based analysis of the data are included in this first section. 
Several forms of analyses were used for this purpose. 
The questionnaire responses, including how missing data were handled and the 
assessment of sample representativeness, are the first areas considered in these 
results. The frequency data are then presented for the demographic data views of 
reporting and disclosure and each item of the SAQ.  
The low response rate in relation to some of the demographic and frequency 
information had implications for further analysis. Where relevant, the detail relating 
to how this was handled is undertaken in relation to where the relevant frequency 
data have been presented.   
Further results relating to the SAQ are then presented. Included is an examination 
of the internal consistency of the scale from the previous UK study using data 
obtained for this present research. Having determined the scale not to be reliable, 
results from a subsequent exploratory principal components analysis are presented.  
These results are then utilised to calculate factor scores for each respondent. Once 
this is achieved, the frequency of responses with positive factor scores is presented. 
With data relating to factors of teamwork and safety climate as well as views of 
reporting and disclosure of error determined, results from the inferential statistics 
analysis are presented. Differences found when comparing views of reporting and 
disclosure with demographic data are presented first. These results are followed by 
the differences found when factors of teamwork and safety climate were compared 
with the same demographic data.  
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Then, results relating to the differences found when comparing factors of teamwork 
and safety climate with views of reporting and disclosure of error are presented. 
Part I concludes with a summary of the variable-based results. 
 Questionnaire responses, missing data and sample 
representativeness 
A total of 123 responses were received from the invitation to participate in the 
online questionnaire for this research. Of these five responses did not include any 
data so were excluded. Two responses indicating postcodes outside the ASGC-RA 
3—5 areas of interest were also excluded. It is possible these responses were 
received from nurses who received the invitation through their union as a result of 
inaccurate membership data. 
A further five responses did not include any postcode data. Three of these 
contained incomplete questionnaires, leaving two fully completed questionnaires. 
Whilst it is possible these responses were from nurses in workplaces outside the 
geographical area of interest, it was also considered possible that respondents felt 
they may have been identified by the student researcher if they had included their 
postcode.  
The previous chapter outlined the process of a conservative approach regarding the 
inclusion of these responses in the analyses. Repeat analysis with the exclusion of 
these responses of results with borderline significance produced either a similar 
result of a result indicating significance. Additional analysis was also undertaken in 
relation to some tests that were significant and the exclusion of these responses did 
not affect the outcome with regard to significance. The relevant Chi-squared tables 
for these are in Appendix 7. 
Therefore, so as not to bias results towards increasing significance of results from 
analyses, the responses were included. This is, however, a limitation of the 
research.  
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The process of analysis for SAQ data meant that three responses would be included 
in that analysis (as others were excluded due to missing data). In addition, the 
responses without postcode data were obviously not included in the analyses 
relating to geographical location. Hence, a total of 116 eligible surveys were 
included in the final sample for the variable-based analysis.  
According to Health Workforce Data the number of nurses employed in ASGC-RA 
3—5 areas in Tasmania 2012 was 1688 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2013). Thus it may be estimated that the survey responses represent approximately 
6.8% of the total population.  
This figure is an estimate only as the AIHW indicates caution in relation to its final 
figures (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013), and it is also possible that 
some of the nurses registered work in sites not considered eligible for this study (for 
example pathology services and medical specialist rooms). In addition, 304 nurses 
(from a total of 7132) did not indicate remoteness.  
The AIHW data also relate to main employment (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2013) and the survey in this study did not indicate whether respondents 
were working in their main employment or another job. That is, some may have 
been working in the rural setting as a second job with their main employment in a 
metropolitan area. More detailed information regarding the representativeness of 
the survey will be presented with the relevant results. 
With regard to frequency data obtained from the questionnaire the demographic 
information is presented first. This is followed by the frequency of responses 
received in relation to views of reporting and error acknowledgment and then those 
relating to safety attitude. 
 Demographic data 
The frequency of responses to the demographic questions of the survey provide 
further detail as to the nature of the sample obtained for this research. Responses 
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to each question are presented in graph format with the number (N) indicated with 
percentage values in brackets. Missing data have been excluded pairwise for this 
section of the results. 
 Level of Registration 
Figure 5-1 shows the distribution of the participants by level of registration. The 
majority of respondents were Registered Nurses (92.2%) with 7.8% of respondents 
being Enrolled Nurses (ENs).  This compares with the AIHW data set where 22% of 
nurses working in ASGC-RA 3—5 areas in Tasmania were ENs (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2013). This suggests that Enrolled Nurses may be under-
represented in this sample.  
 
Figure 5-1: Level of registration (N=115) 
 
 Work location/setting 
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setting (20.9%). Only 7.8% of respondents work in other settings such as general 
practice, mental health or disability services. 
According to the AIHW in 2012 amongst the ASGC-RA 3-5 locations there were 25 
666 nurses (not including midwives) working in settings similar to those selected for 
this research. Of these 65.7% worked in hospitals and 14.5% worked in residential 
aged care. There were 8.5% working in community health settings with a further 
2.9% working specifically in community aged care settings and 2.3% in mental 
health community settings. There were 5.2% working in general practice.  A small 
percentage worked in residential mental health (0.39%) and alcohol and drug 
services (0.50%).  
 
Figure 5-2: Main location of work (N=115) 
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health and alcohol and drug services it may also explain the low response from 
nurses in mental health settings for this research. So whilst the representativeness 
of the sample cannot be specifically identified the trend in the responses reflects 
the overall trend of the national data set. 
 Facility bed numbers 
It is evident from Figure 5-3 (below) that the majority of respondents work in 
settings with less than 50 beds (41.2%). Approximately one quarter of respondents 
(24.6%) work in facilities with 50—99 beds. There were fewer respondents from 
facilities of 100 beds or more (11.4%) and 3.2% of respondents indicated they were 
unsure of the number of beds in their facility. This uncertainty may reflect the 
changes to service provision that were being undertaken by the DHHS at the time 
the survey was administered as some hospitals were undergoing bed closures. A 
total of 20.2% of respondents indicated other/not applicable to bed numbers which 
reflects the nature of worksites in general practice and community settings where 
workplaces do not have beds. 
 
Figure 5-3: Number of beds (N=114) 
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There are no publicly available data regarding nurse employment relative to bed 
numbers of a facility. Therefore it is not possible to determine the 
representativeness of these data. 
 Work role 
As indicated in Figure 5-4 (below) the majority of respondents indicated that their 
work role was clinical (80.7%). This compares to 19.3% who indicated their role was 
management. It is difficult to determine the representativeness of these data 
although it is possible that nurses in a management role are over-represented. In 
Tasmania in 2012 there were 6014 nurses who noted their role as “Clinician” and 
176 as “Clinical management’” However, these are state-wide data and as the 
worksites in rural areas tend to be smaller (as indicated in Figure 4), it is arguable 
the ratio of managers amongst clinicians would be greater.  
 
 
Figure 5-4: Main work role (N=114) 
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statistics will be explored further when those results are presented (Sections 
5.7.1and 5.8.1). 
 Employment sector 
Figure 5-5 indicates most of the respondents work for government (65.8%) with 
33.3% of respondents indicating they work in the non-government/private sector. 
One respondent (0.9%) indicated they were unsure of the employment sector they 
were working in. Whilst this may seem unusual the nature of funding for some 
centres in Tasmania may lead to this type of uncertainty. Several centres, such as 
Esperance and Tasman Multi-purpose services have been operated by both public 
and private sector entities.  
It is difficult to determine the representativeness of the sample in relation to the 
employment sector. These data are reported by AIHW on a state level and in 
Tasmania in 2012 there were 4269 nurses employed in the public sector and 3081 in 
the private sector. These figures suggest the Non-government workforce may be 
under-represented in the sample obtained for this research. This possibility reflects 
a similar observation from research conducted by ACSQHC where there was also a 
low response rate from the private sector was also.  
 
Figure 5-5: Employment sector (N=114) 
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 Experience in current workplace 
As indicated in Figure 5-6, almost one third of respondents indicated they had 
worked in the current workplace from 3 years to less than 8 years (31.3%) and 
17.4% had worked in the same workplace for 21 years or more. A small number of 
respondents indicated they had been in their current workplace for less than 6 
months (2.6%) or from 6 months to less than 1 year (4.3%). The remainder of 
respondents had been working in their current workplace for 1 year to less than 3 
years (16.5%), from 8 years to less than 13 years (14.8%) or from 13 years to less 
than 21 years (13.0%).  
 
 
Figure 5-6: Experience in current workplace (N=115) 
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 Experience in nursing 
More than half of the respondents have worked in nursing for 21 years or more 
(57.4%) and as Figure 5-7 indicates almost one third of respondents have worked in 
nursing from 3 years to less than 8 years (31.3%). Approximately half this number 
have worked in nursing for either 8 years to less than 13 years (14.8%) or from 13 
years to less than 21 years (13.0%).  
Figure 8 also indicates a small number of responses from nurses with less than 6 
months (1.7%) or from 1 year to less than 3 years (1.7%) experience in nursing. 
There were no respondents indicating experience in nursing of 6 months to less 
than 1 year. Whilst AIHW collects data on the age of nurses there are no specific 
data collected in relation to experience in nursing or experience in current 
workplace.   
 
Figure 5-7: Experience in nursing (N=115) 
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Of the 7132 nurses registered in Tasmania in 2012 there were 4 178 (59%) who 
were aged 45 or older. Whilst not all nurses in this age group may necessarily have 
been employed in nursing for their whole working, it is arguable that the majority 
have. This suggests that the 57% of respondents who had worked for 21 years or 
more is representative of the nursing workforce in Tasmania.  
 Rurality 
A large majority of respondents indicated that they worked in an outer regional 
(ASGC-RA 3) location (92.8%). This compares with 4.5% of respondents working in a 
remote location (ASGC-RA 4) and 2.7% working in very remote (ASGC-RA 5) areas. 
This is shown in Figure 5-8. The AIHW data indicates that in 2012 of the enrolled 
and registered nurses working in the ASGC-RA 3-5 areas in Tasmania 88.7% were 
working in an ASGC-RA 3 area, 8.6% were working in ASGC-RA 4 and 2.7% in ASGC-
RA 5. This suggests that an ASGC-RA 3 areas may be over-represented whilst ASGC-
RA 4 areas may be under-represented.  
 
Figure 5-8: ASGC-RA (N=111) 
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 Region 
The responses from each regional area of Tasmania are shown in Figure 5-9. More 
than half of the respondents worked in settings situated in the north-west of the 
state (55.0%) with 26.1% of respondents working in the north and 18.9% of 
respondents working in settings located in the south. The geographical location of 
facilities in Tasmania explains this unusual result. The larger hospitals in the north 
and north-west regions are located in centres in ASGC-RA 2 (outer regional) 
settings. Hence they were excluded whilst the three larger facilities in the north -
west region remained in the sample.  
It is not possible to make a comparison with AIHW data in this instance as the ASGC-
RA is the recognised classification for location. Regional data were collected as at 
the time there were three regional health areas operating within the Tasmanian 
public health system.  
 
 
Figure 5-9: Region (N=111) 
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 Summary of sample 
Having examined the demographic information obtained for this research, it is clear 
that caution is required when determining the representativeness of the sample. 
Whilst comparison may be made with the data obtained from the AIHW several 
areas have been noted as potentially problematic in terms of representativeness. 
This includes possible under-representation of enrolled nurses in the sample as well 
as nurses in a clinical role. The private sector is not well represented although this 
has been noted in other studies. Work locality may not be reflective of national data 
with regards to ASGC-RA and it is not possible to compare region data with a 
national data set as one is not available.  
The experience level of nurses and the workplace settings indicated amongst the 
sample, whilst not directly comparable to AIHW data do reflect similar trends in 
terms of representativeness.  With regard to facility bed numbers it is difficult to 
determine representativeness as there is no national data set of this information. 
These elements need to be kept in mind when considering the results obtained for 
this research. It may be that the sample is not representative of the broader 
population. However, with regard to rural clinical settings in Tasmania these are the 
only known data on views of reporting or acknowledgment of error, teamwork and 
safety climate amongst nurses.   
The low number responses in some of the variables above lead to combining of 
results where possible. This included merging responses for ASGC-RA 4-5 resulting 
in two categories of outer regional and remote/very remote. This allowed for 
reducing the number of cells with counts less than five so as to improve the Chi-
squared analysis.  
In the situation of the responses to facility bed numbers and employment sector 
there were some 3 and 1 respondents respectively who indicated their answer as 
Unsure. It was not possible to combine these data with another response category 
so these respondents were excluded from the Chi-squared analysis.  
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There were nine respondents indicating their worksite as other including responses 
from mental health, general practice and disability service worksites. With such 
diversity in this group of responses comparing these responses with the other 
groupings was unlikely thus they were excluded from variable-based analyses that 
related to workplace setting (Sections 5.7.1and 5.8.1). 
 Frequency: Views of reporting and disclosure 
This section presents the results relating to views of reporting and disclosure of 
error. The results therefore relate to the first research sub-question which is: what 
level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical medication 
error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
Views of reporting and disclosure in relation to error severity amongst respondents 
are presented in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11. Figure 5-10 shows the views of 
reporting of whilst Figure 5-11 indicates the views of disclosure.  
Although 80.2% (n= 85) of respondents indicated the likelihood that the severe 
error would Always be reported in their workplace, 9.4% (n=10) indicated such an 
error would Never be reported with 4.7% (n=5) indicating such an error would 
Usually be reported, 1.9% (n=2) indicating it would Sometimes be reported and 
3.8% (n=4) indicating it would Rarely be reported.  
Compared to a view of reporting severe error, fewer respondents (64.8%, n=68) 
indicated the moderate error scenario would Always be reported. There were 
19.0% (n=20) of respondents indicating such an error would Usually be reported, 
3.8% (n=4) indicating Sometimes, 10.5% (n=11) indicating Rarely and 1.9% (n=2) felt 
such an error would Never be reported.  
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Figure 5-10: Views of reporting error  
In relation to the near miss scenario less than half (45.7%, n=48) of the respondents 
indicated that such an error would Always be reported and 3.8% (n=4) indicated it 
would Never be reported. Approximately one quarter of respondents (25.7%, n=27) 
felt that the near miss would Usually be reported in their worksite with 11.4% 
(n=12) indicating Sometimes and 13.3% (n=14) indicating such an error would Rarely 
be reported. 
 
Figure 5-11: Views of error disclosure 
8
0
.2
%
 (
n
=8
5
)
4
.7
%
 (
n
=5
)
1
.9
%
 (
n
=2
)
3
.8
%
 (
n
=4
)
9
.4
%
 (
n
=1
0
)
6
4
.8
%
 (
n
=6
8
)
1
9
.0
%
 (
n
=2
0
)
3
.8
%
 (
n
=4
)
1
0
.5
%
 (
n
=1
1
)
1
.9
%
 (
n
=2
)
4
5
.7
%
 (
n
=4
8
)
2
5
.7
%
 (
n
=2
7
)
1
1
.4
%
 (
n
=1
2
)
1
3
.3
%
 (
n
=1
4
)
3
.8
%
 (
n
=4
)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Always Usually Sometimes Rarely Never
VIEW OF REPORTING
Severe Moderate Near Miss
5
4
.7
%
 (
n
=5
8
)
2
5
.5
%
 (
n
=2
7
)
8
.5
%
 (
n
=9
)
4
.7
%
 (
n
=5
)
6
.6
%
 (
n
=7
)
4
4
.8
%
 (
n
=4
7
)
3
4
.3
%
 (
n
=3
6
)
1
0
.5
%
 (
n
=1
1
)
6
.7
%
 (
n
=7
)
3
.8
%
 (
n
=4
)
2
6
.4
%
 (
n
=2
8
)
3
4
.9
%
 (
n
=3
7
)
1
5
.1
%
 (
n
=1
6
)
1
8
.9
%
 (
n
=2
0
)
4
.7
%
 (
n
=5
)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Always Usually Sometimes Rarely Never
VIEW OF DISCLOSURE
Severe Moderate Near Miss
  
152 
Respondent views of disclosing the severe, moderate and near miss error scenario 
are presented in Figure 5-11. The use of an axis to 100% is deliberate so that the 
graphs can be easily compared with the results for views of error reporting. 
The number of respondents indicating that the severe error scenario would Always 
be acknowledged to the patient and/or their family was 54.7% (n=58). Almost one 
quarter (25.5%, n=27) of respondents indicated such an error would Usually be 
disclosed, 8.5% (n=9) indicated Sometimes, 4.7% (n=5) indicated Rarely and 6.6% 
(n=7) indicated such an error would Never be disclosed. 
Less than half of respondents (44.8%, n=47) indicated that the moderate error 
scenario would Always be disclosed. Approximately one third (34.3%, n=36) 
indicated that the moderate error would Usually be disclosed, with 10.5% (n=11) 
indicating Sometimes, 6.7% (n=7) indicating Rarely and 3.8% (n=4) indicating Never. 
Responses for the near miss error scenario indicate that just 26.4% (n=28) agreed 
this outcome would Always be disclosed. More than this (34.9%, n=37) indicated 
the scenario would Usually be disclosed. Responses for Sometimes, Rarely and 
Never were 15.1% (n=16), 18.9% (n=20) and 4.7% (n=5) respectively. 
Examination of Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11 suggests there are differences between 
the frequency of views the error would Always be reported when compared to the 
error of the same level of harm would be viewed as likely to Always be disclosed. 
Furthermore, the views regarding the likelihood the error would Always be 
reported or disclosed decreased as severity of harm decreased.  
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit Tests were undertaken to compare comparing results 
that the error would Always be reported or disclosed. The relevant results tables 
from these tests appear in Appendix 9. 
Severe error was more likely to be reported than disclosed (χ2=31.745, df=1, N=115, 
p=0.000), as was moderate error (χ2=20.386, df=1, N=114, p=0.000)   and the near 
miss outcome (χ2=21.618, df=1, N=114, p=0.000). Severe error was more likely to be 
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reported than moderate error (χ213.075, df=1, N=115, p=0.000) or near miss error 
(χ2 18.513, df=1, N=115, p=0.000) with moderate error also more likely to be 
reported than near miss (χ2=18.513, df=1, N=114, p=0.000). Similarly severe error 
was more likely to be disclosed than moderate error (χ2=3.895, df=1, N=115, 
p=0.048) or near miss (χ244.736, df1, N=115, p=0.000) with moderate error also 
more likely to be disclosed than the near miss scenario (χ218.847, df=1, N=113, 
p=0.000). 
Differences found in the frequency of views of error reporting and disclosure 
amongst nurses relating to the demographic data will be presented in Sections 5.7.1 
and 5.7.2 of this chapter. Further frequency data obtained in relation to safety 
climate will be considered first. 
 Frequency: teamwork and safety climate 
The first section of the questionnaire obtained data with respect to safety attitude 
through use of the SAQ. The frequency of responses to this section will now be 
presented.  
Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 outline the frequency data obtained in relation to the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ).   Items 2, 6, 18 and 23 are negatively worded. In 
most items the majority of respondents indicated they agreed strongly or agreed 
slightly to the statements. The opposite was the case for the negatively worded 
items where the majority of respondents indicated they either disagreed strongly or 
disagreed slightly with the item statement. 
Responses to the teamwork items of the SAQ are presented in Table 5-1. Responses 
can be grouped into two clear categories. The first group consisting of Items 1, 3, 8, 
9, 11 and 14 there were over 60% or greater of respondents indicating they agreed 
strongly in relation to the particular statement.  Of the respondents, 64.6% 
indicated they agreed strongly that nurse input was well received (Item 1).  
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Table 5-1 Frequency SAQ Teamwork Questions 
 
 Disagree 
Strongly* 
% (N) 
Disagree 
slightly* 
% (N) 
Neutral* 
% (N) 
Agree 
Slightly* 
% (N) 
Agree 
strongly* 
% (N) 
N/A# 
% (N) 
1. Nurse input is well received 
where I work 
4.4 
(5) 
 
1.8 
(2) 
 
5.3 
(6) 
 
23.9 
(27) 
 
64.6 
(73) 
 
 
2. Where I work it is difficult to 
speak up if I perceive a 
problem with patient care 
55.8 
(63) 
25.7 
(29) 
 
1.8 
(2) 
 
 
13.3 
(15) 
 
3.5 
(4) 
 
 
3. Decision making where I 
work uses input from relevant 
staff 
4.6 
(5) 
 
6.4 
(7) 
 
4.6 
(5) 
 
22.9 
(25) 
 
61.5 
(67) 
 
 
4. The doctors and nurses 
here work together as a well- 
coordinated team 
0.9 
(1) 
 
10.1 
(11) 
 
9.2 
(10) 
 
35.8 
(39) 
 
44.0 
(48) 
 
2.7 
(3) 
5. Disagreements where I 
work are resolved 
appropriately (i.e. not who is 
right but what is best for the 
patient) 
5.4 
(6) 
 
13.5 
(15) 
 
9.9 
(11) 
 
27.9 
(31) 
 
43.2 
(48) 
 
 
6. I am frequently unable to 
express disagreement with the 
senior clinical staff here 
33.6 
(36) 
40.2 
(43) 
 
8.4 
(9) 
 
11.2 
(12) 
 
6.5 
(7) 
 
3.6 
(4) 
7. It is easy for staff here to 
ask questions when there is 
something they do not 
understand 
33.6 
(36) 
 
40.2 
(43) 
 
8.4 
(9) 
 
11.2 
(12) 
 
6.5 
(7) 
3.6 
(4) 
8. I have the support I need 
from other staff to care for 
patients 
0.9 
(1) 
 
11.6 
(13) 
 
3.6 
(4) 
 
16.1 
(18) 
 
67.9 
(76) 
 
 
9. I know the first and last 
names of all the staff I worked 
with during my last shift 
1.8 
(2) 
 
1.8 
(2) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
 
6.4 
(7) 
 
89.0 
(97) 
 
 
10. Important issues are well 
communicated at shift 
changes 
2.9 
(3) 
 
9.5 
(10) 
 
3.8 
(4) 
 
29.5 
(31) 
 
54.3 
(57) 
 
 
11. Briefing staff on handovers 
between shifts/periods of work 
(i.e. to plan for possible 
contingencies) is important for 
patient safety 
0.0 
(0) 
0.9 
(1) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
 
5.5 
(6) 
 
92.7 
(102) 
 
12. Briefings are common 
where I work 
2.7 
(3) 
 
7.2 
(8) 
 
9.9 
(11) 
 
33.3 
(37) 
 
46.8 
(52) 
 
 
13. I am satisfied with the 
quality of collaboration that I 
experience with senior doctors 
where I work 
5.7 
(6) 
 
 
6.6 
(7) 
 
8.5 
(9) 
 
33.0 
(35) 
 
46.2 
(49) 
 
 
14. I am satisfied with the 
quality of collaboration that I 
experience with nurses where 
I work 
0.0 
(0) 
8.0 
(9) 
 
5.4 
(6) 
 
25.9 
(29) 
 
60.7 
(68) 
 
 
*Valid percent (not including N/A) 
#N/A result is for total % (N) in overall sample 
 
There were 61.5 % of respondents indicating that they agreed strongly that decision 
making in their workplace used input from relevant staff (Item 3), 22.9% agreed 
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slightly and 4.6% indicated a neutral response. Those in slight disagreement were 
6.4% of responses with 4.6% in strong disagreement. 
A total of 67.9% felt they had support from other staff to care for their patients 
(Item 8) and 16.1% were in slight agreement with this item. Although only 0.9% 
were in strong disagreement, there were 11.6% of responses disagreeing slightly. 
There were 3.6% of responses neutral to this item. 
A large number of respondents (89.0%) agreed strongly that they knew the first and 
last names of the people they worked with on their last shift (Item 9) and 6.9% 
agreed slightly. Only 0.9% of responses received were neutral for this item with 
1.8% each received for both slight and strong disagreement. 
There were 60.7% of respondents who agreed strongly that they were happy with 
the degree of collaboration where they worked (Item 14) compared with 25.9% in 
slight agreement, 5.4% neutral and 8% in slight disagreement. No responses were 
received indicating strong disagreement with this statement. 
A total of 92.7% of respondents strongly agreed that briefings are important for 
patient safety (Item 11) which was the highest response received in relation to an 
item. Just 5.5% agreed slightly on this item with 0.9% either neutral or slightly 
disagreeing. There were no responses indicating strong disagreement for this item. 
These results contrast with the second group containing Items 4, 5, 10, 12 and 13 
where the percentage of respondents was more evenly distributed across both 
slight and strong agreement. The number of respondents who agreed strongly to 
the relevant item statements was below 55% in these questions and in some cases 
less than 50%. However, with the exception of Item 10 the number of respondents 
agreeing slightly with the statements of each question was over 30%. 
Whilst 44% of respondents indicated they agreed strongly that doctors and nurses 
worked together as a well-coordinated team there were 35.8% that agreed slightly 
with this statement. Similarly 43.2% of respondents were agreed strongly that there 
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was an appropriate resolution to disagreements in their workplace with 27.9% 
indicating that they agreed slightly. 
Respondents to Item 10 showed 54.3% agreed strongly and 29.5% agreed slightly 
that important issues are well communicated at shift changes. Whilst 3.8% of 
responses were neutral to this item there were 9.5% who slightly disagreed and a 
further 2.9% indicating strong disagreement. Therefore 12.4% (almost one in eight) 
of respondents do not agree that communication is adequate at shift changes.    
In relation to briefings in the workplace being common (Item 12) 46.8% agreed 
strongly and 33.3% agreed slightly to this. However, 9.9% of respondents indicated 
a neutral view to this item with 7.2% in slight disagreement and 2.7% strongly 
disagreeing. 
The quality of collaboration with nurses in the workplace (Item 14) was considered 
satisfactory by most respondents with 60.7% in strong agreement and 25.9% in 
slight agreement. There were no responses in strong disagreement with this item 
although 8% slightly disagreed and 5.4% were neutral in their response. 
The first of the two negatively worded questions (Item 2) indicating difficulty in 
speaking up around perceived problems with patient care returned a response of 
55.8% disagreeing strongly and 25.7% disagreeing slightly. That is, the large 
majority of respondents did not feel this is an issue in their workplace. 
The responses to Item 6, regarding feeling unable to indicate disagreement with 
senior staff indicate that 33.6% of staff disagreed strongly and 40.2% disagreed 
slightly. That is, allowing for the negative wording, the majority of respondents felt 
able to disagree with senior staff in their workplace. 
What is of concern in relation to this question is that Item 7, which is not negatively 
worded, returned the same results as Item 6 across all possible choices. Previous 
studies using the SAQ have suggested that respondents may not correctly read 
negatively worded questions. However, the results in this study may not necessarily 
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reflect this as Item 7 responses indicate that 33.6% of staff disagree strongly that 
they are able to ask questions when there is something they do not understand 
with 40.2% disagreeing slightly. It seems somewhat unusual that respondents 
would feel this way yet feel able to disagree with senior clinical staff. Therefore, the 
results of both Item 6 and Item 7 should be interpreted with caution.  
Respondents who indicated N/A were excluded pairwise from this analysis. 
However, the % (N) total in the overall sample is noted in Table 5-2. Of the 14 items 
relating to teamwork there were only three where respondents indicated N/A.  
Results in relation to the safety climate section of the SAQ as presented in Table 5-2 
are quite different compared to the teamwork questions. There were fewer items 
returning a response of greater than 60% strong agreement with only Items 17, 22 
and 24 returning this level of agreement.  
With respect to being encouraged by their colleagues to report safety concerns 
(Item 17), 69.1% indicated strong agreement and 23.6% slight agreement. Only 
2.7% indicated strong disagreement with the same response also present for slight 
agreement. There were 1.8% of respondents neutral to this question.  
A larger percentage, 82.3%, indicated they strongly agreed they knew the proper 
channels through which to report error (Item 22) and 15% indicated slight 
agreement with this statement. No respondents (0%) indicated they disagreed 
slightly and just one respondent (0.9%) indicated they strongly disagreed. Once 
again 1.8% of respondents indicated a neutral position to this question. 
There were 64% of respondents who indicated they strongly agreed that 
management did not knowingly compromise the safety of patients (Item 24), 13.5% 
who agreed slightly and 7.2% indicating a neutral response. Of concern is that 7.2% 
and 8.1% of respondents indicated they disagreed strongly or disagreed slightly 
respectively. Thus 15.3% of respondents felt management in their workplace 
knowingly compromised the safety of patients. 
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Table 5-2 Frequency SAQ Safety climate questions 
 
 Disagree 
Strongly* 
% (N) 
Disagree 
slightly* 
% (N) 
Neutral
* 
 
% (N) 
Agree 
Slightly* 
% (N) 
Agree 
strongly* 
% (N) 
N/A# 
 
% (N) 
15. The levels of staffing where 
I work are sufficient to handle 
the number of patients 
9.8 
(11) 
23.2 
(26) 
6.3 
(7) 
 
29.5 
(33) 
 
31.3 
(35) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
16. I would feel safe being 
treated as a patient in this 
service 
2.7 
(3) 
6.2 
(7) 
8.0 
(9) 
27.4 
(31) 
55.8 
(63) 
 
17. I am encouraged by my 
colleagues to report any patient 
safety concerns I may have 
2.7 
(3) 
 
2.7 
(3) 
 
1.8 
(2) 
 
23.6 
(26) 
 
69.1 
(76) 
 
1.8 
(2) 
18. Staff frequently disregard 
rules or guidelines (e.g. hand-
washing, treatment 
protocols/clinical pathways etc.) 
that are established for the area 
where I work 
46.4 
(52) 
 
28.6 
(32) 
 
3.6 
(4) 
 
15.2 
(17) 
 
6.3 
(7) 
0.9 
(1) 
19. The culture where I work 
makes it easy to learn from the 
errors of others 
9.8 
(11) 
 
7.1 
(8) 
 
15.2 
(17) 
 
36.6 
(41) 
 
31.3 
(35) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
20. I receive appropriate 
feedback about my performance 
10.6 
(12) 
 
9.7 
(11) 
 
15.9 
(18) 
 
27.4 
(31) 
 
36.3 
(41) 
 
 
21. Medical errors are handled 
appropriately here 
4.5 
(5) 
 
5.5 
(6) 
 
9.1 
(10) 
 
30.0 
(33) 
 
50.9 
(56) 
 
2.7 
(3) 
22. I know the proper channels 
to which I should direct 
questions regarding patient 
safety 
0.9 
(1) 
 
0.0 
(0) 
1.8 
(2) 
 
15.0 
(17) 
 
82.3 
(93) 
 
23. Where I work it is difficult to 
discuss errors 
46.0 
(52) 
25.7 
(29) 
 
8.0 
(9) 
 
15.0 
(17) 
 
5.3 
(6) 
 
 
24. Management does not 
knowingly compromise the 
safety of patients 
7.2 
(8) 
 
8.1 
(9) 
 
7.2 
(8) 
 
13.5 
(15) 
 
64.0 
(71) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
25. This organisation is doing 
more for patient safety than it 
did one year ago 
6.5 
(7) 
 
10.2 
(11) 
 
21.3 
(23) 
 
27.8 
(30) 
 
34.3 
(37) 
 
4.4 
(5) 
26. Leadership is driving us to 
be a safety-centred organisation 
6.3 
(7) 
 
7.1 
(8) 
 
17.0 
(19) 
 
24.1 
(27) 
 
45.5 
(51) 
 
0.9 
(1) 
27. My suggestions about safety 
would be acted upon if I 
expressed them to management 
6.2 
(7) 
 
8.0 
(9) 
 
6.2 
(7) 
 
28.3 
(32) 
 
51.3 
(58) 
 
 
*Valid percent (not including N/A) 
#N/A result is for total % (N) in overall sample 
 
Whilst 55.5% of respondents agreed strongly that they would feel safe being 
treated as a patient in the health service (Item 16) and 27.4% agreed slightly there 
were 8% of respondents who were neutral on this item. Of concern is that 6.2% 
disagreed slightly with this item and 2.7% disagreed strongly. Thus almost 9% of 
respondents felt they would not be safe as a patient in their own health service.  
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In relation to work culture making it easy to learn from the errors of others (Item 
19) there were only 31.3% of the respondents who were in strong agreement and 
36.6% slightly agreed. The percentage of respondents who neither agreed nor 
disagreed with this item was 15.9%. Respondents who slightly disagreed were 7.1%, 
and 9.8% were in strong disagreement. That is, 16.9% of respondents disagreed 
with the item, which by comparison to other items is relatively high for an item not 
negatively worded. 
A similar high rate of disagreement was found in responses to Item 20. There were 
10.6% of respondents who disagreed strongly that they received appropriate 
feedback about their performance and 9.7% who slightly agreed with this item. This 
indicates approximately one in five respondents felt they do not receive appropriate 
feedback about their performance. There were 15.9% of respondents who were 
neutral on this item. In relation to agreement with the item, 27.4% of respondents 
agreed slightly and 36.3% agreed strongly. 
Agreement regarding the appropriate handling of medical error (Item 21) was high 
overall. Whilst just over half (50.9%) of the respondents agreed strongly with this 
item, 30.0% agreed slightly. There were 9.1% of respondents who were neutral and 
5.5% and 4.5% indicating slight disagreement and strong disagreement respectively. 
Of the responses to the statement that their organisation was doing more for 
patient safety than it did one year ago (Item 25), 34.3% agreed strongly and 27.8% 
agreed slightly. This item received the highest rate of neutral responses for any item 
with 21.3% of nurses indicating this. There were 10.2% of respondents who agreed 
slightly and 6.5% who disagreed strongly with this item.  
There were 45.5% of respondents who strongly agreed that leadership was driving 
their organisation to be safety centred (Item 26) and 24.1% agreed slightly with this. 
Of the respondents who disagreed, 7.1% did so slightly and 6.3% were in strong 
disagreement. There were 17% of respondents indicating a neutral view on this 
item. 
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For the final item of the SAQ section of the questionnaire relating to whether or not 
their suggestions about safety would be acted upon if expressed to management 
(Item 27), 51.3% of respondents strongly agreed and 28.3% agreed slightly. There 
were 6.2% of respondents who were neutral, 8.0% who disagreed slightly and 6.2% 
who disagreed strongly with this item. 
The negatively worded items in this section of the SAQ were Items 18 and 23. The 
first of these (Item 18) relates to staff frequently disregarding rules or guidelines 
and 46.4% of respondents indicated they disagreed strongly with this statement. 
There were 28.6% of respondents who disagreed slightly and just 3.6% who 
indicated a neutral response. However there were 6.3% of respondents who agreed 
strongly that staff frequently disregarded rules or guidelines and 36.6% agreed 
slightly with the statement. 
In relation to difficulty discussing errors in the workplace (Item 23) 46.0% of 
respondents disagreed strongly that it was difficult to do so in their workplace and 
25.7% disagreed slightly.  There were 8% of respondents who were neutral to the 
statement with 15.0% agreeing slightly and 5.3% agreeing strongly. 
The number of respondents indicating N/A for any item is reported in Table 5-2. Of 
the 13 items there were eight where respondents indicated this.  
Although the frequency results of this research are not identical to those obtained 
by a previous study using the same questionnaire (Hutchinson et al., 2006) there is 
a similarity in that the majority of respondents indicated agreement with item 
statements, with the reverse occurring for negatively worded items. In contrast this 
research had comparatively fewer respondents indicating a neutral or N/A response 
to items.  
 Principal components analysis (PCA) 
A previous study in the UK using the same wording of the SAQ found five factors, 
two for teamwork and three for safety climate (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Use of 
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Cronbach’s α is recommended in order to check the reliability of a scale (Pallant, 
2013). When this was done one of the factor scales was found to have a value of 
less than 0.70, which indicates a lack of reliability. The Cronbach’s α factor scores 
for the previous study compared to the data obtained in this research appear in 
Appendix 10.  
An exploratory principal components analysis (PCA) was therefore undertaken in 
order to extract factors resulting in a reliable scale that could then be applied as 
conditions in QCA. It also identified the conditions to be used for QCA.  
The steps taken for PCA were outlined in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.3). The three steps 
involved considering the suitability of the data, factor extraction and rotation of 
factors. The results from this process are outlined here and the SPSS outputs for the 
final analysis appear in Appendix 12.   
 Data suitability 
As discussed in earlier in this chapter (Section 5.2), there were 116 responses 
received from the survey. This was slightly under the recommended minimum of 
five responses per question for the 27 questions from the SAQ in the first part of 
the survey. However, as previous applications of the SAQ had identified two 
elements of teamwork (Items 1—14) and safety climate (Items 15—27), the survey 
items were analysed in relation to these two elements. This meant that a minimum 
of 70 responses was required and therefore the minimum number of responses 
recommended was easily met.  
Data were found not to be normally distributed. The SPSS outputs for this analysis 
appear in Appendix 6. Although not ideal, principal components analysis is 
considered robust enough for non-normally distributed data to be used (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). 
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 Factor extraction 
Determining the number of factors to extract within each of the two elements was 
then undertaken. Oblique rotation (Direct Oblimen) was adopted. This approach 
resulted in factors that could be grouped and described in a meaningful way. Whilst 
this is the same survey that was used in the UK, it should be noted that the factors 
extracted are not identical to those identified through previous use (Hutchinson et 
al., 2006). Discussion regarding this appears in (Section 6.1).   
Initial analysis resulted in a matrix for teamwork that was not positive definite. 
Hence there was no result for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity for this element. This indicated there was no correlation between the 
data relating to these items. The initial analysis for safety climate questions 
returned a matrix that was positive definite suggesting an underlying correlation 
was present. 
Frequency data for the responses to teamwork questions identified concerns in 
relation to Items 6 and 7. These have been addressed in Section 5.5. The non-
retention of these items for the analysis resulted in a matrix that was also positive 
definite. Both elements were then taken through the further steps of PCA factor 
extraction. 
Table 5-3 outlines the results for the KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity. In each 
case the KMO was greater than 0.7 (0.834 for teamwork and 0.844 for safety 
climate) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity indicated significance (p=0.000). 
The Kaiser Criterion (identifying Eigenvalues of ≥1) and Catell’s Scree Test for each 
of the elements were not conclusive. It was difficult to ascertain whether two or 
three factors should be extracted, particularly in relation to the teamwork 
questions. Similar issues were identified in a previous use of this questionnaire 
(Hutchinson et al., 2006). Scatter plots for each analysis may be found in Appendix 
12.   
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The pattern matrix in particular was evaluated through the process of PCA. It 
identified that removal of some questions with low Eigenvalue scores may be 
necessary.  
Parallel analysis was therefore used to finalise the number of factors that should be 
extracted. The Monte Carlo PCA tables produced for Horne’s Test during this 
analysis appear in Appendix 12. These tables suggested one factor be extracted for 
teamwork and two for safety climate. The final tables presented for the thesis 
relate to the final analysis where 11 questions were retained for each of the 
elements of teamwork and safety climate. 
Table 5-3 Factors identified from PCA 
 
 
Factor  KMO 
(approx. χ 2) 
Bartlett’s 
Test of 
Sphericit
y 
Number 
of items 
Valid
% (N) 
Number 
of 
responses 
excludeda 
Item 
Mean 
Cronbach 
α  
Total 
variance 
explained 
(%) 
Teamwork 
Factor 1 
Teamwork 
and patient 
safety at 
bedside 
 
 
 
0.834 
(438.041) 
 
 
 
df=55 
p=0.000 
7 86.2 
(100) 
16 4.257 0.841 43.82 
Teamwork 
Factor 2 
Workplace 
relationships 
and 
communicati
on 
4 87.9 
(102) 
14 4.299 0.697 12.30 
Safety 
Climate 
Factor 1 
Workplace 
safety culture  
 
 
 
0.844 
(491.110) 
 
 
 
df=55 
p=0.000 
4 95.7 
(111) 
5 4.011 0.721 13.54 
Safety 
Climate 
Factor 2 
Leadership 
and error 
management 
7 92.2 
(107) 
9 4.096 0.853 43.83 
aListwise exclusion 
 
Following the above processes four factors were extracted with two for each of the 
elements of teamwork and safety climate. These are listed in Table 5-3. The total 
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variance explained for each teamwork factor was 43.82% for teamwork and patient 
safety at bedside, and 12.30% for workplace relationships and communication, 
whereas it was 13.54% for workplace safety culture and 43.83% for leadership and 
error management. 
It has already been noted that non retention of Items 6 and 7 of the teamwork 
element was required. Based upon the experience of a previous use of the survey 
where it was determined Item 11 reflected an observation rather than an attitude 
this item was also not retained (Hutchinson et al., 2006). The negatively worded 
questions in the safety climate element (Items 18 and 23) were also not retained as 
was also the case in a previous use of the SAQ (Hutchinson et al., 2006). 
 
Table 5-4 Optimum factor loadings for teamwork items 
 
 
 
Teamwork items 
Teamwork  
Factor 1 
Teamwork and 
patient safety  
at bedside 
Teamwork  
Factor 2 
Workplace 
relationships and 
communication 
1. Nurse input is well received where I work .614  
2. Where I work it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem 
with patient care 
.823 -.442 
3. Decision making where I work uses input from relevant staff .693  
5. Disagreements where I work are resolved appropriately (i.e. 
not who is right but what is best for the patient) 
.597  
8. I have the support I need from other staff to care for patients .792  
10. Important issues are well communicated at shift changes .698  
14. I am satisfied with the quality of collaboration that I 
experience with nurses where I work 
.760  
4. The doctors and nurses here work together as a well-
coordinated team 
 .820 
9. I know the first and last names of all the staff I worked with 
during my last shift 
 .365 
12. Briefings are common where I work  .465 
13. I am satisfied with the quality of collaboration that I 
experience with senior doctors where I work 
 .824 
 
 
Once the items and factors were finalised, the reliability of each of these was 
assessed through use of Cronbach’s α. The results from this process are also noted 
in Table 5-3.  
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It is generally regarded that a result of 0.70 or higher suggests a scale is reliable (Flin 
et al., 2006; Matsunaga, 2010; Valentine et al., 2015). Whilst the result for the 
second teamwork factor was 0.697, a similar α result for another factor has been 
identified and reported in a previous study (Hutchinson et al., 2006).   
The optimal factor loadings for the final included items are presented in Table 5-4 
and Table 5-5. These tables also indicate the items which were retained for the final 
factor structure.  
Table 5-5 Optimum factor loadings safety climate items 
 
 
Safety climate items 
Safety Climate 
Factor 1 
Workplace safety 
culture 
Safety Climate 
Factor 2 
Leadership and 
error 
management  
15. The levels of staffing where I work are sufficient to handle 
the number of patients 
.896  
16. I would feel safe being treated as a patient in this service .865  
17. I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient 
safety concerns I may have 
.457 .354 
19. The culture where I work makes it easy to learn from the 
errors of others 
.455 .340 
20. I receive appropriate feedback about my performance .380 .553 
21. Medical errors are handled appropriately here  .808 
22. I know the proper channels to which I should direct questions 
regarding patient safety 
 .601 
24. Management does not knowingly compromise the safety of 
patients 
 .724 
25. This organisation is doing more for patient safety than it did 
one year ago 
 .661 
26. Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centred organisation  .814 
27. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I 
expressed them to management 
 .802 
 
Further non-retention of items may have improved the Cronbach’s α result (refer to 
Appendix 12).  However, decisions regarding which items to retain were also made 
in reference to the previous use of the questionnaire in the UK (Hutchinson et al., 
2006). Therefore, the final factor structure for this research retained a similar 
number of items.  This allowed for comparison of results to occur. 
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The final factor structure saw the original questionnaire reduced to 22 items which 
included two factors for teamwork and two for safety climate (11 items each). The 
items included in each were considered and the factors named to reflect these.  
The first teamwork factor was labelled teamwork and patient safety at bedside and 
the second workplace relationships and communication. The safety climate factors 
were labelled workplace safety culture and leadership and error management. 
With the factor structure and items to be included finalised it was then possible to 
calculate the factor scores for each respondent. This was done using the formula 
outlined in the previous chapter (Section 4.2.2).     
The number of respondents with a positive score for each of the factors is 
presented in Figure 5-12. The teamwork factor workplace relationships and 
communication was the factor with the highest number of positive scores (79.6%, 
N=74). This was followed by the second teamwork factor teamwork and patient 
safety at bedside where 75.3% (N=70) of respondents had a positive factor score. 
The two safety climate factors of leadership and error management and workplace 
safety culture had 73.1% (N= 76) and 66.3% (N=69) of respondents with a positive 
score respectively. 
 
Figure 5-12: Percentage of positive factor scores (teamwork N=94, safety climate N=103) 
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Frequency data in relation to factor scores and views of reporting and disclosure 
were then subjected to further analysis. Inferential statistics were used to 
determine if areas differed in relation to the demographic data collected. These 
results will now be considered, with views of reporting and disclosure presented 
first. 
 The level of reporting and disclosure that nurses think is 
occurring 
This section presents results relating to the first research sub-question which is: 
what level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring?  Results were 
produced through the use of Chi-squared analysis incorporating the use of Fisher’s 
Exact Test. 
Following analysis utilising the abovementioned inferential statistics several 
differences were noted in regard to views of reporting and acknowledgment of 
error. Differences were found in relation to workplace setting and work role. These 
are in addition to those noted in Section 5.4relating to reporting and disclosure and 
severity of harm. The other area of difference noted was employment sector 
however these results may have been influenced by other factors such as workplace 
setting.    
 Differences amongst workplace settings 
The views of error Always being reported are presented in Figure 14. Differences in 
the views of reporting an error were present in different workplace settings. The 
settings considered were hospital/multi-purpose settings, community and 
residential aged care. Due to a low number of responses from other areas these 
responses were excluded from the analysis. Further details of this can be found in 
the previous chapter (Section 4.4). 
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Amongst the nurses working in residential aged care settings, 96% (n=24) indicated 
a view that the severe error would Always be reported. This compared with 77.2% 
(n=44) amongst nurses in hospital/multi-purpose settings and 70.8% (n=17) 
amongst nurses in community settings. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13: View that error ‘Always’ reported by workplace setting 
 
It is not clear as to whether or not there is a difference amongst the different 
settings with regard to the frequency of views that a severe error would Always be 
reported.  Whilst there seems to be a visible difference between the different 
settings as indicated in Figure 5-13 the results presented in Table 5-6 show the 
Pearson’s χ2 (p=0.061) for views that a severe error would Always be reported 
suggests that there is no significance with these results. However, the Fisher’s Exact 
Test (p=0.042) suggests that there may be. As discussed in the previous chapter 
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(Section 4.4), in the event Chi-squared tables have cell counts less than five then the 
Fisher’s Exact Test is recognised as a valid test alternative test (Howell, 2007).  
Table 5-6 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of reporting severe error and workplace 
setting 
 
Formally report severe error Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/ 
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 44 17 24 85 
% Workplace setting 77.2% 70.8% 96.0% 80.2% 
% of Total 41.5% 16.0% 22.6% 80.2% 
Not Always 
Count 13 7 1 21 
% Workplace setting 22.8% 29.2% 4.0% 19.8% 
% of Total 12.3% 6.6% 0.9% 19.8% 
Total 
Count 57 24 25 106 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.8% 22.6% 23.6% 100.0% 
χ2 = 5.578a, df=2, N=106, p=0.061, Fisher’s Exact = 0.042 
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.75 
 
Results indicating  differences between views that moderate or near miss error 
would Always be reported are clearer. In both cases none of the cells of the Chi-
squared table have counts of less than five.   
The results with respect to views of reporting the moderate error scenario 
presented in Table 5-7, note differences amongst the settings (p=0.007).  There 
were 88% (n=22) of nurses in residential aged care indicating such an error would 
always be reported, compared with 62.5% (n=35) of nurses working in 
hospital/multi-purpose settings and 45.8% (n=11) of nurses in community settings. 
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Table 5-7 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of reporting moderate error and 
workplace setting 
 
 
Formally report moderate error  
Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/ 
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 35 11 22 68 
% Workplace setting 62.5% 45.8% 88.0% 64.8% 
% of Total 33.3% 10.5% 21.0% 64.8% 
Not Always 
Count 21 13 3 37 
% Workplace setting 37.5% 54.2% 12.0% 35.2% 
% of Total 20.0% 12.4% 2.9% 35.2% 
Total 
Count 56 24 25 105 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.3% 22.9% 23.8% 100.0% 
χ2= 9.809a, df= 2, N=105, p=0.007, Fishers Exact=0.006 
 a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.46. 
Results presented in Table 5-8 suggest that the near miss scenario was also more 
likely to be viewed as Always reported. Amongst nurses in residential aged care 
settings (p=0.010) 72% (n=18) indicated this scenario would Always be reported 
whilst 37.5% (n=9) of nurses working in both hospital/multi-purpose and 
community settings indicated that outcome. 
Table 5-8 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of reporting moderate error and work 
location/setting 
 
Formally report near miss error Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/  
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 21 9 18 48 
% Workplace setting 37.5% 37.5% 72.0% 45.7% 
% of Total 20.0% 8.6% 17.1% 45.7% 
Not Always 
Count 35 15 7 57 
% Workplace setting 62.5% 62.5% 28.0% 54.3% 
% of Total 33.3% 14.3% 6.7% 54.3% 
Total 
Count 56 24 25 105 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.3% 22.9% 23.8% 100.0% 
χ2=9.136a, df=2, N=105, p=0.010, Fishers Exact=0.011 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.97. 
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Figure 5-14: View error ‘Always’ be acknowledged by workplace setting 
Differences in relation to views that each of the severe, moderate and near miss 
error scenarios would always be acknowledged were also noted across the 
workplace settings. Figure 5-14 presents the frequency of the view that such an 
error would Always be acknowledged to the patient/client or their family.  
Table 5-9 Chi squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of severe error and 
workplace setting 
 
 
Acknowledge severe error to 
patient/client or family 
Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/  
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 28 8 22 58 
% within Workplace setting 49.1% 33.3% 88.0% 54.7% 
% of Total 26.4% 7.5% 20.8% 54.7% 
Not Always 
Count 29 16 3 48 
% within Workplace setting 50.9% 66.7% 12.0% 45.3% 
% of Total 27.4% 15.1% 2.8% 45.3% 
Total 
Count 57 24 25 106 
% within Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.8% 22.6% 23.6% 100.0% 
χ2=16.326a. df=2, N=106, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.87. 
 
Table 5-9 presents the difference amongst the workplace settings regarding the 
view that a severe error would Always be disclosed (χ2=16.326 df=2, N=106, 
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p=0.000). Nurses working in the residential aged care settings were more likely to 
indicate that a severe error would Always be disclosed with 88% (n=22) indicating 
this outcome compared to 49.1% (n=28) of nurses in hospital/multi-purpose 
settings and 33.3% (n=8) of nurses working in the community. None of the cells in 
this analysis had an expected count of less than five. 
The views of the moderate scenario Always being reported indicated a similar 
difference across the settings (χ2=22.319a, df=2, N=105, p=0.000).  Table 5-10 
indicates 84% (n=21) of nurses in residential aged care settings were in agreement 
with this outcome. Once again nurses in hospital/multi-purpose settings were less 
likely to view the moderate scenario would Always be reported (37.5%, n=21) and 
community nurses even less likely again with 20.8% (n=5) indicating this outcome.  
 
Table 5-10 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of moderate error and 
work location/setting 
 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/  
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 21 5 21 47 
% Workplace setting 37.5% 20.8% 84.0% 44.8% 
% of Total 20.0% 4.8% 20.0% 44.8% 
Not Always 
Count 35 19 4 58 
% Workplace setting 62.5% 79.2% 16.0% 55.2% 
% of Total 33.3% 18.1% 3.8% 55.2% 
Total 
Count 56 24 25 105 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.3% 22.9% 23.8% 100.0% 
χ2=22.319a, df=2, N=105, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.74. 
 
The scenario for near miss error being Always disclosed was also different across 
the settings (χ2=29.127a, df=2, N=106, p=0.000). Of the nurses in residential aged 
care settings 68% (n=17) agreed that this scenario would Always be disclosed. This 
view was much lower amongst nurses in both hospital/multi-purpose and 
community settings with just 14% (n=8) and 12.5% (n=3) respectively indicating this 
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outcome. In the case of both moderate and near miss scenarios none of the cells 
had an expected count of less than five (refer to Table 5-11). 
Table 5-11 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of near miss error and 
work location/setting 
 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/  
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 8 3 17 28 
% Workplace setting 14.0% 12.5% 68.0% 26.4% 
% of Total 7.5% 2.8% 16.0% 26.4% 
Not Always 
Count 49 21 8 78 
% Workplace setting 86.0% 87.5% 32.0% 73.6% 
% of Total 46.2% 19.8% 7.5% 73.6% 
Total 
Count 57 24 25 106 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.8% 22.6% 23.6% 100.0% 
χ2=29.127a, df=2, N=106, p=0.000, Fishers Exact=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.34. 
Workplace setting was the only instance where differences in both views of error 
reporting and views of error disclosure were noted. However, analysis of other 
demographic conditions suggests differences may exist in relation to views of 
disclosure and work role as well as the employment sector of the nurse. 
The frequency of a view that each of the scenarios would be acknowledged to the 
patient/client or their family depending upon work role are presented in Figure 
5-15. The differences exist in respect to severe (χ2=5.061b, df=1, N=114, p=0.024b, 
Phi=-0.233), moderate (χ2=5.463b, df=1, N=112, p=0.019b, Phi=-0.243) and near miss 
(χ2=7.140b, df=1, N=114, p=0.008, Phi=-0.276) scenarios.  
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 Differences in relation to work role 
 
Figure 5-15: View that error would Always be disclosed by workplace role 
Table 5-12 indicates that managers were more likely to indicate a view that a severe 
error would Always be disclosed, with 77.3% (n=17) indicating this outcome. The 
nurses working in a clinical role were less likely to indicate this response with less 
than half (47.8%, n=44) indicating this outcome. None of the cells in this analysis 
had an expected count of less than five.  
Table 5-12 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of severe error and work 
role 
 
Acknowledge severe error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace role Total 
Clinical role Management 
role 
Always 
 
Count 44 17 61 
% Workplace role  47.8% 77.3% 53.5% 
% of Total 38.6% 14.9% 53.5% 
Not Always 
Count 48 5 53 
% Workplace role 52.2% 22.7% 46.5% 
% of Total 42.1% 4.4% 46.5% 
Total 
Count 92 22 114 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 80.7% 19.3% 100.0% 
χ2=5.061b, df=1, N=114, p=0.024b, Phi=-0.233, Fisher’s Exact=0.017 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.23  
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Results from Table 5-13 show that whilst the overall response of a view that a 
moderate error would Always be reported was 43.8%, the clinical nurses were less 
likely to indicate this (37.8% n=34). Those working in a management role were more 
likely to view that the error to be disclosed with 68.2% (n=15) indicating this 
response. 
 
Table 5-13 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of moderate error and 
work role 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace role 
Total 
Clinical role Management 
role 
Always 
 
Count 34 15 49 
% Workplace role 37.8% 68.2% 43.8% 
% of Total 30.4% 13.4% 43.8% 
Not Always 
Count 56 7 63 
% Workplace role 62.2% 31.8% 56.2% 
% of Total 50.0% 6.2% 56.2% 
Total 
Count 90 22 112 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 80.4% 19.6% 100.0% 
χ2=5.463b, df=1, N=112, p=0.019b, Phi=-0.243, Fisher’s Exact=0.015 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
With regard to the near miss scenario, Table 5-14 shows that approximately one 
quarter of respondents indicated a view that the scenario would Always be 
disclosed in their workplace. However, just 19.6% (n=18) of nurses in a clinical role 
indicated this response compared with 50% (n=11) of nurses in a management role. 
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Table 5-14 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of severe error and work 
role 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace role 
Total 
Clinical role Management 
role 
Always 
 
Count 18 11 29 
% Workplace role 19.6% 50.0% 25.4% 
% of Total 15.8% 9.6% 25.4% 
Not Always 
Count 74 11 85 
% Workplace role 80.4% 50.0% 74.6% 
% of Total 64.9% 9.6% 74.6% 
Total 
Count 92 22 114 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 80.7% 19.3% 100.0% 
χ2=7.140b, df=1, N=114, p=0.008, Phi=-0.276, Fisher’s Exact=0.006 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Having found differences in views of reporting and disclosure in different workplace 
settings and nurses working in different roles, consideration was given as to 
whether results in one of these may have influenced the other. Examination of the 
data indicated there was a higher than expected number of responses from 
managers working in aged care settings.  
In order to determine if this had an impact on the results the analyses were redone 
with responses from nurses in management roles excluded. If having been found 
more likely to view errors disclosed, then the expected result after excluding these 
responses from further analyses the expected result would be either no significance 
in the result. This was not the case. The analysis of the views of clinicians only 
resulted in aged care nurses more likely to view error reported or disclosed across 
all levels of harm except the reporting of severe error.   
 Differences amongst clinicians 
Closer examination of frequency data identified a greater frequency of managers 
who responded to the questionnaire occurred in aged care settings (refer to 
Appendix 8). It was possible that this may have influenced the results for Table 5-13 
to Table 5-15.  
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Further analysis was therefore undertaken with only clinical respondents included 
in the sample. These results appear in Table 5-15 to Table 5-20. 
 
Table 5-15 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of reporting severe error and 
workplace setting (clinical respondents only) 
 
Formally report severe error 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting Total 
Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 34 17 14 65 
% Workplace 
setting 
72.3% 73.9% 100.0% 77.4% 
% of Total 40.5% 20.2% 16.7% 77.4% 
Not Always 
Count 13 6 0 19 
% Workplace 
setting 
27.7% 26.1% 0.0% 22.6% 
% of Total 15.5% 7.1% 0.0% 22.6% 
Total 
Count 47 23 14 84 
% Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 56.0% 27.4% 16.7% 100.0% 
χ2=4.933a, df=2, N=84, p=0.098, Fishers Exact=0.064 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.17 
 
Table 5-16 shows there was no statistical significance were found from respondents 
in relation to different workplace settings (χ2=4.933a, df=2, N=84, p=0.098, Fishers 
Exact=0.064). Of note, however, is that 100% of the respondents in aged care 
settings (n=14) held the view the severe error scenario would Always be reported in 
their workplace (Table 5-15). It is therefore possible that in this instance the higher 
response from nurses in management roles impacted these results. 
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Table 5-16 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of moderate error and workplace 
setting (clinical respondents only) 
 
Formally report moderate error 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 27 11 14 52 
% within Workplace 
setting 
58.7% 47.8% 100.0% 62.7% 
% of Total 32.5% 13.3% 16.9% 62.7% 
Not Always 
Count 19 12 0 31 
% within Workplace 
setting 
41.3% 52.2% 0.0% 37.3% 
% of Total 22.9% 14.5% 0.0% 37.3% 
Total 
Count 46 23 14 83 
% within Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.4% 27.7% 16.9% 100.0% 
χ2=10.814a, df=2, N=83, p=0.004, Fisher’s Exact=0.002 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.23. 
 
This was also the case with regards to the views relating to moderate error (Table 
5-16) with 100% of nurses in aged care settings viewing this outcome as Always 
reported compared to nurses in hospital/multi-purpose settings (58.7%, n=27) and 
community settings (47.8%, n=11). However in this situation a statistical significance 
in the difference was found (χ2=10.814a, df=2, N=83, p=0.004, Fisher’s Exact=0.002).  
Thus, overall, whilst nurses in management roles were more likely to view moderate 
error reported compared to those in clinical roles, when removed from the sample 
100% of the clinicians in aged care felt such an error would be reported in their 
workplace. This suggests that nurses in management roles did not impact these 
results through increased likelihood that the view would be reported.  
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Table 5-17 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of reporting near miss error and 
workplace setting (clinical respondents only) 
 
 
Formally report near miss error 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 15 9 12 36 
% within Workplace 
setting 
32.6% 39.1% 85.7% 43.4% 
% of Total 18.1% 10.8% 14.5% 43.4% 
Not Always 
Count 31 14 2 47 
% within Workplace 
setting 
67.4% 60.9% 14.3% 56.6% 
% of Total 37.3% 16.9% 2.4% 56.6% 
Total 
Count 46 23 14 83 
% within Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.4% 27.7% 16.9% 100.0% 
χ2=12.558a, df=2, N=83, p=0.002, Fishers exact =0.002 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.07. 
 
Similarly with respect to near miss error (Table 5-17) those respondents in aged 
care settings (85.7%, n=12) were more likely to view the error would Always be 
reported compared to nurses in hospital/multipurpose (32.6%, n=15) or community 
(39.1%, n=9) settings (χ2=12.558a, df=2, N=83, p=0.002, Fishers exact =0.002).  
Therefore, in relation to views of error reporting it is possible that the results for the 
severe error scenario were influenced by the number of managers who responded 
in aged care. However, in the other error outcomes no influence was found that 
altered the results. 
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Table 5-18 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of severe error and 
workplace setting (clinical respondents only)  
 
Acknowledge severe error to  
patient/client or family 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 20 8 12 40 
% within Workplace 
setting 
42.6% 34.8% 85.7% 47.6% 
% of Total 23.8% 9.5% 14.3% 47.6% 
Not Always 
Count 27 15 2 44 
% within Workplace 
setting 
57.4% 65.2% 14.3% 52.4% 
% of Total 32.1% 17.9% 2.4% 52.4% 
Total 
Count 47 23 14 84 
% within Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 56.0% 27.4% 16.7% 100.0% 
χ2=10.148a, df=2, N=84, p=0.005, Fisher’s Exact=0.005 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.67. 
 
By contrast, statistical significance was still found for differences in all the error 
scenarios relating to views of disclosure. Nurses in aged care settings (85.7%, n=12) 
were more likely to view the severe error Always reported) compared to those in 
hospital/multi-purpose (42.6, n=20) or community (34.8%, n=8) settings 
(χ2=10.148a, df=2, N=84, p=0.005, Fisher’s Exact=0.005) (Table 5-19). 
Table 5-19 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of moderate error and 
workplace setting (clinical respondents only) 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting Total 
Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 14 5 12 31 
% within Workplace 
setting 
30.4% 21.7% 85.7% 37.3% 
% of Total 16.9% 6.0% 14.5% 37.3% 
Not Always 
Count 32 18 2 52 
% within Workplace 
setting 
69.6% 78.3% 14.3% 62.7% 
% of Total 38.6% 21.7% 2.4% 62.7% 
Total 
Count 46 23 14 83 
% within Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.4% 27.7% 16.9% 100.0% 
χ2=17.330a, df=2, N=83, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.23. 
As indicated in Table 5-19, 85.7% (n=12) of nurses in aged care settings viewed the 
moderate error scenario would Always be acknowledged in their workplace 
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(χ2=17.330a, df=2, N=83, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000). Nurses in community 
settings (21.7%, n=5) and in rural hospital/multi-purpose settings (30.4%, n=14) 
were less likely to view this scenario would Always be disclosed. 
 
Table 5-20 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of near miss error and 
workplace setting (clinical respondents only) 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to  
patient/client or family 
(clinical respondents only) 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 3 3 10 16 
% within Workplace 
setting 
6.4% 13.0% 71.4% 19.0% 
% of Total 3.6% 3.6% 11.9% 19.0% 
Not Always 
Count 44 20 4 68 
% within Workplace 
setting 
93.6% 87.0% 28.6% 81.0% 
% of Total 52.4% 23.8% 4.8% 81.0% 
Total 
Count 47 23 14 84 
% within Workplace 
setting 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 56.0% 27.4% 16.7% 100.0% 
χ2=30.338a, df=2, N=84, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000 
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67. 
 
Results relating to the disclosure of near miss error are of concern (refer to Table 
5-20). Only 6.4% (n=3) of the nurses in the rural hospital/multi-purpose and 13.0% 
(n=3) in community settings felt this scenario would Always be disclosed. This 
compares to 71.4% (n=10) of the nurses in aged care settings (χ2=30.338a, df=2, 
N=84, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000). 
The analyses conducted with the respondents in management roles excluded had a 
two-fold impact. Firstly, the number of respondents indicating they felt the error 
would Always be reported or disclosed increased. Secondly there was no 
significance found for the results regarding the view of reporting the severe error.  
  
182 
 Differences in relation to employment sector 
When considering employment sector, there was no statistical significance found 
with respect to views of reporting error. Nor was there any statistical significance in 
relation to views of disclosure of severe error. However, the results in relation to 
views of disclosure of moderate and near miss error indicated possible difference 
amongst employment sector. 
 
Table 5-21 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of moderate error and 
employment sector 
 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
Employment sector 
Total 
Government 
(DHHS) 
Non-Government/ 
private sector 
Always 
 
Count 28 22 50 
% employment sector 37.8% 59.5% 45.0% 
% of Total 25.2% 19.8% 45.0% 
Not Always 
Count 46 15 61 
% employment sector 62.2% 40.5% 55.0% 
% of Total 41.4% 13.5% 55.0% 
Total 
Count 74 37 111 
% employment sector 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
χ2=3.826b, df=1, N=111, p=0.050b, Phi=-0.205, Fisher’s Exact=0.043 
a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.67 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Results for views of disclosure of the moderate error scenario are outlined in Table 
5-21. The respondents in the non-government/private sector were more likely to 
view an error would be disclosed (59.5%, n=22) compared to those working in the 
government sector (37.8%, n=28). However, these data need to be interpreted with 
caution as whilst the Fisher’s Exact is p=0.043 the Yates Continuity Correction does 
not indicate statistical significance in this result (χ2=3.826b, df=1, N=111 p=0.05). 
The Pearson’s χ2 is 4.658 (p=0.043) and with no cells having an expected count of 
less than 5, the results are therefore not conclusive. 
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The near miss error scenario indicates clearer results. These are presented in Table 
5-22. Of nurses employed in the non-government/private sector 47.4% (n=18) 
indicated that this scenario outcome would be disclosed in their workplace. This 
compares with 16% (n=12) of those employed in the government sector. 
 
Table 5-22 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of near miss error and 
employment sector 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to  
patient/client or family 
Employment sector 
Total 
Government 
(DHHS) 
Non-Government/ 
private sector 
Always 
 
Count 12 18 30 
% employment sector 16.0% 47.4% 26.5% 
% of Total 10.6% 15.9% 26.5% 
Not Always 
Count 63 20 83 
% employment sector 84.0% 52.6% 73.5% 
% of Total 55.8% 17.7% 73.5% 
Total 
Count 75 38 113 
% employment sector 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.4% 33.6% 100.0% 
χ2=11.169b, df=1, N=113, p=0.001b, Phi=-0.336, Fisher’s Exact=0.001 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.09 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
It is possible that workplace settings may have influenced this result. Nurses in 
residential aged care settings are predominantly based in the non-
government/private sector. Nurses employed by government Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) are predominantly employed in hospital/multi-purpose 
and community settings.  
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Table 5-23 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of moderate error and 
employment sector (aged care respondents excluded) 
 
Acknowledge moderate error 
to patient/client or family 
(aged care respondents excluded) 
 
Employment Sector  
Total 
Government 
(DHHS) 
Non-Government/ 
private sector 
 
Always 
 
Count 26 3 29 
% employment sector 36.1% 21.4% 33.7% 
% of Total 30.2% 3.5% 33.7% 
Not Always 
Count 46 11 57 
% employment sector 63.9% 78.6% 66.3% 
% of Total 53.5% 12.8% 66.3% 
Total 
Count 72 14 86 
% employment sector 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.7% 16.3% 100.0% 
χ2=0.569b, df=1, N=86, p=0.366b, Phi=0.115, Fisher’s Exact=0.366 
a.1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.72 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Results were therefore analysed with responses from nurses indicating they worked 
in aged care excluded.  The results of this additional analysis may be found in Table 
5-23 and Table 5-24.  
Table 5-24 Chi-squared test of the relationship between views of disclosure of near miss error and 
employment sector (aged care respondents excluded) 
 
Acknowledge near miss error 
to patient/client or family 
(aged care respondents excluded) 
 
Employment sector  
Total 
Government 
(DHHS) 
Non-Government/ 
private sector 
Always 
 
Count 11 2 13 
% employment sector 15.1% 13.3% 14.8% 
% of Total 12.5% 2.3% 14.8% 
Not Always 
Count 62 13 75 
% employment sector 84.9% 86.7% 85.2% 
% of Total 70.5% 14.8% 85.2% 
Total 
Count 73 15 88 
% employment sector 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.0% 17.0% 100.0% 
χ2=0.000b, df=1,N=88, p=1.000b, Phi=.018, Fisher’s Exact=1.000 
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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There was no statistical difference found between nurses working in the 
government and non-government employment sectors in relation to views of 
disclosure of either the moderate (χ2=0.569b, df=1, N=86, p=0.366b, Phi=0.115, 
Fisher’s Exact=0.366) or near miss scenarios (χ2=0.000b, df=1, N=88, p=1.000b, 
Phi=.018, Fisher’s Exact=1.000). 
The results presented in this section inform the first research question of this 
research which is: what level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a 
hypothetical medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring?  
Differences have been observed in relation to workplace setting and work role. 
Other differences may have been influenced by the nature of the sample obtained. 
Such influences reflect the complexity of views of reporting and disclosure that 
were outlined in the literature review (Sections 2.10 to 2.14). 
These issues will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. The results 
relating to safety climate will now be considered. 
   The nature of safety climate amongst nurses in rural 
clinical settings 
In addition to views of reporting and disclosure, data were also analysed in relation 
to safety climate and teamwork factors extracted through PCA and demographic 
data. This analysis noted differences in some factors being positive across 
workplace setting, facility bed numbers, workplace role and geographical location. 
These results inform the second research sub-question which is: what is the nature 
of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in these settings?  
 Differences in relation to workplace setting  
In the different workplace settings nurses in residential aged care (83.3%, n=20) and 
community settings (81.8%, n=18) were more likely to have a positive score in 
relation to workplace safety culture (χ2= 9.194a, df=2, N=98, p=0.010, Fisher’s Exact 
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Test p=0.012) compared to those in a hospital/multi-purpose setting (53.8%, n=28). 
These results are outlined in Table 5-25. 
 
Table 5-25 Chi Squared test of workplace safety culture and work location/facility setting 
 
 
Workplace safety culture 
Workplace setting 
Total 
Hospital/ 
Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Positive 
 
Count 28 18 20 66 
% Workplace setting 53.8% 81.8% 83.3% 67.3% 
% of Total 28.6% 18.4% 20.4% 67.3% 
Not positive 
Count 24 4 4 32 
% Workplace setting 46.2% 18.2% 16.7% 32.7% 
% of Total 24.5% 4.1% 4.1% 32.7% 
Total 
Count 52 22 24 98 
% Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 53.1% 22.4% 24.5% 100.0% 
χ2= 9.194a, df=2, N=98, p=0.010, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.012 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.18. 
 
 
  Differences relating to facility size 
Results from Table 5-26, which presents the results of positive scores for the 
workplace safety culture factor in relation to facility bed numbers, need to be 
interpreted with caution. Whilst the χ2 result (8.012a, df=3, N=100, p=0.048) was 
significant, one cell had an expected count of less than fie and the Fisher’s Exact 
Test (p=0.05) suggests that this result may be questionable. The overall rate of 
positive scores in this factor was 68% (n=68). Nurses in facilities of less than 50 beds 
had a higher rate of positive score (76.2% n=32) as did those indicating Other/not 
applicable (83.3%, n=15).  
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Table 5-26 Chi-squared of workplace safety culture of error and facility bed numbers 
 
 
Workplace safety culture 
Facility bed numbers 
Total 
less than 
50 beds 
50 - 99 
beds 
100+ 
beds 
Other/not 
applicable 
Positive 
 
Count 32 15 6 15 68 
% facility bed numbers  76.2% 55.6% 46.2% 83.3% 68.0% 
% of Total 32.0% 15.0% 6.0% 15.0% 68.0% 
Not positive 
Count 10 12 7 3 32 
% facility bed numbers  23.8% 44.4% 53.8% 16.7% 32.0% 
% of Total 10.0% 12.0% 7.0% 3.0% 32.0% 
Total 
Count 42 27 13 18 100 
% facility bed numbers 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 42.0% 27.0% 13.0% 18.0% 100.0% 
χ2 = 8.012a, df=3, N=100, p=0.048, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.05 
a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.16. 
 
Those in facilities with 50 or more beds were less likely to have a positive score for 
workplace safety culture. Of the nurses working in facilities of 100 or more beds 
46.2% (n=6) had a positive score whilst amongst those working in facilities with 50 
to 90 beds 55.6% (n=15) indicated a positive score. 
Taking into consideration the possible impact of workplace setting upon the results 
relating to bed numbers, analysis was undertaken to determine whether the 
responses from nurses in aged care settings may have influenced this result. This 
analysis indicated that nurses working in rural hospital/multi-purpose settings were 
more likely to be working in facilities of less than 50 beds (refer to Appendix 8). As 
these nurses were less likely to have a positive factor score for workplace safety 
culture (Table 5-25) it is unlikely that workplace setting had any influence over these 
results.  
It was also considered possible that responses from nurses in a management role 
may have impacted upon the results related to facility bed numbers. However, 
there was no significance in responses from managers when compared to bed 
numbers (refer to Appendix 8).  
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 Differences relating to work role 
The rate of positive factor scores also differed amongst those in a clinical or 
management role. All of the three factor scores for safety climate (workplace safety 
culture, leadership and error management and overall safety climate factor score) 
suggest differences in the positive scores amongst those in a clinical role and those 
in a management role. These results are presented in Table 5-27 to Table 5-29. 
Workplace relationships and communication was the only factor that did not exhibit 
a difference, although the results presented in Table 5-27 suggest caution when 
considering results in relation to differences in the factor of teamwork and patient 
safety at the bedside. Whilst Yates continuity correction (χ2 = 3.737b, df=1 N=92, 
p=0.053b, Phi=-0.233) does not suggests significance in the results, one cell had an 
expected count of less than five. The subsequent Fisher’s Exact test (p=0.035) 
suggests the results are statistically significant.  
With 75% (n=69) of the sample indicating a positive score for teamwork and safety 
climate at the bedside, 94.7% (n=18) of those in a management role indicated a 
positive score compared to 69.9% (n=51) of those in a clinical role. 
 
Table 5-27 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and work role 
 
 
Teamwork and patient safety  
at bedside 
Work role 
Total 
Clinical role Management 
role 
Positive 
 
Count 51 18 69 
% Workplace role 69.9% 94.7% 75.0% 
% of Total 55.4% 19.6% 75.0% 
 
Not positive 
Count 22 1 23 
% Workplace role 30.1% 5.3% 25.0% 
% of Total 23.9% 1.1% 25.0% 
Total 
Count 73 19 92 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.3% 20.7% 100.0% 
χ2=3.737b, df=1 N=92, p=0.053b, Phi=-0.233, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.035 
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.75. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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With regard to workplace safety culture the overall rate of positive scores was 66% 
(n=68) of the total responses. However, those in a management role were more 
likely to have a positive score with 88.9% (n=16) compared to 61.2% (n=52) 
amongst those in a clinical role. This difference (χ2= 3.925b, df=1 N=103, p=0.048b, 
Phi=-0.222, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.028) is presented in Table 5-28. 
  
Table 5-28 Chi-squared test of workplace safety culture and work role 
 
 
Workplace safety culture 
Work role 
Total 
Clinical role Management role 
Positive 
 
Count 52 16 68 
% Workplace role 61.2% 88.9% 66.0% 
% of Total 50.5% 15.5% 66.0% 
Not positive 
Count 33 2 35 
% Workplace role 38.8% 11.1% 34.0% 
% of Total 32.0% 1.9% 34.0% 
Total 
Count 85 18 103 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 82.5% 17.5% 100.0% 
χ2= 3.925b, df=1 N=103, p=0.048b, Phi=-0.222, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.028 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.12  
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
The scores for leadership and error management also differed between clinicians 
and managers (χ2 = 6.564b, df=1, N=103, p=0.010b, Phi=-0.281, Fisher’s Exact Test 
p=0.003) as indicated in Table 5-29. All of the respondents in a management role 
(100%, n=18) had a positive score for this factor compared to 67.1% (n=17) of those 
in a clinical role. The overall total percentage of positive scores was 72.8% (n=75). 
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Table 5-29 Chi-squared test of leadership and error management and workplace role 
 
 
Leadership and error management 
Workplace role 
Total 
Clinical role Management 
role 
Positive 
 
Count 57 18 75 
% Workplace role 67.1% 100.0% 72.8% 
% of Total 55.3% 17.5% 72.8% 
Not positive 
Count 28 0 28 
% Workplace role 32.9% 0.0% 27.2% 
% of Total 27.2% 0.0% 27.2% 
Total 
Count 85 18 103 
% Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 82.5% 17.5% 100.0% 
χ2 = 6.564b, df=1, N=103, p=0.010b, Phi=-0.281, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.003 
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 Differences relating to geographical location 
The results of safety climate and teamwork factors and geographical location were 
mixed. Whilst statistically significant, the low number of responses from workplaces 
in remote/very remote areas (ASGC-RA 4—5) saw a large number of cells with an 
expected count of less than five. Even reducing the variables to a 2x2 table resulted 
in only 4 total responses in the total for remote/very remote localities (refer to 
Appendix 11).  
Data in relation to regions were more suitable for analysis. However, only the 
results for the factor of workplace safety culture indicated a statistical significance 
(χ2= 6.598a, df=2, N=103, p=0.037, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.032) and these results 
are presented in Table 5-30. Whilst 67% (n=67) of total respondents had a positive 
score for this factor those in the northern region (85.2%, n=23) and southern region 
(70.6%, n=12) were more likely to have a positive score than those from the north-
west region (57.1%, n=32).  
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Table 5-30 Chi-squared of workplace safety culture and region 
 
 
Workplace safety culture Region 
Total 
Sth Nth NW 
Positive 
 
Count 12 23 32 67 
% Region 70.6% 85.2% 57.1% 67.0% 
% of Total 12.0% 23.0% 32.0% 67.0% 
Not positive 
Count 5 4 24 33 
% Region 29.4% 14.8% 42.9% 33.0% 
% of Total 5.0% 4.0% 24.0% 33.0% 
Total 
Count 17 27 56 100 
% Region 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 17.0% 27.0% 56.0% 100.0% 
χ2= 6.598a, df=2, N=103, p=0.037, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.032 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.61. 
 
As with previous analyses it was considered whether other results may have 
influenced the results in relation to geographical region. Further analyses indicated 
that there was no significant difference in responses received based on workplace 
setting or work role in relation to geographical region. However, some differences 
were found in relation to bed numbers.  
There were more facilities with between 50 –99 beds in the northern region where 
a higher factor score was noted. However, responses from the northwest region 
were also more likely to have a positive factor score despite not having more 
facilities with this number of beds.  
The other possible area of influence in this regard was a higher number of 
respondents in the north-west region indicating they worked in facilities with 100 or 
more beds. However, the acute hospitals located in the north and south are located 
in ASGC-RA 2 locations and were therefore excluded from this research. This left the 
only acute hospitals with more than 100 beds located in the north-west.  As those 
located in hospital settings were less likely to have a positive factor score, this may 
have influenced the results with respect to region. Therefore, these results should 
be interpreted bearing this in mind. 
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Having considered the results for each factor in conjunction with demographic 
information it is possible to summarise the areas of difference in teamwork and 
safety climate factor scores. In doing so it is possible to inform the second research 
sub-question of: what is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in 
these settings?   
Nurses working in aged care and community settings were more likely to have a 
positive factor score for workplace safety culture compared to nurses working in 
hospital/multi-purpose settings. This is the only factor score where a difference was 
noted in relation to workplace setting. 
Three factors were more likely to be positive amongst nurses working in a 
management role compared to those in a clinical role. These three factors were 
teamwork and patient safety at bedside, workplace safety culture and leadership 
and error management.  
Just as there were some differences were found in relation to views of reporting, 
the results of this section found differences between safety climate and views of 
reporting and disclosure. These will also be discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
 The variable-based relationship between safety climate 
and views of reporting and disclosure 
Having established the level of reporting that this sample of nurses in rural clinical 
settings think is being reported and the level of safety climate and teamwork 
factors, the relationship between the two will now be explored. Results presented 
in this section relate to the third research sub-question of the thesis which is: What 
is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical 
settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error? 
Once again chi-squared analysis was undertaken. The results appear in Table 5-31 to 
Table 5-39. The only area where statistical significance was noted in relation to 
  
193 
views of reporting error were those associated with the views of reporting the 
severe error scenario. All scenarios relating to views of disclosure resulted in 
elements of teamwork and safety climate demonstrating differences.  
In all the scenarios where the differences were statistically significant, teamwork 
and patient safety at the bedside, and leadership and error management were of 
influence. In relation to the disclosure of moderate error, workplace and safety 
culture was also statistically significant. 
 Differences relating to views of reporting error 
Table 5-31 and Table 5-32 present the results with regard to the relationship 
between factor scores and views of reporting the severe error scenario. Table 5-31 
shows that whilst 82.8% (n=77) of respondents had a view that the severe error 
scenario would Always be reported, 88.6% (n=62) of those with a positive score for 
the factor of teamwork and safety at the bedside indicated they thought the severe 
error scenario would Always be reported compared to only 65.2% (n=15) of 
respondents with a factor score that was not positive.  
Table 5-31 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and view of reporting severe 
error 
 
 
Formally report severe error 
Teamwork and patient 
safety at bedside  
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 62 15 77 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 88.6% 65.2% 82.8% 
% of Total 66.7% 16.1% 82.8% 
Not Always 
Count 8 8 16 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 11.4% 34.8% 17.2% 
% of Total 8.6% 8.6% 17.2% 
Total 
Count 70 23 93 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.3% 24.7% 100.0% 
χ2= 5.090b, df=1, N=103, p=0.024b, Phi=0.302, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.022 
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.96. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
  
194 
Table 5-32 shows the results in relation to safety climate. Of the 104 respondents 
included within this factor, 79.8% had a view that the severe scenario would Always 
be reported. However, amongst those with a positive factor score for leadership 
and error management, 86.8% (n=66) viewed this scenario would Always be 
reported and 60.7% (n=17) of those with a score that was not positive had the same 
view. 
Table 5-32 Chi-squared test of leadership and error management and view of reporting severe error 
 
 
 
Formally report severe error 
Leadership and error management  
Total Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 66 17 83 
% Leadership and error management 86.8% 60.7% 79.8% 
% of Total 63.5% 16.3% 79.8% 
Not Always 
Count 10 11 21 
% Leadership and error management 13.2% 39.3% 20.2% 
% of Total 9.6% 10.6% 20.2% 
Total 
Count 76 28 104 
% Leadership and error management 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 73.1% 26.9% 100.0% 
χ2 = 7.122b, df=1, N=104, p=0.008b, Phi=0.289, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.006 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.65 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 Differences relating to views of disclosure of error 
Views of the disclosure of severe error scenario and the various factor scores 
identified with statistical significance in the results appear in Table 5-33 and Table 
5-34. Of the 93 respondents in the teamwork factors, 57% (n=53) of respondents 
indicated that the severe error scenario would Always be disclosed. There were 104 
respondents included in the analysis of safety climate factors of whom 52.2% (n=55) 
indicated the severe error would be disclosed. 
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Table 5-33 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and view of disclosure severe 
error 
 
Acknowledge severe error to 
patient/client or family 
Teamwork and patient safety 
at bedside 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 47 6 53 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 67.1% 26.1% 57.0% 
% of Total 50.5% 6.5% 57.0% 
Not Always 
Count 23 17 40 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 32.9% 73.9% 43.0% 
% of Total 24.7% 18.3% 43.0% 
Total 
Count 70 23 93 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.3% 24.7% 100.0% 
χ2 = 10.289b, df=1, N=93, p=0.001b, Phi=0.358, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.001 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Results presented in Table 5-33 show whilst 57% of the respondents viewed the 
severe error would Always be disclosed, 67.1% (n=47) of those with a positive score 
for teamwork and patient safety at the bedside indicated such a view compared to 
just 26.1% (n=6) of those respondents with a factor score that was not positive. 
 
Table 5-34 Chi-squared test of leadership and error management and view of disclosure severe error 
 
Acknowledge severe error to  
patient/client or family 
Leadership and error management 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 48 7 55 
% Leadership and error management 63.2% 25.0% 52.9% 
% of Total 46.2% 6.7% 52.9% 
Not Always 
Count 28 21 49 
% Leadership and error management 36.8% 75.0% 47.1% 
% of Total 26.9% 20.2% 47.1% 
Total 
Count 76 28 104 
% Leadership and error management 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 73.1% 26.9% 100.0% 
χ2 = 10.474b, df=1, N=104, p=0.001b, Phi=0.339, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.001 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.19 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Respondents with a positive factor score for leadership and error management 
were more likely to view the severe error would be disclosed, with 63.2% (n=48) 
indicating this outcome. Of those with a factor score that was not positive, 25% (n= 
7) indicated they felt the severe error scenario would be acknowledged to the 
patient/client or family. These results can be seen in Table 5-34.  
The results in Table 5-35 to Table 5-37 relate to the teamwork and safety climate 
factor scores and views of reporting the moderate error scenario. Of the 93 
respondents included in the teamwork factor analysis, less than half (46.2%, n=43) 
indicated a view that this scenario would Always be acknowledged. There were 102 
respondents included in the analysis relating to safety climate factors and again, 
less than half (41.2%, n= 42) indicated the same outcome. 
Table 5-35 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and view of disclosure 
moderate error 
 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
Teamwork and patient 
safety at bedside 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 39 4 43 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 55.7% 17.4% 46.2% 
% of Total 41.9% 4.3% 46.2% 
Not Always 
Count 31 19 50 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 44.3% 82.6% 53.8% 
% of Total 33.3% 20.4% 53.8% 
Total 
Count 70 23 93 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.3% 24.7% 100.0% 
χ2 = 8.744b, df=1, N=93, p=0.032b, Phi=0.332, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.002 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
However, a respondent with a positive factor score for teamwork and patient safety 
at the bedside was more likely to view the moderate error would be disclosed. 
Table 5-35 shows that 55.7% (n=39) of respondents viewed this outcome to be 
likely compared to just 17.4% (n=4) of those with a score that was not positive. 
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Results from Table 5-36 show that 49.3% (n=34) of respondents with a positive 
factor score for workplace safety culture viewed the moderate error scenario would 
Always be disclosed compared to 24.2% (n=8) of respondents with a factor score 
that was not positive. Of interest in this result is that whilst the positive factor score 
may have a higher probability of a view the error would Always be disclosed than 
the overall sample result of 41.2%, more than half of those with a positive factor 
score 50.7% (n=35) viewed the error would Not always be reported. 
 
Table 5-36 Chi-squared test of workplace safety climate and view of disclosure moderate error 
 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to  
patient/client or family 
Workplace safety culture 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 34 8 42 
% Workplace safety culture 49.3% 24.2% 41.2% 
% of Total 33.3% 7.8% 41.2% 
Not Always 
Count 35 25 60 
% Workplace safety culture 50.7% 75.8% 58.8% 
% of Total 34.3% 24.5% 58.8% 
Total 
Count 69 33 102 
% Workplace safety culture 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 67.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
χ2 = 4.788b, df=1, N=102, p=0.029b, Phi=0.238, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.019 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.59. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Similar results are present in Table 5-37. Of the respondents with a positive score 
for the factor leadership and error management 49.3% (n=37) indicated they 
viewed the error would Always be disclosed compared to 18.5% (n=5) of those with 
a score that was not positive.  Once again there were more than half the 
respondents (50.7%, n=38) who viewed such an error would Always be reported, 
despite the positive factor score. 
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Table 5-37 Chi-squared Leadership and error management and view of disclosure moderate error 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to 
patient/client or family 
Leadership and error management Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 37 5 42 
% Leadership and error management 49.3% 18.5% 41.2% 
% of Total 36.3% 4.9% 41.2% 
Not Always 
Count 38 22 60 
% Leadership and error management 50.7% 81.5% 58.8% 
% of Total 37.3% 21.6% 58.8% 
Total 
Count 75 27 102 
% Leadership and error management 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 73.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
χ2 = 6.563b, df=1, N=102, p=0.004b, Phi=0.276, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.006 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
The results related to the teamwork and safety climate factor scores and views of 
the disclosure of near miss error are presented in Table 5-38 and Table 5-39. As was 
the case with views of reporting severe error, positive scores in relation to 
teamwork and patient safety at the bedside, overall teamwork, leadership and error 
management and overall safety climate resulted in a greater likelihood that the 
error scenario would be viewed as Always disclosed.  
Of the 93 respondents included in the teamwork factor analysis, 26.9% (n=25) 
viewed the near miss scenario would Always be disclosed. There were 104 
respondents included in the safety climate analysis of whom 25% (n=26) viewed the 
same outcome. 
A positive score for teamwork and patient safety at bedside resulted in a greater 
likelihood that the error would Always be disclosed with 32.9% (n=23) of 
respondents indicating this outcome. This compares to 8.7% (n=2) of respondents 
who had a factor score that was ‘not positive’. These results can be seen in Table 
5-38.  
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Table 5-38 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and view of disclosure near 
miss error 
 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to 
patient/client or family 
Teamwork and patient safety 
at bedside 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 23 2 25 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 32.9% 8.7% 26.9% 
% of Total 24.7% 2.2% 26.9% 
Not 
Always 
Count 47 21 68 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 67.1% 91.3% 73.1% 
% of Total 50.5% 22.6% 73.1% 
Total 
Count 70 23 93 
% Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.3% 24.7% 100.0% 
χ2 = 3.986, df=1, N=93, p=0.046b, Phi=0.235, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.018 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.18. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Table 5-39 shows that 30.3% of respondents with a positive score for leadership and 
error management indicated they viewed the near miss error would Always be 
disclosed. This compares to 10.7% (n=3) of respondents with a positive score for 
this factor who viewed the same outcome.  Although there were no cells having an 
expected count of less than five the Yates continuity correction (p=0.074) is a p 
value >0.05 whilst the Fisher’s Exact Test is p=0.045 indicating that the results from 
this table are inconclusive. 
Table 5-39 Chi-squared test of leadership and error management and view of disclosure near miss 
error 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to 
patient/client or family 
Leadership and error management 
Total 
Positive Not positive 
Always 
 
Count 23 3 26 
% Leadership and error management 30.3% 10.7% 25.0% 
% of Total 22.1% 2.9% 25.0% 
Not 
Always 
Count 53 25 78 
% Leadership and error management 69.7% 89.3% 75.0% 
% of Total 51.0% 24.0% 75.0% 
Total 
Count 76 28 104 
% Leadership and error management 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 73.1% 26.9% 100.0% 
χ2 = 3.193b, df=1, N=104, p=0.074b, Phi=0.200, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.045  
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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In all results in relation to near miss error, despite having a positive factor score, 
there were less than half of the respondents who indicated that they viewed the 
scenario would Always be disclosed. 
Where factor scores for teamwork and patient safety at bedside and leadership and 
error management were positive, there was a greater likelihood that a severe error 
would be viewed as Always reported and all levels of error more likely to be viewed 
as Always disclosed. In addition, the moderate error scenario was more likely to be 
viewed as Always acknowledged if the factor score for workplace safety climate was 
positive.  
There were no significant differences found between factor scores and views of 
reporting moderate or near miss error. In addition, no difference was found in 
views of reporting or disclosure of any error outcome in relation to the factor 
workplace relationships and communication. 
  Summary of variable-based results 
The first part of this chapter has presented the variable-based results. This included 
an examination of the sample obtained as well as views of reporting and disclosure, 
safety climate data and the relationship between each of these.  
Demographic data were, where possible, compared to workforce data to establish 
representativeness. It is possible that enrolled nurses may be under-represented in 
this sample along with relatively low responses from nurses working in the private 
sector. It was not possible to make an assessment on some other areas such as 
ASGC-RA representativeness for example. 
The results presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.7 of this chapter outlined the results of 
this research in relation to nurses’ views of reporting and disclosure of a 
hypothetical medication error. These results inform the first research sub-question: 
what level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
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medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring?  Differences 
were noticed in these views with regard to workplace settings and work role.  
Although, due to potential bias from the low sample size and subsequent issues 
relating to cell counts, caution is needed when interpreting the results of views 
relating to reporting of severe error, the results for moderate and near miss error 
suggest workplace setting may be of influence. Results for views of acknowledging 
error in the workplace in relation to all levels of harm also differed with regard to 
workplace setting. Aged care nurses were more likely to view the scenarios would 
be either reported or acknowledged in their workplace compared to nurses in other 
workplace settings. 
Nurses working in a management role were more likely indicate they thought error 
would be disclosed in their workplace compared to nurses indicating their role was 
clinical. However, no difference was noted between managers and clinicians with 
respect to views of reporting error. 
Sections 5.5 and 5.8 presented the results of the analysis of safety climate data 
which relate to the second research sub-question: what is the nature of workplace 
safety climate amongst nurses in these settings?   This included the need to 
undertake an exploratory principal components analysis in order to determine a 
reliable factor structure on which to base teamwork and safety climate factor 
scores. 
Similar findings emerged from these results where differences in teamwork and 
safety climate factor scores were found in relation to the demographic data. Once 
again workplace setting and work role were areas where differences were 
identified. Although facility size/bed numbers and regional location of the worksite 
exhibited differences in some factor scores it is possible these results were 
influenced by other factors such as the size of workplaces located in a particular 
region.  
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Aged care nurses and those working in community settings were more likely to have 
positive scores in the factor for workplace safety culture. This factor contains 
questions in relation to staffing levels, ability to learn from error and observations 
of behaviours relating to safety. It is the only factor where a difference in settings 
was noted. 
In contrast, nurses in management roles were more likely to have a positive score in 
three of the four factors. These were teamwork and patient safety at bedside, 
workplace safety culture and leadership and error management. Once again, due to 
the potential bias associated with the sample caution is needed with regard to 
interpreting the results of the first of these factors. It is possible that the only area 
where there was no difference found is the second teamwork factor of workplace 
relationships and communication. 
The third research sub-question of this research is: what is the relationship between 
workplace safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings and their views of 
reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error?  Results relating to this sub-
question were presented in Section 5.9. The analysis using inferential statistics 
found that respondents with positive scores for teamwork and patient safety at 
bedside and leadership and error management were more likely to view severe 
error as Always reported and all error scenarios as Always disclosed. In addition if 
the safety climate factor of workplace safety culture was positive the moderate 
error scenario was more likely to be considered Always acknowledged in the 
workplace. 
These results are relatively straightforward when considered in respect to each 
individual research sub-question. However, the sub-questions have been developed 
to inform the overall research question of how is safety climate related to views of 
reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in rural clinical 
settings?  When this question is taken into account, several issues arise from the 
results.  
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For example, although nurses working in aged care settings were more likely to 
view errors as reported or disclosed the only teamwork and safety climate factor 
that was more likely to be positive amongst this group was workplace safety culture. 
The disclosure of the moderate scenario was more likely when this factor was 
positive but in relation to reporting or disclosure of other levels of harm there was 
no difference found.  
Another example of the complicated nature of these results is the nurses in 
community settings were more likely to have a positive factor score for this same 
factor compared to nurses in rural hospital/multi-purpose settings but the 
community nurses were also less likely to view the moderate harm scenario to 
Always be disclosed compared to nurses in aged care.  
Although these variable results have identified differences relating to safety climate 
and views of reporting and disclosure, these differences cannot be explained. 
Furthermore, some results are complicated as outlined above. Issues such as this 
will be explored in further detail in the following chapter (Section 6.1) once the 
case-based results have been presented.  
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Part II: Case-based results 
Having undertaken the statistical analysis and identified that there are differences 
in nurses’ views of error reporting and disclosure Part II of this chapter presents the 
analysis of the case-based configurations using fsQCA. These results relate to the 
third research sub-questions which is: what is the relationship between workplace 
safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings and their views of 
reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error?  
A consistent approach to analysis has been outlined in the previous chapter (Section 
4.8.3). Through adopting this consistency a transparent comparison of each of these 
outcomes is then possible.  
The fsQCA results presented first are those relating to teamwork and safety climate 
and the likelihood the severe error outcome would Always be reported. It is 
recognised that many who read this thesis may not be familiar with either CCM or 
fsQCA. For this reason detailed information will be provided regarding this initial 
analysis with each step of the analysis being worked through in this chapter.  
Once this has been done, results of a further analysis are presented where 
demographic data have been included as additional conditions. This allowed for a 
comparison of teamwork and safety climate factors amongst nurses in aged care 
settings compared to those in other settings and nurses working in a management 
role and compared to those in a clinical role.  
 Before the analytic moment 
The first phase of the funnel of complexity is referred to as before the analytic 
moment. During this phase case selection, adoption of Boolean algebra expressions 
and transformation of raw data to form a calibrated data set for the conditions and 
outcome occur.  
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As outlined in Part I of this chapter (Section 5.6) there were four factors identified 
from the PCA. The two teamwork factors identified were teamwork and patient 
safety at bedside and workplace relationships and communication and the two 
safety climate factors were workplace safety culture and leadership and error 
management.  
These four factors represent the conditions for analysis using fsQCA. The outcomes 
for the analysis are the views of reporting a severe, moderate and near miss error 
(each considered a separate outcome) as well as disclosure of these same outcomes 
(again analysed separately). The rationale for the conditions and outcomes has 
previously been discussed in the literature review and method chapter. 
 Case selection  
In order to determine safety climate and teamwork scores for the fsQCA a response 
across all the SAQ items was required. Similarly, not all respondents provided an 
answer in relation to views of reporting or disclosing error.  
In order to maintain transparency in the fsQCA analysis it was determined that 
responses to all items of the questionnaire were required. Therefore, only cases 
with full responses to both the SAQ questions and the views of reporting and 
disclosure were included for the fsQCA.  
Of the total responses received there were 85 responses with fully completed 
questionnaires. These responses were given individual “case ID” numbers for the 
purpose of analysis and reporting of results.  
Of these cases 45 were nurses working in a rural hospital/multi-purpose setting, 20 
working in rural aged care environments and 16 indicated their work was located 
within a community setting. This left the remaining four cases where respondents 
worked in another work location.  
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With regard to work role, 16 of the respondents indicated management was their 
primary role. One of the remaining cases (case 29) did not indicate either 
management or clinical as their role. This case was allocated to the not 
management set. In the event this allocation resulted in the case being present as a 
contradictory case with respect to any outcome, then it would be possible to re-
assign the case.   
There were two cases included in the analysis that did not contain postcode data. 
These were case 50 and case 56. Just as a conservative decision was made to 
include respondents with missing postcode data in the variable-based analysis, so 
too was the decision that was made to include them here. In the event the cases 
proved contradictory to the outcome this would clearly be identified through fsQCA. 
If this occurred then it would be possible to re-examine their inclusion. 
 Boolean algebra 
It is recommended that appropriate terminology and Boolean expressions are used 
for analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). This is required for both the use of the 
software and interpretation of results. The expressions for each of these are 
outlined in Table 5-40. As noted in the previous chapter (Section 4.5) these 
expressions are based upon the outputs from fs/QCA software (Ragin & Davey, 
2012). 
As indicated in the previous chapter (Section 4.2.2) there has been an allocation of a 
qualitative descriptor in the naming of condition and outcome sets. This is a key 
aspect of fsQCA as it allows for the data to be described from the analysis 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  
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Table 5-40 Boolean expressions for conditions, outcomes and solution terms 
 
Full terminology Role in analysis Boolean expression 
Teamwork factor 1 (teamwork and patient safety at 
bedside) positive 
Condition tf1 
Teamwork factor (workplace relationships and 
communication) 2 positive 
Condition tf2 
Safety climate factor 1 (workplace safety culture) 
positive 
Condition scf1 
Safety climate factor 2 (leadership and error 
management) positive 
Condition scf2 
View of reporting severe error Always Outcome sr 
View of reporting moderate error Always Outcome mr 
View of reporting near miss error Always Outcome mmr 
View of disclosure of severe error Always Outcome sd 
View of disclosure of moderate error Always Outcome md 
View of disclosure of near miss error Always Outcome nmd  
Negated set (ie not ‘in’ the set) Expression ~ (before set expression) 
Logical ‘OR’ Expression + 
Logical ‘AND’ Expression  * 
With conditions and outcomes determined through the literature review and 
calibration outlined in the previous chapter, the raw data were transformed to a 
calibrated data set. As noted in the previous chapter (Section 4.8.2) raw and 
calibrated data tables appear in Appendix 13 and Appendix 14. 
 Possible configurations 
The formula used to determine the number of possible configurations in fsQCA is 2k 
where k is the number of conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Hence, with 
the four conditions of interest the total possible combinations of positive and not 
positive scores for teamwork and safety climate is 24 or sixteen. Table 5-41 shows 
these combinations. The number “1” in the table indicates the condition is present 
whilst “0” indicates the condition is absent. 
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Table 5-41 Possible configurations of conditions of interest with number of cases 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No of cases 
1 1 1 1 41 
1 1 1 0 4 
1 1 0 1 5 
1 1 0 0 3 
1 0 1 1 4 
1 0 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 2 
1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 5 
0 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 4 
0 1 0 0 6 
0 0 1 1 2 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 4 
 
The configurations listed in Table 5-41 are presented in order of factor scores for 
each condition being positive. This has been done for easy comparison across all 
analyses. The same pattern of configurations will be used consistently for 
presenting the results of this research in matrix tables allowing for comparing 
across analyses for both views of reporting and disclosure as well as the different 
levels of harm. 
The number of configurations present for each outcome is also listed in this table. 
The configuration with no cases present (~tf1 ~tf2 ~scf1 scf2) is the only logical 
remainder. As noted in the previous chapter (Section 4.8.4) in this research there 
were no directional assumptions made in relation to logical remainders. 
 Presentation of results  
Results of analysis from fsQCA are presented in a series of figures and tables. 
Results from the test of necessity are presented first. Outputs from fs/QCA software 
for test for necessity are presented for the initial analysis for factors and views of 
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reporting and disclosure in this chapter with remaining output data contained in 
Appendix 16. A sample data output for the test of sufficiency appears in this 
chapter.  
Truth tables were produced for all conditions and outcomes. The truth table of the 
initial analysis of teamwork and safety climate factors and views of reporting severe 
error appears in this chapter. All remaining tables where a test of sufficiency was 
undertaken appear in Appendix 1 and Appendix 19. It is through consideration of 
the truth table that the sufficiency cut-off is determined. The guidelines developed 
in the previous chapter (Section 4.8.2) were applied when determining the 
sufficiency cut-off and in more than one analysis was undertaken for some 
outcomes. Once the sufficiency cut-off was determined the analysis for sufficiency 
was completed through the software and solution terms produced. 
Solution terms from each analysis are presented in a separate results table. Cases 
found to be either consistent or inconsistent with the outcome for each solution 
term, are identified in these tables, all of which appear in this chapter. 
As noted in the previous chapter (Section 4.8.3,) to assist in the process of 
presenting these results and comparing the data across different outcomes by 
means of a matrix a results key was developed (Table 5-42). Where a factor score 
was present for the outcome the difference of positive or not positive was 
represented by “1” (present) and “0” (not present) and colour coded green or red 
respectively. Lighter shades reflecting the same colours were used for demographic 
elements of workplace setting (aged care or not aged care) and work role 
(management role or not management role). 
Each analysis (Analysis X, Y, and Z) is indicated as present for the outcome through 
use of the corresponding alphabetical symbol. Those configurations found present 
in the initial analysis (with no additional conditions) are shaded in grey in all matrix 
tables. 
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Table 5-42 Key to fsQCA results tables 
 
Key Representation 
1 Factor score positive is present for the outcome 
0 Factor score not positive is present for the outcome 
1 Setting or role present for the outcome 
0 Setting or role not present for the outcome 
X Configuration present for outcome when analysis sufficiency cut-off = 1.00000 
Y 
Configuration present for outcome when analysis sufficiency cut-off < 1.00000 and no 
inconsistent cases included in analysis 
Z 
Configuration present for outcome when analysis sufficiency cut-off < 1.00000 and 
inconsistent cases included in analysis 
  
The analysis therefore proceeded under the parameters outlined in the previous 
chapter with results presented in a consistent manner. Further details of the results 
obtained during the analytic moment will now be provided. 
 During the analytic moment 
The second phase of the funnel of complexity is during the analytic moment which 
occurs when the analysis proper is undertaken. This encompasses both the test for 
necessity and test for sufficiency.  
 Test for necessity 
The concept of necessary conditions was discussed in the previous chapter (Section 
4.7).  This test is performed first. 
The output from fs/QCA software (Ragin & Davey, 2012) for the test for necessity 
from the analysis of each individual teamwork and safety climate factor the views of 
reporting a severe error appears in Figure 5-16.   None of the values for this analysis 
were found to have a consistency of 1.00. Therefore none of the conditions were 
found necessary for the outcome. Data outputs for the test for necessity for other 
outcomes appear in Appendix 16. 
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Figure 5-16: fsQCA output for necessary conditions for factors and views of reporting severe error 
 Test for sufficiency factors and views of reporting severe 
error 
Following the test for necessity, a test for sufficiency was performed. The truth table 
for factors and views of reporting of severe error is presented as Table 5-43. The 
rows are listed from most consistent to least consistent configuration and the row 
without any cases is a logical remainder.  
In examining the truth table it is possible to see the most consistent row of 
configurations is the one where all factors are positive and the row with the 
configuration of all not positive factor scores the least consistent with the outcome. 
Although the configuration of all positive factor scores is the most consistent there  
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Table 5-43 Truth table views of reporting severe error 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No sr 
Raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. Product Cases consistent with row 
Cases inconsistent with 
row 
1 1 0 1 5 1  0.898865 0.893362 0.893362 22;32;43;48;52  
1 1 1 1 41  1 0.891151 0.888457 0.90282 1;2;3;4;6;8;11;12;13;15; 18; 19 20;  24; 
26;29;30;34; 35; 37;38;46;   47;55;57; 59;61;   
67;68;69;70;71;73;74; 
     76; 84;        
9; 31;51;54;56 
1 1 0 0 3 1  0.890805 0.868056 0.868056 10;65;78  
1 1 1 0 4  1 0.844933 0.830441 0.830441 7;25;58;82  
1 0 0 1 2 1  0.836120 0.803213 0.803213 41;83  
1 0 1 1 4  1 0.823276 0.809598 0.809598 17;40; 64;85;   
0 1 0 0 6 1  0.822844 0.785311 0.785311 14;16;81; 5 23;39 
0 1 1 1 5  0 0.788321 0.781681 0.781681 28;36; 44;77   79 
0 1 0 1 4 0  0.778761 0.765808 0.765808 42;53;66 62 
1 0 0 0 1  0 0.753363 0.640523 0.640523  63 
0 0 0 0 4 0  0.720588 0.641509 0.641509 49;75 60;72 
0 0 1 1 2  0 0.705179 0.672566 0.672566 21;27  
0 1 1 0 1 0  0.704545 0.656891 0.656891 33  
1 0 1 0 2  0 0.570000 0.439130 0.439130 50 45 
0 0 1 0 1 0  0.428571 0.333333 0.333333  80 
0 0 0 1 0  0           
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Figure 5-17:  fsQCA software output for all solution terms (factors and views reporting severe error) 
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are five contradictory cases for that configuration. That is, of all cases with that 
configuration there were five cases where the nurse respondent indicated they felt 
the error would Not always be reported in their workplace.  
Closer examination of the truth table revealed that amongst all the cases there 
were only 14 that were contradictory for the outcome.  
Undertaking an analysis including contradictory cases is not ideal. The previous 
chapter outlined a consistent approach to the use of fsQCA designed to ensure 
comparison of multiple outcome sets. The approach applied for this analysis was to 
adopt Analysis Z. The solution cut-off was therefore set at 0.823276 which was 
greater than 0.80. This value allowed the inclusion of a contradictory row. However, 
as the proportion threshold was set at 0.85, no less than 85% of the cases included 
were contradictory. This ensured there were transparent levels at which any 
contradictory rows were included in any analysis.  
The fs/QCA software output containing the complex, parsimonious and 
intermediate solution terms may be viewed in Figure 5-17 with solutions terms 
available in Table 5-44.   Use of Kirq software (Reichert & Rubinson, 2014) identified 
the any cases that were inconsistent with solution terms and these are also 
presented in this table. Through examining the result for this analysis it can be seen 
that two of the four solution terms contained the 5 inconsistent cases with the 
other two solutions fully consistent (consistency=1.00) for the outcome.  
The solution statement is provided as:  
a positive factor score for teamwork and patient safety at the bedside (tf1) 
AND a positive factor score for workplace communication and teamwork 
(tf2) OR; 
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a positive factor score for teamwork and patient safety at the bedside (tf1) 
AND positive factor score for leadership and error management (scf2)   
leads to the outcome of severe error viewed as Always reported. 
This is quite a long statement. As a result, subsequent solution terms will not be 
stated fully. The Boolean expressions are present in the solution term tables and 
the configurational rows for the solution terms appears in the matrix tables.  
 
Table 5-44 Solution terms for factors view severe error Always reported (Analysis Z) 
Severe error  
Always reported 
tf1*tf2      +       tf1*scf2      
Consistency 0.903211 0.903339 
Raw coverage 0.810741     0.058056     
Unique coverage 0.067029     0.058056     
Cases consistent 1;2;3;4;6;8;11;12;13;15;17;  
18;19;20;22;24;26;29;30;32; 
34;35;37;38;40;41;43;46;47;48;52; 
55;57;59;61;64;67;68;69;70;71;73; 
74;76; 83;84;85 
1;2;3;4;6;7;8;10;11;12;13;15;18; 
19;20;22;24;25;26;29;30;34;32;35; 
37;38;43;46;47;48;52;55;57;58;59; 
61;65;67;68;69;70;71;73;74;76;78; 
82;84; 
Cases inconsistent 9;31;51;54;56 9;31;51;54;56 
Consistency cut-off 0.823276  
Solution consistency 0.909091  
Solution coverage 0.868797  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are parameters of fit that need to be noted.  The solution consistency (0.91) 
indicates the large majority of the cases covered by the entire solution are 
consistent. The solution coverage is 0.87 and also indicates many of the cases are 
covered by this solution term and hold membership of the outcome set. From this 
table it is possible to identify it is five cases (cases 9, 31, 51, 54 and 56) that are 
contradictory for the outcome with respect to each of the solution terms. 
The solution term paths were mapped into a matrix which can be seen in Table 
5-45. There are two issues that should be noted in relation to the solution for this 
analysis. Firstly, consideration of the parsimonious solution term reveals no 
difference between it and other solution terms That is, when mapped in the matrix, 
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the parsimonious solution does not alter the configurational rows covered by the 
intermediate solution. 
The solution path tf1*tf2 is represented by rows 1-4 in the matrix table. The 
solution term tf1*scf2 is represented by rows 1, 3, 5 and 7. The unshaded 
conditions within each of these rows is not relevant to the outcome. Whilst it is 
possible to differentiate in relation to this particular set of solution term for the 
condition of teamwork and safety climate factors and the outcome of views of 
reporting severe error, for the purposes of comparison through other matrices it is 
necessary to highlight  
Table 5-45 Presence of rows in solution terms (views of reporting severe error) 
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Analysis for other outcomes (views of reporting moderate and near miss error and 
views of disclosure of severe and moderate error and the negated (non-outcome 
set) for views of disclosure of moderate and near miss error were also undertaken. 
However, the sufficiency cut-off for each of these varied making direct comparison 
difficult. The addition of further conditions was considered in order to address this 
matter and this is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
Analysis of the outcome sets for disclosure of near miss error as well as the negated 
(non-outcome set) for views of moderate reporting, near miss reporting and severe 
error disclosure were not pursued to fsQCA. These truth tables contained 
configurations where it was either not possible to set a sufficiency threshold that 
was at or above the 0.80 threshold set for this research, or there were rows present 
with contradictory cases that could not be resolved with a proportion threshold of 
0.85 (85%) or greater (Rubinson, 2013). In addition, some truth tables, although 
exhibiting sufficiency consistency of ≥0.80, the PRI and PRODUCT were lower than 
the 0.75 threshold set for this research (Section 4.8.3). The relevant truth tables for 
these appear in Appendix 17 with the solution tables presented in Appendix 18. A 
table of the configurational rows represented by the solution terms for each of 
these was not produced due to different consistency cut-off values for each 
analysis. 
As noted earlier in the previous chapter, it is possible to resolve contradictory rows 
through adding conditions.  This approach was taken as it produced improved 
consistency cut-off thresholds allowing for a comparison across multiple outcomes. 
The results of this further analysis will now be presented.  
 Case-based relationship including workplace setting and 
work role 
Several options for resolving contradictory rows were discussed in the previous 
chapter (Section 4.7.3) (Rubinson, 2013; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012; Ragin, 
2009). A proportional threshold of 0.80 was applied to the previous analysis and 
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cases with low consistency but present for the outcome were determined to be not 
present (coded as “0”). Other options include re-examine cases and adding 
conditions.  
A re-examination of the cases of this research with respect to demographic 
information resulted in the addition of workplace setting and work role as 
conditions for analysis. This decision was also supported through the variable-based 
inferential statistics results where workplace setting and work role were areas 
where differences in views of reporting and disclosure as well as some teamwork 
and safety climate factors were noted. 
The rationale for adding conditions for further analysis was not based solely on 
resolving contradictions. The variable-based results relating to the disclosure of 
severe, moderate and near miss error clearly identified that nurses in residential 
aged care settings viewed such errors as more likely to be disclosed compared to 
the nurses in rural hospital or community settings. Nurses working in management 
roles were also more likely to view error to be disclosed. With this in mind 
additional conditions were added for further analysis with fsQCA. 
As these additional conditions of interest were specific to aged care nurses 
compared to nurses who were not working in aged care, as well as nurses working 
in management roles compared to those who were not, then the additional 
conditions created focused on the presence or absence of each. Thus, the 
conditions added were a crisp set category where each was either present (1) or 
absent (0). 
Adding conditions resolved some of the inconsistent rows and improved PRI and 
PRODUCT consistency levels which enabled analysis to go ahead. However, it also 
raised the number of possible configurations of conditions from 16 to 64 resulting in 
37 logical remainders. These may be viewed in the truth tables produced for the 
test of sufficiency (Appendix 19). 
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The majority of these logical remainders were present amongst the nurses working 
in residential aged care settings. There were also more present amongst nurses in 
management roles in aged care compared to those employed in a clinical role in 
that same workplace setting.  
 Test for necessity additional conditions 
Once again, the first test for analysis with the additional conditions was that for 
necessity. Necessary conditions were found relating to demographic data include 
membership of the set not working in aged care (~racf consistency=1.00) and not 
management (~mx consistency=0.91) for the Not always outcome for reporting of 
severe error. The condition ~racf was also found necessary for the Not always set 
for disclosure of severe (consistency=0.95) and moderate error (consistency=0.92). 
The presence of this condition as necessary for the outcome of Not always 
acknowledging near miss error was close to the 0.9 threshold with a consistency of 
0.89.  
As noted previously, all fs/QCA software outputs for the test for necessary 
conditions may be found in Appendix 16.  
 Test for sufficiency 
Analyses for the outcomes relating to views of reporting error were undertaken 
using consistency cut-off of 1.00 (Analysis X). Similarly, analyses for outcomes 
relating to views of disclosure were also undertaken with the same consistency cut-
off of 1.00 (Analysis X) as were analyses for the negated outcome for near miss 
reporting and all negated (non-outcome sets) for views of disclosure. This approach 
of using the same level of sufficiency consistency makes a comparison across the 
different outcomes possible. The truth tables for each of these analyses appear in 
Appendix 19 
It should be noted here that case 50 and case 56, the two cases with not post-code 
that were included in the analysis (refer to Section 5.11.1), were varied in whether 
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or not they were contradictory to any of the outcomes of interest.  Both cases were 
either consistent for the outcomes relating to views of Always reporting or 
acknowledging error or where inconsistent there were also other cases that were 
inconsistent for that same outcome.  Therefore the inclusion of these cases did not 
lead to contradictory rows being included in the analysis. 
Each analysis was undertaken through assessment of solution consistency where 
PRI and PRODUCT values were appropriate. Each analysis will now be considered 
separately prior to the comparison using the multiple outcomes analysis. 
Table 5-46 Solution terms for view that severe error Always reported including workplace setting and 
work role  
Severe error Always reported ~tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*~mx     + tf1*~tf2*scf2*~racf*mx     +        
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.023929     0.013868     
Unique coverage 0.023929     0.013868     
Cases consistent 44;53 17;83 
Cases inconsistent Nil Nil 
 tf1*tf2*scf1*racf*mx       +        tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*mx        
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.084976     0.088239     
Unique coverage 0.006934     0.010197     
Cases consistent 6;12;18;26;30;58 6;12;18;26;30;48 
Cases inconsistent Nil Nil 
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 1.000000  
Solution coverage 0.132971  
   
 
The paths and overall solution for the analysis of factors and demographic 
conditions for the outcome that the severe error was Always likely to occur appear 
in Table 5-46. This analysis included no contradictory rows and therefore the 
solution cut-off and overall solution consistency was 1.00. The coverage was 0.13. 
All configurational pathways had a consistency of 1.00 with the pathway 
~tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*~mx having a raw and unique coverage of 0.02 and pathway 
tf1*~tf2*scf2*~racf*mx a raw and unique coverage of 0.01. The pathways 
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tf1*tf2*scf1*racf*mx and tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*mx had raw coverage of 0.08 and 0.09 
respectively. However, the unique coverage for each was also 0.01. 
Analysis relating to the outcome that the moderate error was likely to Always be 
reported may be seen in Table 5-47. This solution term has a consistency of 1.00 
and coverage of 0.04.  The raw and unique coverage for each pathway were the 
same values with ~tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*~mx having coverage values of 0.03 and 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx and tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*mx a raw and unique 
coverage of 0.01.                 
Table 5-47 Solution terms for views moderate error Always reported including workplace setting and 
work role 
Moderate error Always reported ~tf1*tf2*scf2*racf*~mx           + tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx     
+        
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.026210     0.007595     
Unique coverage 0.026210     0.007595     
Cases consistent 44;53 83 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*mx       +        
Consistency 1.000000  
Raw coverage 0.011169      
Unique coverage 0.011169      
Cases consistent 48  
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 1.000000  
Solution coverage 0.044974  
 
 
A solution such as this may be regarded as trivial due to the low representation of 
cases (Ragin, 2006). However, it could also be argued that as the subject matter of 
this research is patient safety, that any configuration leading to the outcome of 
interest is significant, regardless of the level of representation within the cases. That 
is, whilst one of the rows of the truth table represents twenty-three of the 85 cases 
included, just one is fully consistent with the solution term for the outcome that the 
near miss error would Always be reported. This case is therefore unusual and 
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warrants further investigation which would have been possible in the event that 
data obtained for this research were re-identifiable. 
Results pertaining to factors, workplace setting and work role and the outcome of 
the view near miss error would Always be reported appear in Table 5-48. There was 
just one path for this solution, although the coverage was less than 0.01.  
 
Table 5-48 Solution terms views near miss error Always reported including workplace setting and work 
role  
 
Near miss error 
Always reported 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx      
Consistency 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.009427     
Unique coverage 0.009427     
Cases consistent 83 
Cases inconsistent  
Consistency cut-off 1.000000 
Solution consistency 1.000000 
Solution coverage 0.009427     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
This low solution coverage value is a concern when considering the solution 
represents a single case (case 83). A solution such as this may be regarded as trivial 
due to the low representation of cases (Ragin, 2006). However, it could also be 
argued that as the subject matter of this research is patient safety, that any 
configuration relating to the outcome of interest is important. That is, whilst this 
case is just one of 85 included in this research, it is the only one fully consistent with 
the outcome that near miss error would Always be reported. This is therefore an 
unusual case and warrants further investigation. This would have been possible in 
the event that data obtained for this research were re-identifiable. 
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Table 5-49 Solution terms for view near miss error always reported (negated outcome including 
workplace setting and work role 
Near miss error Always reported 
(negated) 
~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~racf*~mx     + tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~racf*~mx            
+        
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.049515     0.064725     
Unique coverage 0.001295     0.016505     
Cases consistent 49;72;63 41;63 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx     +         
Consistency 1.000000  
Raw coverage 0.016505      
Unique coverage 0.016505      
Cases consistent 58  
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 1.000000  
Solution coverage 0.082524  
This is in contrast to the results presented in Table 5-49 which presents the solution 
terms for the negated set of the view that near miss error would Always be 
reported. The coverage of the solution for this outcome was 0.08. Five cases (cases 
41, 49, 58, 63 and 72) were consistent with this solution. 
Other non-outcome (negated outcome sets) for views of error reporting were not 
analysed with fsQCA. Again this was due to the parameters set for this research not 
being achieved. As noted previously, these truth tables may be seen in Appendix 19. 
Table 5-50 Solution terms for views severe error Always disclosed including workplace setting and 
work role  
Severe error Always 
acknowledged 
tf1*~tf2*scf2*~racf*mx         + tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*mx            
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.016846     0.012386     
Unique coverage 0.016846     0.012386     
Cases consistent 17;83 48   
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 1.000000  
Solution coverage 0.029232  
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Analysis undertaken with respect to the outcome that severe error would Always be 
acknowledged to the patient/client or their family is presented in Table 5-50. These 
results indicate that this solution has a consistency of 1.00 and coverage of 0.03. 
Three cases were consistent with this solution (cases 17, 48 and 83). 
 
Table 5-51 Solution terms for views moderate error Always disclosed including workplace setting and 
work role  
 
Moderate error 
Always acknowledged 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx      
Consistency 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.009206     
Unique coverage 0.009206     
Cases consistent 17;83 
Cases inconsistent  
Consistency cut-off 1.000000 
Solution consistency 1.000000 
Solution coverage 0.009206     
The solution for the outcome relating to the view a moderate error was likely to 
Always be disclosed also had a consistency of 1.00. This result may be seen in Table 
5-53. The solution coverage, raw and unique coverage) of this solution was 001. 
Only case 17 and case 83 were consistent with this solution. 
Table 5-52 Solution terms for views near miss error Always disclosed including workplace setting and 
work role  
 
 
Near miss error 
Always acknowledged 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx      
Consistency 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.012201     
Unique coverage 0.012201     
Cases consistent 83 
Cases inconsistent  
Consistency cut-off 1.000000 
Solution consistency 1.000000 
Solution coverage 0.012201     
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Analysis was also performed with respect to the outcome that a near miss error 
would Always be disclosed. The result for this appears in Table 5-52. The solution 
term is a single path with a solution consistency of 1.00 and solution coverage, 
unique and raw coverage of 0.01. Once again, the single case represented by a 
single pathway and the low solution coverage should be noted. 
Table 5-53 Solution terms for views severe error Always disclosed including workplace setting and 
work role  
 
Severe error Always 
acknowledged (negated) 
~tf1*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx        + ~tf1*tf2*~scf2*racf*~mx          +        
Consistency 1.000000 0.829545 
Raw coverage 0.062577     0.059714     
Unique coverage 0.021268     0.028630     
Cases consistent 60;75;39 33;39 
Cases inconsistent   
 ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*racf*~mx          +        tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx  +       
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.051943     0.041309     
Unique coverage 0.020859     0.020859     
Cases consistent 39;53 45 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx         
Consistency 1.000000  
Raw coverage 0.020859      
Unique coverage 0.020859      
Cases consistent 58  
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 0.926108  
Solution coverage 0.153783  
Results presented in Table 5-53, indicate results pertaining to the negated (non-
outcome set) indicating views that severe error would Not always be disclosed. The 
sufficiency cut-off of 1.00 produced a solution with a consistency of 0.93 and a 
solution coverage of 0.15. This solution represents seven cases (case 33, 39, 45, 53, 
58, 60, and 75). The pathway tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx shows a raw and unique 
coverage of 0.02 with only case 58 consistent. Another pathway,  
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tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx, is also represented by a single case (case45) and 
shows a raw coverage of 0.04 and unique coverage of 0.02. Two other pathways, 
~tf1*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx and ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*racf*~mx have raw coverage of 
0.06 and 0.04 respectively and both have unique coverage of 0.02. The former of 
these pathways represents three consistent cases and the latter is represented by 
two.   The remaining pathway, ~tf1*tf2*~scf2*racf*~mx covers two consistent cases 
and has a raw coverage of 0.06 and unique coverage of 0.03. This solution term has 
a consistency of 0.83, indicating it is less consistent that the other pathways in the 
solution term.        
All paths in this solution term contain the condition racf. That is, the outcome is 
only seen when the condition racf is present, suggesting this condition is necessary. 
However, the test for necessity did not indicate that racf is a necessary condition. 
This is referred to as a false necessary condition (Section 4.7) and is a possible 
indication that set membership scores may be “skewed” (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012, p 249). Further support for the false necessity is that there are examples in 
the data where the condition racf is not present for the outcome. 
The solution term for the non-outcome (negated) set for views of disclosure of 
moderate error has multiple pathways, all of which have a consistency of 1.00. This 
is the same value as the overall solution consistency and the solution coverage is 
0.21. This may be seen in Table 5-54.  
Of these, the pathways tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~racf*~mx and ~tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~mx 
have the highest raw coverage of 0.07 for each. The former (with two consistent 
cases) has a unique coverage of 0.03 and the latter (with four consistent cases) a 
unique coverage of 0.00. Similarly, the pathways ~tf1*~tf2*~scf2*~racf*~mx and 
~tf1*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx (each with three consistent cases) have a raw coverage 
of 0.05 but the former has a unique coverage of 0.02 and the latter 0.00.  
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Table 5-54 Solution terms for views moderate error Always disclosed including workplace setting and 
work role 
Moderate error Always 
acknowledged (negated) 
~tf1*~tf2*~scf2*~racf*~mx       + tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~racf*~mx         
+        
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.051689     0.067568     
Unique coverage 0.017230     0.034459     
Cases consistent 49;72;80 41;63 
Cases inconsistent   
 ~tf1*tf2*~scf2*racf*~mx          +        ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*racf*~mx          
+       
Consistency 0.829545 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.049324     0.042905     
Unique coverage 0.023649     0.017230     
Cases consistent 33;39 39;53 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx   + tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx       
+          
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.034122     0.017230     
Unique coverage 0.017230     0.017230     
Cases consistent 45 58 
Cases inconsistent   
 ~tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~mx      +   ~tf1*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx         
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.068919     0.051689     
Unique coverage 0.000000     0.000000     
Cases consistent 49;60;72;75 39;60;75; 
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 0.954614  
Solution coverage 0.213176  
The pathway ~tf1*tf2*~scf2*racf*~mx also has a raw coverage of 0.05 and has two 
consistent cases. This pathway has a unique coverage of 0.02.      
The remaining three pathways ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*racf*~mx (with three consistent 
cases), tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx and tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx (each with 
two consistent cases) have a raw consistency of 0.04, 0.03 and 0.02 respectively. 
Each of these have the same unique consistency of 0.02.  
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Table 5-55 Solution terms for view near miss error Always disclosed (negated outcome including 
workplace setting and work role) 
 
Near miss error Always 
acknowledged (negated) 
~tf2*~scf2*~racf*~mx           + ~tf1*tf2*racf*~mx              +        
Consistency 1.000000 0.933775 
Raw coverage 0.059028     0.065278     
Unique coverage 0.006019     0.047685     
Cases consistent 49;50;72;80;63 33;39;44;53 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~racf*~mx     +        tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*~mx        +       
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.046296     0.069444     
Unique coverage 0.011806     0.011806     
Cases consistent 50;63; 45;50 
Cases inconsistent   
 tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx     + ~tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~mx      +          
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.011806     0.047222     
Unique coverage 0.011806     0.000000     
Cases consistent 58  49;60;72;75 
Cases inconsistent   
 ~tf1*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx        
Consistency 1.000000  
Raw coverage 0.035417      
Unique coverage 0.000000      
Cases consistent 39;60;75;  
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 0.974587  
Solution coverage 0.177546  
It is worth revisiting the concept of raw and unique coverage here. As outlined in 
Section 4.9, raw coverage is a measure of how much the membership of the 
outcome is covered by the respective single path whereas the unique coverage is 
how much that single path uniquely covers (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The 
two abovementioned pathways with unique coverage of 0.00 indicate the cases in 
these pathways are also covered by other solution terms. Each of these paths have 
raw consistency at values similar to other paths so they comprise similar 
membership of the outcome to those paths. However, these solution paths with a 
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coverage of 0.00 are not themselves unique as the cases covered by these solutions 
are also covered by other paths. The non-outcome (negated outcome set) for views 
of disclosing near miss error was also analysed with respect to factors and the 
additional conditions of workplace setting and work role . Results may be viewed in 
Table 5-55. The solution consistency was 1.00 and solution coverage 0.04.  
It has been suggested that truth tables alone may be of use in analysis (Collier, 
2014). For example, they indicate that the most consistent configuration for the 
non-occurrence of some outcomes (negated) is not the configuration where all 
factor scores are not positive.  Similarly, the truth tables for views of reporting 
moderate and near miss error, as well as severe, moderate and near miss disclosure 
indicate that the least consistent configuration is that where all factors are positive. 
This is an indication of the complexity of safety climate found in the case-based 
results. The multiple outcome analysis provides further support of this complexity. 
 Multiple outcome analysis 
As outlined in the previous chapter (Section 4.8.3) through selecting a consistency 
cut-off of 1.00 for each analysis with fsQCA a comparison of the outcomes was also 
possible.  Thus, having completed each analysis, the results of each outcome were 
compared. Two approaches were undertaken for this. Firstly, the number of cases 
and the solution consistency of each solution statement were compared. Secondly a 
matrix was developed displaying the configurational rows present in the solution 
terms for each outcome.  
In undertaking this further analysis of the fully consistent configurational rows it 
should be noted that there are examples within the truth tables of the outcome 
occurring that are not explained by the solution terms in the tables above. That is, 
there are examples of configurational rows with a consistency less than 1.0 where 
the cases exhibited the outcome of interest.   
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Table 5-56 Comparison of number of cases and solution consistency of solution terms for each 
outcome 
Outcome 
Always 
report 
severe 
Always 
report 
moderate 
Always 
report near 
miss 
Always 
disclose 
severe 
Always 
disclose 
moderate 
Always 
disclose 
near miss 
Cases 
(number) 
11 4 1 3 2 1 
Solution 
coverage 
0.13 0.04 <0.01 0.03 <0.01 0.01 
Outcome  
Always 
report 
severe 
(negated) 
Always 
report 
moderate 
(negated) 
Always 
report near 
miss 
(negated) 
Always 
disclose 
severe 
(negated) 
Always 
disclose 
moderate 
(negated) 
Always 
disclose 
near miss 
(negated) 
Cases 
(number) 
N/A N/A 5 7 13 13 
Solution 
coverage 
N/A N/A 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.18 
 
Through selecting only those configurational rows and cases with full consistency 
then a transparent comparison is possible between all the different outcomes for 
views of reporting and disclosure. This aids in meeting the aim of this research to 
describe describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical 
settings. Thus the results presented in Section 5.14 and this current section reflect a 
description of the fully consistent cases in the data.  
The comparison of the number of cases and solution consistency appear in Table 
5-56. From this comparison it is apparent that more cases were covered by solution 
terms where nurses felt the severe outcome would Always be reported (11 cases) 
compared to the same view in relation to moderate (4 cases) and near miss error (1 
case). Fewer cases were covered by solution terms where nurses thought the 
severe error would Always be disclosed compared to moderate (2 cases) and near 
miss (1 case). 
In all outcomes where solution terms were produced for both the outcome and the 
non-outcome (negated) set, there were more cases in the latter than the former. 
There were 5 cases covered by the solution which indicated the outcome that a 
near miss would Not always be reported compared to just 1 case for the outcome it 
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would Always be reported. Similarly, 7 cases were represented by the solution term 
for severe disclose Not always being disclosed (compared to 3 covered for the 
outcome set) and 13 cases consistent for the outcome that moderate and near miss 
error would Not always be disclosed compared to 3 cases and two cases for the 
outcome of each respectively. 
Thus more cases were identified as fully consistent with the non-outcome sets 
compared to the outcome. In addition, more cases were fully consistent with the 
outcome that a severe error would be reported than the outcome (non-negated) 
set for any other scenario. The outcome sets with a higher number of cases 
therefore also displayed higher solution coverage.  
This suggests that the relationship between the different solution terms for each 
outcome and non-outcome (negated) set varied. This may be a reflection of the 
manner in which both policy and research focus on what is needed to ensure severe 
error is reported and why all error is not reported (a Safety I approach) rather than 
focussing upon what is required for error of all outcomes to be reported and 
disclosed (Safety II approach). This will be considered further in Chapter 3 (Section 
ADDITHERE) 
The visual matrix representation of configuration rows found present from the 
analysis for each outcome may be seen in Table 5-57. Two initial observations can 
be made from this table.  
Firstly, the configuration row where all factor scores are positive was only present 
for views of reporting severe error amongst nurses working in management roles in 
aged care settings. For nurses working in other settings and/or working in a clinical 
role this configuration was not consistent for the severe error being reported. 
As with the first analysis, there are other configurations present for the outcome. 
That is, a view that the particular outcome would be reported and/or disclosed was 
possible even though some of the factor scores were not positive. This challenges 
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Table 5-57 Matrix of configurations present for outcome set 
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1 0 0 0 1 1                         0 1                         
0 1 1 1 1 1                         0 1                         
0 1 1 0 1 1                         0 1                         
0 1 0 1 1 1                         0 1                         
0 1 0 0 1 1                         0 1                         
0 0 1 1 1 1                         0 1                         
0 0 1 0 1 1                         0 1                         
0 0 0 1 1 1                         0 1                         
0 0 0 0 1 1                         0 1                         
1 1 1 1 1 0                         0 0                         
1 1 1 0 1 0                        0 0                         
1 1 0 1 1 0                         0 0                         
1 1 0 0 1 0                         0 0                         
1 0 1 1 1 0                         0 0                         
1 0 1 0 1 0                   X X X 0 0                       X 
1 0 0 1 1 0                 
 
      0 0           X         X X 
1 0 0 0 1 0                         0 0           X         X X 
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0 1 1 1 1 0 X X                   X 0 0                         
0 1 1 0 1 0                   X X X 0 0                         
0 1 0 1 1 0 X X               X X X 0 0                         
0 1 0 0 1 0                   X X X 0 0                         
0 0 1 1 1 0                         0 0                         
0 0 1 0 1 0                         0 0                     X X 
0 0 0 1 1 0                       0 0                         
0 0 0 0 1 0                   X  X X 0 0           X         X X 
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the view that positive safety climate needs to be present if error is to be reported and 
disclosed.  
Secondly, the configuration where all factor scores are not positive was present for the 
non-outcome (negated) set amongst nurses working in clinical roles in aged care and 
non-aged care settings. However, the configurational row present varied between each 
setting. This configurational row was o present for the non-outcome (negated) set for 
views relating to all outcomes for error disclosure in aged care. However it was present 
for the non-outcome (negated) set for views of reporting near miss error and views of 
disclosure of moderate and near miss error in non-aged care settings. This result 
challenges the concept that if safety climate is not positive then error will not be viewed 
as reported as this configurational row was not present for all of the non-outcome 
(negated) for all error outcomes, nor was it present for any outcome amongst nurses 
working in a management role. 
Further observations of the configurations present for different outcomes, severity of 
harm, workplace settings and work roles may also be made. Differences in 
configurations may also be found when comparing outcomes for reporting and 
disclosure as well as between these two outcome groups. Further comparison is also 
possible through comparing the views of reporting and disclosure between the non-
outcome (negated) for each of the different error scenarios. The production of smaller 
tables containing the relevant outcomes and configurations assists in the process of 
reporting the case-based results.  
 
 Case-based comparison views of reporting 
The configurational rows present for the outcomes and negated (non-outcome) that the 
severe, moderate or near miss scenario would Always be reported appear in Table 5-58. 
This comparison matrix shows the number of cases found for each configurational row  
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Table 5-58 Configurations present for outcome: view that error Always reported including workplace setting and work role 
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and it can be seen the configurational rows were found to be different relating to 
severity of harm, workplace setting and work role.  
The previously noted comments relating to the configuration of all positive factor scores 
and all not positive factor scores is also relevant here. The row containing all positive 
score was present only for the outcome that the severe error scenario would Always be 
reported. It was a single case – a nurse working in a management role in aged care.  
In contrast, the configuration where all factor scores were not positive was found 
present amongst two nurses in working in non-aged care clinical roles and this was only 
present for the outcome that the near miss error would Not always be reported. 
Although some configurational rows observed in this sample were present for more than 
one outcome, where this occurred they were grouped together in either outcome or 
negated (non-outcome) scenario. Of interest is the seven cases with the configurational 
row of tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx where this row was observed to be present that the 
severe error scenario would Always be reported but also present for the non-outcome 
(negated) view of the moderate and near miss error Not always being reported. This 
demonstrates both the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between teamwork and 
safety climate factors and views of reporting as well as the complexity of that 
relationship. This will be discussed further in the next chapter (Section 6.2).  
There were a similar number of configurational rows present amongst the nurses 
working in aged care settings compared to those working in other settings. However, 
there were also more cases within aged care settings compared to those in non-aged 
care. This result also mirrors the variable-based results. Aged care nurses were more 
likely to view error to be reported. Configurational rows  present for the outcome for 
each level of harm also varied based upon work role. There were more cases amongst 
those in a management role compared to those in a clinical role.  
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Of interest is that the configurational rows for the negated (non-outcome) sets were 
amongst nurses in aged care working in management roles and those working in clinical 
roles in non-aged care settings. Also of note here are the results relating to views of 
reporting severe error. The variable-based results found no differences relating to views 
of reporting yet there are clear differences in relation to the case-based results with 
different configurational rows observed for this outcome across different settings and 
role. 
The use of fsQCA has allowed for a description of the factors of teamwork and safety 
climate amongst nurses in different settings, working in different roles and with respect 
to views of reporting a hypothetical medication error with different levels of harm. The 
results from the analysis allow for describing the complex nature of this relationship 
based upon considering the information obtained from nurses on a case-by-case basis. 
Further consideration of this complexity and interpretation of the results will be 
undertaken in the following chapter (Sections 6.2 and 6.3). 
 Case-based comparison views of disclosure 
Similar results were found in the analysis relating to views of disclosure of the same 
error scenario. The visual presentation of these results is presented in Table 5-59 will 
also be considered on the basis of severity of harm, workplace setting and work role. 
However, it should first be noted that the configurational row for all positive teamwork 
and safety climate factor scores was not observed for the outcome that any of the 
scenarios would Always be disclosed. The notion that positive teamwork and safety 
climate factors contribute to error reporting and disclosure may not be supported by 
these results. 
The configurational row of all not positive factor scores was present amongst five cases, 
all of which were nurses working in a clinical role. This configuration was present for all 
the non-outcome (negated) that the error would Not always be disclosed amongst 
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nurses in aged care settings but was only present for the non-outcome for the moderate 
and near miss scenario amongst nurses working in clinical settings.  
This same configurational row was not observed amongst nurses working in 
management roles, nor was it observed for any of the outcomes or non-outcomes 
relating to views an error scenario would Always be reported. Once again, this 
challenges the notion that when safety climate is not positive error reporting and 
disclosure may not always occur. 
Differences can be seen once again when comparing configurational rows present for 
different levels of harm. Only one configuration row (tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx) 
with a single consistent case was present for the view amongst all outcomes that an 
error scenario would Always be disclosed. This compares to numerous configurational 
rows, three of which had more than one consistent case, for the negated (non-outcome) 
for the three scenarios. This indicates more cases and pathways were observed for the 
non-outcome than the outcome. It also suggests that understanding the relationship 
between factors for teamwork and safety climate and error disclosure may be greater 
when considering what contributes to the non-disclosure of error compared to its 
disclosure. A similar situation can be observed when considering different workplace 
settings and work role. There were more cases and configurational rows present 
amongst nurses working in non-management roles compared to those working in a 
management role. However, when considering work role, it was only those who 
indicated their role was in management where there was a configuration noted for any 
of the outcome sets. One case was observed to be fully consistent with all scenarios 
being viewed as Always reported and one fully consistent for the view the severe error 
would Always be reported. These results further support the concept that teamwork 
and safety climate factors may be more likely to assist what leads to the non-disclosure 
of error rather than its disclosure. 
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Table 5-59 Configurations present for outcome and non-outcome: view that error Always disclosed including workplace setting and work role 
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0 0 1 0 1 1             0 1             1 0             0 0         1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1             0 1             1 0           0 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1             0 1             1 0       3  3  3 0 0         2 2 
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Table 5-60 Configurational rows  present for outcome that error Always reported and Always disclosed including workplace setting and work role 
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 Case-based comparison views of reporting and disclosure 
A comparison between the views that error would Always be reported and Always 
disclosed is presented in Table 5-60. This comparison also shows differences between 
level of harm, workplace setting and work role. 
Results from this table indicate some configurational were present for just a single level 
of harm (such as the configurational row where all teamwork factors were positive 
amongst managers in aged care settings) whilst others were present for more than one. 
Of note is the configuration tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*mx which was present for all 
scenarios for both views of reporting and disclosure.  
Differences are also present across different setting and roles. There were no 
configurational rows observed amongst nurses working in non-aged care clinical settings 
and all other configurational rows present for any outcome set were only seen in a 
particular setting and/or role. 
It may therefore be possible that different combinations of factors of teamwork and 
safety climate influence outcomes in different settings and roles. What is clear from 
these results is that there is a level of complexity of the factors of safety climate present 
for the view an error may be viewed to Always be reported or disclosed. 
 Negated (non-outcome) sets  
It was also possible compare the negated (non-outcome) sets for reporting and 
disclosure of error. That is, the outcome sets of interest for this comparison is the error 
being viewed by respondents as Not always reported or acknowledged to the 
patient/client or their family. The visual representation of this analysis is presented in 
Table 5-61. 
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Table 5-61 Configurations present for negated (non-outcome) view that error ‘Always’ reported or disclosed including workplace setting and work role 
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As with previous comparisons differences can be seen in relation to level of harm, work 
setting and work role. These will now be outlined. 
Firstly, there is only one configurational row that is represented in relation to the view a 
moderate error would Not always be reported. This single configuration was only 
observed amongst nurses working in a management role in aged care this same 
configurational row is also present for the near miss non-outcome (negated) set, along 
with three others that were only present amongst nurses working in clinical roles in non-
aged care settings.  
This compares to numerous configurational rows observed for the outcome error would 
Not always be disclosed. In addition, no configurations were present for any of the 
negated (non-outcome) sets amongst nurses working in non-management roles in aged 
care settings.  
This is in contrast to the large number of configurational rows present amongst nurses 
working in clinical and management roles in non-aged care settings. Apart from the 
aforementioned rows relating to view of the near miss negated (non-outcome) set these 
configurational rows relate do the view that severe error would Not always be disclosed. 
Some of these had more than one consistent case, with three configurations amongst 
nurses working in a clinical role in aged care settings. 
Of interest is the configurational row where all teamwork and factor scores were not 
positive. Three cases consistent with this row indicated they worked in aged care clinical 
roles and viewed that all error scenarios would Not always be disclosed. A further two 
cases working in clinical roles in non-aged care settings, indicated they felt the near miss 
error would Not always be reported and the moderate and near miss scenario would 
Not always be disclosed. 
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Whilst this may suggest support for the notion that where teamwork and safety climate 
factors are not positive then error disclosure may not occur it is important to note that 
other configurational rows were present for the same outcomes where teamwork and 
safety climate scores were positive, including two where three of the possible four 
factors exhibited scores that were positive. Hence it is possible that similar views may 
occur despite high factor scores. 
These results also suggest that teamwork and safety climate factor scores may 
contribute to understanding why disclosure does not occur more than for the outcome 
that error reporting does not occur. These matters will be considered further in Chapter 
6 (Sections 6.2 and 6.3). 
 Case-based comparison all outcomes 
Having considered the case-based results with comparison of the configurational rows 
included in the analysis for views of reporting, views of disclosure and comparison 
between views of reporting and views of disclosure for the outcome and non-outcome 
(negated set), a final comparison was made of the configurations for teamwork and 
safety climate for all the outcomes where fsQCA was undertaken. This comparison is 
condensed in Table 5-62.  What can be seen from this table is that a total of 16 
configurational rows are represented. Two of these (tf1*tf2*scf1*scf2*racf*mx and 
tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*~racf*~mx) each had a case consistent with a single outcome (view 
that severe error Always reported and view that near miss error Not always disclosed 
respectively). A further six configuration rows are present for the outcome that severe 
error would Always be reported, one of which (tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*mx) had seven 
consistent cases.  
This configuration row with seven consistent cases is also present for four other 
outcomes, the view that moderate and near miss error would Not always be reported or 
disclosed. This distinct difference in outcomes is representative of the complexity of the 
relationship between teamwork and safety climate factors and views of reporting and 
disclosure of error. 
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Four other configurational rows have more than one consistent case. These are 
~tf1*tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx with four consistent cases, and 
~tf1*tf2*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx and ~tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx each with three 
cases (all present for negated (non-outcome) sets for view error Not always disclosed). 
The remaining configuration row with more than one consistent case is 
~tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~racf*~mx. This configuration row was present for the view near 
miss error would Not always be report and moderate and near miss error would Not 
always be disclosed.  
The remaining configurational rows had one consistent case. The row 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*mx is the one with the only case amongst the 85 included in 
the analysis with fsQCA which was fully consistent for the outcome that the error would 
Always be reported and disclosed for all error outcomes. 
The row with the configuration of tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*mx had a case consistent for 
the outcome that the severe and moderate error would Always be reported whilst the 
row tf1*~tf2*scf1*scf2*~racf*mx had a single case consistent with the view that the 
severe error outcome would Always be reported as well as disclosed. 
The rows with configurations tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*racf*~mx and 
~tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2*racf*~mx had a single case each that was consistent for the view 
that the severe error would Not always be disclosed. The latter of these cases was also 
consistent with the view that severe and moderate error scenarios would Always be 
reported.  
Of the four remaining configurational rows with a single consistent case, three were 
consistent with the outcome that moderate and near miss error would Not always be 
disclosed. Of these ~tf1*~tf2*scf1*~scf2*~racf*~mx was not consistent with any other 
outcomes, and rows tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2*~racf*~mx and 
tf1*~tf2*~scf1*~scf2*~racf*~mx were both also consistent with the view near miss 
error would Not always be reported.  
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Table 5-62 Comparison of configurations of teamwork and safety climate factors across workplace settings 
and work role present for more than one level of harm 
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The case for the remaining row ~tf1*tf2*scf1*scf2*racf*~mx was consistent for the view 
that near miss error would Not always be reported and that severe and moderate error 
would Always be reported. 
Of the eleven outcomes represented in this table, all but four had more than one 
configurational row present for the relevant outcome (or non-outcome). This indicates a 
degree of equifinality amongst the different solutions for each outcome. Diversity is also 
present.  
This, along with several of configuration rows containing a case (or cases) consistent 
with the outcome for one level of harm and the non-outcome for another level suggests 
a level of complexity exists in the relationship between teamwork and safety climate 
factors and views of reporting and disclosure of error. In the very least, the relationship 
is asymmetrical. 
 Summary of case-based results 
Several analyses using fsQCA were undertaken for this research. Utilising the four factors 
determined from PCA as conditions with the outcome determined as views of reporting 
or disclosure, a comparative analysis was undertaken with fsQCA. Whilst an initial 
analysis found configurations present for the outcome relating to views of error 
reporting and disclosure the different levels of sufficiency cut-off would have made 
comparison difficult and therefore only the results relating to what nurses thought was 
happening in relation to the reporting of the severe error scenario was discussed in 
detail. The remaining results were included as appendices..  
The addition of demographic data as to whether respondents worked in residential aged 
care (or not) and if they worked in a management role (or not) were added as crisp sets. 
This resolved many of the contradictory rows that were present in the truth tables, 
some of which were analysed with fsQCA were produced of conditions and views error 
would Always be reported or disclosure for each level of harm as well as the negated or 
non-outcome. The resolution of the contradictory rows resulted in the ability to set a 
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sufficiency cut-off of 1.00 for all analyses which allowed for comparison between the 
results of these different outcomes.. 
In all instances where analyses were undertaken there were solution terms containing 
more than one factor for the outcome under consideration. Thus conjunctural causality 
(more than on condition present for the outcome) was observed For most of these 
outcomes equifinality was also observed. That is, there was more than one set of 
configurations observed to be present for the relative outcome. 
Some configurational rows that were observed to be present for the negated outcome 
were also present for the outcome of the other error scenarios. This suggests complexity 
and indicates the relationship between teamwork and safety climate factors and views 
of reporting and disclosure of error is not symmetrical. .. 
A further result to note is that the presence of all positive factor scores was only present 
for the outcome in the initial analysis of conditions. When analysis was undertaken with 
additional demographic conditions that particular configuration was only present in one 
case which was manager working in aged care settings.. There were configurational rows 
present for the same outcome that included factors that were not positive, including 
one which covered seven cases (managers working in an aged care setting). Thus, it is 
possible that error will still be viewed as reported (or disclosed) even if some factor 
scores are not positive. 
What emerged from this comparison of multiple outcomes was that the solution terms 
for views of reporting severe error and those for the views for the non-outcome 
(negated set) had greater coverage when compared to those observed for the outcome 
moderate and near miss error would be reported and all error scenarios would Always 
be disclosed. The solution terms, solution paths and cases with higher levels of coverage 
therefore had greater membership within the outcome set.  
This suggests that there may be a stronger relationship between the results of teamwork 
and safety climate factors and those particular outcome sets. This may also indicate that 
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the use of the SAQ is more able to identify relationships that could assist understanding 
why moderate and near miss error is not reported and why all scenarios were not 
disclosed.  
 Chapter summary 
Results of both variable and case-based analyses have been presented in this chapter. 
The first of these identified differences in relation to views of reporting and disclosure 
and also safety climate. The differences were found between views of reporting 
compared to disclosure as well as workplace setting and work role. Variable results also 
suggest a possible relationship between some positive teamwork and safety climate 
factor scores and views of reporting and disclosure.  
The case-based results found differences in the configurations that were present for 
each of the views of reporting and disclosure. These differences were observed when 
comparing views of reporting with views of disclosure, different levels of severity of 
harm as well as workplace setting and work role. 
Having established the presence of configurations is not a finding in itself. It should not 
be assumed that these configurations are causal for the particular outcome for which 
they have been found.  
What the comparative results do indicate is that there is possibly a stronger relationship 
between the solution terms, solution paths and cases for the outcome that severe error 
would Always be reported and that severe, moderate and near miss error would Not 
always be disclosed. That is, apart from views of reporting severe error, we possibly 
understand more how safety climate and teamwork influences why error is not reported 
and disclosed rather than why it is. This matter will be explored further in the following 
chapter. 
The final phase of analysis is to consider the findings with regard to case and theoretical 
knowledge. This occurs in the after the analytical moment phase and will be undertaken 
in the next chapter. 
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6 Discussion 
The nature of error management in health care is complex. Although error reporting is 
an important part of error management it is an approach that results in a focus on the 
measurement of the non-presence of safety. To ensure safety is present a greater focus 
on resilience is required. For resilience to be understood it is necessary to accept the 
complexity of the health care system and adopt innovative methods for researching that 
complexity. Understanding resilience may assist in understanding how to achieve safe 
patient care. 
The aim of this research is to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses working 
in rural clinical settings. The research question that was established to achieve this aim 
was: how is safety climate related to views of reporting and disclosure of medication 
error amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings?  As outlined in the literature 
review this aim assumes that this relationship is complex (Section 2.19.1).  
Five research sub-questions were also developed to inform the research question and 
aim. These are:  
1. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
2. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in these settings?   
3. What is the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses in 
rural clinical settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical 
medication error? 
4. How is the understanding of the relationship between workplace safety climate 
and views of reporting medication error changed through the use of a 
configurational comparative method? 
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5. What does this mean for the management of medication error?  
Results relating to each of these sub-questions inform the findings that will be presented 
in this chapter. The first two relate to the specific areas of data collection for the 
outcomes (views of reporting and disclosure relating to different levels of harm) and 
conditions (scores for factors of teamwork and safety climate) determined for this 
research. The third ensures examination of the relationship between each of these. 
The fourth and fifth sub-questions are informed through the use of CCM within a 
framework of health care as a complex system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). Through 
this approach it has been possible to describe the complexity of safety climate and views 
of error reporting and disclosure and thus achieve the aim of this research. 
The final phase of the funnel of complexity is after the analytical moment whereby 
consideration is given to how the results inform existing knowledge of case, context and 
theory knowledge (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). Through the use of CCM to address the 
research question and sub-questions and therefore achieve the aim of this research, 
three key findings have emerged. These three findings relate to complexity in rural 
clinical settings, the implications for resilience and reframing the management of 
medication error. 
The first finding refers to the contribution this research makes to knowledge regarding 
complexity of safety climate and error reporting and disclosure in rural clinical settings. 
This research identified differences between views of reporting compared to disclosure, 
severity of harm, workplace setting and work role. These reflect results from other 
studies and suggest similarities between the views of nurses in rural clinical settings and 
nurses and other health professionals in other areas of health care. 
The second key finding relates to implications for resilience which is informed by the 
concept of Safety I and Safety II. This finding was determined through analysis utilising 
both variable and case-based results within a framework of different approaches to 
knowledge generation in a complex health system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). 
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Firstly, the inferential statistics indicated that nurses working in aged care settings were 
more likely to view error to be reported or disclosed. This suggests they are resilient with 
respect to reporting and disclosure and that further investigation is warranted into why 
this result has occurred. Secondly, the comparison of the case-based results suggests 
that the solution terms, solution paths and cases have greater membership in relation to 
the outcome a severe error would Always be reported and severe, moderate and near 
miss error would Not always be disclosed. That is, knowledge linking teamwork with 
what goes wrong (Safety I) are greater than what goes right (Safety II). 
This research used a framework for complexity in health care (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010). The successful application of this framework was possible through two means. 
Firstly, the use of a transparent process for the case-based analysis allowed for a 
comparison of multiple outcomes and secondly the use of both variable and case-based 
results made use of both evidence and sense-making. This allowed for interpretation of 
the results that makes theoretical sense.  
Both of these findings support the need to reframe the management of medication 
error.  This key finding suggests that the two approaches to safety (Safety I and Safety II) 
(Hollnagel, 2014) have a role in improving medication management allowing for safe 
patient care to be achieved. Rather than regarding safety climate as an intervention to 
improve error management, error management needs to be reframed as an action 
required for safe patient care. However, if we are understand how this is to be achieved, 
a greater knowledge of how safety climate influences the actions that lead to error 
being reported and disclosed is required rather than how they may hinder them. That is, 
Hollnagel’s argument of a Safety II approach needs to be adopted in both practice and 
research. 
These findings will now be discussed in more detail. Following this, the limitations of this 
research will be outlined. The chapter concludes with discussion of future directions for 
research.  
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 Complexity in rural clinical settings 
The first three sub-questions of this research have assisted in describing the complexity 
of safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings. Through examination of how 
safety climate is related to views of reporting and disclosure of medication error 
amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings it was found that there are similarities 
between results obtained from this research and those of previous studies. 
Differences were noted between views of reporting compared to disclosure as well as 
with regards to the severity of harm resulting from a given error (Section 5.4). Some 
safety climate factor scores were also more likely to be positive in relation to views of 
reporting and disclosure (Sections 5.9.1 and 0).   
Differences have been found in other studies between views of reporting and views of 
disclosure. This includes emergency department personnel (Hobgood, Bowen et al., 
2006; Hobgood, Weiner et al., 2006) and acute hospital settings including intensive care 
units (Latif et al., 2013). 
Other studies have also identified that error is more likely to be reported if harm is 
involved compared to when there is no harm (Kagan & Barnoy, 2008). A study in the US 
of hospital leaders found that the frequency of views an error would be reported or 
acknowledged decreased as harm decreased (Weissman et al., 2005). This same study 
also found lower frequency for disclosure compared to views an error would be 
reported. 
Workplace settings and work role were further areas of differentiation (Sections 5.7.1 
and 5.7.2). In particular, aged care nurses were more likely to view that an error was 
reported or disclosed and those working in a management role more likely to view error 
was disclosed compared to clinicians.  
It is difficult to determine a specific reason for this. Whilst it has been suggested that 
cognitive impairment of a resident/client may improve disclosure of error by nurses in 
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aged care settings it is not possible to make that assumption from the results obtained 
here (Wagner et al., 2013).  
The definition of the term disclosure for this research differs to that of open disclosure. It 
is difficult to determine if this is a factor in the current study as the survey question, 
whilst asking about likelihood of acknowledgement did not seek further details about 
how much information would be disclosed, nor did it refer to any form of apology. 
However, neither of these elements is possible without an initial acknowledgment. 
In addition, the different approaches to accreditation that are in place in Australia 
(Hinchliffe et al. 2012) may be a further explanation, although further research would be 
required to determine this. For example, it has already been highlighted in Chapter 2 
that accreditation of general practice, hospitals and aged care facilities is overseen by 
different agencies and they are also governed by different legislation (Hinchliffe et al. 
2012). This may be an area where further research identifies areas of difference.  
A recent publication (Greenfield et al., 2015) has highlighted that accreditation 
programmes in Australia reflect models of continued quality improvement and 
regulatory compliance with a hybrid mode encompassing each of these being adopted. It 
may be that differences exist between the accreditation agencies as to the extent to 
which the hybrid model reflects improvement and compliance. There may also be 
differences in relation to the oversight that the agencies have and the level at which 
facilities are assessed.  
It has previously been postulated that acute hospital staff are more likely to witness 
error so they have a lower view of safety in their workplace (Vlayen et al., 2011). 
However, in the present study there was only one factor from four where a difference 
was noted amongst workplace settings indicating if the postulated view is correct the 
only difference would be in relation to workplace safety culture. It is not possible to 
determine from this research why a difference was found with only one factor. Although 
the difference between the hospital and non-hospital environment has been identified it 
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has not been explained. Workplace settings, including different contexts, as well as 
experience and education are all areas worthy of consideration for future research. 
Further differences were found in the frequency of views of disclosure of the error 
amongst nurses in different work roles, with nurses who indicated that they worked in a 
management role more likely to view the error would Always be acknowledged. 
However, there were no differences found based upon level of registration or between 
managers and clinicians in relation to the view the error would Always be reported 
formally in their workplace. This is in contrast to findings of other studies which have 
found senior nurses have indicated they reported error more frequently compared to 
the clinical (staff) nurses (Kim et al., 2007; Kagan & Barnoy, 2013). This reflects the 
complex nature of safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure.     
It has also been noted by others that there are gaps between what managers consider 
they would report in relation to their actions compared to what is actually happening in 
practice where it is found that actual reporting rates are lower (Westbrook et al., 2015). 
It is therefore possible that the actual reporting rates amongst settings in this current 
study are lower than those that nurses consider are occurring. This is an important point 
to note as one may be tempted to argue that views of what is occurring is lower than 
reality yet the abovementioned study suggests otherwise. 
Safety climate factors were also found to differ. Positive scores were more likely to be 
found in some workplace settings and amongst different work roles (Sections 5.3.2 and 
5.3.4). A further point of note here is that although, as noted in Chapter 2, safety climate 
may influence safety culture (as well as the reverse) (Morello et al. 2013) this present 
research examined safety climate only. Therefore results make reference to safety 
climate only. 
To extend the results of this research beyond this is therefore not possible. Not only 
because of the nature of the data obtained through use of the SAQ, but because of the 
difficulty in determining what culture is.  
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As highlighted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.15) there is no consensus regarding a definition 
nor is there agreement as to whether the terms safety climate and safety culture are 
related (Halligan et al., 2011). Therefore, whilst in this research safety climate has been 
situated within the broader concept of safety culture (Section 2.15) there are many who 
may disagree with this approach. 
In relation to this the use of the term workplace safety culture as a term for one of the 
factors, this should be seen in terms of the items of the SAQ which form that factor. That 
is, the term relates only to items 15, 16, 17 and 19 as viewed by the individual 
participants rather than an assessment of workplace safety culture overall. Further 
consideration of this issue will be given in Section 6.3.4 of this chapter. 
This research identified that with respect to workplace setting a positive factor score for 
workplace safety culture was more likely to occur amongst nurses working in community 
and aged care settings compared with nurses in rural hospital/multipurpose settings. 
This reflects results of other studies where safety climate was found to be higher in roles 
outside of acute care settings (Braithwaite et al., 2009; Deilkas & Hofoss, 2008; El-Jardali, 
Jaafar, Dimassi, Jamal, & Hamdan, 2010; Verbakel et al., 2014; Vlayen et al., 2011).  
Those working in management roles were also more likely to have a positive factor score 
for teamwork and safety at bedside, workplace safety culture and leadership and error 
management. These results reflect other studies where those in management roles 
were found to have higher safety climate scores (Braithwaite et al., 2009; Singer et al., 
2003; Vlayen et al., 2011).  
Results from the principal components analysis also found subtle differences between 
this research and a previous study (Hutchinson et al., 2006) (Section 5.6). The internal 
consistency of a factor structure established by a previous study in the UK was not 
achieved (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Subsequent exploratory principal components 
analysis found some differences in the number and make-up of factors based on the 
data obtained in this study compared to the results of the UK study. It is possible that 
differences in context or work role may explain this result. 
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This point regarding different context and work role may be expanded through 
consideration that the present research involved only nurses whereas the UK study 
included responses from both medical and nursing staff in the analysis (Hutchinson et 
al., 2006). This suggests work role may have an impact upon teamwork and safety 
climate. 
The results of  the present research also included responses from staff working away 
from direct patient care whereas the UK study did not include these as to do so would 
impact upon reliability. This is a further example of how work role may have an impact.  
In addition, it may be that Australian nurses in management roles, particularly those 
working in small worksites are closer to direct patient care than their UK counterparts. In 
this respect not only work role but the context of small rural hospitals  may have an 
impact upon safety climate. This is another area for potential further research that will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
Facility size and regional areas were further areas of difference (Sections 5.8.4 and 
5.8.2).  Although there is another examples of different safety climate found based upon 
facility size (El-Jardali et al., 2010), the results relating regional location of the workplace 
may have been influenced by a higher number of responses from nurses in aged care 
settings. Although not conclusive, these areas are worthy of consideration for in future 
research. 
Other studies have found differences in views of reporting and/or disclosure based upon 
experience. The low number of responses for this research restricted analysis in this area 
therefore a clear finding is not possible.  
Despite other studies finding differences in safety climate based upon nursing 
experience (Chiang et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2007) the low response rate affected the 
ability to conduct this analysis for the present study. Nor was any difference noted 
based upon level of registration. 
  
261 
Feedback has been highlighted as a facilitating factor (Hartnell et al., 2012). If results 
with regard to performance feedback obtained in the current study (Section 5.5) reflect 
similar practices in feedback from error reporting then this is an area for potential 
concern and may indicate another area of future research.  
Approximately one in five of the nurses who responded to this study indicated they 
disagreed with the statement they received appropriate feedback regarding their 
performance. This suggests the facilitating factor of feedback that was identified by 
Harntell et al. (2012) may be lacking amongst the respondents to this study. Whether or 
not this is limited to the responses of this study or goes further afield warrants further 
investigation. Research as to whether or not this element is also impacting upon error 
reporting and disclosure is also worth considering.Lack of training has also been 
identified as a barrier to error disclosure along with fear, blame and punitive culture 
(Harrison et al., 2014). Although not a consideration in the current study, others have 
noted differences in relation to training and education. Academic nurses have been 
found to have higher rates of error but lower reporting rates (Kagan & Barnoy, 2008) 
and education has also been linked to improving medication error reporting along with 
improving communication and ensuring reporting is not burdensome (Hartnell et al., 
2012). The importance of training as preparation for involvement in open disclosure has 
also been recognised elsewhere (Iedema et al., 2008).  
Other problems identified, such as nurses not being involved in the disclosure process 
(Harrison et al., 2014) may assist in explaining some of the differences in the results of 
the current study. Aged care nurses may be more involved in the process of disclosure 
and may have more education in relation to it. A study in aged care setting supports this, 
with RN’s with more education and having had prior experience of error disclosure being 
more likely to provide more information about an error to nursing home residents 
(Wagner et al., 2013). This is a possible area for future research that will be discussed 
further later in this chapter. 
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Results considered to this point have therefore reflected the complexity of views of 
reporting and disclosure as well as safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical 
settings. They relate to the first two research sub-questions which are:  
1. What level of reporting and disclosure of different severity of a hypothetical 
medication error do nurses in rural clinical settings think is occurring? 
2. What is the nature of workplace safety climate amongst nurses in these settings?   
Implications arise in relation to what has been discussed so far. These will now be 
addressed prior to further consideration of the complexity of rural clinical settings. 
 Implications  
Several implications should be noted with regards to the first finding relating to the 
complexity of rural clinical settings. These include further discussion regarding the non-
disclosure of the near miss error and  positive deviance  
For both reporting and disclosure of the near miss outcome the frequency of 
respondents in this research was lower than the moderate and severe outcomes, each 
of which involved harm. Two issues arise from this. Firstly, the perceived impact of the 
law upon reporting and disclosure and secondly the importance of near miss error and 
safe medication management. 
One of the reasons given for non-reporting and/or non-disclosure of error is a fear of 
reprimand or fear of litigation (Haw et al., 2014; Studdert & Richardson, 2010). It is 
therefore difficult to explain why the scenario where there is no harm is so low in 
frequency of respondents indicating it would Always be reported or disclosed. Whilst 
mandatory reporting may explain why severe error is viewed as Always reported 
litigation for negligence involves a process which includes the involvement of harm 
(Atkins et al., 2014). It is therefore arguable that a near miss error with no harm involved 
has extremely low risk of litigation.  
  
263 
This suggests there may be other factors involved in addition to fear of litigation. One 
study in the chemical industry found that workers exposed to near miss error did not 
consider it to be an error as they had intervened and there was no resulting harm 
(Kanse, 2004). Similar results have been found in a recent study of nurses and error 
where near miss error on the whole went unreported (Hewitt & Chreim, 2015).  
Studies acknowledging the under-reporting of error, including near miss error are well 
documented. Work burden, lack of knowledge and excusing the error were identified in 
one study (Haw et al., 2014) and blaming the individual rather than adopting a systems 
approach have been acknowledged elsewhere (Bayazidi et al., 2012). Many of these 
elements were noted in the To Err is Human report (Kohn et al., 2000). However, it is of 
concern that despite this report studies some ten to fifteen years later are still 
determining why error is not reported. It is arguable that there is a need for greater 
focus upon why such errors are reported and disclosed (Safety II) rather than continue 
to investigate why they are not (Safety I). This is an area of potential future research that 
will be explored further in Section 6.6 of this chapter.  
Identification that aged care nurses are more likely to both report and disclose error is 
important (Sections 0 and 0). It is important that the consumer or patient is involved in 
medication management (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2013b) and there is a suggestion from this research that such involvement may be 
limited in hospital and community settings.  
In addition, having obtained data from a range of rural workplace settings, including the 
aged care and community contexts supports the view that context should be considered 
in disclosure research (Birks et al., 2014). If, like many other studies, data had only been 
obtained from secondary care settings then this finding would not have been made. 
As indicated in the literature review, there are arguments that a greater focus needs to 
be placed upon what is required for things to go right in the delivery of health care 
(Hollnagel, 2014) (Section 2.6). This includes focusing upon those areas which exhibit a 
positive deviance and are therefore likely to be resilient (Lawton et al., 2014).  
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The views of aged care nurses suggest that there may be something to be learned 
through further research regarding their views of reporting and disclosure. It is this 
possible positive deviance that led to the condition of residential aged care (or not) 
being added for fsQCA analysis. Similarly, the difference between nurses working in 
management roles compared to those working in a clinical role resulted in adding the 
further condition of management (or not management). Further discussion in relation to 
this will be undertaken at a later stage when considering the case-based results from 
this research (Section 6.2.1).  
The variable-based results of this research found differences relating to workplace 
setting and work role as well as between different levels of harm and reporting and 
disclosure of the same level of harm. However these findings do not explain how any of 
these differences arise.  
Findings from this present research and that of others indicates the differences in safety 
climate and teamwork are not consistent from one setting to the next, one role to the 
next or one context to the next. That is, although differences have been identified, there 
is no single variable that influences either views of reporting and disclosure or safety 
climate in a consistent fashion.  
In other words, the simple/complicated approach to research has not provided 
understanding of how the factors of teamwork and safety climate are different based 
upon workplace setting or work role. Nor can such an approach explain the difference in 
findings from this research compared to other studies. Differences have been identified 
but cannot be explained. 
 Complexity between workplace safety climate and views in 
rural clinical settings 
Having established the level of error that nurses think is being reported as well as the 
nature of safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings, it is now possible to 
consider the third research sub-question: what is the relationship between workplace 
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safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings and their views of 
reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error?  This was achieved through both 
a variable-based analysis making use of inferential statistics and case-based analysis 
using fsQCA.  
The variable results suggest a relationship exists between some factors of teamwork and 
safety climate and views of error reporting and disclosure. Respondents with positive 
scores for teamwork and safety at bedside and leadership and error management were 
more likely to view the severe error scenario to be reported and all error scenarios to be 
acknowledged to the patient and/or their family. In addition, the moderate outcome 
scenario was more likely to be disclosed if the factor for workplace safety culture was 
positive. These results reinforce findings from other studies where a no-blame, non-
punitive approach is considered to improve the rate of error reporting and disclosure 
(Duffy, 2012; Kim et al., 2007; Kronman et al., 2012).  
Although a link between safety climate and the occurrence of medication error has been 
suggested (Colla et al., 2005), a recent review and pilot meta-analysis found no 
relationship between these two variables (Groves, 2014). Whether the same result 
would be obtained in a meta-analysis of research relating to views of reporting rather 
than actual error occurring result is unclear. This suggests that further research may be 
needed. 
An example of how large N studies may obscure significant results at the more micro 
level was provided in the literature review (Townsend, 2013). Systematic reviews rely on 
meta-analysis (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992) through combining 
samples. Therefore, such an analysis may also obscure details relating to differences 
based upon context. Although a systematic review has suggested no established 
relationship between safety climate and medication error it is also plausible that there 
may be a genuine relationship existing within the context of this research.   
The variable-based results have therefore identified the possibility a relationship may 
exist between some factors of safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure. As 
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with previous results, this relationship has been identified but the differences cannot be 
explained. 
Consideration of the case-based results provides further support that this relationship 
may exist. These results will now be discussed. 
 Case-based results 
An extensive case-based analysis was undertaken for this research using fsQCA, a 
configurational comparative method. Rather than adopting a simple/complicated 
approach to research, this method of analysis allowed for the recognition of complexity 
(Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). 
The initial case-based analysis, which included only teamwork and safety climate factors 
as conditions, establishes a possible relationship may exist with regards to views of 
reporting and disclosure of error. Due to a large number of contradictory cases the 
sufficiency cut-off for each varied. Thus, only the outcome related to reporting of severe 
error was fully reported in this research and the remaining analyses can be found in 
Appendix 1.  These analyses suggested there may be a relationship between safety 
climate and views of reporting and disclosure. However, with the different sufficiency 
cut-off values a comparison of multiple outcomes would have been difficult so the 
option of adding further conditions was explored.. 
This further case-based analysis was therefore undertaken through adding conditions for 
workplace setting and work role. This resulted in configurational rows with a consistency 
of 1.00 and so analysis of multiple outcomes possible. This analysis allowed for 
comparison of the results and the configurational rows between the different outcome 
sets.  
This comparison identified differences in the presence of configurations. These occurred 
in areas similar to those identified through the variable-based analysis, including 
between views of reporting and disclosure, severity of harm, workplace setting and work 
role. 
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These patterns amongst the configurations suggest a possible relationship between 
safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure. Underpinning this is a large degree 
of complexity. 
Assumptions regarding the presence of positive safety climate (Duffy, 2012; Kim et al., 
2007; Kronman et al., 2012) are also challenged in this analysis including additional 
conditions. The configuration where all factors are positive was only present in aged 
care settings, although not for all outcomes.  
There were also other configurations that were present where a factor score (or scores) 
was not positive. This suggests the relationship between factors and outcomes is not a 
single solution and this challenges existing assumptions around the need for positive 
safety climate to improve error reporting and disclosure (Duffy, 2012; Kim et al., 2007; 
Kronman et al., 2012; Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012; Hutchinson et al. 2009).  
The configuration where all factors were not positive was present amongst nurses 
working in clinical roles in aged care settings who held the view that near miss error 
would Not always be reported and moderate and near miss error Not always disclosed.  
This also challenges the view that if a safety climate and teamwork factor is not positive 
then it is unlikely that an error would be e likely to be reported or disclosed. 
With no other known studies using a configurational comparative method in this subject 
area it is not possible to make a direct comparison. There are, however, similarities 
between these results and those of other studies where CCM has found more than one 
solution for an outcome. 
As noted in the literature review, a study of transformational leadership found that 
leaders with this trait were able to implement organisational change (Whittington & 
Goodwin, 2013). However, this study also found combinations of other elements that, if 
present, could result in the same outcome.  
Another study looking at smoking cessation found that education was not the sole factor 
for success in low socio-economic communities but that access to housing and 
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employment opportunities were also required (Blackman, 2008). In each of these 
studies the use of CCM allowed for the identification of causal complexity that 
challenged existing assumptions. These results mirror those of this research where 
additional explanations for an outcome may have been identified. 
This research therefore addresses the third research sub-question through the use of 
variable and case-based results. The former has identified that some positive factor 
scores lead to a greater likelihood that some error outcomes are more likely to be 
viewed as reported or disclosed. This reflects the findings of other research.  
However, the case-based results have also added to these. With some configurations 
present for the outcome in some settings and roles also found to be present for the 
negated (non-outcome) for near miss disclosure suggests the relationship between 
factors of safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure is complex.  
This complexity is further indicated when considering the results comparing solution 
coverage of the solution terms for each outcome. Those with the greatest number of 
cases and solution coverage (that is the greatest membership in the outcome set) were 
in relation to views that severe error would Always be reported and all levels of harm 
would Not always be disclosed. This suggests more may be known about what elements 
of safety climate hinder error reporting and disclosure than what promotes it. The 
exception is reporting of severe error. However, this may reflect the focus of public 
enquiries such as those noted in Chapter 2. This is explored further in Section 6.4 
The presence of configurations for the outcomes is not a finding in itself (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Nor has it been ascertained that the configurations are causal. All 
that has been established to this point is that there is complexity regarding them. 
However, in contrast to the variable results which have identified differences, the case-
based results provide an opportunity to explain these differences and to inform future 
research. In particular, there are implications regarding the concept of resilience and the 
need focus more upon Safety II (what supports error reporting and disclosure) rather 
continue to focus primarily upon Safety I (identifying what hinders it). In order to make 
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further sense of the results it is necessary to return to the theory that informed this 
research. 
 Implications for resilience and error management 
The final phase of analysis occurs in the after the analytical moment phase where results 
are considered with regards to case and theoretical knowledge and this still needs to 
occur (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). This final phase produced a 
second key finding of this research regarding an emerging resilience in relation to safety 
climate.  
Consideration of different approaches to theory development and error management 
informed this finding which was possible through a retroductive analysis of both the 
variable and case-based results. Details of this finding will now be discussed further. 
 Different approaches to developing theory 
The use of CCM for this research served two main purposes which were outlined in 
Chapter 3. Firstly, as the research aim was to describe the complexity of safety climate of 
nurses working in rural clinical settings the purpose of CCM was to summarise the data 
in manner that would describe the complexity of safety climate. The second purpose of 
using CCM was for theory development.  
Both deductive and inductive approaches to theory development were discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.4). It was noted that retroductive theory development occurs with 
CCM analysis (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). 
In addition, the need to focus on effectality was explained (Section 3.6.1) (Byrne, 2011). 
That is, it is important to focus on the outcome and what is required for it to occur 
rather than causality.  To this point discussion for this finding regarding resilience has 
drawn on both deductive and inductive approaches. This will now be further clarified.  
The aim of this research is based upon an underlying assumption of the existence of 
complexity. This was noted in the literature review (Section 2.19.1).  
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The variable-based results of this research, through finding that there is similar 
complexity amongst rural clinical nurses, whilst not strictly testing a hypothesis, 
supports this underlying assumption of complexity. In this sense, the finding is a 
deductive one. 
The previous section of this chapter also outlined differences found in the configurations 
present for each outcome of interest. This provides a description of the complexity of 
the relationship between factors of teamwork and safety climate and views of reporting 
and disclosure of error. 
These results could be interpreted as conjunctural causality (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). That is, numerous configurations were found for each outcome and 
therefore it could be interpreted that each configuration is causal for the particular 
outcome of interest. However, if such causality exists then there must be other elements 
contributing to that causality.  
The configurational rows present for views of reporting and disclosure, different severity 
of harm, workplace setting or work role were different. This also supports the notion of 
complexity.  
To suggest the configurations are causal is using the results of this research to inform 
theory. That is, the process is more an example of inductive interpretation.  
Such an interpretation is somewhat limited. To do so considers the case-based results in 
isolation from the variable-based results with no reference to theoretical knowledge. 
This is in contradiction of the aims and recommendations for good practice when using 
CCM (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Through approaching the interpretation of results 
through reference to theory, an alternative explanation is proposed that makes 
theoretical sense. 
The relevant theory that is drawn upon is related to the different approaches to error 
management which will now be discussed. Consideration of the variable-based results is 
also required as part of this process. 
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 The complexity of error management  
Different approaches to error management were outlined in Chapter 2 (Hollnagel, 2014). 
In particular the difference between Safety I and Safety II was outlined. The first of these 
focuses on what has gone wrong to cause an error whereas the latter focuses on 
understanding what is required for things to be done safely. This leads to the need to 
understand how some organisations achieve this consistently and become resilient 
(Hollnagel, 2014).  
Each of these will now be explored with regard to the error scenario used for this 
research. From doing so it is possible to interpret both the variable-based and case-
based research with respect to current theoretical knowledge. 
The error scenario used for this research involved the prescribing of an antibiotic for an 
infection where there was a known documented allergy (Weissman et al., 2005). From a 
Safety I perspective the error would be described as a prescribing error (Australian 
Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b). This interpretation places the 
focus upon what has caused the error.  
If such an error causes harm it is an adverse event (Australian Commission for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2013a). In such cases the error should be both reported and 
disclosed. Results from this study and others suggest that if the error is severe it is much 
more likely to be both reported and disclosed (Basey et al., 2013; Sheu et al., 2009; 
Weissman et al., 2005). Therefore the focus is upon harm.  
By contrast, the outcome of the near miss scenario used in this research resulted in no 
harm to the consumer/patient. However, such events should still be reported so as to 
assist prevention of further errors of the same nature. Based upon the results of this 
study and others it is reasonable to assume that such errors are much less likely to be 
either reported or disclosed (Basey et al., 2013; Sheu et al., 2009; Weissman et al., 
2005). Yet, near miss errors occur more often than adverse events (Westbrook et al., 
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2015). A learning opportunity is missed through not examining these events, particularly 
as there may be clues to the prevention of further harm. 
The non-disclosure of the near miss scenario has ramifications for safe medication 
management. The ACSQHC also has guidelines for best possible medication assessment 
including the appropriate documentation of allergies which is also required by Standard 
4 of hospital accreditation (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2011a). In the literature review it was noted that patient involvement is an area 
highlighted for improvement (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2013b). The patient or consumer is regarded as the last point at which an error 
may be prevented (Elliott & Liu, 2010).  
If a patient or consumer is administered a medication that they are supposed to be 
allergic to and after two days has no reaction then the question should be asked as to 
the accuracy of the history and documentation of the allergy. It is therefore possible to 
argue that rather than simply alter the medication prescribed (as in the scenario) there 
should be a conversation with the consumer regarding this matter. Although open 
disclosure is not necessary as there is no harm, the acknowledgment of the error needs 
to occur to ensure safe medication management is achieved. To not undertake this 
process arguably puts the consumer at future risk.  
The Safety I approach is therefore a necessary element of error management. Indeed, it 
could be argued that a Safety II approach to Safety I is required. That is, what should 
happen when an error occurs is that it should be reported and disclosed. Not because it 
needs to be measured, but because to do so reflects the aim of achieving safe patient 
care. This will be examined further in Section 6.4. 
The Safety II approach argues for a greater focus on understanding what is required for 
things to be done safely which then leads to the need to understand how some 
organisations achieve this consistently and become resilient (Hollnagel, 2014). In this 
respect, consideration would be given to ensuring the error is acknowledged to the 
patient so they may be involved in the management of their medications.  
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Therefore, there is a need for a greater focus upon what is needed to support the 
reporting and disclosure of error. Further consideration of the results will now be 
undertaken in respect of this. 
 Results interpretation 
Each of the theories noted above may now be drawn upon to in order to inform the 
findings of this research, in particular the finding relating to the implications for 
resilience. Both the variable and case-based results need to be examined. In doing so, it 
is possible to address the main aim of this research and describe the complexity of safety 
climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings through interpretation of the results. 
The variable-based results identified the complexity that exists between safety climate 
and views of error reporting and disclosure. In particular, aged care nurses were more 
likely to view error to be reported or disclosed and those working in management roles 
more likely to view it disclosed. However, it was also noted that nurses in non-
management roles in aged care were more likely to view error reported or disclosed.  
The situation whereby safe outcomes are consistently achieved by some people or 
organisations is referred to as positive deviance and it is argued that a greater focus on 
those who achieve this is required (Lawton et al., 2014). This was outlined in Chapter 2. 
It has been noted that aged care nurses and those in a management role may represent 
positive deviants (Section 3.3). The likelihood an error would be viewed as reported or 
disclosed differed between reporting and disclosure as well as decreased in conjunction 
with decreased severity of harm (Section 5.7).  
The case-based results found differences in configurations present in relation to each of 
these matters. While it is possible there may be an element of conjunctural causality 
(that is, the configurational rows are causal for the relative outcome) (Ragin, 1987; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) there is also equifinality (more than one solution 
pathway present for any outcome) as well as other patterns present when making 
comparison across the multiple outcomes. If reference is made to solution coverage 
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values, there is a pattern suggesting a stronger relationship may exist between 
teamwork and safety climate factors and certain outcomes As well as the presence of 
some configurations for more than one outcome there were some configurational rows 
found to be present for both the outcome the error would Always be reported or 
disclosed as well as for the negated (non-outcome) for reporting and/or disclosure of 
the same outcome in a different setting and/or role. This demonstrates further 
complexity and also highlights the importance of the analysis of the occurrence of the 
non-outcome set. It also highlights that if there is conjunctural causality or equifinality it 
is not consistent across all workplace settings or work roles. 
Through examination of the variable and case-based results and consideration of the 
theoretical knowledge it is possible to postulate that the different configurations are an 
indication of the presence, or absence, of resilience (Hollnagel, 2014). For example, of 
the 85 cases included in the case-based analysis there was just one that was consistent 
for the solution terms of all outcomes where error was viewed as Always reported and 
disclosed. It is cases such as this that offer opportunity to discover what is needed in to 
support the reporting and disclosure of error. In doing so a Safety II approach is being 
undertaken. Cases such as this therefore offer an opportunity to identify resilience and 
therefore inform improvement research.  
Of note is that this particular case exhibited the conditions tf1*~tf2*~scf1*scf2 and 
worked in a management role in a non-aged care setting. Whilst this response indicated 
a teamwork and safety climate factor that were not positive suggesting that not all 
factors need to be positive for a view that an error is Always reported or disclosed it 
could also be argued that the respondent’s role as a manager may have also influenced 
the result in some way. However, until such cases are identified and examined further 
such statements are merely postulation. Either way, this case is unique amongst those 
considered in this research and if data were re-identifiable would offer an opportunity 
not possible through other methods. That is, case-based fsQCA has allowed for the 
identification of an unusual case that could assist understanding about how elements of 
teamwork and safety climate may promote the reporting and disclosure of error. 
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Conversely, several cases were consistent for solution terms relating to only the negated 
(non-outcome) set and yet other cases were consistent outcomes in a combination 
across both. These differences may suggest a phase shift is occurring in relation to safety 
climate and views of reporting and disclosure. However, whether this is in reference to 
individuals or particular roles, settings or worksite cannot be identified from this present 
research and therefore warrants further investigation through future studies. 
Both variable and case-based results have informed this finding in a deductive manner 
through confirming the assumption made by this research regarding safety climate 
exhibiting complexity. However, these same results have informed theory development 
through the identification of equifinality through the presence of multiple configurations 
of conditions for the different outcomes.  
Each approach to analysis therefore informed the third research sub-question: what is 
the relationship between workplace safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical 
settings and their views of reporting/disclosure of a hypothetical medication error? In 
order to improve rates of reporting and disclosure of error the elements that support 
this need to be identified. Teamwork and safety climate may be a means to achieve this. 
Through showing it is possible through a case-based approach to identify cases that may 
improve the capacity to do this, this research has the potential to inform further 
research regarding the relationship between safety climate and views of reporting and 
disclosing error.  
Accepting health care as a complex system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010) and use of a 
method acknowledging that complexity has contributed to the development of a new 
framework for understanding medication management. . This will now be discussed in 
more detail prior to the presentation of a proposed framework for medication 
management.  
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 Evidence and sense-making through CCM 
The concept of health care as a complex system was introduced in Chapter 3. Also 
introduced was the contrast between EBM (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 
1992) and complexity science (Lewin, 1999). Research was described as focused upon 
evidence or sense-making as means of knowledge generation (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010). The former tends to pursue knowledge as truth whereas the latter regards 
knowledge as developing understanding (Bennett et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Approaches to knowledge generation from this research (based on Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010, p. 418) 
 
The use of CCM within a framework of knowledge generation within a complex health 
care system has added to understanding of the relationship between safety climate and 
views of reporting and disclosure of error. This has occurred through making reference 
to a Safety II approach for safe patient care. How this research has applied this 
framework is outlined in Figure 6-1. 
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Case-based results obtained for this research have therefore provided a capacity for 
describing the safety climate in rural clinical settings. The relationship between safety 
climate and views of reporting and disclosure has been explored and the aim of this 
research to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical 
settings has been achieved. 
There are two ways that use of CCM within a framework of knowledge generation within 
the complex health care system has assisted the understanding of complexity through 
research. These are, the use of both evidence and sense-making (Martin & Félix-
Bortolotti, 2010) to inform knowledge of resilience and the use of a transparent 
approach to compare configurations present for all outcome analysed (multiple 
outcomes analysis). This finding informs the fourth research sub-question of: how is the 
understanding of the relationship between workplace safety climate and views of 
reporting medication error changed through the use of a configurational comparative 
method? 
The simple/complicated approach to research through pursuit of evidence used a 
questionnaire to identify difference. However, as noted earlier, this approach also 
allowed for the identification of teamwork and safety climate factors that were the 
conditions for the fsQCA and the areas where a positive deviance may exist with regards 
to views of reporting. 
This reflects other research on safety climate and error which has primarily focused 
upon measurement of safety climate and views or actual reporting and disclosure 
(Etchegaray et al., 2011; Groves, 2014). Qualitative studies have also been undertaken in 
this area (Sheu et al., 2009) although these studies focus on the identification of 
similarities. There is little explanation in either of these approaches as to how any 
relationship between factors of safety climate impacts upon the individual clinician.  
Hence, knowledge of the impact factors of safety climate may have upon how nurses 
work and where and how consumers receive and participate in care is not well 
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understood. That is, the understanding of the edge of chaos where medication 
management occurs is limited.  
The complex/chaotic approach to knowledge generation (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 
2010) was possible using fsQCA through transparently comparing the configurations 
found for reporting and disclosure of different levels of harm. Patterns emerging from 
this comparison have informed knowledge of resilience through retrospective coherence 
(Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010) of the configurational rows in the solution paths. .  
A consistent approach to analysis assisted in this process. This was achieved through the 
capacity to compare cases and configurational rows fully consistent with each of the 
respective outcomes. . 
As indicated in Chapter 3, complexity science does not dismiss the notion of evidence or 
cause-and-effect approaches to research (De Simone, 2006). It merely suggests that such 
approaches are not the only means of achieving knowledge. There is room for both 
within the framework presented in Figure 6-1.  
This research has therefore used sense-making to assist understanding how safe 
medication management can occur through demonstrating the complexity in the 
relationship between safety climate and reporting and disclosure of error. This includes 
the potential of conjectural causality and equifinality amongst the solution terms 
obtained through fsQCA. In addition, the observation of some configurational roles 
consistent for an outcome and non-outcome in different settings and roles further 
supports that this relationship is asymmetrical and complex.  
However, the discussion undertaken in Section 6.2.1 should also be recalled here noting 
that the results of this research relate to safety climate, and do not necessarily reflect 
culture. In addition, the configurational rows presented in the matrix tables, along with 
the solution terms resulting from the analysis with fsQCA that included worksite and 
workplace role, only relate to those with full consistency of the cases (Section 5.15). 
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There are therefore numerous examples of the outcome that are not explained by these 
fully consistent configurational rows.  
Hence, what has occurred in this research is the identification of unusual cases (those 
fully consistent with the outcome) that could lead to improved understanding (through 
sense making) rather than the identification of causal elements of safety climate or 
culture. The use of CCM has provided the means of achieving this. Through future 
research current understanding of safety climate and views of reporting may be 
improved. This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.6. 
Through the use of both the variable and case-based results, a framework is proposed 
that aims to enhance the understanding of the relationship between safety climate and 
views of reporting and disclosure of error.. This is discussed further in the following 
section. 
 Reframing error management understanding of complexity 
Through applying a configurational comparative method that acknowledges complexity, 
this research has identified that resilience to safety climate may assist in the delivery of 
safe patient care. Both case and variable results allowed for understanding how factors 
of safety climate may influence nurses’ views of reporting and disclosure.  However, 
there are other issues that are raised by this research.  
These relates not only to how nurses view error reporting and disclosure and the 
subsequent issues relating to error management but also to the delivery of safe patient 
care with respect to the management of medication management. That is, there is a 
sense- making of the edge of chaos where medication management occurs that has 
been achieved.   
The previous section identified the need to focus more on Safety II approaches and 
suggested that safety climate and error management are both part of the delivery of 
safe patient care as an outcome, rather than focusing on safety climate as a means of 
intervention for error reporting and disclosure. This reframed focus is outlined in Figure 
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6-2. This appropriate management includes greater likelihood that any error would be 
disclosed and the acknowledgment of the near miss error to the patient suggests 
consumer involvement is more likely. 
With such an approach, nurses are using error reporting and disclosure to ensure patient 
safety as an outcome, regardless of the safety climate they perceive. Because their 
approach is consistent despite the safety climate present the emergence of 
configurations for the outcome occurs (Dekker, 2011). Therefore, rather than needing 
positive safety climate factors for improved patient care a greater focus on safe patient 
care as an outcome may lead to the development of resilience. 
This is not to suggest that efforts to improve either safety climate or error reporting 
should be discontinued.  The purpose of this argument is to suggest there are other 
ways in which safe patient care may be achieved.   
Langton’s theory of how emergence affects local activity is relevant to this argument 
(Lewin, 1999). He postulated that the emergent elements influence the local activity 
which then feeds back to create further emergence.  
 
  
Figure 6-2: Medication management at the edge of chaos  
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(Based on Langton’s view of emergence in Lewin, 1999, p. 13) 
The framework proposed here (Figure 6-2) implies that both Safety I and Safety II 
(Hollnagel, 2014) approaches may influence safe patient care. That is, the reporting and 
disclosure of error leads to improved understanding of error prevention that then feeds 
back to develop further emergence, in this case the emergence of resilience. Likewise, a 
focus on safe patient care as an outcome ensures the patient is involved in medication 
management and this feeds back to create more emergence of resilience. 
 
The concept of Safety I focusing on measuring the absence of safety rather than its 
presence has already been identified (Hollnagel, 2014). So too was the importance of 
dealing with error appropriately, as there may be a valid understanding gained through 
examination of what may have caused the error to occur or in the event of a near miss 
what may have prevented harm (Bayazidi et al., 2012; Westbrook et al., 2015). In 
particular the consumer or patient should be informed through the process of open 
disclosure (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a).  
Consumers should also be involved in the management of their medications. Improved 
involvement of consumers is regarded as a means for ensuring safe medication 
management (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013b). If 
consumers are involved properly in health care it is possible for patient care to be an 
outcome within the health care system, rather than an intervention (Sturmberg, 
O'Halloran, & Martin, 2012). That is, safe patient care may be achieved. 
The literature review outlines many of the developments undertaken by the ACSQHC 
regarding medication management. The guidelines relating specifically to management 
of allergies indicate that allergies should be documented as part of an appropriate 
assessment (Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013a). These 
areas need to be implemented for a Safety II approach. 
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Findings from public enquiries add further support to this argument. It was noted in the 
literature review that such enquires generally found one of two circumstances relating 
to how error was dealt with. Either clinicians had reported error(s) and these had not 
been investigated or dealt with by the establishment concerned (Queensland Health, 
2005; Walshe & Offen, 2001), or clinicians failed to identify poor practice (Francis, 2013; 
Skinner et al., 2009). In each circumstance neither of the Safety I or Safety II approaches 
is evident.  
In the case of failure to recognise poor practice it would not be possible to know what 
should happen (Safety II), nor would any poor practice or outcome be reported or 
disclosed. Failure to investigate errors that have been reported is also an example of 
how a Safety II approach was not present. As a result the organisations and health 
systems that were the subject of these enquiries were clearly not resilient. 
Unfortunately, public enquiries tend to focus on what has caused severe error or why 
reporting of such error does not occur. In addition, research tends to focus on the same 
area. Therefore, it is possible we know more the elements of teamwork and safety 
climate that impact upon these areas. The Safety II approach may arguably alter this. 
This area informs the main research question of this research which is: how is safety 
climate related to views of reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses 
working in rural clinical settings? This research has shown the relationship to be complex 
and more than a simple cause-and-effect relationship that goes beyond the capabilities 
of Newtonian science. It also suggests that a different focus may further improve 
understanding in this area. 
Determining the rationale for the differences found in this research is another area of 
future research that will be discussed later in this chapter. First, the limitations of the 
research need to be outlined. 
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 Limitations of this research 
There are several limitations to this research. Some of these have already been referred 
to in previous chapters with limitations relating to the method noted in Chapter 4 and 
some relating to the sample representativeness mentioned in Chapter 5. 
This study also considered nurses’ views of reporting and used a hypothetical 
medication error. In addition, studies observing clinicians suggest that actual reporting 
rates are lower than what nurses and other health professionals state they would report 
(Bayazidi et al., 2012; Westbrook et al., 2015). If what nurses in this present study think 
is happening, particularly if their views that the likelihood of near miss error being 
reported or disclosed is lower in reality (Section 5.7) then this is an obvious area of 
concern.  
Social acceptability has been noted as a limitation in previous studies using 
questionnaires to assess safety climate (Etchegara et al., 2011; Halligan & Zecevic, 2011; 
Freeth et al., 2012). This must therefore be acknowledged as a possible limitation of this 
research. Social acceptability may be different in different settings and roles which may 
be an alternative explanation for the differences found in this present study. It is 
therefore a matter that is should be kept in mind when considering the results of this 
and other research. 
The nature of the research design restricted the fsQCA analysis to the data obtained 
from the questionnaire. This meant the capacity to revisit cases was limited and so not 
all contradictory cases could be resolved. However, these cases were identified and the 
possibility of other areas influencing the outcomes of interest is an area for further 
research. This research also only considered a sufficiency cut-off of 1.0 and a lower 
threshold may provide different results. This has been highlighted in Section 5.15 and 
earlier in this chapter in Section 6.3.4. 
Although the sample obtained represented approximately 6.7% of nurses working in the 
ASGC-RA 3—5 locations, the response to the survey was low (Section 5.3). As a result 
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some the data were not sufficient to perform some analyses (such as experience in 
nursing and experience in current role). The PCA was also affected in that a confirmatory 
analysis of the data obtained for this research could not be undertaken (Section 5.6). 
These are limitations that may therefore have impacted the results. 
In addition, the recruitment of participants was difficult. The student researcher’s prior 
employment may have impacted responses. Post-code data were missing from some 
questionnaires and the inclusion of these responses, while transparent, may have 
affected the results. In addition, the timing of the research coincided with state 
government budget cuts which may have also had an impact upon results.  
Issues in relation to representativeness of the sample have also been noted. There was a 
larger response from nurses in management roles from aged care settings and it is 
possible that enrolled nurses are under-represented. In some areas such as facility size 
and region it was not possible to determine the representativeness of the responses. 
Self-selection of participants is also an element that along with under-representative 
may also have been affected the results. 
Sample size was not problematic for the analysis with fsQCA. However, there was a 
variety in the number of cases in different configurational rows and this may have 
skewed set membership results. However, there were also instances of single cases and 
it is not possible to infer from this study that these configurational rows would always 
result in the same outcome. Hence it should be re-emphasised that the use of fsQCA 
here has been to describe the data. 
Two points may be made with respect to this. Firstly, this forms part of the description 
of the data, therefore assisting in meeting the aim of this research which is to describe 
the complexity of safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings. Secondly, this 
may indeed reflect the current status of safety climate and views of reporting and 
disclosure. If the goal is to improve each of these elements then over time it is possible 
this type of results will become more skewed. 
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Concerns regarding the accuracy of responses were also noted (Section 5.5). In 
particular, Item 7 may not have been read correctly and it is therefore possible that 
other items may not be accurate as well. This has implications for the overall reliability 
of the data collection tool which may have influenced results in relation to teamwork 
and safety climate. 
The limitations noted here also impact upon the generalisability of the results. The study 
was conducted amongst nurses in rural clinical settings in Tasmania. Although the 
findings reflect similar results from other studies any comparison made must be done 
with the limitations noted above kept in mind. 
These limitations also reflect the contrasts in this research. The difficulty in obtaining a 
representative sample, along with the varying number of cases and the contradictions in 
the case-based results, reflects the noisiness of social science data (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
It may well be argued that if the health care system is truly complex and constantly 
changing, generalisability of the results of any study is not possible as over time due to 
this constant change. If this same research were to be repeated, the system would be 
different as would the people working within it. After all, people change jobs and even if 
they remain with a single employer, they may change roles.  
Therefore, in order to determine if the findings of this research are generalizable, 
further research is required. This will now be considered further.  
 Future directions for research 
Numerous options for future research are possible from the findings of this research. 
This includes further investigation of the complexity of safety climate in rural clinical 
settings, the use of CCM for further research as well as research relating to the 
reframing of error to enable safe practice to be achieved. 
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The finding of complex safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical settings is an 
important one and the importance of the context of this research was identified earlier 
in this chapter (Section 6.1.1). Further research is required in relation to workplace 
setting, including the non-hospital sector. In addition, a focus on aged care settings to 
investigate the possible positive deviance of views of reporting and disclosure and how 
nurses working in these settings have become resilient is required.  
Facility size and geography are also areas warranting further investigation. This study 
had limited responses from those working in remote/very remote settings (ASGC-RA 4—
5) and there may be differences across these different areas of rurality.  
Other areas worthy of further research are the roles of education and experience, both 
in terms of work experience and prior exposure to error and disclosure. Although not an 
element of this research, it has been highlighted by others as an important issue, 
particularly in relation to error disclosure (Harrison et al., 2014; Iedema et al., 2008). 
Consideration of research regarding the impact of education to improve the focus upon 
safe patient outcomes should be a priority.  
Approaches to how research is undertaken also need to be addressed. Further research 
of health care as a complex system, particularly the use of evidence and sense-making 
for knowledge generation is required. The complexity of the practice arena should be 
matched with appropriate frameworks and methods.  
The use of CCM in a more deductive research design to test the findings of this research 
is also a possibility. The use of CCM for hypothesis testing is an area that is recognised as 
being underutilised (Rihoux et al., 2009). It has been noted that larger-N studies with 
CCM tend to be more deductive (Greckhamer et al., 2013) therefore this method 
combined with a larger study to test the factor structure identified from PCA, is worth 
considering.  
A further use of CCM is through the identification of cases that are unusual. Cases that 
are contradictory also offer an additional opportunity for research. The single case which 
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viewed all error scenarios would be reported and disclosed is an example. Likewise, the 
cases where all factor scores were positive but were contradictory to the outcome of 
interest offer an opportunity to explore why they were not resilient. Although this was 
not possible to revisit cases in this research due to the anonymous nature of the design 
research design, future research could easily be designed to achieve this. 
The overall focus of any research needs to be that of improving understanding of how 
safe patient care may be achieved. Both Safety I and Safety II approaches to error should 
involve the patient/consumer and both are necessary elements of safe practice. 
However, a greater focus upon Safety II is required if safe patient care is to be achieved. 
Along with this is an equally important need to focus on research that contributes to an 
understanding of the complexity of the health care system, in particular the edge of 
chaos where safe care is expected. 
Although this research, and therefore the findings, is limited to nurses in rural clinical 
settings, other areas of health care should be considered for future research. In addition, 
the findings of this research may also have relevance to the management of error and 
other safety issues in the health care sector or even other industries. 
 Summary of this research 
This research has applied a CCM research design within a framework of knowledge 
generation within a complex health system. This design also used the funnel of 
complexity (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009) to ensure the research aim was achieved.  
The first phase, before the analytical moment was applied through consideration of the 
context and the literature as outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. That is, the context 
and theoretical knowledge was outlined to develop the research aim, question and sub-
questions of this research. Included in this was a discussion of how knowledge is 
generated in a complex health care system (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). This same 
phase identified the conditions and outcomes for analysis using a configurational 
comparative method, namely qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).  
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For this research, fsQCA was used primarily with crisp set (csQCA) calibration applied to 
demographic data. The detail of the method was provided in Chapter 4. This analysis 
was undertaken in the second during the analytical moment phase of the funnel of 
complexity.  
Details of the results were provided in Chapter 5. Variable results identified differences, 
particularly in relation to workplace setting and work role. These results also suggested a 
relationship between some positive factor scores and views of reporting and disclosure. 
Case-based results identified numerous configurations were present for each of the 
outcomes of interest. The use of both variable and case-based results informed the 
findings of this research. Findings were also informed through the framework of 
knowledge generation within a complex health system. 
Three key findings were obtained from this research. Firstly, the relationship between 
safety climate and views of reporting and disclosure of error amongst nurses in rural 
clinical settings is complex. Although variable-based results were able to identify this 
complexity, it was the case-based results that allowed for it to be described further. In 
addition, the subsequent analysis provided an interpretation that made theoretical 
sense.  
This first finding provided a new understanding of the complexity of safety climate 
amongst nurses in rural clinical settings. It informed the aim of this research which was 
to describe the complexity of safety climate of nurses working in rural clinical settings. 
The research question determined to inform this aim was how is safety climate related 
to views of reporting and disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in rural 
clinical settings?  The nature of this relationship was identified to be complex.  
Secondly, adopting a framework of health care as a complex system allowed for both 
evidence and sense-making to support the finding of complexity. This suggests the need 
for a paradigm shift for research within health care away from the dominance of 
evidence-based medicine. This does not mean that the evidenced-based approach is 
irrelevant and therefore should be abandoned but that research methods must be ‘fit 
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for purpose’ and knowledge sourced from many areas. Through adopting new 
paradigms with new methods then complex issues such as that considered in this 
research may be better understood. 
This finding also informed the aim and main research question. Complexity science 
offers an alternative paradigm to the linear thinking of evidence-based medicine and 
Newtonian science. However, it does not dismiss such a world view. In fact, the 
adaptation of Martin’s framework (Figure 6-1) discussed in this chapter allows for a 
combination of both evidence and sense-making in order to inform knowledge (Martin 
& Félix-Bortolotti, 2010). That is, linear thinking alongside complexity has a role in 
assisting the understanding of how safety climate is related to views of reporting and 
disclosure of medication error amongst nurses working in rural clinical settings. 
Finally, it is necessary to rethink error management. Although there may be a complex 
relationship between safety climate and views of error reporting and disclosure, it is safe 
practice as an outcome that needs to be the focus.  
Traditional approaches have focused on what has gone wrong (Safety I) and through 
reconsidering the thesis results in relation to what has gone right or what should happen 
(Safety II) the outcome of interest becomes safe practice. Within a new view of error 
management safety climate, teamwork and other areas of influence form a complex 
web surrounding the two different approaches. When things go right we need to 
understand them. When things go wrong we also need to develop understanding. 
Central to this is the consumer who ideally should be involved in medication 
management at all times. In doing so, error reporting and disclosure move from 
outcomes of error management to becoming encompassed within the delivery of safe 
care.  
However, if we are to address the problems of the complex health care system there is a 
risk that “quality will wither (and costs blow out) if our paradigm of knowledge 
generation does not reflect reality” (Martin & Félix-Bortolotti, 2010, p. 419). Complexity 
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science reflects the reality of the complex world at the edge of chaos where nurses work 
and in which patients receive care.  
Fuzzy set QCA, a configurational comparative method that is designed to research 
complex causality, allows for sense-making of the edge of chaos where nurses in rural 
clinical settings work. This sense-making has potential to not only assist the 
understanding of the influence of safety climate upon nurses views of medication error 
reporting and disclosure but to also inform knowledge in relation to safe practice in 
medication management. 
As Battles argues (2006, p. i3) “rather than continually measuring the width and depth of 
the quality chasm, we need to design and build the bridge to span it”.  To achieve this we 
must “design in quality and design out identifiable risks and hazards” (Battles, 2006, p. 
i3).    
In other words, instead of constantly measuring culture and/or error (the absence of 
safety) we need to adopt new ways of thinking and new ways of researching in order to 
understand what is required for implementation of safe practice. We not only need to 
understand how and why error occurs but how and why safe practice occurs. 
Complexity science allows us to begin to understand the chasm of safety culture and 
safety climate and how it relates to nurses’ views of reporting and disclosure of 
medication error. Although this research has not spanned the chasm, it has achieved the 
aim of describing the complexity of safety climate amongst nurses in rural clinical 
settings. In doing so, it has contributed a solid footing upon which further research and 
an understanding of safe patient care may be built.  
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Appendix 5 Additional tables (Chapter 4) 
Table 7-1 ASGC-RA and Region Locations by Post-code 
 
 
SOUTH NORTH NW
postcode ASGC-RA  postcode ASGC-RA postcode ASGC-RA
7022 3 7209 3 7305 3
7023 3 7210 3 7306 3
7024 3 7211 3 7307 3
7025 3 7212 3 7310 3
7026 3 7213 3 7315 3
7027 3 7214 3 7316 3
7030 3 7215 3 7320 3
7109 3 7216 3 7321 3
7112 3 7252 3 7322 3
7113 3 7253 3 7325 3
7116 4 7254 3 7330 3
7117 3 7255 5 7331 3
7119 3 7256 5 7466 4
7120 3 7257 5 7467 4
7139 3 7259 3 7468 4
7140 3 7260 3 7469 4
7150 3 7261 3 7470 4
7154 3 7262 3
7155 3 7263 3
7162 3 7264 4
7163 3 7265 3
7171 3 7267 3
7172 3 7270 3
7174 3 7275 3
7175 3 7276 3
7176 3 7300 3
7177 3 7301 3
7178 3 7302 3
7179 3 7303 3
7180 3 7304 3
7182 3
7183 3
7184 3
7185 3
7186 3
7187 3
7190 3
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Table 7-2 Rationale for demographic data collection 
 
Question  Answer options Rationale 
Please indicate your 
level of registration 
RN, EN RN and EN scope of practice is 
different including specifically in 
relation to administering medications 
It is worth assessing if this has an 
impact upon safety climate or views 
of reporting 
Please indicate the 
main location of 
your work 
Community, hospital/multipurpose 
service, residential aged care, mental 
health service, disability services, 
other 
Previous study in NHS (Hutchinson et 
al., 2006) indicates a higher level of 
reliability in SAQ from hospital 
settings therefore collecting this data 
will allow for benchmarking 
Please indicate the 
main type of work 
you do 
Clinical, management other Previous study in NHS indicates 
greater reliability in SAQ amongst 
‘clinicians’ (Hutchinson et al., 2006). 
Study in USA regarding views of 
reporting and disclosure was only 
administered to senior management 
(Weissman et al., 2005) 
Collecting above data will allow for 
benchmarking each of these data sets 
Please indicate your 
experience in your 
current workplace 
As per SAQ Previous study (De Wet, Johnson, 
Mash, McConnachie, & Bowie, 2010) 
has indicated that more experienced 
staff have a higher view of safety 
climate therefore by collecting this 
data benchmarking can be 
undertaken 
Please indicate your 
experience in 
nursing 
As per SAQ As above.  
Do you work for 
Government or 
private sector 
employer 
Work for DHHS/Government, Work 
for non-government/private sector, 
Unsure 
Will allow analysis of data based upon 
sector of employment 
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How many beds 
does your hospital/ 
workplace have? 
<50, 50 – 99, 100+, unsure, 
other/Not applicable 
Will allow analysis of data based upon 
hospital/facility size. Criteria applied 
here has been used previously in 
studies re safety in US rural hospitals 
(Loux, Payne, & Knott, 2005)  
Please provide the 
postcode of your 
workplace 
It is a requirement of the study that 
a worksite is located in AGSC-RA 3-5 
location (by postcode). Collecting 
this data ensures the data being 
collected matches the inclusion 
criteria 
Postcode data will also allow 
worksites to be grouped into Regions 
(N, S, NW) and other geographical 
classification such as ARIA in order to 
conduct analysis. In some cases 
these classifications may be merged 
to ensure that worksites cannot be 
identified. 
Data regarding error (including 
medication error) is not currently 
collected at a national level regarding 
‘rurality’. There are plans to 
undertake this level of analysis 
(Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2008) therefore it is prudent 
to consider this aspect.   
Worksite name, gender data and age 
data will not be collected. Due to the 
small numbers of nurses in worksites 
there is a potential risk of participants 
being identified from this type of 
data. 
 
 
Table 7-3 Consideration of heterogeneity and homogeneity 
 
INCLUDED TO IMPROVE HOMOGENEITY INCLUDED TO IMPROVE HETEROGENEITY 
Rural Clinical settings Rural clinical settings allows 
for one geographical area of 
nursing practice 
Variety of clinical settings Whilst rural specific workplaces 
have been chosen they cover a 
wide variety of clinical areas 
including 
hospital/community/mental 
health/residential aged care thus 
intending a broad heterogeneity of 
workplace culture and nursing 
practice 
  “Rurality”  Workplaces will be grouped into 
groups indicating ASGC-RA 
(Australian Statistical Geographical 
Categories – Rural Area is a 
classification based upon 2006 
Census data compiled by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics  
Nurses  One professional group. 
Nurses administer medication 
and are likely to be in a 
position to assess the 
occurrence of an error.  
Role of nurse Past administration of SAQ 
suggests a greater reliability when 
administered to clinicians 
therefore differentiating 
‘management’ from ‘clinical’ roles 
is warranted. 
Error scenario One single scenario with 
three different outcomes. The 
aim is to minimise other 
factors such as cause of error 
having an impact upon 
reporting practices. 
Error outcome Three clearly different outcomes 
from a single hypothetical error.  
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Appendix 6 SPSS Outputs Normality of  
Data 
Table 7-4 Tests for Normality (SAQ items) 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
1. Nurse input is well 
received where I work 
.359 116 .000 .630 116 .000 
2. Where I work it is difficult 
to speak up if I perceive a 
problem with patient care 
.312 116 .000 .708 116 .000 
3. Decision making where I 
work uses input from 
relevant staff 
.344 112 .000 .672 112 .000 
4. The doctors and nurses 
here work together as a well 
coordinated team 
.247 115 .000 .831 115 .000 
5. Disagreements where I 
work are resolved 
appropriately (ie not who is 
right but what is best for the 
patient) 
.246 114 .000 .798 114 .000 
6. I am frequently unable to 
express disagreement with 
the senior clinical staff here 
.300 114 .000 .810 114 .000 
7. It is easy for staff here to 
ask questions when there is 
something they do not 
understand 
.300 114 .000 .810 114 .000 
8. I have the support I need 
from other staff to care for 
patients 
.395 116 .000 .646 116 .000 
9. I know the first and last 
names of all the staff I 
worked with during my last 
shift 
.485 116 .000 .411 116 .000 
10. Important issues are well 
communicated at shift 
changes 
.282 116 .000 .809 116 .000 
11. Briefing staff on 
handovers between 
shifts/periods of work (ie to 
plan for possible 
contingencies) is important 
for patient safety 
.485 116 .000 .393 116 .000 
12. Briefings are common 
where I work 
.257 116 .000 .813 116 .000 
14. I am satisfied with the 
quality of collaboration that I 
experience with nurses 
where I work 
.339 116 .000 .734 116 .000 
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15. The levels of staffing 
where I work are sufficient to 
handle the number of 
patients 
.244 116 .000 .853 116 .000 
16. I would feel safe being 
treated as a patient in this 
service 
.320 116 .000 .736 116 .000 
17. I am encouraged by my 
colleagues to report any 
patient safety concerns I 
may have 
.388 115 .000 .608 115 .000 
18. Staff frequently disregard 
rules or guidelines (eg hand-
washing, treatment 
protocols/clinical pathways 
etc) that are established for 
the area where I work 
.269 116 .000 .772 116 .000 
19. The culture where I work 
makes it easy to learn from 
the errors of others 
.258 116 .000 .850 116 .000 
20. I receive appropriate 
feedback about my 
performance 
.231 116 .000 .833 116 .000 
21. Medical errors are 
handled appropriately here 
.280 116 .000 .785 116 .000 
22. I know the proper 
channels to which I should 
direct questions regarding 
patient safety 
.478 116 .000 .431 116 .000 
23. Where I work it is difficult 
to discuss errors 
.264 116 .000 .783 116 .000 
24. Management does not 
knowingly compromise the 
safety of patients 
.379 115 .000 .677 115 .000 
25. This organisation is 
doing more for patient safety 
than it did one year ago 
.192 116 .000 .904 116 .000 
26. Leadership is driving us 
to be a safety centred 
organisation 
.257 116 .000 .821 116 .000 
27. My suggestions about 
safety would be acted upon 
if I expressed them to 
management 
.282 116 .000 .739 116 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 7-5 Tests for Normality (views of reporting and disclosure) 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
28. In your current workplace 
how often would this kind of 
incident be formally 
reported? 
.479 115 .000 .479 115 .000 
Formally report severe error .495 115 .000 .480 115 .000 
29. How often would 
someone from your 
workplace acknowledge to 
patients/clients or their family 
members that an incident of 
this kind occurred? 
.300 115 .000 .717 115 .000 
Acknowledge severe error to 
patient/client or family 
.360 115 .000 .634 115 .000 
30. In your current workplace 
how often would this kind of 
incident be formally 
reported? 
.382 114 .000 .641 114 .000 
Formally report moderate 
error 
.421 114 .000 .599 114 .000 
31. How often would 
someone from your 
workplace acknowledge to 
patients/clients or their family 
members that an incident of 
this kind occurred? 
.260 113 .000 .777 113 .000 
Acknowledge moderate error 
to patient/client or family 
.370 113 .000 .632 113 .000 
32. In your current workplace 
how often would this kind of 
incident be formally 
reported? 
.261 114 .000 .798 114 .000 
Formally report near miss 
error 
.363 114 .000 .634 114 .000 
33. How often would 
someone from your 
workplace acknowledge to 
patients/clients or their family 
members that an incident of 
this kind occurred? 
.241 115 .000 .875 115 .000 
Acknowledge near miss 
error to patient/client or 
family 
.462 115 .000 .547 115 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 7-6 Tests for Normality (Demographic Information) 
 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
34. Please indicate your 
level of registration 
.536 115 .000 .297 115 .000 
Level of registration .536 115 .000 .297 115 .000 
35. Please indicate the main 
location of your work 
.272 115 .000 .748 115 .000 
Workplace setting .303 115 .000 .784 115 .000 
36. How many beds does 
your hospital/workplace 
setting have? 
.251 114 .000 .774 114 .000 
38. Do you work for the 
Government (DHHS) or a 
private sector employer? 
.418 114 .000 .625 114 .000 
Employment sector .421 114 .000 .599 114 .000 
Experience in current role .197 115 .000 .924 115 .000 
Experience in nursing .329 115 .000 .721 115 .000 
41. Post-code .226 111 .000 .868 111 .000 
41. ASGC-RA  .531 111 .000 .280 111 .000 
41. ASGC-RA (remote/very 
remote combined) 
.537 111 .000 .282 111 .000 
41. Region .342 111 .000 .729 111 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Appendix 7 Chi-squared tables 
(sensitivity tests) 
 
 
 
Table 7-7 Chi-squared of workplace role and teamwork and patient safety at bedside (responses missing 
post-code data excluded) 
 
Teamwork and patient safety  
at bedside 
Workplace role Total 
Clinical role Management role 
Positive 
 
Count 50 18 68 
% within Workplace role 71.4% 94.7% 76.4% 
% of Total 56.2% 20.2% 76.4% 
Not positive 
Count 20 1 21 
% within Workplace role 28.6% 5.3% 23.6% 
% of Total 22.5% 1.1% 23.6% 
Total 
Count 70 19 89 
% within Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 78.7% 21.3% 100.0% 
  χ2=3.303b, df=1, N=99, p=0.069b, Phi=-0.225, Fisher’s Exact=0.036 
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 7-8 Chi-squared for leadership and error management and acknowledgment of moderate error 
(responses missing post-code data excluded) 
 
 
Acknowledge moderate error to 
patient/client or family 
 
Leadership and error management  
Total  
positive 
 
not positive 
Always 
 
Count 36 5 41 
% within Leadership and 
error management 
49.3% 20.0% 41.8% 
% of Total 36.7% 5.1% 41.8% 
Not Always 
Count 37 20 57 
% within Leadership and 
error management 
50.7% 80.0% 58.2% 
% of Total 37.8% 20.4% 58.2% 
Total 
Count 73 25 98 
% within Leadership and 
error management 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 74.5% 25.5% 100.0% 
  χ2=5.427b, df=1, N=98, p=0.020b, Phi=-0.259, Fisher’s Exact=0.011 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.46. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 7-9 Chi-squared for teamwork and patient safety at bedside and facility bed numbers (responses 
missing post-code data excluded) 
 
Teamwork and patient safety 
at bedside 
 
Facility bed numbers Total 
less than 
50 beds 
50 - 99 
beds 
100+ 
beds 
Other/not 
applicable 
positive 
 
Count 30 15 6 15 66 
% within facility bed numbers 78.9% 55.6% 46.2% 83.3% 68.8% 
% of Total 31.2% 15.6% 6.2% 15.6% 68.8% 
not positive 
Count 8 12 7 3 30 
% within facility bed numbers  21.1% 44.4% 53.8% 16.7% 31.2% 
% of Total 8.3% 12.5% 7.3% 3.1% 31.2% 
Total 
Count 38 27 13 18 96 
% within facility bed numbers 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 39.6% 28.1% 13.5% 18.8% 100.0% 
 χ2=8.898a, df=1, N=96, p=0.031, Fisher’s Exact=0.034 
a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.06 
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Table 7-10 Chi-squared of view of reporting severe error and workplace setting (responses missing post-
code data excluded) 
 
 
Formally report severe error 
 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ 
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 42 17 23 82 
% within Workplace setting 77.8% 70.8% 95.8% 80.4% 
% of Total 41.2% 16.7% 22.5% 80.4% 
Not Always 
Count 12 7 1 20 
% within Workplace setting 22.2% 29.2% 4.2% 19.6% 
% of Total 11.8% 6.9% 1.0% 19.6% 
Total 
Count 54 24 24 102 
% within Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 52.9% 23.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
χ2=5.255a, df=1, N=102, p=0.072, Fisher’s Exact=0.066  
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.71. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7-11 Chi-squared acknowledgment of near miss error and workplace setting (responses missing post-
code data excluded) 
 
 
Acknowledge near miss error to 
patient/client or family 
 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 8 3 16 27 
% within Workplace setting 14.8% 12.5% 66.7% 26.5% 
% of Total 7.8% 2.9% 15.7% 26.5% 
Not Always 
Count 46 21 8 75 
% within Workplace setting 85.2% 87.5% 33.3% 73.5% 
% of Total 45.1% 20.6% 7.8% 73.5% 
Total 
Count 54 24 24 102 
% within Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 52.9% 23.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
 χ2=26.099, df=1, N=102, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000  
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.35 
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Table 7-12 Chi-squared acknowledgement of moderate error and workplace setting (responses missing 
postcode data excluded) 
 
Acknowledge moderate error  
to patient/client or family 
 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/ Multi-
purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
Always 
 
Count 21 5 20 46 
% within Workplace setting 39.6% 20.8% 83.3% 45.5% 
% of Total 20.8% 5.0% 19.8% 45.5% 
Not Always 
Count 32 19 4 55 
% within Workplace setting 60.4% 79.2% 16.7% 54.5% 
% of Total 31.7% 18.8% 4.0% 54.5% 
Total 
Count 53 24 24 101 
% within Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 52.5% 23.8% 23.8% 100.0% 
 χ2=20.477, df=1, N=101, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact=0.000  
a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.06 
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Appendix 8 Chi squared tables 
(Demographic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7-13 Chi-squared test of workplace role and region 
 
Workplace role 
 
Region Total 
South North North west 
Clinical role 
 
Count 17 22 49 88 
% within Region 81.0% 78.6% 80.3% 80.0% 
% of Total 15.5% 20.0% 44.5% 80.0% 
Management role 
Count 4 6 12 22 
% within Region 19.0% 21.4% 19.7% 20.0% 
% of Total 3.6% 5.5% 10.9% 20.0% 
Total 
Count 21 28 61 110 
% within Region 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 19.1% 25.5% 55.5% 100.0% 
χ2=0.052a, df=2, N=110, p=1.000, Fisher’s Exact Test p=1.000 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.20. 
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Table 7-14 Chi-squared test of region and facility bed numbers 
 
Region 
Facility bed numbers  
Total less than 
50 beds 
50 - 99 
beds 
100+ beds Other/not 
applicable 
South 
 
Count 5 7 0 9 21 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
11.6% 25.0% 0.0% 39.1% 19.6% 
% of Total 4.7% 6.5% 0.0% 8.4% 19.6% 
North 
 
Count 22 2 2 3 29 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
51.2% 7.1% 15.4% 13.0% 27.1% 
% of Total 20.6% 1.9% 1.9% 2.8% 27.1% 
North west 
Count 16 19 11 11 57 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
37.2% 67.9% 84.6% 47.8% 53.3% 
% of Total 15.0% 17.8% 10.3% 10.3% 53.3% 
Total 
Count 43 28 13 23 107 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.2% 26.2% 12.1% 21.5% 100.0% 
χ2=30.186a, df=6, N=107, p=0.000, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.000 
a. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.55. 
 
 
Table 7-15 Chi-squared test of region and workplace setting 
 
Region 
Workplace setting  
Total Hospital/  
Multi-purpose 
Community Residential 
aged care 
South 
 
Count 4 6 7 17 
% within Workplace setting 7.4% 25.0% 29.2% 16.7% 
% of Total 3.9% 5.9% 6.9% 16.7% 
North 
 
Count 17 5 6 28 
% within Workplace setting 31.5% 20.8% 25.0% 27.5% 
% of Total 16.7% 4.9% 5.9% 27.5% 
North west 
Count 33 13 11 57 
% within Workplace setting 61.1% 54.2% 45.8% 55.9% 
% of Total 32.4% 12.7% 10.8% 55.9% 
Total 
Count 54 24 24 102 
% within Workplace setting 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 52.9% 23.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
χ2=7.493a, df=4, N=102, p=0.113, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.101 
a. 2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.00. 
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Table 7-16 Chi-squared test of workplace setting and workplace role 
 
Workplace setting 
 
Workplace role  
Total Clinical 
role 
Management 
role 
Hospital/ Multi-purpose 
 
Count 47 10 57 
% within Workplace role 56.0% 47.6% 54.3% 
% of Total 44.8% 9.5% 54.3% 
Community 
Count 23 1 24 
% within Workplace role 27.4% 4.8% 22.9% 
% of Total 21.9% 1.0% 22.9% 
Residential aged care 
Count 14 10 24 
% within Workplace role 16.7% 47.6% 22.9% 
% of Total 13.3% 9.5% 22.9% 
Total 
Count 84 21 105 
% within Workplace role 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
χ2=11.017a, df=2, N=105, p=0.004, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.005  
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.80. 
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Table 7-17 Chi-squared test of workplace setting and facility bed numbers 
 
 
Workplace setting 
 
Facility bed numbers  
Total less than 
50 beds 
50 - 99 
beds 
100+ 
beds 
Other/not 
applicable 
Hospital/ Multi-purpose 
 
Count 35 10 9 1 55 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
74.5% 38.5% 69.2% 6.2% 53.9% 
% of Total 34.3% 9.8% 8.8% 1.0% 53.9% 
Community 
 
Count 6 1 0 15 22 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
12.8% 3.8% 0.0% 93.8% 21.6% 
% of Total 5.9% 1.0% 0.0% 14.7% 21.6% 
Residential aged care 
Count 6 15 4 0 25 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
12.8% 57.7% 30.8% 0.0% 24.5% 
% of Total 5.9% 14.7% 3.9% 0.0% 24.5% 
Total 
Count 47 26 13 16 102 
% within facility bed 
numbers  
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 46.1% 25.5% 12.7% 15.7% 100.0% 
χ2=77.523a, df=6, N=102, p=1.000, Fisher’s Exact Test p=1.000 
a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.80. 
 
 
Table 7-18 Chi squared test of work role and facility bed numbers 
 
Workplace role 
 
Facility bed numbers  
Total less than 
50 beds 
50 - 99 
beds 
100+ 
beds 
Other/not 
applicable 
Clinical role 
 
Count 40 18 9 21 88 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
85.1% 66.7% 69.2% 91.3% 80.0% 
% of Total 36.4% 16.4% 8.2% 19.1% 80.0% 
Management role 
Count 7 9 4 2 22 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
14.9% 33.3% 30.8% 8.7% 20.0% 
% of Total 6.4% 8.2% 3.6% 1.8% 20.0% 
Total 
Count 47 27 13 23 110 
% within facility bed 
numbers 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 42.7% 24.5% 11.8% 20.9% 100.0% 
χ2=6.545a, df=3, N=110, p=0.088, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.085 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60. 
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Appendix 9 Chi-squared (Goodness of  
Fit) 
Table 7-19 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting severe error compared with views reporting 
moderate error 
Formally report severe error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 93 74.5 18.5 
Not Always 22 40.5 -18.5 
Total 115   
χ2=13.075a, df=1, N=115, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 40.5. 
 
 
Table 7-20 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting severe error compared with views reporting 
near miss error 
Formally report severe error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 93 52.6 40.4 
Not Always 22 62.4 -40.4 
Total 115   
χ2=57.272a, df=1, N=115, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 52.6. 
 
 
 
Table 7-21 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting severe error compared with views of 
disclosure severe error 
Formally report severe error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 93 62.9 30.1 
Not Always 22 52.1 -30.1 
Total 115   
χ2=31.745a, df=1, N=115, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 52.1. 
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Table 7-22 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting moderate error compared with views 
reporting near miss error 
Formally report moderate error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 75 52.1 22.9 
Not Always 39 61.9 -22.9 
Total 114   
χ2=18.513a, df=1, N=114, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 52.1. 
 
 
Table 7-23 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting moderate error compared with views 
disclosure moderate error 
Formally report moderate error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 75 51.0 24.0 
Not Always 39 63.0 -24.0 
Total 114   
χ2=20.386a, df=1, N=114, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 51.0. 
 
 
Table 7-24 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views reporting near miss error compared with views 
disclosure moderate error 
Formally report near miss error 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 52 30.1 21.9 
Not Always 62 83.9 -21.9 
Total 114   
χ2=21.618a, df=1, N=114, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 30.1. 
 
 
Table 7-25 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views disclosure severe error compared with views 
disclosure moderate error 
Acknowledge severe error to patient/client or family 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 62 51.5 10.5 
Not Always 53 63.5 -10.5 
Total 115   
χ2=3.895a, df=1, N=115, p=0.048 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 51.5. 
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Table 7-26 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views disclosure severe error compared with views 
disclosure near miss error 
Acknowledge severe error to patient/client or family 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 62 30.4 31.6 
Not Always 53 84.6 -31.6 
Total 115   
χ2=44.736a, df=1, N=115, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 30.4. 
 
 
Table 7-27 Chi-squared goodness of fit test for views disclosure moderate error compared with views of 
disclosure near miss error 
Acknowledge moderate error to patient/client or family 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Always 50 29.8 20.2 
Not Always 63 83.2 -20.2 
Total 113   
χ2=18.487a, df=1, N=113, p=0.000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 29.8. 
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Appendix 10 Internal consistency (based 
on previous UK study) 
 
Table 7-28 Internal Consistency (this research compared with factors determined by (Hutchinson et al., 
2006) 
 
Factor Identified by (Hutchinson et al., 
2006) 
Factor α score (Hutchinson et al., 
2006) 
Factor α score (this study) 
Teamwork Factor 1 
Input into decisions and collaboration 
with other staff 
0.84 0.68 
Teamwork Factor 2 
Information handover 
0.69 0.67 
Safety Climate Factor 1 
Attitudes to safety within own team; 
capacity to learn from errors 
0.73 0.74 
Safety Climate Factor 2 
Overall confidence in safety of 
organisation 
0.70 0.51 
Safety Climate Factor 3 
Perceptions of management’s attitudes 
to safety 
0.78 0.85 
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Appendix 11 Chi-squared tables 
(geographical location) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7-29 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and ASGC-RA 
 
Teamwork and patient safety at the bedside ASGC-RA Total 
Outer 
Regional 
Remote Very 
Remote 
Positive 
 
Count 68 1 0 69 
% ASGC-RA 79.1% 50.0% 0.0% 76.7% 
% of Total 75.6% 1.1% 0.0% 76.7% 
Not positive 
Count 18 1 2 21 
% ASGC-RA 20.9% 50.0% 100.0% 23.3% 
% of Total 20.0% 1.1% 2.2% 23.3% 
Total 
Count 86 2 2 90 
% ASGC-RA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 95.6% 2.2% 2.2% 100.0% 
χ2=7.644a, df=2, N=90, p=0.038, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.038 
a. 4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .47. 
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Table 7-30 Chi-squared test of teamwork and patient safety at bedside and ASGC-RA (2x2 table) 
 
Teamwork and patient safety at bedside 
 ASGC-RA  
Total Outer 
Regional 
Remote/Very 
Remote 
Positive 
 
Count 68 1 69 
% within ASGC-RA 79.1% 25.0% 76.7% 
% of Total 75.6% 1.1% 76.7% 
Not positive 
Count 18 3 21 
% within ASGC-RA 20.9% 75.0% 23.3% 
% of Total 20.0% 3.3% 23.3% 
Total 
Count 86 4 90 
% within ASGC-RA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 95.6% 4.4% 100.0% 
χ2=3.590b, df=1, N=90, p=0.058 b, Phi=0.263, Fisher’s Exact=0.038 
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .93. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 7-31 Chi-squared test of leadership and error management and ASGC-RA 
 
Workplace safety culture ASGC-RA Total 
Outer 
Regional 
Remote Very 
Remote 
Positive 
 
Count 66 0 1 67 
% ASGC-RA 70.2% 0.0% 33.3% 67.0% 
% of Total 66.0% 0.0% 1.0% 67.0% 
Not positive 
Count 28 3 2 33 
% ASGC-RA 29.8% 100.0% 66.7% 33.0% 
% of Total 28.0% 3.0% 2.0% 33.0% 
Total 
Count 94 3 3 100 
% ASGC-RA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 94.0% 3.0% 3.0% 100.0% 
χ2=8.068a, df=2, N=100, p=0.014, Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.014 
a. 4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .99. 
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Appendix 12 Principal Components 
Analysis  
Table 7-32 Total variance explained for teamwork items 
  
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 4.821 43.824 43.824 4.821 43.824 43.824 4.334 
2 1.354 12.308 56.132 1.354 12.308 56.132 2.902 
3 1.033 9.392 65.524     
4 .850 7.731 73.255     
5 .750 6.814 80.069     
6 .581 5.284 85.354     
7 .506 4.601 89.954     
8 .370 3.366 93.320     
9 .276 2.511 95.831     
10 .257 2.339 98.170     
11 .201 1.830 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.  
 (1=teamwork and patient safety at bedside, 2=workplace relationships and communication) 
 
17/09/2013   1:38:44 PM 
Number of variables:     11 
Number of subjects:      93 
Number of replications:  50 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Eigenvalue #     Random Eigenvalue     Standard Dev 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
      1                1.5702                .0793 
      2                1.3741                .0505 
      3               1.2628                .0449 
      4                1.1698                .0404 
      5                1.0593                .0335 
      6                0.9840                .0410 
      7                0.8954               .0305 
      8                0.7948                .0306 
      9                0.7131               .0470 
     10                0.6359               .0470 
     11                0.5405                .0471 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
17/09/2013   1:38:44 PM 
 
Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis 
©2000 by Marley W. Watkins. All rights reserved. 
****************************************************** 
Figure 7-1: Monte Carlo output teamwork items 
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Figure 7-2: Catell’s scree plot for teamwork items 
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Table 7-33 Item-total statistics teamwork and patient safety at bedside 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
1. Nurse input is well 
received where I work 
25.3800 23.268 .564 .480 .824 
2. Where I work it is 
difficult to speak up if I 
perceive a problem with 
patient care 
25.6300 22.902 .453 .276 .843 
5. Disagreements where 
I work are resolved 
appropriately (ie not who 
is right but what is best 
for the patient) 
25.8800 21.440 .579 .394 .823 
3. Decision making 
where I work uses input 
from relevant staff 
25.5100 21.242 .666 .598 .808 
8. I have the support I 
need from other staff to 
care for patients 
25.3800 22.622 .608 .435 .817 
10. Important issues are 
well communicated at 
shift changes 
25.6000 21.717 .667 .510 .808 
14. I am satisfied with the 
quality of collaboration 
that I experience with 
nurses where I work 
25.4200 22.731 .670 .552 .810 
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Table 7-34 Item-total statistics workplace relationships and communication 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
4. The doctors and 
nurses here work 
together as a well 
coordinated team 
13.0196 4.396 .688 .602 .494 
9. I know the first and last 
names of all the staff I 
worked with during my 
last shift 
12.4216 6.821 .208 .111 .762 
12. Briefings are 
common where I work 
13.0882 5.230 .375 .197 .703 
13. I am satisfied with the 
quality of collaboration 
that I experience with 
senior doctors where I 
work 
13.0588 3.818 .703 .612 .464 
 
Table 7-35 Total variance explained for safety climate items 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
1 4.821 43.826 43.826 4.821 43.826 43.826 4.402 
2 1.489 13.540 57.366 1.489 13.540 57.366 2.929 
3 .970 8.815 66.181     
4 .723 6.573 72.754     
5 .661 6.010 78.764     
6 .620 5.633 84.396     
7 .594 5.400 89.797     
8 .329 2.989 92.785     
9 .312 2.834 95.619     
10 .301 2.737 98.356     
11 .181 1.644 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
(1=leadership and error management, 2=workplace safety culture) 
 
 
  
357 
17/09/2013   1:41:36 PM 
Number of variables:     11 
Number of subjects:     104 
Number of replications:  50 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Eigenvalue #     Random Eigenvalue     Standard Dev 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
      1                1.5532                 .1064 
      2                1.3960                .0423 
      3                1.2724                 .0508 
      4                1.1416                 .0340 
      5                1.0698                 .0514 
      6                0.9778                 .0448 
      7                0.8982                 .0349 
      8                0.8070                .0416 
      9                0.7151                 .0302 
     10                0.6233                 .0501 
     11                0.5456                 .0456 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
17/09/2013   1:41:36 PM 
Figure 7-3: Monte Carlo output safety climate items 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Catell’s scree test safety climate items 
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Table 7-36 Item-total statistics workplace safety culture 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
15. The levels of staffing 
where I work are 
sufficient to handle the 
number of patients 
12.5586 5.558 .581 .428 .623 
16. I would feel safe 
being treated as a patient 
in this service 
11.7568 7.058 .608 .451 .611 
17. I am encouraged by 
my colleagues to report 
any patient safety 
concerns I may have 
11.4685 8.415 .481 .267 .690 
19. The culture where I 
work makes it easy to 
learn from the errors of 
others 
12.3514 6.885 .444 .227 .705 
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Table 7-37 Item-total statistics leadership and error management 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
20. I receive appropriate 
feedback about my 
performance 
24.9720 24.801 .603 .444 .836 
21. Medical errors are 
handled appropriately 
here 
24.4860 25.328 .731 .588 .816 
22. I know the proper 
channels to which I 
should direct questions 
regarding patient safety 
23.8598 32.480 .410 .221 .862 
24. Management does 
not knowingly 
compromise the safety of 
patients 
24.4860 26.026 .525 .328 .848 
25. This organisation is 
doing more for patient 
safety than it did one 
year ago 
24.9439 26.261 .553 .394 .842 
26. Leadership is driving 
us to be a safety centred 
organisation 
24.7009 24.155 .786 .699 .806 
27. My suggestions 
about safety would be 
acted upon if I expressed 
them to management 
24.5888 23.848 .785 .692 .805 
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Appendix 13 Standards of  good practice 
 
Criteria  Summary of application in this thesis 
Before the analytic moment  
1. QCA should be used for its original aims QCA is being used in this thesis to describe the case-based data and assist meet the research aim to describe the complexity of 
safety culture of nurses working in rural clinical settings and for theory development (Sections 6.3 and 6.4) 
2. QCA should be applied together with other data analysis techniques in a 
research project 
Statistical analysis (inferential statistics and principal components analysis) is being used alongside QCA for this thesis (Sections 
4.3 and 4.4) 
3. Familiarity with cases is a requirement before, during, and after the 
analytical moment of a QCA 
The cases for the research are the nurses working in rural clinical settings.  Familiarity with the cases has been undertaken 
through review of the literature as well as the QCA analysis process.  The possible outcomes from the QCA analysis are 
informed from the statistical analysis that has been undertaken (Sections 4.3.3 and 5.6)  
4. There should always be an explicit and detailed justification for the(non-
) selection of cases 
All cases have been included in the QCA process.   
5. The number of conditions should be kept at a moderate level The number of conditions has been determined by the Exploratory Factor Analysis using Principle Components Analysis.  This 
process has been based upon a previous study {Hutchinson, 2006 #221}.  Hence the use of safety climate and teamwork factors 
was identified in the research design but the final approach taken has been determined by the statistical analysis of the data 
obtained for this study (Sections 4.3.3 and 5.6). 
6. The conditions and outcome should be selected and conceptualised on 
the basis of adequate prior theoretical knowledge as well as empirical 
insights gained throughout the research process 
The research design incorporated the conditions and the outcome that have been selected.  The need to consider these has 
been outlined in the literature review (Chapter 2, Part II) This process informed the use of existing tools from previous studies 
{Hutchinson, 2006 #221;Weissman, 2005 #211;Sexton, 2006 #222} to increase transparency.  The statistical analysis has also 
informed the choice of conditions (Sections 4.3.3 and 5.6) 
7. The calibration of set membership scores should be discussed in detail Please refer to Section 4.2.2). 
8. The appropriate QCA terminology should be followed Terminology and algebra as used by Schneider and Wagemann (2012). 
During the analytic moment  
9. Necessary and sufficient conditions should be analysed in separate 
analytical steps with the analysis of necessary conditions undertaken 
first 
fsQCA and Kirq software has been used to undertake the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.  These results appear 
in Chapter 5 Part II and Appendix 16, 17 and 19. 
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10. Contradictory truth table rows should be resolved prior to minimising 
the truth table algorithm 
This has been undertaken in Sections 4.8.1, 5.13 and 5.14  
11. Truth tables should be minimised with the help of appropriate 
computer software 
fsQCA software has been used to minimise the truth tables.   
12. The choice of appropriate levels of consistency and coverage are 
research-specific and need to be supported with arguments 
Please refer to Sections 4.8.3 and 5.14 
13. The treatment of inconsistent truth table rows (in fsQCA) in the logical 
minimisation process should be transparent 
Please refer to Sections 4.8.3 and 5.14 
14. The treatment of logical remainders should be transparent Please refer to Section 4.8.4 
15. Based on one truth table, several solution formulas of different 
complexity should be produced and presented 
Solution terms presented are complex/intermediate terms except in Section 5.13.2 which presents all solutions. .   
16. The outcome and the negation of the outcome should always be dealt 
with in two separate analyses 
Analysis of negated sets appears in Section 5.15.2Relevant truth tables appear in Appendix 17 and 19. 
After the analytic moment  
17. Different presentational forms of QCA results should be used in order to 
depict both the case- and variable- oriented aspects of QCA 
Two methods of presentation have been undertaken. Solution term tables are presented in Section 5.13 and 5.14. Matrix 
tables comparing configurational rows appear in Sections 5.13 and 5.15.  
18. QCA should always be related back to the cases rather than being 
applied in a mechanical way 
This has been undertaken in Section 5.17 and Chapter 6.  
19. Solution formulas should be linked back to the cases, preferably 
through graphical representation tools 
As above 
20. Individual conditions of a conjunctural and equifinal solution term 
should not be (over)interpreted 
As above 
21. The researcher should always provide explicit justification when one (or 
more) of the paths towards an outcome is deemed more important 
than others 
As above 
22. Solution formula alone should not be taken as demonstrating an 
underlying causal relationship between the conditions and an outcome 
As above. Please see Sections 6.2 to 6.6 in particular 
23. The raw data matrix should be published Raw data appears in Appendix 14 and the calibrated data may be seen in Appendix 15.  
24. The truth table should be reported Truth tables appear in Section 5.13.2 as well as Appendix 18 and Appendix 19 
25. Every QCA must contain the solution formula(s) These appear in the Section 5.13.2 and Section 5.14. 
26. The consistency and coverage measures should always be reported These appear Section 5.14. 
(Based upon Schneider & Wagemann 2010) 
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Appendix 14 Raw data table 
Case ID 
Score 
TF1 
Score 
TF2 
Score 
SCF1 
Score 
SCF2 
Report 
Severe 
Disclose 
Severe 
Report 
Moderate 
Disclose 
Moderate 
Report Near 
Miss 
Disclose Near 
Miss 
1 96.43 93.75 93.75 89.29 Always Rarely Always Sometimes Always Sometimes 
2 100.00 87.50 100.00 100.00 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
3 96.43 100.00 100.00 92.86 Always Always Usually Usually Usually Usually 
4 85.71 93.75 81.25 82.14 Always Usually Always Usually Usually Sometimes 
5 71.43 93.75 62.50 42.86 Always Always Never Never Never Never 
6 96.43 87.50 87.50 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
7 89.29 81.25 100.00 67.86 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
8 100.00 100.00 100.00 85.71 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
9 89.29 93.75 75.00 89.29 Rarely Rarely Rarely Usually Always Usually 
10 100.00 100.00 56.25 57.14 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
11 96.43 87.50 100.00 100.00 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
12 96.43 87.50 81.25 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
13 89.29 87.50 81.25 75.00 Always Usually Always Always Usually Usually 
14 67.86 81.25 56.25 57.14 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
15 85.71 75.00 87.50 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
16 39.29 81.25 12.50 28.57 Always Never Always Never Sometimes Never 
17 85.71 68.75 81.25 75.00 Always Always Usually Usually Usually Usually 
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18 100.00 100.00 75.00 96.43 Always Always Usually Usually Usually Usually 
19 92.86 81.25 81.25 78.57 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
20 100.00 81.25 100.00 100.00 Always Rarely Always Rarely Always Rarely 
21 67.86 56.25 75.00 82.14 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
22 100.00 100.00 68.75 92.86 Always Always Always Always Always Never 
23 50.00 81.25 31.25 28.57 Usually Rarely Usually Sometimes Rarely Rarely 
24 96.43 93.75 81.25 89.29 Always Usually Always Usually Always Usually 
25 78.57 93.75 81.25 57.14 Always Usually Always Usually Always Usually 
26 100.00 100.00 93.75 82.14 Always Always Always Always Sometimes Sometimes 
27 64.29 37.50 87.50 85.71 Always Always Always Always Always Sometimes 
28 67.86 100.00 87.50 100.00 Always Usually Usually Usually Usually Rarely 
29 85.71 100.00 100.00 100.00 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
30 100.00 87.50 87.50 100.00 Always Always Always Always Usually Always 
31 85.71 100.00 87.50 78.57 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
32 92.86 100.00 68.75 78.57 Usually Usually Usually Usually Usually Usually 
33 35.71 87.50 81.25 50.00 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
34 100.00 93.75 100.00 78.57 Always Usually Always Usually Always Usually 
35 100.00 100.00 100.00 82.14 Always Never Always Never Always Always 
36 60.71 75.00 81.25 75.00 Always Usually Always Usually Always Sometimes 
37 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.43 Always Usually Usually Usually Rarely Rarely 
38 89.29 75.00 81.25 96.43 Always Always Always Always Usually Usually 
39 25.00 93.75 56.25 14.29 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
40 75.00 37.50 81.25 92.86 Sometimes Sometimes Usually Sometimes Never Never 
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41 78.57 68.75 50.00 75.00 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
42 64.29 87.50 56.25 75.00 Always Always Always Usually Usually Usually 
43 82.14 81.25 56.25 89.29 Always Usually Always Usually Sometimes Rarely 
44 71.43 75.00 87.50 75.00 Always Always Always Always Always Sometimes 
45 85.71 68.75 75.00 71.43 Always Always Always Always Sometimes Usually 
46 100.00 93.75 87.50 100.00 Never Never Rarely Rarely Rarely Rarely 
47 100.00 81.25 100.00 92.86 Always Usually Usually Usually Sometimes Rarely 
48 85.71 100.00 43.75 89.29 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
49 67.86 43.75 43.75 67.86 Always Always Always Usually Usually Sometimes 
50 82.14 68.75 81.25 64.29 Always Always Always Sometimes Sometimes Rarely 
51 100.00 93.75 100.00 75.00 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
52 100.00 93.75 68.75 100.00 Rarely Rarely Rarely Rarely Rarely Rarely 
53 64.29 87.50 56.25 82.14 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
54 96.43 100.00 93.75 92.86 Always Usually Always Usually Usually Usually 
55 96.43 93.75 100.00 92.86 Never Usually Rarely Usually Rarely Usually 
56 85.71 75.00 75.00 89.29 Always Usually Always Usually Usually Usually 
57 85.71 81.25 87.50 96.43 Rarely Usually Rarely Usually Rarely Sometimes 
58 96.43 75.00 75.00 67.86 Always Always Rarely Usually Rarely Sometimes 
59 100.00 93.75 100.00 100.00 Always Usually Sometimes Sometimes Sometimes Rarely 
60 42.86 25.00 43.75 64.29 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
61 96.43 87.50 81.25 89.29 Always Always Always Usually Sometimes Sometimes 
62 67.86 81.25 68.75 75.00 Never Never Usually Usually Usually Usually 
63 75.00 50.00 62.50 46.43 Usually Usually Usually Usually Sometimes Sometimes 
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64 82.14 68.75 81.25 85.71 Always Usually Always Usually Always Usually 
65 75.00 81.25 62.50 71.43 Always Always Usually Always Sometimes Sometimes 
66 67.86 81.25 62.50 75.00 Always Always Usually Usually Rarely Rarely 
67 100.00 100.00 93.75 85.71 Always Always Always Always Sometimes Always 
68 89.29 93.75 87.50 100.00 Always Always Always Always Always Sometimes 
69 96.43 100.00 75.00 92.86 Always Always Always Always Usually Usually 
70 89.29 93.75 87.50 92.86 Always Usually Always Usually Always Usually 
71 92.86 87.50 81.25 75.00 Always Always Sometimes Sometimes Rarely Rarely 
72 64.29 68.75 68.75 53.57 Never Never Usually Usually Usually Usually 
73 100.00 93.75 100.00 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Usually 
74 96.43 87.50 100.00 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
75 53.57 31.25 31.25 71.43 Always Sometimes Always Sometimes Always Rarely 
76 100.00 93.75 81.25 100.00 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
77 67.86 87.50 75.00 75.00 Always Always Always Usually Usually Usually 
78 82.14 100.00 68.75 46.43 Always Usually Always Usually Sometimes Sometimes 
79 64.29 81.25 75.00 85.71 Never Rarely Rarely Rarely Never Rarely 
80 46.43 62.50 75.00 32.14 Never Usually Usually Usually Always Usually 
81 53.57 87.50 37.50 39.29 Always Usually Always Usually Usually Sometimes 
82 85.71 93.75 100.00 39.29 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
83 85.71 62.50 56.25 96.43 Always Always Always Always Always Always 
84 96.43 93.75 93.75 78.57 Always Always Always Always Usually Usually 
85 82.14 62.50 75.00 85.71 Always Always Usually Always Usually Usually 
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Appendix 15 Calibrated Data Table 
Case ID tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 sr sd mr md nmr nmd rh racf rc mx 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.15 1 0.3 1 0.3 0 0 0 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0 0 1 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0 0 1 0 
4 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.45 0.3 1 0 0 0 
5 0.49 1 0.49 0.25 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
7 1 1 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
9 1 1 1 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.45 1 0.45 0 0 1 0 
10 1 1 0.49 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
13 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 1 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
14 0.49 1 0.49 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
16 0.25 1 0 0.25 1 0 1 0 0.3 0 0 0 1 0 
17 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 1 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0 1 0 1 
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19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 0.15 1 0.15 1 0.15 0 0 1 0 
21 0.49 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
22 1 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
23 0.49 1 0.25 0.25 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.3 0.15 0.15 1 0 0 0 
24 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
25 1 1 1 0.49 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0 1 0 1 
27 0.49 0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 0 0 0 
28 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.15 1 0 0 0 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0 1 0 1 
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
32 1 1 0.49 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
33 0.25 1 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
34 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.45 0 1 0 0 
35 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
36 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.3 1 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.15 0.15 0 0 1 0 
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0.49 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
40 1 0.25 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.45 0.3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
41 1 0.49 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0 0 1 0 
  
368 
42 0.49 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
43 1 1 0.49 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.3 0.15 1 0 0 0 
44 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 0 1 0 0 
45 1 0.49 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.3 0.45 0 1 0 0 
46 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0 0 1 0 
47 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.3 0.15 1 0 0 0 
48 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
49 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.49 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.3 1 0 0 0 
50 1 0.49 1 0.49 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.15 1 0 0 0 
51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
52 1 1 0.49 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0 0 0 
53 0.49 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
54 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 1 
55 1 1 1 1 0 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.15 0.45 0 0 1 1 
56 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
57 1 1 1 1 0.15 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.15 0.3 1 0 0 0 
58 1 1 1 0.49 1 1 0.15 0.45 0.15 0.3 0 1 0 1 
59 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.15 0 0 1 0 
60 0.25 0 0.25 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
61 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.3 0.3 1 0 0 0 
62 0.49 1 0.49 1 0 0 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
63 1 0.49 0.49 0.25 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.3 0.3 1 0 0 0 
64 1 0.49 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.45 0 0 1 0 
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65 1 1 0.49 0.49 1 1 0.45 1 0.3 0.3 1 0 0 0 
66 0.49 1 0.49 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.15 0.15 1 0 0 0 
67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 0 1 0 0 
68 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 0 0 0 
69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
70 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0.45 1 0 0 0 
71 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.15 1 0 0 1 
72 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0 0 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0 0 1 0 
73 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0 0 1 0 
74 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
75 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.49 1 0.3 1 0.3 1 0.15 0 1 0 0 
76 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
77 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
78 1 1 0.49 0.25 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0 
79 0.49 1 1 1 0 0.15 0.15 0.15 0 0.15 1 0 0 0 
80 0.25 0.49 1 0.25 0 0.45 0.45 0.45 1 0.45 0 0 1 0 
81 0.49 1 0.25 0.25 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.45 0.3 1 0 0 0 
82 1 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
83 1 0.49 0.49 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
84 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.45 0.45 0 0 0 0 
85 1 0.49 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 0.45 0.45 1 0 0 0 
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Appendix 16 Necessary conditions 
Views of reporting – necessary conditions 
 
 
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: sr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.875731             0.896825  
~tf1                  0.133787             0.746586  
tf2                   0.904555             0.882478  
~tf2                  0.101564             0.777315  
scf1                  0.843100             0.881826  
~scf1                 0.173895             0.871253  
scf2                  0.870156             0.896735  
~scf2                 0.142760             0.770359  
rh                    0.525493             0.858889  
~rh                   0.474507             0.872500  
racf                  0.241332             0.887500  
~racf                 0.758668             0.858462  
rc                    0.178790             0.821875  
~rc                   0.821210             0.875362  
mx                    0.203943             0.937500  
~mx                   0.796057             0.848551 
 
  
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~sr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.708297             0.112921  
~tf1                  0.352838             0.306525  
tf2                   0.813100             0.123491  
~tf2                  0.226201             0.269511  
scf1                  0.834935             0.135950  
~scf1                 0.274236             0.213896  
scf2                  0.726638             0.116576  
~scf2                 0.356332             0.299340  
racf                  0.048035             0.026190  
rh                    0.554585             0.141111  
~rh                   0.445415             0.127500  
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racf                  0.196507             0.112500  
~racf                 0.803493             0.141538  
rc                    0.248908             0.178125  
~rc                   0.751092             0.124638  
mx                    0.087336             0.062500  
~mx                   0.912664             0.151449 
 
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: mr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.891288             0.833333  
~tf1                  0.158600             0.808042  
tf2                   0.912881             0.813105  
~tf2                  0.122859             0.858481  
scf1                  0.853164             0.814704  
~scf1                 0.194490             0.889646  
scf2                  0.878928             0.826958  
~scf2                 0.156813             0.772561  
rh                    0.499628             0.745556  
~rh                   0.500372             0.840000  
racf                  0.247952             0.832500  
~racf                 0.752048             0.776923  
rc                    0.192852             0.809375  
~rc                   0.807148             0.785507  
mx                    0.188384             0.790625  
~mx                   0.811616             0.789855   
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~mr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.858263             0.213311  
~tf1                  0.329412             0.446130  
tf2                   0.923810             0.218729  
~tf2                  0.210644             0.391259  
scf1                  0.909244             0.230802  
~scf1                 0.270028             0.328338  
scf2                  0.826331             0.206669  
~scf2                 0.308123             0.403522  
rh                    0.641457             0.254444  
~rh                   0.358543             0.160000  
racf                  0.187675             0.167500  
~racf                 0.812325             0.223077  
rc                    0.170868             0.190625  
~rc                   0.829132             0.214493  
mx                    0.187675             0.209375  
~mx                   0.812325             0.210145   
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Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: nmr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.933641             0.703286  
~tf1                  0.148614             0.610015  
tf2                   0.907578             0.651280  
~tf2                  0.138632             0.780437  
scf1                  0.906284             0.697241  
~scf1                 0.171349             0.631471  
scf2                  0.899815             0.682079  
~scf2                 0.151941             0.603081  
rh                    0.502773             0.604444  
~rh                   0.497227             0.672500  
racf                  0.227357             0.615000  
~racf                 0.772643             0.643077  
rc                    0.219039             0.740625  
~rc                   0.780961             0.612319  
mx                    0.187615             0.634375  
~mx                   0.812384             0.636957 
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~nmr  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.833657             0.358674  
~tf1                  0.310356             0.727618  
tf2                   0.931715             0.381881  
~tf2                  0.149191             0.479709  
scf1                  0.824919             0.362486  
~scf1                 0.311003             0.654632  
scf2                  0.824919             0.357153  
~scf2                 0.265696             0.602348  
rh                    0.576052             0.395556  
~rh                   0.423948             0.327500  
racf                  0.249191             0.385000  
~racf                 0.750809             0.356923  
rc                    0.134304             0.259375  
~rc                   0.865696             0.387681  
mx                    0.189320             0.365625  
~mx                   0.810680             0.363043  
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Views of disclosure 
 
 
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: sd  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.921057             0.776525  
~tf1                  0.136746             0.628225  
tf2                   0.909001             0.730070  
~tf2                  0.117424             0.739854  
scf1                  0.878447             0.756399  
~scf1                 0.169447             0.698910  
scf2                  0.906523             0.769091  
~scf2                 0.142196             0.631695  
rh                    0.566474             0.762222  
~rh                   0.433526             0.656250  
racf                  0.232865             0.705000  
~racf                 0.767134             0.714615  
rc                    0.157721             0.596875  
~rc                   0.842279             0.739130  
mx                    0.222956             0.843750  
~mx                   0.777044             0.681884  
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~sd  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.799591             0.272208  
~tf1                  0.343558             0.637329  
tf2                   0.897751             0.291153  
~tf2                  0.167689             0.426639  
scf1                  0.819223             0.284841  
~scf1                 0.299387             0.498638  
scf2                  0.794683             0.272243  
~scf2                 0.325971             0.584740  
rh                    0.437628             0.237778  
~rh                   0.562372             0.343750  
racf                  0.241309             0.295000  
~racf                 0.758691             0.285385  
rc                    0.263804             0.403125  
~rc                   0.736196             0.260870  
mx                    0.102249             0.156250  
~mx                   0.897751             0.318116  
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Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: md  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.949639             0.732526  
~tf1                  0.155957             0.655539  
tf2                   0.928881             0.682584  
~tf2                  0.131588             0.758585  
scf1                  0.915523             0.721274  
~scf1                 0.181949             0.686648  
scf2                  0.919675             0.713885  
~scf2                 0.151625             0.616288  
rh                    0.546931             0.673333  
~rh                   0.453068             0.627500  
racf                  0.237365             0.657500  
~racf                 0.762635             0.650000  
rc                    0.166065             0.575000  
~rc                   0.833935             0.669565  
mx                    0.201263             0.696875  
~mx                   0.798736             0.641304  
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~md  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.846622             0.348928  
~tf1                  0.351014             0.788316  
tf2                   0.921622             0.361852  
~tf2                  0.191554             0.590010  
scf1                  0.844595             0.355518  
~scf1                 0.337838             0.681199  
scf2                  0.823311             0.341460  
~scf2                 0.310135             0.673514  
rh                    0.496622             0.326667  
~rh                   0.503378             0.372500  
racf                  0.231419             0.342500  
~racf                 0.768581             0.350000  
rc                    0.229730             0.425000  
~rc                   0.770270             0.330435  
mx                    0.163851             0.303125  
~mx                   0.836149             0.358696   
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Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: nmd  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.966029             0.562239  
~tf1                  0.146411             0.464340  
tf2                   0.966029             0.535615  
~tf2                  0.139234             0.605619  
scf1                  0.936603             0.556741  
~scf1                 0.168660             0.480245  
scf2                  0.949282             0.555976  
~scf2                 0.157177             0.482025  
rh                    0.480861             0.446667  
~rh                   0.519139             0.542500  
racf                  0.287081             0.600000  
~racf                 0.712919             0.458462  
rc                    0.183014             0.478125  
~rc                   0.816986             0.494928  
mx                    0.226077             0.590625  
~mx                   0.773923             0.468841  
 
 
  
  
Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
  
Outcome variable: ~nmd  
  
Conditions tested:  
                      Consistency          Coverage  
tf1                   0.836574             0.503202  
~tf1                  0.272222             0.892261  
tf2                   0.912269             0.522748  
~tf2                  0.189583             0.852237  
scf1                  0.823380             0.505830  
~scf1                 0.278472             0.819482  
scf2                  0.836574             0.506375  
~scf2                 0.266435             0.844461  
rh                    0.576389             0.553333  
~rh                   0.423611             0.457500  
racf                  0.185185             0.400000  
~racf                 0.814815             0.541538  
rc                    0.193287             0.521875  
~rc                   0.806713             0.505072  
mx                    0.151620             0.409375  
~mx                   0.848380             0.531159 
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Appendix 17 Truth tables factors and views 
Table 7-38 Truth table views of reporting moderate error 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No mr raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
1 0 0 1 2   0.986622 0.980392 0.980392 41;83  
0 0 1 1 2   0.984064 0.974359 0.974359 21;27;  
1 1 0 1 5   0.957688 0.944520 0.94452 22; 32;43;48; 52;  
1 0 0 0 1   0.955157 0.907407 0.907407  63 
0 0 1 0 1   0.942857 0.833333 0.833333  80 
1 0 1 1 4   0.928161 0.893843 0.893843 40;64; 17;85 
0 1 0 1 4   0.909292 0.859589 0.859589 42;53; 66;62 
0 1 1 1 5   0.896594 0.840225 0.840226 77; 44 28;36;79 
1 1 0 0 3   0.871647 0.804094 0.804094 78;10 65 
0 0 0 0 4   0.867647 0.790698 0.790698 49;75 60;72 
1 1 1 0 4   0.858364 0.803056 0.803056 25;82;7 58 
1 0 1 0 2   0.853333 0.696552 0.696552 50 45 
1 1 1 1 41   0.851820 0.828782 0.878698 1; 2; 4; 6; 8; 11;12; 13;15; 19; 
20;24; 26;29; 30;34;35; 
37;38;47;55; 59; 61; 67;68;69;70; 
73;74;76;84 
3;9;18;31;46;51; 54;56;57;71  
0 1 1 0 1   0.845960 0.741525 0.741525 33  
0 1 0 0 6   0.843823 0.772109 0.772109 14;16; 81 5; 23; 39 
0 0 0 1 0             
  
377 
 
Table 7-39 Truth table views of reporting near miss error 
tf1 tf2 
scf
1 
scf
2 
No nmr raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
0 0 1 1 2   0.944223 0.915663 0.915663 21;27  
0 0 1 0 1   0.920000 0.844444 0.844444 80  
1 0 1 1 4   0.908046 0.853211 0.853211 40;64 17;85 
1 0 0 1 2   0.869565 0.719424 0.719424 83 41 
1 1 0 1 5   0.842105 0.710775 0.738703 22;32;43;52 48 
1 1 1 0 4   0.786325 0.695122 0.695122 7;25;82 58 
1 0 1 0 2   0.770000 0.594118 0.594118 50 45 
0 1 0 1 4   0.761062 0.406593 0.406593  42;53;62;66 
1 0 0 0 1   0.757847 0.475728 0.475728  63 
1 1 1 1 41   0.732793 0.654781 0.764706 1;2;6;8;9;11;12;15;19;20;24;
29;34;35;38;47;59;68;70;73;
74;76 
3;4;13;18;26;30 
31;37;46;51;54; 55; 
56;57;61;67;69;71 84; 
0 1 1 1 5   0.732360 0.502262 0.502262  28;36;44;79;77 
0 1 1 0 1   0.717172 0.608392 0.608392 33  
1 1 0 0 3   0.708812 0.451263 0.451263 10 65;78 
0 0 0 0 4   0.691176 0.447368 0.447368 75 49;60;72 
0 1 0 0 6   0.550117 0.282528 0.287879 14 5; 16;23;39;81 
0 0 0 1 0           
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Table 7-40 Truth table views of reporting severe error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 
scf
1 
scf
2 
No ~sr 
 
raw consist. 
 
PRI consist. 
 
Product 
 
0 0 1 0 1   0.714286 0.666667 0.666667 
1 0 1 0 2   0.663333 0.560870 0.560870 
1 0 0 0 1   0.560538 0.359477 0.359477 
0 0 0 0 4   0.500000 0.358491 0.358491 
0 1 1 0 1   0.434343 0.343108 0.343109 
0 0 1 1 2   0.394422 0.327434 0.327434 
0 1 0 0 6   0.351981 0.214689 0.214689 
1 0 0 1 2   0.331104 0.196787 0.196787 
1 1 0 0 3   0.281609 0.131944 0.131944 
0 1 0 1 4   0.276549 0.234192 0.234192 
1 0 1 1 4   0.248563 0.190402 0.190402 
0 1 1 1 5   0.242092 0.218319 0.218319 
1 1 1 0 4   0.240537 0.169559 0.169559 
1 1 0 1 5   0.152735 0.106638 0.106638 
1 1 1 1 41   0.117475 0.095634 0.097180 
0 0 0 1 0         
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Table 7-41 Truth table views of reporting moderate error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 
scf
1 
scf
2 
No ~mr raw consist. PRI consist. Product 
0 0 1 0 1   0.714286 0.166667 0.166667 
1 0 1 0 2   0.663333 0.303448 0.303448 
1 0 0 0 1   0.560538 0.092593 0.092593 
0 1 1 0 1   0.558081 0.258475 0.258475 
0 0 0 0 4   0.500000 0.209302 0.209302 
1 1 0 0 3   0.473180 0.195906 0.195906 
0 1 0 0 6   0.470862 0.227891 0.227891 
0 1 1 1 5   0.456204 0.159774 0.159774 
0 1 0 1 4   0.444690 0.140411 0.140411 
1 1 1 0 4   0.422466 0.196944 0.196944 
1 0 1 1 4   0.395115 0.106157 0.106157 
0 0 1 1 2   0.394422 0.025641 0.025641 
1 0 0 1 2   0.331104 0.019608 0.019608 
1 1 0 1 5   0.279670 0.055480 0.055480 
1 1 1 1 41   0.233569 0.114411 0.121302 
0 0 0 1 0         
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Table 7-42 Truth table views of reporting near miss error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No ~nmr 
 
raw consist. 
 
 
PRI consist. 
 
Product 
0 1 0 1 4   0.836283 0.593407 0.593407 
0 1 0 0 6   0.811189 0.698885 0.712121 
1 0 0 0 1   0.780269 0.524272 0.524272 
1 1 0 0 3   0.760536 0.548736 0.548736 
0 0 0 0 4   0.750000 0.552632 0.552632 
0 1 1 1 5   0.729927 0.497738 0.497738 
1 0 0 1 2   0.665552 0.280576 0.280576 
1 0 1 0 2   0.663333 0.405882 0.405882 
1 1 0 1 5   0.591331 0.251418 0.261297 
0 0 1 0 1   0.565714 0.155556 0.155556 
0 1 1 0 1   0.560606 0.391608 0.391608 
1 1 1 0 4   0.512821 0.304878 0.304878 
1 0 1 1 4   0.465517 0.146789 0.146789 
0 0 1 1 2   0.394422 0.084337 0.084337 
1 1 1 1 41   0.381922 0.201471 0.235294 
0 0 0 1 0         
 
 
 
  
381 
Table 7-43 Truth table views of acknowledging severe error 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No sd raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
1 1 0 1 5   0.854489 0.815445 0.815445 22;32;43;48;52  
1 1 1 0 4   0.843712 0.755725 0.755725 7;82 25;58 
1 0 1 1 4   0.836207 0.796792 0.796791 17;40;85 64 
0 1 1 1 5   0.795621 0.658537 0.658537 44;77 28;36;79 
1 1 1 1 41   0.791444 0.747705 0.836759 2;3;6;8;11;12;15;18;19;26;29;30;37;3
8;47;57;59;61;67;68;69;71;73;74;76;8
4 
1;4;9;13;20;24;31;34;35;46;51;5
4;55;56;70 
0 1 1 0 1   0.777778 0.582938 0.582938  33 
1 1 0 0 3   0.766284 0.648415 0.648415 10;65 78 
0 0 1 1 2   0.764940 0.682796 0.682796 21;27  
1 0 0 1 2   0.73913 0.659389 0.659389 41;83  
0 1 0 1 4   0.674779 0.505051 0.505051 66 42;53;62 
0 0 1 0 1   0.628571 0.277778 0.277778  80 
1 0 0 0 1   0.623318 0.368421 0.368421  63 
1 0 1 0 2   0.620000 0.400000 0.400000 50 45 
0 1 0 0 6   0.564103 0.404459 0.404459 5;14 16;23;39;81 
0 0 0 0 4   0.470588 0.320755 0.320755 49 60;72;75 
0 0 0 1 0             
 
 
 
  
382 
Table 7-44 Truth table views of acknowledging moderate error 
 
 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No md raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
0 0 1 1 2   0.984064 0.962264 0.962264 21;27  
0 0 1 0 1   0.942857 0.000000 0.000000  80 
1 0 1 1 4   0.922414 0.856383 0.856383 40;85 17;64 
1 1 0 1 5   0.892673 0.793651 0.826446 22;32;43;52 48 
0 1 1 1 5   0.874696 0.628159 0.628159 44 28;36;77;79 
1 0 1 0 2   0.853333 0.536842 0.536842 50 45 
1 1 1 0 4   0.851038 0.725225 0.725225 7;82 25;58 
1 0 0 1 2   0.839465 0.515152 0.515152 83 41 
0 1 0 1 4   0.827434 0.385827 0.385827  42;53;62;66 
0 1 1 0 1   0.792929 0.374046 0.374046  33 
1 1 0 0 3   0.787356 0.576336 0.576336 10;65 78 
1 0 0 0 1   0.784753 0.000000 0.000000  63 
1 1 1 1 41   0.768846 0.684854 0.824462 2;6;8;11;12;13;15;19;26;29;30;37;3
8;47;59;67;68;69;73;74;76;84 
1;3;4;9;18;20;24;31;34;35;46;51;54
;55;56;57;61;70;71 
0 0 0 0 4   0.661765 0.000000 0.000000  49;60;72;75 
0 1 0 0 6   0.585082 0.222707 0.222707 14 5;16;23;39;81 
0 0 0 1 0             
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Table 7-45 Truth table views of acknowledging near miss error 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No nmd raw consist. PRI consist. Product 
1 0 1 1 4   0.794540 0.406639 0.443439 
0 0 1 1 2   0.780876 0.481132 0.481132 
0 0 1 0 1   0.771429 0.000000 0.000000 
1 1 1 0 4   0.724054 0.433584 0.433584 
1 0 0 1 2   0.705686 0.366907 0.366907 
1 1 0 1 5   0.690403 0.453552 0.457721 
0 1 1 1 5   0.684915 0.274510 0.274510 
1 0 1 0 2   0.683333 0.000000 0.000000 
0 1 1 0 1   0.641414 0.256544 0.256544 
1 1 1 1 41   0.638089 0.464386 0.608972 
0 1 0 1 4   0.628319 0.225806 0.225806 
1 1 0 0 3   0.593870 0.320513 0.320513 
1 0 0 0 1   0.538117 0.000000 0.000000 
0 0 0 0 4   0.441176 0.000000 0.000000 
0 1 0 0 6   0.398601 0.165049 0.165049 
0 0 0 1 0         
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Table 7-46 Truth table views of acknowledging severe error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No ~sd raw consist. PRI consist. Product 
0 0 1 0 1   0.857143 0.722222 0.722222 
1 0 0 0 1   0.780269 0.631579 0.631579 
0 0 0 0 4   0.750000 0.679245 0.679245 
1 0 1 0 2   0.746667 0.600000 0.600000 
0 1 0 0 6   0.703963 0.595541 0.595541 
0 1 1 0 1   0.689394 0.417062 0.417062 
0 1 0 1 4   0.668142 0.494950 0.494950 
0 1 1 1 5   0.605839 0.341463 0.341463 
1 1 0 0 3   0.568965 0.351585 0.351585 
1 1 1 0 4   0.516484 0.244275 0.244275 
1 0 0 1 2   0.494983 0.340611 0.340611 
0 0 1 1 2   0.494024 0.317204 0.317204 
1 0 1 1 4   0.357759 0.203209 0.203209 
1 1 0 1 5   0.357069 0.184555 0.184555 
1 1 1 1 41   0.293945 0.145868 0.163241 
0 0 0 1 0         
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Table 7-47 Truth table views of acknowledging moderate error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No ~md raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
0 0 0 0 4   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 49;60;72;75  
0 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 80  
1 0 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 63  
0 1 0 1 4   0.891593 0.614173 0.614173 42;53;62;66  
0 1 0 0 6   0.881119 0.777293 0.777293 5;16;23;39;81 14 
0 1 1 0 1   0.876263 0.625954 0.625954 33  
1 0 1 0 2   0.830000 0.463158 0.463158 45 50 
1 0 0 1 2   0.829431 0.484848 0.484848 41 83 
0 1 1 1 5   0.788321 0.371842 0.371841 48 22;32;43;52 
1 1 0 0 3   0.710728 0.423664 0.423664 78 10;65 
1 1 1 0 4   0.606838 0.274775 0.274775 25;58 7;82 
0 0 1 1 2   0.593625 0.037736 0.037736  21;27 
1 1 0 1 5   0.566564 0.166667 0.173554 28;36;77;79 44 
1 0 1 1 4   0.537356 0.143617 0.143617 17;64 40;85 
1 1 1 1 41   0.373469 0.145814 0.175538 1;3;4;9;18;20;24;31;34;35;46;51;54;5
5;56;57;61;70;71 
2;6;8;11;12;13;15;19;26;29;30;37
;38;47;59;67;68;69;73;74;76;84 
0 0 0 1 0           
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Table 7-48 Truth table views of acknowledging near miss error (negated) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 No ~nmd raw consist. PRI consist. Product  Cases consistent with row Cases inconsistent with row 
1 0 1 0 2   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 45;50  
0 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 80  
1 0 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 63  
0 0 0 0 4   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 49;60;72;75  
0 1 0 1 4   0.891593 0.774193 0.774194 42;53;62;66  
0 1 0 0 6   0.881119 0.834951 0.834951 5;16;23;39;81 14 
0 1 1 1 5   0.880779 0.725490 0.72549 28;36;44;77;79  
0 1 1 0 1   0.876263 0.743455 0.743456 33  
1 0 1 1 4   0.830460 0.510373 0.556561 17;40;64;85  
1 0 0 1 2   0.829431 0.633093 0.633094 41 83 
1 1 0 0 3   0.808429 0.679487 0.679487 65;78 10 
0 0 1 1 2   0.796813 0.518868 0.518868 27 21 
1 1 1 0 4   0.788767 0.566416 0.566416 7;25;58 82 
1 1 0 1 5   0.737874 0.537341 0.542279 22;43;48 32;52 
1 1 1 1 41   0.525789 0.298187 0.391028 1;2;3;4;9;13;18;20;24;26;31;35;37;46;51;
54;55;56;57;61;68;69;70;71;73;84 
6;8;11;12;15;19;29;30;34;38;47; 
59;67;74;76 
0 0 0 1 0             
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Appendix 18 Additional Results tables 
(factors and views) 
Table 7-49 Solution terms for view that moderate error Always reported 
Moderate error 
Always reported 
tf1*~scf1*scf2    +       ~tf1*~tf2*scf1*scf2      
Consistency 0.960803 0.984064 
Raw coverage 0.149665     0.036783     
Unique coverage 0.131794     0.018913     
Cases consistent 22;32;41;43;48;52;83 21;27 
Cases inconsistent Nil Nil  
Consistency cut-off 0.957688  
Solution consistency 0.965047  
Solution coverage 0.168578  
 
Table 7-50 Solution terms for view that moderate error Always acknowledged (negated)(Analysis X) 
Moderate error  
Always acknowledged 
(negated) 
~tf2*~scf1*~scf2     +        ~tf1*~tf2*~scf2       
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.086149     0.086149     
Unique coverage 0.017230     0.017230     
Cases consistent 49;60;63;72;75; 49;60;63;72;80 
Cases inconsistent   
Consistency cut-off 1.000000  
Solution consistency 1.000000  
Solution coverage 0.103378  
 
Table 7-51 Solution terms for view that moderate error Always acknowledged (negated) (Analysis Y) 
Moderate error  
Always acknowledged 
(negated) 
~tf2*~scf1*~scf2     +        ~tf1*~tf2*~scf2     + ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2      
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 0.891593 
Raw coverage 0.086149     0.086149     0.136149     
Unique coverage 0.017230     0.017230     0.102703     
Cases consistent 49;60;63;72;75; 49;60;63;72;80 42;53;62;66 
Cases inconsistent Nil Nil Nil 
Consistency cut-off 0.891593   
Solution consistency 0.925645   
Solution coverage 0.206081   
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Table 7-52 Solution terms for view near miss error Always acknowledged (negated) (Analysis X) 
Near miss error 
Always acknowledged (negated) 
~tf2*~scf2      
Consistency 1.000000 
Raw coverage 0.094444     
Unique coverage 0.094444     
Cases consistent 45;549;0;60;72;75;80 
Cases inconsistent Nil 
Consistency cut-off 1.000000 
Solution consistency 1.000000 
Solution coverage 0.094444     
 
 
Table 7-53 Solution terms for view near miss error Always acknowledged (negated) (Analysis Y) 
Near miss error 
Always acknowledged (negated) 
~tf2*~scf2     + ~tf1*tf2*~scf1*scf2      
Consistency 1.000000 0.891593 
Raw coverage 0.094444     0.093287     
Unique coverage 0.094444     0.070370     
Cases consistent 45;549;0;60;72;75;80 42;53;62;66 
Cases inconsistent Nil Nil 
Consistency cut-off 0.891593  
Solution consistency 0.935611  
Solution coverage 0.164815  
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Appendix 19 Truth tables factors and views (demographics) 
 
 
Table 7-54 Truth table views of reporting severe error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No sr raw 
consist. 
PRI consist. Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1  1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 53  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 44  
1 0 0 1 0 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 17  
1 1 0 1 1 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 48  
1 1 1 0 1 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 58  
1 1 1 1 1 1 5  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 6;12;18;26;30 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2  0 0.941176 0.894737 0.894737 75 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6  0 0.938519 0.938519 0.938519 15;29;34;67;74;76 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3  0 0.885312 0.859951 0.859951 10;65;78  
1 1 1 0 0 0 3 0  0.883408 0.869783 0.869783 7;25;82  
1 1 1 1 0 1 7  0 0.874687 0.874687 0.874687 1;2;8;11;55;71 54 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4  0 0.872892 0.864078 0.864078 22;32;43;52  
1 1 1 1 0 0 23  0 0.867144 0.861812 0.884638 3;4;13;19;20;24;35;37;38;46;47;57;59;61;68;69;70;73;84 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3  0 0.851107 0.843220 0.843220 10;65;78 
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0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.848000 0.800000 0.800000 33 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5  0 0.844193 0.821429 0.821429 5;14;16;81 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3  0 0.734043 0.715100 0.715100 42;66 62 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4  0 0.731481 0.720706 0.720706 28;36;77 79 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1  0 0.723684 0.543478 0.543478  39 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 0.718391 0.671141 0.671141 41  
0 0 1 1 0 0 2  0 0.631841 0.631841 0.631841 21;27  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0.630872 0.471154 0.471154  63 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.608040 0.493507 0.493507 50  
0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0.500000 0.500000 0.500000 49 72 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.495050 0.328947 0.328947  45 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.200000 0.200000 0.200000  80 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
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0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
 
 
 
 
  
392 
 
 
Table 7-55 Truth table views of reporting moderate error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No mr raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases 
inconsistent 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1  1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 53  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 44  
1 0 0 1 0 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
1 1 0 1 1 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 48  
0 0 1 1 0 0 2  0 0.980099 0.969466 0.969466 21;27  
1 0 1 1 0 0 3  0 0.979879 0.971989 0.971989 40;64 85 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 0.977012 0.961538 0.961538 41  
0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.968000 0.950000 0.950000 33  
1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.959799 0.904762 0.904762 50  
1 1 1 1 1 0 6  0 0.957340 0.956522 0.956522 15;29;34;67;74;76  
1 1 0 1 0 0 4  0 0.946822 0.924214 0.924214 22;32;43;52  
0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0.941176 0.894737 0.894737 49 72 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1  0 0.940000 0.890909 0.890909  17 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0.932886 0.830508 0.830508  63 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1  0 0.921053 0.806452 0.806452  39 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.920000 0.714286 0.714286  80 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3  0 0.908819 0.873967 0.873967 7;25;82  
0 1 0 1 0 0 3  0 0.890957 0.810185 0.810185 42; 62;66 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5  0 0.87108 0.851703 0.936123 6;12;26;30 18 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4  0 0.868827 0.76257 0.76257 77 28;36;79 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3  0 0.865191 0.788644 0.788644 10;78 65; 
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1 1 1 1 0 0 23  0 0.836825 0.804491 0.859866 4;13;19;20;24;35;37;38;47;59;61;68;69;70;73;84 3;9;31;46;51;56;5
7 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5  0 0.827196 0.768061 0.768061 14;16;81 5;23 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7  0 0.800752 0.775424 0.828054 1;2;8;11;55 54;71 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2  0 0.794118 0.708333 0.708333 75 60 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.643564 0.409836 0.409836  45 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1  0 0.588235 0.000000 0.000000  58 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
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0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
395 
 
Table 7-56 Truth table views of reporting near miss severe error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No nmr raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.980099 0.969466 0.969466 21;27  
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.971831 0.955128 0.955128 40;64 85 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.968000 0.927273 0.927273 80  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.940000 0.890909 0.890909  17 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.921053 0.806452 0.806452  53 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.884422 0.767677 0.767677 50  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.856322 0.747475 0.747475  44 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.845655 0.717340 0.717340 22;32;43;52  
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.840652 0.812408 0.850077 15;29;34;74;76 67 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0.833333 0.000000 0.000000  41 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.820628 0.744137 0.744136 7;25;82  
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   0.735294 0.000000 0.000000  49;72 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.728723 0.324504 0.324503  42;62;66 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.726020 0.636297 0.751837 9;19;20;24;35;38;47;59;68;
70;73 
3;4;13;31;37;46;51;56;57;61;69;8
4 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.713033 0.662242 0.744610 1;2;8;11 54;55;71 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0.704698 0.000000 0.000000  63 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.699074 0.431487 0.431487  28;36;77;79 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.694165 0.396825 0.396825 10 65;78 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.653310 0.501253 0.716846 6;12 18;26;30 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   0.647059 0.586207 0.586207 75 60 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   0.608000 0.608000 0.608000 33  
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1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.600000 0.000000 0.000000  48 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.597734 0.264249 0.271277 14 5;16;23;81 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   0.588235 0.000000 0.000000  58 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   0.544554 0.352113 0.352113  45 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   0.328947 0.328947 0.328947  39 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
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1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
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Table 7-57 Truth table views of reporting severe error (negated) (workplace setting and work role) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx number ~sr raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.800000 0.800000 0.800000 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   0.752475 0.671053 0.671053 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0.671141 0.528846 0.528846 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   0.671053 0.456522 0.456522 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.618090 0.506494 0.506493 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   0.500000 0.500000 0.500000 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   0.500000 0.105263 0.105263 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0.425287 0.328859 0.328859 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   0.392000 0.200000 0.200000 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.368159 0.368159 0.368159 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.332447 0.284900 0.284900 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.307099 0.279294 0.279294 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.295775 0.140049 0.140049 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.283286 0.178571 0.178571 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.221226 0.130217 0.130217 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.199195 0.156780 0.156780 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.191959 0.135922 0.135922 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.146637 0.112385 0.115362 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.125313 0.125313 0.125313 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.061481 0.061481 0.061481 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0         
0 0 0 0 1 1 0         
0 0 0 1 0 0 0         
0 0 0 1 0 1 0         
0 0 0 1 1 0 0         
0 0 0 1 1 1 0         
0 0 1 0 0 1 0         
0 0 1 0 1 0 0         
0 0 1 0 1 1 0         
0 0 1 1 0 1 0         
0 0 1 1 1 0 0         
0 0 1 1 1 1 0         
0 1 0 0 0 1 0         
0 1 0 0 1 1 0         
0 1 0 1 0 1 0         
0 1 0 1 1 1 0         
0 1 1 0 0 0 0         
0 1 1 0 0 1 0         
0 1 1 0 1 1 0         
0 1 1 1 0 1 0         
0 1 1 1 1 1 0         
1 0 0 0 0 1 0         
1 0 0 0 1 0 0         
  
400 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0         
1 0 0 1 1 0 0         
1 0 0 1 1 1 0         
1 0 1 0 0 1 0         
1 0 1 0 1 1 0         
1 0 1 1 1 0 0         
1 0 1 1 1 1 0         
1 1 0 0 0 1 0         
1 1 0 0 1 0 0         
1 1 0 0 1 1 0         
1 1 0 1 0 1 0         
1 1 0 1 1 0 0         
1 1 1 0 0 1 0         
1 1 1 0 1 0 0         
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Table 7-58 Truth table views of reporting moderate error (negated) workplace setting and work role) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx number ~mr raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.800000 0.285714 0.285714 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   0.752475 0.590164 0.590164 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0.671141 0.169491 0.169491 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   0.671053 0.193548 0.193548 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.618090 0.095238 0.095238 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.578704 0.237430 0.23743 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.534574 0.189815 0.189815 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.510000 0.109091 0.109091 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   0.500000 0.105263 0.105263 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   0.500000 0.291667 0.291667 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.496982 0.211356 0.211356 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.427762 0.231939 0.231939 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0.425287 0.038462 0.038462 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   0.392000 0.050000 0.050000 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.368159 0.030534 0.030534 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.367713 0.126033 0.126033 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.351492 0.075786 0.075786 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.301811 0.028011 0.028011 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.274807 0.13111 0.140134 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.255639 0.161017 0.171946 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.181185 0.058116 0.063877 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.061481 0.043478 0.043478 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0         
0 0 0 0 1 1 0         
0 0 0 1 0 0 0         
0 0 0 1 0 1 0         
0 0 0 1 1 0 0         
0 0 0 1 1 1 0         
0 0 1 0 0 1 0         
0 0 1 0 1 0 0         
0 0 1 0 1 1 0         
0 0 1 1 0 1 0         
0 0 1 1 1 0 0         
0 0 1 1 1 1 0         
0 1 0 0 0 1 0         
0 1 0 0 1 1 0         
0 1 0 1 0 1 0         
0 1 0 1 1 1 0         
0 1 1 0 0 0 0         
0 1 1 0 0 1 0         
0 1 1 0 1 1 0         
0 1 1 1 0 1 0         
0 1 1 1 1 1 0         
1 0 0 0 0 1 0         
1 0 0 0 1 0 0         
1 0 0 0 1 1 0         
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1 0 0 1 1 0 0         
1 0 0 1 1 1 0         
1 0 1 0 0 1 0         
1 0 1 0 1 1 0         
1 0 1 1 1 0 0         
1 0 1 1 1 1 0         
1 1 0 0 0 1 0         
1 1 0 0 1 0 0         
1 1 0 0 1 1 0         
1 1 0 1 0 1 0         
1 1 0 1 1 0 0         
1 1 1 0 0 1 0         
1 1 1 0 1 0 0         
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Table 7-59 Truth table views of reporting near miss error (negated) (workplace setting and work role) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No ~nmr raw consist. PRI consist. Product Cases consistent Cases inconsistent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 49;72  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 63  
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 41  
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 58  
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.869681 0.675497 0.675497 42;62;66  
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.841360 0.709845 0.728723 5;16;23;81 14 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.798793 0.603175 0.603175 65;78 10 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.771605 0.568513 0.568513 28;36;77;79  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   0.752475 0.647887 0.647887 45  
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.733333 0.333333 1.000000 48  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   0.671053 0.671053 0.671053 39  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.671053 0.193548 0.193548 53  
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.618090 0.232323 0.232323  50 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.608301 0.28266 0.28266  22;32;43;52 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.592000 0.072727 0.072727  80 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.574713 0.252525 0.252525 44  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.510000 0.109091 0.109091 17  
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   0.500000 0.413793 0.413793 60 75 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.478326 0.255864 0.255864  7;25;82 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.442509 0.197995 0.283154 18;26;30 6;12 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.404906 0.210026 0.248163 3;4;13;31;37;46;51;56;57;61;69;84 9;19;20;24;35;38;47;59;68;70;73 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.400402 0.044872 0.044872 85 40;64 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   0.392000 0.392000 0.392000  33 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.368159 0.030534 0.030534  21;27 
  
405 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.343358 0.227139 0.25539 54;55;71 1;2;8;11 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.272271 0.143279 0.149923 67 15;29;34;74;76 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000   83 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
  
406 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
407 
Table 7-60 Truth table views of disclosure severe error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No sd raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 17  
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 48  
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.993031 0.992439 0.992439 6;12;18;26;30  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.954023 0.864407 0.864407 44  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.921053 0.000000 0.000000  53 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.890882 0.844350 0.844350 7;82 25 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.889336 0.863184 0.863184 40;85 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   0.882353 0.000000 0.000000  
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.822309 0.784591 0.784591 22;32;43;52  
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.808030 0.782051 0.782051 15;29;67;74;76 34 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   0.800000 0.000000 0.000000  33 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.763782 0.701185 0.816484 3;19;37;38;47;57;59;61;68;69;73;84 4;9;13;20;24;31;35;46;51;56;70 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.756219 0.721591 0.721591 21;27  
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.755639 0.718615 0.846939 2;8;11;71 1;54;55 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.754527 0.648415 0.648415 10;65 78 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.753086 0.630485 0.630485 77 28;36;79 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.733668 0.589147 0.589147 50  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   0.723684 0.000000 0.000000  39 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0.718391 0.671141 0.671141 41  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0.630872 0.471154 0.471154  63 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.625000 0.515464 0.515464 66 42;62 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.560000 0.312500 0.312500  80 
  
408 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.529745 0.433447 0.433447 5;14 16;23;81 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   0.500000 0.500000 0.500000 49 72 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   0.441177 0.000000 0.000000  60;75 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   0.39604 0.000000 0.000000  45 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0              
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
  
409 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
410 
 
 
Table 7-61 Truth table views of disclosure moderate error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No md raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1  1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
0 0 1 1 0 0 2  0 0.980099 0.962264 0.962264 21;27  
1 0 1 1 0 0 3  0 0.971831 0.951219 0.951219 40;85 64 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.959799 0.864407 0.864407 50  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1  0 0.954023 0.864407 0.864407 44  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1  0 0.940000 0.890909 0.890909  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1  0 0.921053 0.000000 0.000000  53 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.920000 0.000000 0.000000  80 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4  0 0.909209 0.833729 0.833729 22;32;43;52  
1 1 1 0 0 0 3  0 0.899851 0.827764 0.827763 7;82 25 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5  0 0.871080 0.843882 0.932401 6;12;26;30 18 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4  0 0.853395 0.564220 0.564220  28;36;77;79 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 0.833333 0.000000 0.000000  41 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6  0 0.826851 0.799127 0.799127 15;29;67;74;76 34 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3  0 0.808511 0.404959 0.404959  42;62;66 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0.805369 0.000000 0.000000  63 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.800000 0.000000 0.000000  33 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3  0 0.776660 0.576336 0.576336 10;65 78 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23  0 0.759096 0.648714 0.822211 13;19;37;38;47;59;68;69;73;84 3;4;9;20;24;31;35;46;51;56;57;61;70 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0.735294 0.000000 0.000000  49;72 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1  0 0.723684 0.000000 0.000000  39 
  
411 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7  0 0.681704 0.578773 0.770419 2;8;11 1;54;55;71 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.643564 0.000000 0.000000  45 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0.600000 0.000000 0.000000  48 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2  0 0.588235 0.000000 0.000000  60;75 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1  0 0.588235 0.000000 0.000000  58 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5  0 0.555241 0.245192 0.245192 14 5;16;23;81 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
  
412 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
 
 
 
 
 
  
413 
 
Table 7-62 Truth table views of disclosure near miss error (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No nmd raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1  1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 83  
1 0 1 1 0 1 1  0 0.940000 0.890909 0.890909  17 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6  0 0.934755 0.920245 0.920245 15;29;34;67;74;
76 
 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1  0 0.862069 0.000000 0.000000  44 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.840000 0.000000 0.000000  80 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3  0 0.832998 0.371212 0.437500  40;64;85 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2  0 0.825871 0.593023 0.593023 21 27 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0.804020 0.000000 0.000000  50 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1  0 0.789474 0.000000 0.000000  53 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3  0 0.781764 0.542320 0.542320 82 7;25 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 0.747126 0.000000 0.000000  41 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5  0 0.722997 0.653595 0.781250 6;12;30 18;26 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4  0 0.687419 0.453515 0.453515 2;52 22;43 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4  0 0.637346 0.294294 0.294294  28;36;77;79 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0.604027 0.000000 0.000000  63 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3  0 0.595745 0.243781 0.243781  42;62;66 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7  0 0.593985 0.434555 0.633588 8;11 1;2;54;55;71 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3  0 0.593561 0.331126 0.331126 10 65;78 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0.588235 0.000000 0.000000  49;72 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23  0 0.5691840 0.300045 0.430039 19;38;47;59 3;4;9;13;20;24;31;35;37;46;51;56;57;61;68;69;70;73
;84 
  
414 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.480000 0.000000 0.000000  33 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  0 0.445545 0.000000 0.000000  45 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5  0 0.441926 0.205645 0.205645 14 5;16;23;81 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0.400000 0.000000 0.000000  48 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1  0 0.294118 0.000000 0.000000  58 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2  0 0.294118 0.000000 0.000000  60;75 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1  0 0.197368 0.000000 0.000000  39 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
  
415 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
416 
Table 7-63 Truth table views of disclosure severe error (negated) (workplace setting and work role) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx number ~sd raw consist. PRI consist. Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 60;75  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 39  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 53  
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 33  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 45  
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 58  
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.8000000 0.687500 0.687500 80  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.706897 0.135593 0.135593  44 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   0.671141 0.528846 0.528846 63  
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.640227 0.566553 0.566553 16;23;81 5;14 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.618090 0.410853 0.410853  50 
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.601064 0.484536 0.484536 42;62 66 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.578704 0.369515 0.369515 28;36;79 77 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.547284 0.351585 0.351585 78 10;65 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   0.500000 0.500000 0.500000 72 49 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0.425287 0.328859 0.328859  41 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.408072 0.155650 0.15565 25 7;82 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.368159 0.278409 0.278409  21;27 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.352789 0.215409 0.215409  22;32;43;52 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.334068 0.157601 0.183516 4;9;13;20;24;31;35;46;51;56;70 3;19;37;38;47;57;59;61;68;69;73;84 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.311167 0.217949 0.217949 34 15;29;67;74;76 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.301811 0.136816 0.136816 64 40;85 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.244361 0.12987 0.153061 1;54;55 2;8;11;71 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.085366 0.007561 0.007561  6;12;18;26;30 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  83 
  
417 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  17 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  48 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
  
418 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
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Table 7-64 Truth table views of disclosure moderate error (negated) (workplace setting and work role) 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx number ~md raw consist. PRI consist. Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 49;72  
0 0 0 0 1 0 2   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 60;75  
0 0 1 0 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 80  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 39  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 53  
0 1 1 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 33  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 63  
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 41  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 45  
1 1 1 0 1 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 58  
0 1 0 1 0 0 3   0.869681 0.595041 0.595041 42;62;66  
0 1 0 0 0 0 5   0.855524 0.754808 0.754808 5;16;23;81 14 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4   0.810185 0.43578 0.43578 28;36;77;79  
1 0 1 0 0 0 1   0.743719 0.135593 0.135593  50 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.733333 0.333333 1.000000 48  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1   0.706897 0.135593 0.135593  44 
1 1 0 0 0 0 3   0.696177 0.423664 0.423664 78 10;65 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0.544747 0.166271 0.166271  22;32;43;52 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3   0.518685 0.172237 0.172236 25 7;82 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1   0.510000 0.109091 0.109091 17  
0 0 1 1 0 0 2   0.492537 0.037736 0.037736  21;27 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0.450704 0.048781 0.048781 64 40;85 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23   0.410419 0.140273 0.177789 3;4;9;20;24;31;35;46;51;56;57;61;70 13;19;37;38;47;59;68;69;73;84 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7   0.374687 0.172471 0.229581 1;54;55;71 2;8;11 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6   0.311167 0.200873 0.200873 34 15;29;67;74;76 
  
420 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5   0.224739 0.061181 0.067599 18 6;12;26;30 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  83 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
  
421 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
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Table 7-65 Truth table views of disclosure near miss error (negated) (workplace setting and work role) 
 
tf1 tf2 scf1 scf2 racf mx No 
~nm
d 
raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
Product cases consistent cases inconsistent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1  1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 49;72  
0 0 0 0 1 0 2  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 60;75  
0 0 1 0 0 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 80  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 39  
0 1 0 1 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 53  
0 1 1 0 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 33  
0 1 1 1 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 44  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 63  
1 0 0 1 0 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 41  
1 0 1 0 0 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 50  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 45  
1 1 1 0 1 1 1  1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 58  
1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0.933333 0.888889 1.000000 48  
0 1 0 1 0 0 3  0 0.869681 0.756219 0.756219 42;62;66  
1 0 1 1 0 0 3  0 0.861167 0.477272 0.562500 40;64;85  
0 1 0 0 0 0 5  0 0.855524 0.794355 0.794355 5;16;23;81 14 
0 1 1 1 0 0 4  0 0.848765 0.705706 0.705706 28;36;77;79  
1 1 0 0 0 0 3  0 0.798793 0.668874 0.668874 65;78 10 
0 0 1 1 0 0 2  0 0.746269 0.406977 0.406977 27 21 
1 1 1 0 0 0 3  0 0.741405 0.45768 0.457680 7;25 82 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4  0 0.740597 0.546485 0.546485 22;43 2;52 
1 1 1 1 0 0 23  0 0.629272 0.397671 0.569961 3;4;9;13;20;24;31;35;37;46;51;56;57;61
;68;69;70;73;84 
19;38;47;59 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1  0 0.510000 0.109091 0.109091 17  
  
423 
1 1 1 1 0 1 7  0 0.462406 0.251309 0.366412 1;2;54;55;71 8;11 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5  0 0.346690 0.183007 0.218750 18;26 6;12;30 
1 1 1 1 1 0 6  0 0.247177 0.079755 0.079755  15;29;34;67;74;76 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1  0 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  83 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0             
0 0 0 0 1 1 0             
0 0 0 1 0 0 0             
0 0 0 1 0 1 0             
0 0 0 1 1 0 0             
0 0 0 1 1 1 0             
0 0 1 0 0 1 0             
0 0 1 0 1 0 0             
0 0 1 0 1 1 0             
0 0 1 1 0 1 0             
0 0 1 1 1 0 0             
0 0 1 1 1 1 0             
0 1 0 0 0 1 0             
0 1 0 0 1 1 0             
0 1 0 1 0 1 0             
0 1 0 1 1 1 0             
0 1 1 0 0 0 0             
0 1 1 0 0 1 0             
0 1 1 0 1 1 0             
0 1 1 1 0 1 0             
0 1 1 1 1 1 0             
1 0 0 0 0 1 0             
1 0 0 0 1 0 0             
  
424 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
1 0 0 1 1 0 0             
1 0 0 1 1 1 0             
1 0 1 0 0 1 0             
1 0 1 0 1 1 0             
1 0 1 1 1 0 0             
1 0 1 1 1 1 0             
1 1 0 0 0 1 0             
1 1 0 0 1 0 0             
1 1 0 0 1 1 0             
1 1 0 1 0 1 0             
1 1 0 1 1 0 0             
1 1 1 0 0 1 0             
1 1 1 0 1 0 0             
 
  
425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
